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Abstract
This thesis examines the relationships between international and local NGOs in Indo­
nesia within the context of theories of global civil society and hegemony. It seeks to 
understand whether global civil society is primarily an arena of cooperation as sug­
gested by its proponents, or whether local NGOs are dominated by international NGOs 
as some literature suggests. My study looks at the everyday interactions of these two 
types of NGOs, including by studying the processes and procedures they engage in, as 
well as the tensions in their relationships. By seeking out the testimonies of local and 
international NGO workers I reveal patterns of domination and resistance which have 
not been explored in sufficient depth in the contemporary literature on NGOs.
I argue that even though international NGOs help local NGOs, they also dominate them. 
They assert their influence through controlling the supply of funds for local NGOs, 
through enforcing conditions of compliance on grant recipients, and through strongly 
shaping the discourse on development, in ways that contradict the egalitarian rhetoric of 
the development sector. Local NGOs also play an enabling role by engaging in practices 
which assist the domination of international NGOs. In this regard, my research finds the 
development sector in Indonesia bears strong resemblances to the classic model of he­
gemony proposed by Antonio Gramsci, in which unequal power relations occur in the 
context of the non-coerced consent of the ruled. However, in contrast to the classical 
theory of hegemony, I find Indonesian NGOs are highly critical of international NGOs 
and exercise targeted non-compliance towards them. International NGOs thus ultimately 
only exercise incomplete hegemony.
In making this analysis, I borrow from theories of the everyday politics of domination 
and resistance advanced by James Scott and Benedict Kerkvliet on the basis of their 
careful studies of peasants in different parts of Southeast Asia. These works on rural 
class relations provide a useful framework that allows me to show the “private tran­
script” of local NGOs’ resistance to the demands and directions of international NGOs. 
I conclude that Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is inadequate for explaining power rela­
tions between superordinate and subordinate groups, not only in rural villages, as dem­
onstrated by the studies of Scott and Kerkvliet, but also in the context of global civil 
society.
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Chapter One
Everyday Politics of NGO Relationships in Indonesia: 
Theoretical Considerations
Introduction
Non-govemmental organisations (NGOs) have become a major facet of social and po­
litical life in Indonesia over the last two decades. A boom in the number of NGOs in 
Indonesia occurred with the beginning of democracy in 1998. Almost all of these NGOs 
rely on larger international NGOs for funding and cooperate with them in varied ways. 
No extensive research has yet been conducted on these relationships, yet they are cru­
cial to the development of Indonesian civil society.
The main concern of this research is the relationship between international and local 
NGOs in Indonesia. I ask what is the nature of the relationships between these two 
types of NGOs? How much autonomy do local NGOs have in the relationships? How 
much do international NGOs dominate local NGOs? My study places the relationship 
between local and international NGOs in the context of theories on global civil society 
and hegemony. The existing literature often analyses NGOs in the context of global 
civil society theory, but less commonly in terms of hegemony. In particular, my re­
search aims to understand the power relations between international and local NGOs by 
studying the “everyday life” of these elements of global civil society in Indonesia. By 
this I mean the everyday interactions of these two types of NGOs, which include the 
processes and procedures they engage in as well as tensions in their relationships. In 
other words, adopting Kerkvlief s working definition of everyday politics, this study 
involves analysing “the debates, conflicts, decisions, and cooperation among individu­
als, groups, and organisations regarding the control, allocation, and use of resources and 
the values and ideas underlying their activities.”1
My thesis shows that international NGOs tend to dominate these relationships; they as­
sert their dominance by providing funding for local NGO activities and enforcing the
1 Kerkvliet, 2002: 11. See also Hilhorst, 2003: 4 and Leftwich, 1984: 64-65.
1
bureaucratic procedures that are supposed to guide their work. The ability of the inter­
national NGOs to dominate local NGOs through such arrangements is exacerbated by 
weak internal organisational management within local NGOs. However, my study re­
veals that although the domination of international NGOs is plainly apparent, local 
NGOs deeply resent their subordination to international NGOs and have the ability to 
‘exploit’ the international funding system for their own benefit. The way in which local 
NGOs express their resentment is through targeted non-compliance towards certain 
international NGO requirements. Albeit weak, this resistance shows that we cannot as­
sume international NGOs possess the normative consent of local NGOs in their domi­
nation of local NGOs. As consent is one of the main ingredients of hegemony, we must 
declare that the domination of the international NGOs in the relationships with local 
NGOs is not absolute.
It should be noted that this thesis is not necessarily meant to be an extended criticism of 
either international or local NGOs. However, it is rather an analysis of the conse­
quences, both intended and unintended, of the unequal power relations between them.
As my research explores relationships between local and international NGOs in Indo­
nesia within the context of theories about global civil society, the discussion in this 
chapter starts by reviewing the concepts of civil society, global civil society and he­
gemony. It then turns to survey the scholarly debates about the relationships between 
local and international NGOs in relation to hegemony. Following that, this chapter 
introduces an alternative framework for examining the debates about hegemony. This 
alternative is the concept of everyday politics which provides an entry point to look at 
domination and resistance in the relationship between international and local NGOs. 
Instead of arguing for or against the existence of hegemony in the relationships between 
international and local NGOs, as other scholars of global civil society tend to do, I will 
argue that by examining everyday forms of domination and resistance, we can see that 
the theory of hegemony is inadequate in explaining power relations between superordi­
nate and subordinate groups. Domination and resistance can coexist.
Civil Society, Global Civil Society and Hegemony
The discussion in this section consists of three parts. The first part looks at what I call a 
“mainstream” view of civil society and the second part provides an overview of the idea 
of global civil society. Finally, the section then discusses Antonio Gramsci’s concepts 
of civil society and hegemony. Though few scholars have considered relations between
2
NGOs in terms of hegemony (despite the fact that some have used the concept for de­
scribing NGOs’ supposedly anti-hegemonic struggle against the state), 1 find the con­
cept useful as it provides a means to think about relationships of inequality between 
NGOs.
An Overview of the Theory of Civil Society
The working definition of civil society in this study is that civil society is a broad sphere 
of organisations between the family, the state and the market. I adopt this broad concept 
from the working definition that is presented by the Centre of Civil Society. Its defini­
tion of “civil society refers to the set of institutions, organisations and behaviours situ- 
ated between the state, the business world, and the family.”
The literature on civil society is abundant. Despite its richness, debate still surrounds 
key definitional concepts. The meaning of civil society has shifted over time. In tracing 
the origin of the concept of civil society, scholars usually referred to the ancient Greek 
world, when Aristotle introduced the term politike koinonia [‘political society or com­
munity’].2 3 The term political society, noted Cohen and Arato, is “defined as a public 
ethical-political community of free and equal citizens under a legally defined system of 
rule.”4 In other words, political society, Anheier et al. say:
was a law-governed society in which the law was seen as the expression of 
public virtue, the Aristotelian ‘good life.’ Civilisation was thus linked to a 
particular form of political power in which rulers put the public good before 
private interest. This also very clearly implied that, both in time and in place, 
there were people excluded, non-citizens, barbarians, who did not have a 
civil society.5
This means that, as Khilnani puts it, there was no distinction between ‘state’ and ‘soci­
ety’, rather the concept simply meant “a community within a legitimate political or­
der.”6 Later, civil society was defined as a sphere outside state institutions, a concept 
introduced by Hegel and Tocqueville, and afterwards by Gramsci, who labels civil soci­
ety as a “realm between the state and the market.”7
2 Glasius, 2001: 4. For similar other sources, see White, 1994: 379; McNicoll, 1995: 3. As will be seen 
later, this working definition was influenced by the concept of civil society of Antonio Gramsci who ar­
gued that civil society is a realm between the state and the market.
3 For example, see Cohen and Arato, 1992: 84; Anheier et al., 2001: 12.
4 Cohen and Arato, 1992: 84.
? Anheier et al., 2001: 12.
6 Khilnani, 2001: 7.
7 Anheier et al., 2001: 12-15. For the debates on civil society discussion see also Kaviraj and Khilnani, 
2001; Guan, 2004; Walzer, 1995; Hedman, 2006.
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Different theorists today have different interpretations of civil society. As Waltzer 
notes, one can look at a range of definitions provided by those who favour neoclassical,
o
socialist, capitalist, and nationalist interpretations of civil society. In illustrating the 
civil society debates, for example, Chandhoke writes:
No theorist who subscribed to say de Tocqueville’s formulations on civil so­
ciety as the realm of social associations had remotely anything in common 
with a Gramscian, who saw civil society as the region where the capitalist 
state establishes hegemony over society. A Hegelian would worry that civil 
society is neither wholly good nor entirely bad, for it is the site of the battle 
between particularity and universality. An orthodox Marxist who had not 
taken Gramsci seriously would dismiss civil society as the sphere where the 
sale and purchase of labour power takes place. And an economist hijacking 
Adam Smith’s complex fonnulations in the Wealth o f Nations [without read­
ing his The Theory o f Moral Sentiments] would employ the concept of civil 
society as an alibi for the domination of the capitalist economy over the 
state.9
Despite the lack of consensus on an exact definition, the Western social sciences litera­
ture tends to view civil society as a “normatively charged concept.” 10 Mainstream dis­
cussion about civil society tends to associate civil society with democracy, civility, plu­
rality, and voluntarily associations. * 11 For instance, McNicoll defines civil society as:
... the totality of self-initiating and self-regulating organizations, peacefully 
pursuing a common interest, advocating a common cause, or expressing a 
common passion; respecting the right of others to do the same; and maintain­
ing their relative autonomy vis-ä-vis the state, the family, the temple, and the 
market. 12
While for Kaldor: “civil society is a process of management of society that is ‘bottom- 
up’ rather than ‘top-down’ and that involves the struggle for emancipatory goals.” 13
In summary, most mainstream ‘civil society’ arguments have a positive take on civil 
society. 14 The concept is perceived as a “good thing.” 15 Fisher is an example of writers 
with a positive take on civil society:
In a world increasingly beset by famines, wars, genocide, AIDS, envi­
ronmental deterioration and continuing population momentum in the poor
8 Waltzer, 1995: 9-21.
9 Chandhoke, 2003: 6.
10 Alagappa, 2004: 26. See also Hedman, 2006: 2.
11 Observation on literatures about civil society in Bahasa Indonesia supports this notion, as the links be­
tween civil society and democracy emerge as the dominant theme (the majority even have these words in 
the titles). For example, see Hikam, 1999b; Azra, 1999; Widjajanto et al., 2007; Fakih, 1996a; Suharko, 
2005; Triwibowo, 2006.
12 McNicoll, 1995: 3.
13 Kaldor, 2003: 142.
14 For example of a critical reading on civil society, see Chandhoke, 2003; Kaviraj and Khilnani, 2001; 
Aspinall, 2004.
15 See for example, Cohen and Arato, 1992; Anheier et.al 2001: 15; Van Rooy, 1998: 30.
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countries, the failed state has become the Achilles heel of the emerging 
international community. For every failed state there are many more “weakly 
institutionalised” governments, which can, curiously, also be described as 
semi-authoritarian. International governance, if it is not to become Olympian 
at best and tyrannical at worst, can only be built on what happens at the 
national level. To be accountable and strong, the national level must inter­
sect, at least indirectly, with the efforts ordinary people make in their own 
communities. So, in a way, the local and the global are intimately connected, 
not just because people plant trees or recycle, but because all politics, to 
paraphrase Tip O’Neill, is ultimately local. The good news is that in much of 
the developing world, failed states co-exist with civil societies, which have 
expanded dramatically since the 1970s.16
In addition, Falk argues that “in civil society, ideas about truth, decency, and destiny 
have always held sway.”17
Meanwhile Edwards reviews various celebratory tones on civil society as follows:
Adam Seligman, tongue firmly in cheek, calls civil society the “new analytic 
key that will unlock the mysteries of the social order”, Jeremy Rifkin calls it 
“our last, best hope”, the UN and the World Bank see it as the key to ‘good 
governance’ and poverty-reducing growth, and even the real reason for war 
against Iraq -  to kick-start civil society in the Middle East, according to Ad­
ministration officials in Washington DC. As a new report from the Washing- 
ton-based Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis puts it, “the US should em­
phasise civil society development in order to ensure regional stability in cen­
tral Asia” -  forgetting, of course, that citizens groups have been a prime 
cause of destabilisation in every society since the Pharaohs.18
In the end, for Biekart, “civil society became an idealised counter-image to counterpoise 
social virtue and political vice, the realm of freedom versus the realm of coercion, mak­
ing the term serviceable to political struggle but thereby losing its analytical value.” 19
Scholars, such as Hedman, suggest that this normative reading of civil society can be 
traced back to the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville on democracy in America in the 
early nineteenth century. Observing the democracy practiced in America, Tocqueville, 
“was greatly impressed by the extent of associations in civil life and put forward the 
argument that active associations were a condition for freedom and equality.”21 In par­
ticular, scholars point to Tocqueville’s interpretation of the important role these dy- 
namic civic associations play in checking state pow erf “Tocqueville,” argues Hedman, 
“provided an early formulation for the argument that a pluralist and self-organising civil
16 Fisher, 2003: 19.
17 Falk, 1995: 41.
18 Edwards, 2005: 1.
19 Biekart, 1999: 31.
20 Hedman, 2006: 2.
21 Anheier et al., 2001: 12.
22 Hedman, 2006: 2; Anheier et.al, 2001: 13.
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society independent of the state is an indispensable condition of democracy .” 23 Tocque- 
ville writes:
As soon as several inhabitants of the United States have taken up an opinion 
or a feeling they wish to promote in the world, they look for mutual assis­
tance; and as soon as they have found one another out, they combine. From 
that moment they are no longer isolated men, but a power seen from afar, 
whose actions serve for example and whose language is listened to . . .
Among the laws that rule human societies, there is one which seems to be 
more precise and clear than all the others. If men are to remain civilised or to 
become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the 
same ratio as the equality of conditions is increased.24
Contemporary civil society scholars reaffirm the importance of civic life to generate 
what they call social capital. Social capital consists of trust, reciprocity and networks, 
and scholars of this view consider such elements as being preconditions of a healthy 
democracy.“ For example, Guan notes that as the existence of a “healthy” democracy 
“depends in large part on the development of a democratic civic culture that refers to 
the behaviours, practices, and norms that enable individuals to govern themselves,” 
therefore “the presence of civic values such as trust, tolerance, civic-mindedness, reci- 
procity, and trust in government” has encouraged the existence of liberal democracy.“
Linking these definitions back to my topic, we can see that the idealist views of civil 
society as being an essential ingredient of democracy have underpinned programs sup­
porting civil society implemented by international aid organisations over the past de- 
cade. We can look at, for instance, the World Bank’s definition of civil society, as 
“the arena in which people come together to pursue the interests they hold in common -  
not for profit or the exercise of political power, but because they care enough about 
something to take collective action.” This definition is a typical example of the cur­
rently dominant idealistic vision of civil society that operates among international 
donors. According to Ottaway and Carothers:
The view that has most influenced donors, especially in the U.S. gov­
ernment, is one according to which civil society consists only of voluntary 
associations that directly foster democracy and promote democratic 
consolidation. These are associations that specifically seek interaction with 
the state, whether to advocate interests of the citizens, to oppose non- 
democratic behaviour of the state, or to hold states accountable to citizens for 
______ their actions. Donors favour groups that interact with the state through
23 Hedman, 2006: 2.
24 Quoted in Anheier et.al, 2001: 13; Kaldor, 2003: 20.
25 For example, see Putnam, 1993; 2000; Fukuyama, 1995.
26 Guan, 2004: 6.
27 See for example, Malena, 2004; Bendell, 2006; The United Nations website: http://www.un- 
ngls.org/cso/cso.htm [accessed on 23 November 2008] and http://www.un-ngls.org/UNreform.htm [ac­
cessed on 26 November 2008],
28 The World Bank, 2000: 5.
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Donors favour groups that interact with the state through advocacy work and 
those that do not explicitly compete for political office. In its purest form, 
this normative conception also insists that not only must a group actively 
promote democracy to be part of civil society but must also follow internal 
democratic procedures.29
This quotation indicates that in addition to having an overwhelmingly positive take on 
civil society, international donor agencies’ interpretation of the concept tends to discuss 
the concept in comparison with the state. This view is also reflected in mainstream lit­
erature on civil society. Abundant literature on democratic transitions in Eastern Europe 
and Latin America, for example, emphasise the important role civil society played in 
challenging and transforming authoritarian political regimes. Prominent writers see 
“the resurrection of civil society” as a key turning point in a democratic transition,31 or 
describe civil society as “the political celebrity of the abertura.”
In explaining the role of civil society in democratic transitions, most scholars underline 
the effectiveness of civil society organisations’ mobilisation in generating pressure for 
political change.33 Diamond, for instance, notes, “extensive mobilisation of civil society 
was a crucial source of pressure for a democratic change.” 34 He explains that the way 
citizens put forward their demands and confront autocracy are not only done through 
their individual acts but also through collective acts channelled through various civil
' i C  #
society organisations. ' Diamond’s analysis here thus reiterates the theme of the pre- 
ceeding discussion about mainstream civil society theory, which links civil society with 
democracy.
Furthermore, the mainstream view of civil society as the above examples have demon­
strated, perceives civil society as a domain that consists of homogenous elements: 
groups that more or less have the same interest in the common good. It therefore implies 
there are no tensions and no unequal power relations in civil society. According to 
Hedman, this “Tocquevillean approach” to civil society “tends to reify civil society as a 
unified and coherent entity, to depict it in celebratory, universalist, and voluntarist 
terms, and to ascribe a single intrinsic meaning and automatic historical trajectory to its
29 Ottaway and Carothers, 2000: 11.
30 See for example, O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Diamond, 1999.
31 O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 48-56, quoted in Aspinall, 2000: 11.
Stepan, 1988: 5, quoted in Aspinall, 2000: 11 and Anheier et.al, 2001: 14.
33 For a review of the links between civil society and democratisation according to the dominant liberal 
view, see Mercer, 2002: 7-10.
34 This quotation is a broad conclusion Diamond draws from a number of comparative case studies. Dia­
mond, 1994: 5.
35 Ibid.
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role in democratisation.” 36 Consequently, she argues, “contestation and class conflict 
within the realm of civil society and crucial questions about the conditions and pro­
cesses of mobilisation in the name o f civil society remain essentially unanswered.” 37 In 
other words, the power relations between elements of civil society receive little atten­
tion.
In reality, elements of civil society are not homogenous and inequality does exist among 
elements of civil society. For instance, Biekart suggests that:
Typologies of associational life and the pluralist approach of the ‘third sec­
tor’ only refer to the organisational dimension of civil society and tend to 
hide potential conflictual interests that are related to the material and ideo­
logical dimensions of civil society. Civil society is not only strong because it 
is ‘dense’, but also because it is relatively ‘equitable’ and ‘inclusive’; ‘den­
sity’ and ‘vibrancy’ of civil society do not automatically imply ‘consensus’.
As some organisations in civil society generally are more powerful than oth­
ers, they have the potential to impose decisions favourable to their interests 
on others.38
Meanwhile, Amoore and Langley argue that within civil society, “inequalities and con­
flicts abound” because “civil society is constituted as much by the highly differentiated 
politics of power as it is by the politics of empowerment and protest.” 39 Similarly Hadiz 
writes that, “neo-liberal assumptions about the existence of a homogenous, common set 
of fundamental interests in civil society have little empirical basis, and neither does the 
notion of a civil society bound together by the nurturance of social capital." 40 More par­
ticularly, Edwards notes the inequalities between international and local NGOs, in 
which international NGOs “talk constantly about partnership, but rarely practice it in 
their relationships with NGOs in other parts of the world.” 41
This study will provide more empirical data on the heterogeneity and inequality that 
exist within civil society, by examining the relationships between international and local 
NGOs. As previous discussion of civil society has indicated, although civil society con­
sists of a broad range of organisations such as professional and sport associations as 
well as trade unions, NGOs are the archetypal civil society organisations. I will discuss 
the definitional and distinctive aspects of NGOs in chapter two. My study of the interac­
tions between NGOs in Indonesia shows that organisations with a stronger position -  be 
it in terms of greater funds or influence in the community or knowledge about or net-
36 Hedman, 2006: 5.
37 Ibid. (Emphasis in original).
38 Biekart, 1999: 40.
39 Amoore and Langley, 2004: 99.
40 Hadiz, 2003: 4.
41 Edwards, 1999a: 25.
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works with donors -  clearly have greater power over, or in competition with, ‘weaker’ 
organisations. The power relations between elements of civil society will become 
clearer in the discussion about global civil society and hegemony below.
An Overview of the Theory of Global Civil Society
Just as there is no fixed definition of civil society, there is also no agreement on the 
definition of global civil society and little agreement on its significance. Scholars pro­
vide different definitions and views on the concept of global civil society. The defini­
tions range from fairly simple to the complex and sophisticated. Some scholars, like 
Schölte, give a specific meaning to the term. He labels global civil society as “a politi­
cal space where voluntary-action associations deliberately seek to shape the rules that 
govern one or the other aspect of social life” which “encompass cultural diversity and 
national context.” 42 This definition is fairly neutral. A comprehensive, ideal-type of ex­
planation about global civil society is given by Kaldor:
Global civil society is a platform inhabited by activists (or post-Marxists),
NGOs and neoliberals, as well as national and religious groups, where they 
argue about, campaign for (or against), negotiate about, or lobby for the ar­
rangements that shape global developments. There is not one global civil so­
ciety but many, affecting a range of issues—human rights, environment and 
so on. It is not democratic; there are no processes of election, nor could there 
be at a global level, since that would require a world state. And such a state, 
even if democratically elected, would be totalitarian. It is also uneven and 
Northern-dominated. Nevertheless, the emergence of this phenomenon does 
offer a potential for individuals—a potential for emancipation.43
Similar to the above positive view of global civil society, Keane argues that:
Global civil society is a vast, interconnected, and multi-layered social space 
that comprises many hundreds of thousands of self-directing or nongovern­
mental institutions and ways of life. It can be likened—to draw for a moment 
upon ecological similes—to a dynamic biosphere. This complex biosphere 
looks and feels expansive and polyarchic, full of horizontal push and pull, 
vertical conflict, and compromise, precisely because it comprises a bewilder­
ing variety of interacting habitats and species: organisations, civic and busi­
ness initiatives, coalitions, social movements, linguistic communities, and 
cultural identities. All of them have at least one thing in common: across vast 
geographic distances and despite barriers of time, they deliberately organise 
themselves and conduct their cross-border social activities, business, and 
politics outside the boundaries of governmental structures, with a minimum 
of violence and a maximum of respect for the principle of civilised power­
sharing among different ways of life.44
42 Schölte, 2002: 3-5.
43 Kaldor, 2003: 590-591.
44 Keane, 2003: 23-24.
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Keane’s definition is an ‘idealistic’ vision of civil society which implies that civil soci­
ety produces only a narrow range of positive attributes. Like other writers on global 
civil society, Keane also does not seem to anticipate the possibility of serious inequality 
within global civil society. As Chandler says:
All the [global civil society] theorists locate global civic actors as the source 
of moral action and their break from conventional state-based politics as the 
strategic basis for radical political change.... For global civil society theo­
rists, it is non-state actors which are held to have overcome the empirical and 
ethical divide between the domestic political realm and the international.45
In defining global civil society for this study, I extend my working definition of civil 
society beyond national boundaries. I adopt the definition of Anheier et.al, by giving a 
“purely descriptive” definition of global civil society: “the sphere of ideas, values, insti­
tutions, organisations, networks, and individuals located between the family, the state, 
and the market and operating beyond the confines of national societies, polities, and ec-
«46onomies.
The term global civil society has become widely used in the past decade, along with the 
rise of globalisation as an increasingly important set of economic, political and social 
processes shaping societies and interactions between them across the globe .47 Many 
scholars view global civil society as an emerging alternative force that can contest the 
dominance of states and state-based politics, and much of the academic discussion 
about it has been as uniformly positive as much of the early literature on civil society 
and democracy one or two decades ago. Jaeger argues:
“Global civil society” has been one of the most important tropes in the post- 
Cold War discourses of globalization and global governance. In activist, of­
ficial, and academic circles alike, an emerging transnational or global civil 
society has been seen as a counterweight to states, markets, and international 
organizations. As a nongovernmental and non-commercial space of associa­
tion and communication, global civil society is said to inject publicity and 
accountability into political and economic systems. New communications 
technologies seem to have enabled it to generate public opinion in a global 
public sphere. To some, especially theorists of cosmopolitan democracy, 
global civil society even promises a democratization of world politics.48
Thus, for Falk, global civil society [movements] “carry the possibility of an extension 
of the movement for democratisation beyond state/society relations to all arenas of
45 Chandler, 2004: 3.
46 Anheier et al., 2001: 17 (emphasis in original).
47 Examples of studies on global civil society include Florini, 2004; Lipschutz, 1992; Schölte, 2002; An­
heier, Glasius and Kaldor (eds.), 2002; Kaldor, 2003; Keane, 2003.
48 Jaeger, 2007: 257.
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power and authority.”49 For Edwards, “this form of governance [i.e. global civil society] 
is messy and unpredictable, but ultimately it will be more effective -  by giving ordinary 
citizens a bigger say in the questions that dominate world politics...”50 For Korten, Per­
las and Shiva, “Global civil society manifests a previously unknown human capacity to 
self-organise on a planetary-scale with an unprecedented inclusiveness, respect for di­
versity, shared leadership, individual initiative, and a deep sense of responsibility for 
the whole.”51 Likewise, Kaldor notes that:
Global civil society does provide a way to supplement traditional democracy.
It is a medium through which individuals can, in principle, participate in 
global public debates; it offers the possibility for the voices of the victims of 
globalisation to be heard if not the votes. And it creates new fora for deliber­
ation on the complex issues of the contemporary world, in which the various 
parties to the discussion do not only represent state interest.52
This positive impact of global civil society towards democracy is also put forward by 
Edwards who suggests that, “For citizens of non-democratic regimes, transnational civil 
society may provide the only meaningful avenue for voice and participation in decision 
making.”53 In line with Edwards’ views, Keane writes:
Global civil society refers to a dynamic non-govemmental system of inter­
connected socio-economic institutions that straddle the whole earth, and that 
have complex effects that are felt in its four comers. Global civil society is 
neither a static object nor a fait accompli. It is an unfinished project that con­
sists of sometimes thick, sometimes thinly stretched networks, pyramids and 
hub-and-spoke clusters of socio-economic institutions and actors who orga­
nize themselves across borders, with the deliberate aim of drawing the world 
together in new ways. These non-govemmental institutions and actors tend 
to pluralise power and to problematise violence; consequently, their peaceful 
or ‘civil’ effects are felt everywhere, here and there, far and wide, to and 
from local areas, through wider regions, to the planetary level itself.54
Yet despite all the interest in the topic a mature discussion about the concept only 
started in the mid-1990s; so far, there have been few case studies of how global civil 
society might actually operate in practice.55 Consequently, solid data and measurement 
of global civil society’s interactions cannot be obtained easily.'6 Hence, my own study
49 Falk, 1995: 35.
50 Edwards, 2001: 4.
51 Korten, Perlas, Shiva, 2002: 18.
52 Kaldor, 2003: 148.
53 Edwards, 2001: 4.
54 Keane, 2003: 8.
55 For example, both Keck and Sikkink, and Chandler acknowledge the scarcity of studies on global civil 
society (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 33; Chandler, 2004: 2). Meanwhile, Taylor argues that “current re­
search into global civil society suffers from weak description and inadequate theorization.” (Taylor, 2002: 
339) For recent efforts to map and measure global civil society, see Munck, 2006: 327; Katz, 2006; Nu- 
groho and Tampubolon, 2007.
36 Keane, 2001: 26; Anheier et al., 2001: 18.
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aims to contribute to this still sparse literature, by presenting a case study of interaction 
between elements of global civil society in Indonesia.
Global Civil Society and Gramsci’s Theory of Civil Society and Hegemony
The above discussion has shown that much mainstream literature on global civil soci­
ety, just as on civil society more generally, tends to ignore the issue of power inequality 
within the system. There is also a tendency to gloss over the potentially negative aspects
cn
of global civil society, while over-emphasising the capacity for normative action. 
There are tendencies to ignore the issue of power inequality within the system. My re­
search will look precisely at tensions and unequal power relations between elements of 
global civil society, which in this case are represented by international and local NGOs 
in Indonesia. In doing so, I find Antonio Gramsci’s analysis of civil society as an arena 
of contestation and inequality to be useful.
Besides describing civil society as the realm between the state and the market (and in 
this sense, not being far different from most contemporary mainstream usages), Gram- 
sci sees civil society as “the arena wherein the ruling class extends and reinforces its 
power by non-violent means.’0 8  For Gramsci, civil society is the sphere of the he­
gemony of the ruling class. The system depends on consent, or in Kerkvliet’s words, 
“acceptance or conformity arising from conscious attachment to or agreement with 
central elements of the prevailing order.” 59
What Gramsci means by hegemony is:
the 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the 
general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; 
this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent confi­
dence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function 
in the world of production.60
In other words, as Scott notes, hegemony is the term for the process of ideological 
domination.61 Femia suggests that hegemony is “the predominance obtained by consent 
rather than force of one class or group over other classes.” “ According to Gill, he­
gemony “generally refers to a relation between social classes, in which one class faction 
or class grouping takes a leading role by the active consent of other classes and
57 For critical reading of global civil society, see for example: Chandhoke, 2001; Pasha and Blaney, 1998; 
Anderson and Rieff, 2005.
58 Buttigieg, 1995: 26.
59 Kerkvliet, 2002: 260.
60 Quoted in Okolie, 2003: 439.
61 Scott, 1985: 315.
62 Femia, 1975: 31.
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groups.” He then suggests that, “hegemony, therefore, is not a relation of coercive 
force as such (as it is viewed in political realist theory), but rather of consent gained 
through “intellectual and moral leadership.” 64 In reading Gramsci’s concept of he­
gemony, Scott argues:
The central idea behind it [hegemony] is the claim that the ruling class 
dominates not only the means of physical production but the means of sym­
bolic production as well. Its control over the material forces of production is 
replicated, at the level of ideas, in its control over the ideological “sectors” of 
society -  culture, religion, education, and the media -  in a manner that al­
lows it to disseminate those values that reinforce its position. What Gramsci 
did, in brief, was to explain the institutional basis of false-consciousness.65
Hattori claims that “the central characteristic of capitalist society for neo-Gramscian 
scholars is the pervasiveness of consent to an otherwise burdensome order of things.” 66 
According to Scott:
The critical implication of hegemony is that class rule is effected not so 
much by sanctions and coercion as by the consent and passive compliance of 
subordinate classes. Hegemony, of course may be used to refer to the entire 
complex of social domination. The term is used here, however, in its sym­
bolic or idealist sense, since that is precisely where Gramsci’s major contri­
bution to Marxist thought lies. It is in fact the pervasiveness of ideological 
hegemony that normally suffices, to ensure social peace and to relegate the 
coercive apparatus of the state to the background.67
Furthermore, in interpreting Gramsci’s hegemony, Kerkvliet suggests that “maintaining 
hegemony requires, in addition to coercion, that dominant groups make concessions to 
subordinate groups to an extent, resulting in lower-class people identifying their inter-
z: o
ests with the perpetuation of the system.”
Beside emphasising the importance of consent in Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, the 
preceding discussion about the concept points out how discourse plays an essential role 
in theories of hegemony. As Davidson argues, the theory of hegemony “incorporates 
ideas about language and popular wisdom (buon senso)”and that hegemony must al­
ways “involve ‘educating’ the people to accept the economic, social and political order 
from which is built consensus.” 69
63 Gill, 1990:42.
64 Ibid.
65 Scott, 1985: 315.
66 Hattori, 2003: 153. For more examples about this strand of thinking, see also Wade, 2002; Hopgood, 
2000; Gale, 1998.
67 Scott, 1985: 315-316.
68 Kerkvliet, 2002: 260.
64 Davidson, 2008: 63.
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Crucially, in Gramsci’s view civil society was the chief sphere in which hegemony was 
manufactured and consent attained. Gramsci also stressed the crucial role of the cultural 
and ideological support provided by civil society and linked it with the hegemony of 
capitalism.70 In explaining how hegemony is accomplished, Femia argues that he­
gemony “is attained through the myriad ways in which the institutions of civil society 
operate to shape, directly or indirectly, the cognitive and affective structures whereby 
men perceive and evaluate problematic social reality.” ' 1
Gramsci also considered civil society as a domain that encouraged an “exploitative and 
unjust status quo which also contains the seeds of revolution.” In this sense, civil soci­
ety was seen as capable not only of promoting ruling ideas (or hegemony) but also of 
challenging and undermining them. As suggested by Munck, “thus from Gramsci we 
can take our understanding of civil society (and global civil society) that is simulta­
neously the arena in which capitalist hegemony is secured but also where the subaltern 
classes forge social alliances and articulate alternative hegemonic projects.” 74 This 
means that global civil society contains both the ingredients which perpetuate the capi­
talist system but also the elements which agitate against it.
As this research explores relationships of local and international NGOs, Gramsci's con­
cept of civil society and his theory of hegemony are also helpful for scrutinising the dy­
namics of interactions between local and international "NGOs in Indonesia, as elements 
of global civil society. In particular it enables me to understand unequal power relations 
within civil society and it allows me to look at tensions inherent to civil society, not just 
the positive outcomes civil society generates. If, for Gramsci, civil society is the arena 
where dominant social forces obtain the consent of subaltern groups, does it not make 
sense to ask whether a similar process of consent creation occur in global civil society? 
Can the daily interactions we see in global civil society be creating hegemony of one 
powerful actor in the international system? The concept also inspires us to consider 
whether what we would otherwise consider to be the weak and apparently dominated 
actors in global civil society have the ability to mount ideological resistance against the 
stronger, non-coercive hegemonic force they interact with there.
70 Ehrenberg, 1999, quoted in Alagappa, 2004: 29.
71 Femia, 1975: 31.
72 Whitelum, 2003: 69.
73 Ibid.
74 Munck, 2006: 330.
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These then are the questions that consideration of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony in­
vites us to ask about global civil society, in particular NGOs, in Indonesia: is hegemony 
being achieved? Through what mechanisms? To what extent and how is hegemony be­
ing resisted? My research on the relationships between Indonesian and international 
NGOs seeks to answer these questions.
Interactions between Local and International NGOs: a Domain for 
Hegemony?
As has been noted at the beginning of this chapter, there are different views on the rela- 
tionship between international and local NGOs. One strand, promoted especially by 
international aid agencies, perceives the relationship as essentially mutually beneficial 
and as promoting ideal values like democracy.76 Another view characterises the rela­
tionship as one of asymmetrical power relations, with the international NGOs dominant 
over the local NGOs. These two views are clearly in contradiction and expose the 
fundamental debate this thesis seeks to explore. The first stand point, as has been dem­
onstrated in the preceding literature review, is that global civil society is a domain for 
inculcating essentially ideal values aiming at the betterment of the human condition. 
The proponents of this view, as Munck argues, base their arguments on an assumption 
that there are “universal moral norms and values” and the global civil society “eschews 
all that smacks of self-interest and, of course, the merest hint that force might play a 
role in progressive social change and democratisation.” 78
On the other hand, there is also a body of literature which connects global civil society 
with Gramsci’s concept of civil society and hegemony. For example, Munck argues that 
global civil society functions as an “empty signifier currently hegemonised by western 
liberal notions of civility and citizenship.” 79 In addition, Pasha and Blaney suggest:
Though transnational associational life may be a site of possible challenges 
to the oligarchical organization of contemporary global political economy, it 
also appears as a basis for sustaining the dominance of a narrow band of hu­
manity; to the extent that global civil society represents an alternative vision, 
this might be seen, then, as equally hegemonic, enacting the ‘global’ values
75 For examples of the debate, see contributions by Smith and Hanlon in Stiles, 2000.
76 For examples of discussion about foreign aid assistance and democracy see Ottaway and Carothers, 
2000; Carothers, 1999; Finkel et al., 2007; Diamond, 1999; Gershman and Allen, 2006.
1 ' For critical discussion of the relationship, see also Edwards and Hulme,1996; Biekart, 1999; Mendel- 
son and Glenn, 2002; Sundstorm, 2005.
78 Munck, 2006: 327.
79 Ibid.: 358.
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of north American and European activists, in lieu o f a genuinely global de­
liberative process.80
In this view, global civil society is mainly a domain of hegemony of the United States, 
other advanced industrial countries, and global capitalism, with international organisa­
tions as its main instruments. For example, Cox argues that hegemony at the interna­
tional level is not just an order among states, but, “it is an order within a world economy 
with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links into
o  1
other subordinate modes of production.” Cox then describes world hegemony as:
A social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure; and it 
cannot be simply one of these things but must be all three. World hegemony, 
furthermore, is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms 
which lay down general rules of behaviour for states and for those forces of 
civil society that act across national boundaries - rules which support the 
dominant mode of production.82
Furthermore he argues that international organisations serve as a mechanism for the 
universal norms of world hegemony.83 According to Cox, there are five features of an 
international organisation which express its hegemonic role.84 These features are non 
coercive in nature:
(1) they embody the rules which facilitate the expansion o f hegemonic world 
orders; (2) they are themselves the product of the hegemonic world order; (3) 
they ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order; (4) they co-opt the 
elites from peripheral countries and (5) they absorb counter-hegemonic 
ideas.85
Discussion about hegemony in the relationships between international aid organisations 
and local NGOs can also be found in the development sector literature, particularly that 
written by anthropologists, some of whom have debated whether “development dis­
course” is hegemonic. For some scholars, like Grillo, the development discourse pro­
moted by international agencies and experts is hegemonic in nature because it “identi­
fies appropriate and legitimate ways of practicing development as well as speaking and
oz:
thinking about it.” However, others have argued against the existence of a hegemonic 
development discourse. Hilhorst, for example, suggests two reasons to dismiss the no­
tion of a hegemonic development discourse, namely the existence of “(a) multiplicity of
80 Pasha and Blaney, 1998: 419.
81 Cox, 1983: 171.
82 Ibid.: 172.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Grillo, 1997: 12, quoted in Hilhorst, 200: 402.
87 See for example, Grillo, 1997; Hilhorst 2001,2003.
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voices within development, even if some are more powerful than others,” and dy­
namic relations between dominant and counter-discourses, which lead to “renegotia- 
tions at the interfaces of discourse encounters.” She proposes to look at “the duality of 
discourse” by looking at “how actors shape discourse through their agency,” and “the 
processes by which discourses become powerful.” 90 Furthermore, Hilhorst translates 
this idea into practice by presenting an insightful study of the everyday practices of a 
local NGO in the Philippines, based on what she labels “actor-orientation.” 91 At this 
point I only wish to hold up these contending perspectives on international development 
discourse, rather than arbitrating between them. Both views adequately illustrate that 
hegemony is a relevant question for analysis in the development sector.
The terms of the debate on development discourse does lead us to isolate one character­
istic of the wider discussion that I want to emphasise: it tends to look at hegemony as a 
top-down phenomenon. When neo-Gramscian critical theorists such as Cox or Wade 
discuss the hegemonic nature of global civil society -  as with the debate on global civil 
society in general -  they tend to do so at the theoretical level. Consequently they pro­
duce a macro-level analysis without representing the ‘voice’ from below. Writers who 
argue there is a hegemonic development discourse likewise tend to focus on the devel­
opment practices of international donors and do not pay close attention to local NGOs 
practices. On the other hand, when scholars such as Hilhorst take up the alternative 
micro-level analysis and scrutinise local NGOs’ everyday activities, they rarely frame 
their analysis in terms of how hegemony works.93
This study intends to look at the relationship between international and local NGOs by 
analysing the perspectives of both international and Indonesian NGOs themselves. This 
study therefore tries to pursue a more balanced approach which accommodates both 
international and local NGOs’ points of view. Such a balanced approach enables this 
study to obtain a comprehensive picture of the relationship, which in turn it is hoped 
creates a more nuanced analysis.
88 Grillo, 1997: 22, quoted in Hilhorst, 2001: 402.
89 Hilhorst, 2001:402.
90 Ibid.
91 Hilhorst, 2001: 402. See also Hilhorst, 2003. Her study is interesting because it takes into account the 
voice of subordinate people, which in this context, the local organisations, in studying development dis­
course.
92 See for example, Ferguson, 1990; Escobar, 1995.
93 See Hilhorst, 2001; 2003. It should be noted that she provides one chapter in analysing the interaction 
between funding agencies and a local NGO in her book (2003) in which she illustrates the domination of 
the funding agency, which led to the discontinuation of the NGO’s program.
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The Study of Domination and Resistance in Everyday Life
In searching for a further conceptual framework to examine the relationship between 
international and local NGOs and link it with the question of hegemony, I came across a 
very useful body of literature that studies the everyday politics of domination and re­
sistance in everyday life. The prominent proponents of the everyday resistance school, 
James C. Scott and Benedict J. Kerkvliet, propose a different way of looking at class 
relationships and hegemony. Drawing their conclusion from careful studies of peasants’ 
everyday life in different parts of Southeast Asia, they suggest that Gramsci’s concept 
of hegemony is inadequate for explaining ideological domination in the relationship be­
tween subordinate and superordinate people.94
As will be shown in this study, although Kerkvliet and Scott’s research derives from 
studies of peasants, it turns out that the key elements of their arguments are very helpful 
in understanding power relations between international and local NGOs in Indonesia. In 
studying the everyday life of peasants, both Scott and Kerkvliet reveal that a close 
examination of the relations of peasants with village elites shows that peasants do not 
morally accept the rule of local elites. Although they are denied space to openly resist, 
peasants passively resist local elites.
According to Scott and Kerkvliet, the fact that peasants deny consent to the ideological 
system which supports their local social hierarchy, militates against hegemony. Scott 
labels the tactics peasants use to resist hegemony the “weapons of the weak.” 95 He 
nominates certain behaviours such as “footdragging, dissimulation, false compliance, 
pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, [and] sabotage.” 96 This study finds similar 
non-compliance in the everyday practices of Indonesian NGOs towards their interna- 
tional counterparts, such as the savings practices of local NGOs. Thus Scott and 
Kerkvliet’s approach for analysing everyday practices of superordinate and subordinate 
classes, is a useful tool for this study.
Scott’s main critique of hegemony is that it fails to account for the capacity of the sub­
ordinated to resist. In his words, “[hegemony] fails to make sense of class relations,” 
and it “also is just as likely to mislead us seriously in understanding class conflict in
94 Scott, 1985, 1990; Kerkvliet, 2002, 2005.
95 Scott, 1985.
96 Ibid.: 29.
97 Holloway labels this practice as corruption with good motives (Holloway, 2001: 14). See chapter four 
for more detailed discussion of this.
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most situations.” 98 He suggests “the concept of hegemony ignores the extent to which 
most subordinate classes are able, on the basis of their daily material experience, to 
penetrate and demystify the prevailing ideology. ” 99 Scott criticises Gramsci for exag­
gerating the power of superordinate classes which underestimate the capabilities of the 
subordinate to resist the main ideology in their everyday behaviour. He also adds that:
... theories of hegemony frequently confound what is inevitable with what is 
just, an error that subordinate classes rarely, if ever, make. This conclusion 
stems from a surface examination of public action in power-laden situations 
that overlooks both the “hidden transcript” and the necessity of routine and 
pragmatic submission to the “compulsion of economic relations” as well as 
the realities of coercion. 100
Scott thus suggests that subordinate people might give the public impression that they 
view their subordination as natural and just, but when these subordinate people are out 
of sight, they behave differently. In other words, subordinate groups might appear to 
accept domination in the public transcript but completely reject it in the hidden one.
Scott therefore points to the importance of looking at everyday practices of subordinate 
people to get a better understanding of how domination and resistance works. He pro­
poses the concept of the hidden transcript as a means to understand the resistance of 
subordinate people. This study will adopt Scott’s concept to analyse the ways local 
NGOs think about their relationship with international NGOs. I find this very useful to 
think in this way as my observation of local NGOs reveals that they behave differently 
when they are not interacting directly with international NGOs.
Scott suggests that the public transcript is “a shorthand way of describing the open 
interaction between subordinates and those who dominate.” In this public sphere he­
gemony might seem to be complete. 101 As Scott suggests:
In ideological terms the public transcript will typically, by its accommoda- 
tionist tone, provide convincing evidence for the hegemony of dominant 
values, for the hegemony of dominant discourse. It is precisely this public 
domain where the effects of power relations are most manifest, and any an­
alysis based exclusively on the public transcript is likely to conclude that 
subordinate groups endorse the terms of their subordination and are willing, 
even enthusiastic, partners in that subordination. 102
98 Scott, 1985: 317.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.: 317.
101 Ibid.: 2.
102 t u ; j  . A
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However, he adds “where it is not positively misleading, is unlikely to tell the whole 
story about power relations.” 103 This is above all because “the public transcript is an 
indifferent guide to the opinion of subordinates.” 104 Scott explains “at the very least, an 
assessment of power relations read directly off the public transcript between the power­
ful and the weak may portray a deference and consent that are possibly only a tactic.” 105 
He concludes that “the questionable meaning of the public transcript suggests the key 
roles played by disguise and surveillance in power relations.” 106
On the other hand, Scott defines the hidden transcript as the “discourse that takes place
1 r\n
“offstage,” beyond direct observation by powerholders.” He argues that “the hidden 
transcript is thus derivative in the sense that it consists of those offstage speeches, ges­
tures, and practices that confirm, contradict, or inflect what appears in the public tran-
i rvo
script.” Scott suggests that the hidden transcript has three characteristics: it is “spe­
cific to a given social site and to a particular set of actors”; it “does not contain only 
speech acts [verbal resistance] but a whole range of practices” and that “the frontier be­
tween the public and the hidden transcript is a zone of constant struggle between domi­
nant and subordinate -  not a solid wall.” 109 Scott elaborates on several prominent ac­
tions in the hidden transcript which include what he labelled as “elementary forms of 
disguise” -  which are “anonymity” (include gossip and rumours), “euphemisms and 
grumbling” -  and “elaborate forms of disguise” which include oral culture, folktales. 110 
He argues that:
For the study of power relations, this perspective [of the public and the hid­
den transcript] alert us to the fact that virtually all ordinarily observed rela­
tions between dominant and subordinate represent the encounter of the pub­
lic transcript of the dominant with the public transcript o f the subordinate. ..
Social science is, in general then, focused resolutely on official or formal re­
lations between the powerful and weak. This is the case even for much of the 
study of conflict, as we shall see, when that conflict has become highly insti­
tutionalised. I do not mean to imply that the study of this domain of power 
relations is necessarily false or trivial, only that it hardly exhausts what we 
might wish to know about pow er."1
103
104
105
106
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108
109
110 
111
Ibid.: 2.
Ibid.: 3.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Scott, 1990: 4. 
Ibid.: 4-5. 
Ibid.: 14.
Ibid.: 136-172. 
Ibid.: 13.
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As I suggest earlier, these concepts are helpful as they enable me to explain contradic­
tions between everyday practices of local and international NGOs, separately, and their 
behaviour when interacting with each other.
Kerkvliet’s analysis of class and status relations in a Philippines village of San Ricardo 
has similarities with Scott’s arguments. Kerkvliet states that:
while Gramsci’s argument recognizes that subordinate people can within 
limits manipulate conditions to gain some material advantages and that su­
perordinate groups grant marginal allowances, it does not allow much room 
for continuous struggle between subordinate and dominant people over ideas 
and values.112
He furthermore elaborates his understanding that Gramsci’s concept of hegemony ap­
pears to suggest that subordinate people:
are confined within the boundaries of the dominant world-view, a divergent, 
loosely adjusted patchwork of ideas and outlooks, which despite its hetero­
geneity, unambiguously serves the interests of the powerful, by mystifying 
power relations, by justifying various forms of sacrifice and deprivation, by 
inducing fatalism and passivity, and by narrowing mental horizons. 113
Yet Kerkvliet finds poor peasants and workers in his study were “neither passive nor 
mystified. Nor have they bought the dominant ideology’s rationalization of their depri­
vation.” 1 14 He offers further explanation by suggesting that:
There is in San Ricardo considerably more ideological struggle between the 
subordinate and dominant classes that Gramsci’s argument conveys. People 
of lower class and status have alternative ideas and beliefs that pose signifi­
cant challenges to the rich capitalists’ views about how property and other 
resources should be used and by whom. They have ideas about rights and 
justice that also contradict the beliefs of more powerful people. Their beliefs 
are not only implicit in actions but are verbalized. People articulate both spe­
cific and general reasons underlying their boycotts, walkouts, land takeovers, 
and other direct actions. Those ideas may not be expressed in language fa­
miliar to intellectuals, but they are expressed nevertheless. Villagers are not 
as confused or unconscious about what they are doing as Gramsci would 
suggest.115
It may seem strange that works on rural class relations can be a good guide for studying 
my topic on the relationships between international and local NGOs. Yet, because the 
perspectives of international and Indonesian NGOs themselves can be at odds, 
Kerkvliet’s and Scott’s analysis of ideological struggle between classes, as discussed 
above, fit well as a framework for analysing relations between international and Indo­
nesian NGOs. Moreover, because one set of actors in these relations -  the international
112 Kerkvliet, 2002: 261.
113 Ibid.: 262.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
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NGOs -  are more powerful, in the sense of having greater financial and agenda setting 
capacity, it is not altogether inappropriate to compare these relations to relations be­
tween rural classes in unequal societies.
Borrowing from their approach that looks at everyday practices of domination and re­
sistance, I agree with Scott and Kerkvliet that Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is inad­
equate in explaining power relations between superordinate and subordinate groups in 
both rural villages and in the context of global civil society, and presumably in many 
other settings too. The case of the relationships between international and local NGOs 
in Indonesia in this study reveals that although the domination of international NGOs is 
apparent, local NGOs’ deep resentment of that domination, and their ability to make use 
of opportunities arises within the relationship for their own benefit, demonstrates that 
Indonesian NGOs are non-compliant towards the domination of international NGOs. 
This non-compliance thus shows the absence of local NGOs’ consent -  one of the main 
ingredients of hegemony -  towards the domination of international NGOs.
Research Questions and Central Findings
As has been indicated in the discussion throughout this chapter, my research focuses on 
the relationship between international and local NGOs in Indonesia and places the rela­
tionship between local and international NGOs within the broader context of theories on 
global civil society and hegemony. NGOs are often understood as the main element of 
global civil society yet they are less commonly understood in terms of hegemony. I par­
ticularly aim to understand the power-play between these elements of global civil soci­
ety by studying the “everyday life” of international and local NGOs in Indonesia. As I 
mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, what I mean by everyday life is the every­
day interactions of these two types of NGOs, the processes and procedures involved in 
their relationships, as well as the tensions that arise in their relationships.
It would not be possible, of course, to study NGOs’ relationships in Indonesia without 
exploring their relationships with Indonesian society. As we will see later, with the 
country’s rich associational life, one of the distinguishing characteristics of local NGOs 
is their close connections with the general society. Most local NGOs in this research, for 
example, either come from mass-based organisations or have deep roots in religious or­
ganisations, or are formed by various associations and community-based groups in pur­
suing common interests. Therefore, although this research looks at NGOs’ relationships
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in the context of global civil society, this study also considers the importance of the 
links these NGOs have with Indonesian society.
There are two sets of questions that guide this study. The first set of questions deals 
with the nature of the relationship between international and local NGOs from the per­
spective of the NGOs themselves. It looks at the everyday politics of the relationship 
between international and local NGOs in their own terms. With this first set, I focus on 
problems relating to divergent cultures, goals, and methods of work. I examine this is­
sue by finding answers to questions such as: How do international NGOs see their rela­
tionships with the local NGOs? What are the perceptions of local NGOs about the rela­
tionship? Are these perceptions the same? What are the sources of tension each side 
faces? How do local and international NGOs think they should address these challen­
ges? The key here is uncovering how the actors themselves view the problems they con­
front.
My second set of questions involves a higher level of conceptualisation and relates to 
the nature of global civil society and the question of hegemony. These questions involve 
placing the relationship between local and international NGOs in Indonesia within the 
context of theories of global civil society and hegemony. I do this by asking questions 
such as: What does the relationship tell us about the nature of global civil society? Does 
global civil society really (or even mainly) serve as a domain purely for the inculcation 
of ideal values such as civility as claimed by its proponents? Or is it also a vehicle of 
hegemony -  in other words, a means by which powerful forces in international society 
(notably, in the rich countries), dominate the less powerful, and try to remake poorer 
countries in their own image? If the latter is the case, through what kind of mechanism 
is hegemony and consent acquired within global civil society? How is hegemony being 
resisted and is hegemony being resisted effectively?
To anticipate my findings, in scrutinising the way the Indonesian NGOs actually talk 
about and perceive their relationship with international donors and partners and how 
those international actors view their Indonesian counterparts -  my first set of questions 
-  I find that local and international actors have different perceptions about their cooper­
ation, achievements and aims. For international NGOs, the main challenges of working 
with local NGOs relate to organizational capacity (or, more accurately, lack of capacity) 
of local NGOs, especially their human resources, accountability and inefficiency, and 
often of problems pertaining to corruption. Meanwhile, the common complaints from 
Indonesian NGOs towards international NGOs revolve around the high expectations
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and rigidity of the international NGOs. Local NGOs resent the obligations they face to 
abide by the international NGOs’ organisational framework. They criticise what they 
see as the excessive bureaucracy of the international NGOs, such as in the proposal 
formats and other administrative forms they impose, and the language (English) they 
insist upon. In other words, local NGOs complain that the relationship is driven by their 
donors rather than being established on an equal partnership. Studying the everyday life 
of Indonesian NGOs thus reveals a hidden transcript of widespread criticism of interna­
tional NGOs.
This research also reveals some of the challenges that these NGOs face within their own 
organisations. It should be noted that, as we will see later, both local and international 
NGOs share similar weaknesses, but these weaknesses have more serious consequences 
for local NGOs because they are in a weaker position. Internal problems are common 
for many local NGOs. In addition, Indonesian NGOs struggle with other issues such as 
a lack of clear agenda and objectives. This condition affects their programs, leadership 
changes and non-egalitarian culture. In contrast with the idealised picture of NGOs that 
is sometimes presented in the mainstream literature on global civil society, a closer look 
at NGOs in Indonesia reveals practices such as elitism and favouritism, undemocratic 
decision making processes and rivalry among local NGOs. 116 These are behaviours that 
dominate the daily work practices, project implementation and strategic planning of 
NGOs and consequently affect local NGOs’ relationship with international actors. I find 
that these characteristics are both results and facilitators of the domination of interna­
tional NGOs in their relationships with Indonesian NGOs. In addition, the existence of 
these practices contradicts both the rhetoric of the NGOs themselves and the highly 
normatively charged parts of the civil society literature that argue NGOs are the pro­
moters and defenders of ideal social values.
In discussing my second set of questions in which I place the relationship between local 
and international NGOs in Indonesia within the context of theories of global civil soci­
ety and hegemony, my research finds that the relationship between international and 
local NGOs in Indonesia is asymmetrical, with international NGOs the dominant party. 
My study discovers that, although funding is the dominant variable that creates the 
asymmetrical shape of the relationship between the two NGOs, it is not the sole factor. 
There are other factors which contribute to the domination of international NGOs.
116 By favouritism I mean the tendency for international donors to work with certain prominent individu­
als that they know instead of with others they do not know.
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These factors are, first, internal weakness among Indonesian NGOs, such as, their ina­
bility to determine a clear agenda and objectives, secondly managerial weaknesses and 
faults in leadership and finally jealousies and strife between local NGOs. Another cause 
for asymmetrical power relationships is the vague and flexible nature of the decision 
making within the local and international NGOs’ relationship itself. This factor is an 
endemic feature of the managerial style that exists within the development sector.
Nevertheless, the evidence of the relationships between international and local NGOs in 
Indonesia in this study reveals that although the domination of international NGOs is 
apparent, the deep resentment among local NGOs of international NGOs domination 
also demonstrates their non-compliance with the domination of international NGOs. 
This finding shows that hegemony within global civil society is not complete. Instead, 
local NGOs use many of the “weapons of the weak” that we expect to find whenever an 
unequal power relationship exists.
Chapter Plan
Although I am aware of the presence of NGOs from the Middle East or other Asian 
countries in Indonesia, when talking about international NGOs in my study, I limit my 
focus to Western NGOs. The first two chapters (including this one) provide theoreti­
cal and historical background on the relationship between international and Indonesian 
NGOs. Although I have benefited from previous studies on Indonesian NGOs which 
predominantly look at either the Indonesian NGO sector as a stand alone case study or 
at its relationships with the state, I will not provide a detailed historical background on
i i o
Indonesian NGOs in the way most scholars on Indonesian NGOs do. Precisely be­
cause such historical overviews are available elsewhere, I instead prefer to write a his­
torical overview of the relationship between international and local NGOs in Indonesia. 
The remaining chapters then discuss various aspects of the relationships between inter­
national and Indonesian NGOs, including the issue of funding, the nature of the rela­
tionship among local NGOs, and the perspectives held by international and local NGO 
workers on their relationships, to shed light on the everyday politics of domination and 
resistance among them.
117 I propose three practical reasons for this: firstly, Western NGOs historically and currently make up a 
large proportion of international NGOs in Indonesia. Secondly, a large body of available literature on 
international NGOs refers to Western NGOs. Thirdly, they provide the most plentiful data.
118 For example, see Riker 1998; Fakih, 1995; Sinaga, 1994; Hadiwinata, 2003.
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In addition to secondary sources, I obtain data from 120 formal in-depth interviews, and 
many observations of NGO offices, NGO meetings, NGO-run workshops and other 
NGO gatherings, during fifteen months of fieldwork, conducted mainly in Jakarta and 
Yogyakarta between 2005 and 2008.119 Some interviews were held during short visits to 
Bandung, Salatiga and Makassar. I interviewed people from around twenty international 
NGOs and thirty local NGOs, as well as government officials, donor agency staff and 
academics. Some of my informants have links with several NGOs at a time, some have 
moved around, changing jobs from one NGO to another, be it inside local NGO circles, 
or in international NGOs, or from local to international NGOs.
Observation during several years of interviewing NGO workers revealed different pat- 
terns of attitude. Some NGO workers have been open and very frank in answering 
my questions since our first meeting. Yet there are also those who only spoke up gradu­
ally over the years as they came to know me better and became more comfortable talk­
ing to me (and by doing so contradicting some of their earlier statements). The most 
cautious were usually the accountants and the administrative staff of local NGOs.
Another dimension of my observations was the enthusiasm and seriousness NGO peo­
ple have for their work. A large proportion of most interviews I had with NGO workers 
would inevitably consist of lengthy talks about the details of their work. Most of them 
know their field very well, they take their job very seriously and implied that working in 
the development sector or in advocacy NGOs is not an ‘easy’ job (particularly for those 
who live far away in the field). However, I also found some of them were often too 
‘caught up’ in the details of program implementation issues and technicalities. Some, 
particularly the international donors’ policy makers, are the opposite as they tend to fo­
cus on the big picture but have problems implementing it.
As we shall see in later chapters, my study does not adopt the approach of focusing 
solely on a single area of advocacy or community development, nor is it exclusively 
focused on a single NGO. Instead, as mentioned earlier, it focuses on issues that were 
named as being important during my interviews with NGO workers themselves. “ I
114 It should be noted that my fieldwork was affected by a 6.3 magnitude earthquake that hit Yogyakarta 
in May 2006 where two main local NGOs for this study located.
120 In this thesis I use the terms NGO “workers”, “activists” and “staff-members” as interchangeable 
words without the usual nuances found in the sector.
121 In assimilating and analysing my infonnants’ perspectives, I am following the approach of other 
scholars, such as Hilhorst, who observed the everyday practices of an NGO in the Philippines using what 
she called as “an actor-orientation to the organisation of NGOs,” and Ford, who conducted an “ethno­
graphic exploration” when studying the relationships between Indonesian labour NGOs with workers,
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find this tactic allowed me to obtain a more comprehensive picture of the relationship. 
Hence, it might not be immediately obvious why 1 include a discussion on local NGOs’ 
internal problems in a thesis on relations between local and international NGOs: the an­
swer is that my informants repeatedly insisted that this was a crucial factor in the rela­
tionships. I do not want to present a study which is merely critical of international 
NGOs, but I want to show how local NGOs’ weaknesses allow them to be dominated by 
international NGOs because this was a repeated theme in my research conversations. 
Some local NGO workers suggest that all the problems are because of international 
NGOs. My research shows that local NGOs weaknesses also contribute to the interna­
tional NGOs’ domination.
Chapter two provides historical background on the relationships between international 
and local NGOs in Indonesia since Indonesia’s independence in 1945. This chapter also 
scrutinises relevant government regulations which affect the relationships between in­
ternational and local NGOs. In addition, it surveys previous studies on the relationship 
between international and Indonesian NGOs. The discussion in this chapter concludes 
that international NGOs have always played and are still playing an important role as 
the main source of funding for Indonesian NGOs. I thus argue that having the control 
over the supply of funds for Indonesian NGOs is one way in which international NGOs 
assert their domination over local NGOs.
Chapter three provides an in-depth case study which introduces all of the main themes 
of this thesis: funding, the characteristics of Indonesian NGOs, and the perspectives of 
international and Indonesian NGOs on the sources of tension in their relationships. The 
in-depth case study is of the relationships that take place between a local NGO - Insist 
(the Indonesian Society for Social Transformation), a Yogyakarta-based Indonesian 
NGO - and two international organisations. The international NGOs are KEPA (Service 
Centre for Development Cooperation), a Finnish NGO, and IMD (the Netherlands Insti­
tute for Multiparty Democracy), a Dutch NGO. KEPA has been Insist’s main partner 
since the late 1990s, while IMD and Insist had a disagreement which led to the discon­
tinuation of their relationship in 2004. I provide this case study early in the thesis to 
provide a detailed, grounded and accessible discussion of the key themes of the thesis.
Chapter four examines the politics of international NGO funding. This chapter identifies 
the public transcript and the hidden transcript in the relationship between the two types
unions and the state. See Hilhorst, 2003: 4-8; Ford, 2003: 23. To moderate bias from my interviews and 
observations during research, I consulted NGO documents and literature when 1 could.
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of NGOs. I use these metaphors to explain power relations between international and 
local NGOs in dealing with matters related to funding. I argue that the public transcript 
on funding reveals the domination of international NGOs, in which they are able to 
wield their ability to dispense funding to impose conditions on the domestic NGO sec­
tor. Yet there is also a “hidden transcript” of resistance in which local NGOs save funds 
against the spirit and sometimes letter of their agreements with the international NGOs. 
This has become a form of non-compliance that is near universal in the Indonesian 
NGO sector.
Chapter five discusses the internal dynamics of Indonesian NGOs and how these dy­
namics affect the relationships between international and local NGOs. In this chapter I 
talk about the issues of personalisation, hierarchy, internal management conflict and 
rivalry among local NGOs and relate them with the hidden transcript of what local 
NGOs say about their donors privately. In other words, this chapter will assess the char­
acteristics of subordinate groups in global civil society and the relations they have with 
one another. The discussion will reveal how local NGOs, because of their lack of uni­
fied purpose and their own internal problems have enabled international NGO domina­
tion to become stronger than it otherwise would be. The discussion will also demon­
strate how international NGOs domination exacerbates these characteristics.
Chapter six looks at the perspectives of international NGOs and Indonesian NGOs on 
their relationships. In particular, it focuses on the sources of tension that these organisa­
tions encounter while working together. It will again discuss the public transcript and 
the hidden transcript in the relationship between the two types of NGOs and use these 
concepts to explain power relations between them. The discussion sheds light on how 
international NGOs assert dominance over Indonesian NGOs. Yet at the same time the 
chapter also reveals widespread resistance among local NGOs towards their interna­
tional counterparts.
Chapter seven ends my dissertation by drawing out the key points from the discussion 
in preceeding chapters into a conclusion. This study concludes that the relationships be­
tween international and local NGOs in Indonesia are dominated by international NGOs. 
There is therefore a form of hegemony. Western NGOs create this system not only be­
cause of their capital, but also through the internal weaknesses of local NGOs. How­
ever, as the subsequent chapters will demonstrate, there is passive resistance on the part 
of local NGOs towards international NGOs, which shows that the weak can indeed deny
28
the superior agent total domination. In other words, international NGOs exercise only 
incomplete hegemony.
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Chapter Two
Relationships between International and Local 
NGOs in Indonesia: Literature Review and 
Historical Background
Introduction
This chapter provides a context for the discussion in my thesis. I first review previ­
ous studies of NGOs in Indonesia, looking for discussion of the relationships be­
tween international and local NGOs. Then I present a historical overview of the rela­
tionship between international and Indonesian NGOs. The latter section concludes 
with a review of relevant government regulations affecting the interactions between 
international and local NGOs.
The discussion in this chapter shows that most studies on NGOs in Indonesia discuss 
NGOs in the context of their relations with the state and with democracy. This pat­
tern occurs because NGOs and civil society have widely been seen as playing an im­
portant role in challenging authoritarian rule in Indonesia. Meanwhile, a historical 
survey of the relationship between international and local NGOs in Indonesia reveals 
that international NGOs have long been crucial to Indonesian NGOs. International 
NGOs have been -  and remain -  the main source of funding for almost all local 
NGOs in Indonesia. Most of the literature also views NGOs and civil society in an 
ideal-normative way, and tends to try to construct typologies. In addition, the litera­
ture review demonstrates that although several studies acknowledge there are un­
equal power-relations in the relationships between international and Indonesian 
NGOs, the topic area has been under-researched. No other scholar has provided deep 
empirical research on the everyday interactions between local and international 
NGOs. This dissertation aims to fill this gap in the literature.
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Previous Studies on the Relationships between Local and Interna­
tional NGOs in Indonesia
In starting the discussion in this chapter, it is essential to define what this study 
means by the term NGO. Just like the concepts of civil society and global civil soci­
ety, the term NGO itself has no universal meaning. 1 2*For the purpose of this study, an 
NGO will be defined as a private organisation existing in the realm between the state 
and the market, in the form of a task-oriented, not-for-profit organisation which does 
not seek political power.“ An NGO is the prototypical civil society organisation. Fol­
lowing previous studies on NGOs in Indonesia, and with the purpose of setting 
boundaries for my study, this study also excludes other forms of civil society asso­
ciations such as mass-membership ‘functional groups’, which include trade unions, 
sports clubs and cooperatives, and ‘cultural and religious groups.’
Literature on NGOs in Indonesia mainly focused on two themes: first, the influence 
of NGOs on democratisation, and, second, their relationship with the state. For ex­
ample, Hadiwinata discusses the struggle of Indonesian NGOs working under the 
authoritarian Suharto regime and how they transformed themselves in the post- 
reformasi period.4 Based on a very rich empirical study of three NGOs in Yogya- 
karta, Hadiwinata argues that “in a situation where authoritarian government im­
posed pervasive control on the political activities of society such as the New Order 
Indonesia, NGOs had cautiously confined their activities to community develop­
ment.” 5 However, “when the political setting had been dramatically transformed 
from authoritarianism to democracy, NGOs played their role in the strengthening of 
civil society by forming grassroots coalitions and networks.” 6 Several other studies, 
written at different stages of late authoritarianism or the democratic transition, like­
wise focus on NGOs’ interaction with the state and their role in promoting democ­
racy.7
Most authors consider the topic of the international links of Indonesian NGOs only 
in passing. When the topic is treated in any depth, with a few exceptions, most dis-
1 Ford, 2003: 27. See also Korten, 1987; Hadiwinata, 2003; Eldridge, 1995.
2 This rough working definition draws heavily from Aspinall, 2000: 126; Hadiwinata, 2003: 4-6; 
Riker, 1998: 23-25.
1 Riker 1998: 23-25; Aspinall, 2000: 126-127; Hadiwinata, 2003: 4-6. For an overview on definitions 
of NGOs, see Ford, 2003: 27-29.
4 See Hadiwinata, 2003.
5 Ibid.: 241.
6 Ibid.
7 For example, see Eldridge, 1995; Hikam 1995; Fakih, 1996a; Riker, 1998; Aspinall, 2000; Hadiwi­
nata 2003; Ford, 2003; Suharko, 2005; Indeco de Unie, 1993; Ganie-Rochman, 2002.
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cussion usually concerns funding and the funding dependency of the local NGOs on 
international NGOs.8 For example, both Eldridge (who mostly looks at Indonesian 
NGOs in the period of the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s) and Hadiwinata (who studies 
Indonesian NGOs in the late 1990s and the early 2000s) argue that the linkages be­
tween international and local NGOs in Indonesia are important. They say that such 
linkages are useful for Indonesian NGOs, primarily as a source of funding. In 1995 
Eldridge predicted, accurately as it turned out, that foreign donors would likely be 
the most reliable funding source for Indonesian NGOs, as it was still difficult for 
them to develop alternative funding sources.9 However, beyond showing the link be­
tween funding and the existence of a relationship between international NGOs and 
local NGOs, their studies do not expand on the issue.10
In addition to their brief discussion of the relationships between international and 
local NGOs, a further point that arises from the work of both Eldridge and Hadiwi­
nata is that they did not differentiate between different types of international donors. 
In their view, which appears to be common among scholars of Indonesian civil soci­
ety in general, all international NGOs, state agencies, and development banks fall 
into one category: international agencies.* 11 International agencies are generally 
treated as having a single, undifferentiated role: as funding agencies. Consequently,
discussion of local-international linkages only occur when these scholars discuss
12funding or financial assistance to local NGOs.
One study which discusses links between international and Indonesian NGOs in 
more detail is Sinaga’s dissertation on the role of NGOs in the development process 
in Indonesia in the early 1990s.13 When discussing the external environment con­
fronting Indonesian NGOs, he provides a section which looked at the role of foreign 
aid from international foundations that operate in Indonesia, including the rules and 
procedures to administer foreign-funded development assistance.14 In particular, he 
discusses in brief the activities of German political foundations in Indonesia. Despite
s For example, see Fakih, 1996a: 229-230; Eldridge, 1995: 51-55; Sinaga, 1993: 137-156. Exceptions 
include Uhlin, 1997, and Ford, 2003, both of which provided detailed discussions of the discursive 
and philosophical influences of international NGOs towards local NGOs in Indonesia.
9 Eldridge, 1995: 56.
10 Ibid.: 51-55, Hadiwinata, 2003: 98-100.
11 It should be noted that Ford briefly highlights the complexity of local NGOs’ funding networks by 
citing Fowler’s schema of NGO funding networks. See Ford, 2003: 30; Fowler, 1992b: 11.
12 For discussion of Indonesian NGOs’ funding sources, see Sinaga, 1993; Ginting, 2004; Atmaja, 
2004.
lj Sinaga, 1994.
14 Ibid.: 220-241.
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laying out the fact that these foundations played a significant role in “promoting so­
cial and political space” for local NGOs to “play their part effectively” as well as 
providing helpful background materials, Sinaga did not say much about the relation­
ships between international and local NGOs. 15
Another theme in the literature is that there are unequal power relations between 
international and Indonesian NGOs, as a consequence of Indonesian NGOs’ depend­
ence on their international funding agencies. For instance, Hikam suggests that local 
NGOs’ dependence on international funding “has limited local NGOs’ activities” 
and “created the danger of cooptation by funding agencies.” 16 Sinaga argues that 
there is “widespread criticism that many NGOs were established solely for the pur­
pose of acquiring funds from foreign donor agencies.” 17 Eldridge notes two prob­
lems, namely the tendency of international NGOs to be interested in funding certain 
programs which have less of a priority for the local community, and the problem of 
reporting and accounting requirements from donors which tend to create a burden for 
local NGOs. This, he suggests, will eventually drive local NGO staff away from the 
community. 18
A focus on the unequal relationship between Indonesian NGOs and their interna­
tional counterparts also appears in the Indonesian language literature. The tone of 
this literature is even more critical than that of the English material, and it tends to 
attack the hegemonic nature of “developmentalism” promoted by international aid 
agencies. 19 These authors are critical intellectuals, themselves often connected to the 
NGO world, and many are NGO workers. Sangkoyo, for instance, argues that in the 
context of what he labels as ‘pengerahan sosiaV [social mobilisation] in the non­
governmental sector, Indonesia has become one of the “giant bazaars - the frontline 
for the expansion of the circuit on capital especially for countries that are the alumni 
of World War II” [bazaar raksasa, garis depan bagi perluasan sirkuit modal,
15 Ibid.: 231-241.
16 Hikam, 1999a: 4.
17 Sinaga, 1993: 145.
18 Eldridge 1995: 55.
14 For example, see Irawan et al., 2004; Kuswardono, 2004: 143-164; Wirasapoetra, 2004: 165-172; 
Sangkoyo, 2004: 11-18; Fakih, 1996a: 69-110,170-171; Herdi SRS, 1999: 16; Billah, 1995: 191-195; 
Indeco de Unie, 1993: 2-24. It should be noted that Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, particularly his 
reading on the counter-hegemonic force of civil society was influential among Indonesian NGO activ­
ists, particularly in the 1990s (see for example Indeco de Unie, 1993: 2-24). Fakih and Billah use the 
concept as a framework for their study. See chapter three for more disscussion.
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khususnya bagi negara-negara alumni Perang Dunia If]~ Kuswardono compares 
this “North-South social mobilisation” with “the zoo management” \pengelolaan ke- 
bun binatang] where:
people in the South always have their behaviour and health assessed; 
they are fed, given vitamins, and trained, but remain powerless inside 
their cage. No matter how opportunistic and smart these NGOs in the 
South are at obtaining funds from the North for the purpose of social 
change, they are still unable to change the position of the people in the 
South. Change could always happen, but it could only be seen in the ex­
hibition room which also serves as the experimental laboratory for plan­
ners and donors, and does not significantly change the fate of people of 
the third world countries.21
In addition, Fakih states, “we need to scrutinise funding agencies as they are fully 
contained with the dominant hegemony [developmentalism] and do not question 
social structure.”22 While Billah et.al note that “the relationship between (Indo­
nesian) NGOs and funding agencies in general tend to be vertical, thus often it is 
very easy for hegemony and domination of foreign agencies over NGOs to occur.” 
Billah further suggests that having the money is not the sole reason for why funding 
agencies constantly succeed in negotiating with local NGOs. Instead, he argues that 
having the ability to better express their ideas rationally with strong arguments has 
provided international NGOs with leverage when dealing with local NGOs, which 
usually results in local NGOs “just tag[ging] along behind [mengekor] funding.”24
The third theme that we can identify in the existing literature’s discussion about 
international and local NGO links in Indonesia is the political sensitivity that sur­
rounds the presence of international donors in the country. In the context of his an­
alysis of Indonesian NGOs’ relationship with the Government of Indonesia, Hadiwi- 
nata provides an extreme example of how in 1992 the Indonesian government can­
celled all official governmental assistance from the Netherlands following what was 
called the “Brussels incident.” In this incident, which happened in 1989 during the 
fifth annual conference of an NGO network called INGI (International NGO Group 
on Indonesia) in Brussels, INGI sternly criticised the government’s handling of large
70
20 Sangkoyo, 2004: 13. Sangkoyo claims that the dominant agenda of international funding agencies is 
to search for and control natural resources and markets. In this context, Indonesia, as a former colo­
nized country which gained its independence after World War II, neatly serves their purpose. Ibid.
21 Kuswardono, 2004: 163.
22 Fakih, 1993: 23.
23 Billah, 1993: 9.
24 Ibid.: 23-24.
25 Hadiwinata, 2003: 100. See “Insiden Brussels” in Tempo, 19 August 1989.
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World Bank-funded development projects.“ Other authors highlight how Indonesian 
NGOs’ dependence on foreign aid offends Indonesian nationalism and religious 
sensitivity. These offences have given rise to the charge among some government 
officials and others that local NGOs are “agen barat,” [“Agents of the West”] or 
“antek asing” [“Foreign Lackey”]. This is an especially common theme in Indo- 
nesian news coverage on NGOs.
In summary, existing scholarly literature and public discussion of Indonesian NGOs 
raises several themes: funding dependence, asymmetrical power relationships and 
domestic ‘sensitivity’ towards the relationship between international and local 
NGOs. In other words, the existing literature mainly presents the problematic face of 
the relationship.“ The literature suggests that the relationship between local and in­
ternational NGOs is a source of tension both within the NGO community and more 
widely in Indonesia. However, although these existing studies about NGOs have 
provided essential background information for this study, most of them do not ex­
plore the link between international and local NGOs thoroughly. Claims about the 
relationship between international and local NGOs are made without providing de­
tailed examples or case studies. This research will fill this gap in the literature by 
providing a study of the relationship between international and local NGOs in Indo­
nesia with an empirical depth that has been missing so far. This research will also 
integrate original data from both sides of the national/international divide, something 
that no other studies have done systematically.
As has been suggested in the previous chapter, the concerns of this study are ex­
plored by examining two related empirical issues. The first issue is the day-to-day 
habits and processes through which the power relations between international and
26 See also Eldridge 1995: 195-201; Herdi SRS 1999: 3. I will discuss this case further in my histori­
cal overview later in this chapter.
27 For example, see; “Dituding Antek Asing, YLBHI Tak Pusing” in Jawa Pos, 20 June 2006; “Antek 
Asing Pengganggu Kedaulatan NKRI Selalu Berubah Bentuk” in Berita Sore, 15 August 2007; “In- 
tervensi Asing Pemerintah Diminta Audit Dana LSM,” in Kompas, 28 June 2006; “LSM, Suara Do­
nor Atau Suara Rakyat?” in Suara Pembaruan, 22 June 2004; “Dikader Funding” in NU Online, 24 
August 2005.
[http://www.nu.or.id/page.php?lang=id&menu=news_view&news_id-7331 accessed on 6 October 
2007], Newspaper coverage also include oftentimes critical opinion of government official towards 
NGOs, mostly during the New Order period, but also as recent as late 2008. See for example, “Me- 
nengok Peran LSM di Mata Pemerintah” in Bernas, 5 February 1992; “Ada LSM Yang Jadi Tangan 
Belanda” in Jawa Pos 31 March 1992; “LSM Diminta Tetap Junjung Harkat dan Martabat Bangsa” in 
Bernas, 12 May 1992; “Menko Polkam Tentang LSM” in Jawa Pos 16 January 1992; “Menhankam 
LB Moerdani: Kegiatan dan Pendanaan LSM Perlu Diteliti” in Suara Merdeka, 15 February 1992; 
“Menhan: Jangan Jadi Preman Moral” in Kompas, 23 December 2008.
2S It should be noted also that there exists literature which presents more positive interpretations of the 
international link in fostering democratic governance in Indonesia. For example, see Riker, 2002.
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local NGOs are mediated. In other words, the study looks at the everyday practices 
of local and international NGOs. The second focus is the perspectives held by inter­
national and local NGOs themselves about the problems or sources of tension in 
their relationships. This study will demonstrate that although domination of interna­
tional NGOs in their relationships with Indonesian NGOs is apparent, the concept of 
hegemony is inadequate in explaining the relationship between international and 
local NGOs in Indonesia. Instead, this study argues that at the ideological level, the 
domination of international NGOs is met with resistance and non-compliance by lo­
cal NGOs.
Historical Overview of the Relationships between Local and Inter­
national NGOs in Indonesia
The number of both international and local NGOs working in Indonesia has in­
creased significantly over the last decade. According to records held by the Depart­
ment of Foreign Affairs in 2006, there were 106 international NGOs working in In­
donesia. The department’s data only includes those NGOs which have established an 
in-country office and a formal structure in Indonesia. There are of course many 
international NGOs that do not set up an office in Indonesia, yet operate in Indonesia 
and provide funding to local organisations from abroad. However, this number can 
increase sharply in response to an emergency. For example, after the earthquake in 
Yogyakarta in 2006, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UN-OCHA) registered 140 international NGOs working in the province. 
Despite occasional peaks in NGO activity it is true nevertheless that the overall num­
ber of NGOs (foreign and domestic) in Indonesia has been growing for some time. 
Based on data from the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics, it is believed that the number 
of Indonesian NGOs in Indonesia has grown from around 10,000 in 1996 to around 
70,000 in 2000.29
Relationships between international and local NGOs fall into at least four categories. 
First, there is provision of funds or grants by international NGOs to local NGOs. 
This form is by far the most common form of interaction. An example of this is the 
relationship between Insist and its international counterparts examined in chapter 
two. Second, several international NGOs also provide technical assistance, which is 
usually in the form of training and workshops, for local NGOs. An example of this 
kind of relationship is an NGO Management Certificate training program for mid-
29 Hadiwinata, 2003: 1.
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level Indonesian NGO managers, conducted by the National Democratic Institute 
(NDI) in cooperation with the Centre for Global Civil Society Studies (PACIVIS) at 
the University of Indonesia.30 This form of cooperation is very common among de­
velopment NGOs. Thirdly, there are relationships which are a combination of the 
first and second models. This form usually takes place in a long-term program. As an 
illustration of the third hybrid type the Asia Foundation, apart from providing grants, 
has a professional team of auditors, accountants and grantee trainers to provide tech- 
nical assistance on financial and grants management to its grantees. The fourth 
classification comes when local and international NGOs join a network. These net­
works are usually single issue groupings, such as The World Rainforest Movement, 
or the Jubilee South Asia/Pacific Movement on Debt and Development. Another ex­
ample is INFID (International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development), which is a 
prominent forum for international and Indonesian NGOs concerned with Indonesia’s 
development.32 These networks advocate an increase in public awareness and the 
influence of government policy. The act of local NGOs to “bypass their state and 
directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from 
outside” is what Keck and Sikkink call the “the boomerang pattern.”33
The involvement of international NGOs in Indonesia after the country declared its 
independence in 1945 can be traced as far back as the first decade of Indonesian in­
dependence. The Ford Foundation, for example, started its work in Indonesia in 1953 
and since then has been an influential grant provider in the country. During its first 
two decades in Indonesia the Ford Foundation focused on educational activities 
(most notably teacher training and scholarship programs and English-language edu­
cation). Thus, the foundation mainly worked with the Indonesian government’s ag­
encies and universities.34 Another prominent international NGO which established 
itself in Indonesia early in the country’s history is the Asia Foundation, a different 
American NGO which started its work in Indonesia in 1955. The first two decades of 
the Asia Foundation’s activities in Indonesia also revolved around education which 
included the provision of books through its “Books for Asia Program.” From 1955 to
30 Http://www.ndi.org/indonesia?page=0,l#NGOManagementCertificateProgramTraining [accessed 
on 23 February 2009],
31 See “Finance and Grants Management: Services to Donors and Grantees,” The Asia Foundation 
Brochure.
32 INFID is previously known as INGI -  the network mentioned on p.32.
33 Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 12-13.
34 See Bresnan, 2006; Ford Foundation, 2003; Ford Foundation, 1970.
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2006, the Asia Foundation provided over two million books to various educational 
institutions, public libraries, government agencies and civil society organisations.35
The Sukarno Era: 1945-1966
The scarce information available on international NGO activities in Indonesia during 
the Sukarno era indicates that these organisations mainly focused on working with 
the Indonesian government and universities at that time.36 As an illustration, one es­
timate is that ninety percent of the Ford Foundation’s assistance to Indonesia up to 
1970 was allocated for education and the “the development of Teachers Training In­
stitutions, English Language and Technical Education, Faculties of Economics, eco-
T7nomic and social research, assistance to national planning, and management.”
Another example of an international program in the early years of independence is 
the Australian Volunteer Graduate Scheme for Indonesia. The scheme, which was 
the embryo of the Australian Volunteers Abroad program, was established in the 
early 1950s with the central notion that “Australians possessing specific skills and 
qualifications should be employed by Indonesian government or voluntary agencies
T O
at local rates of pay and conditions.” Almost all of the forty-one participants of the 
scheme worked for government ministries, hospitals, research institutes and universi- 
ties.39
The first two decades after Indonesia’s independence was an era of turbulent nation­
building characterised by increasing hostility towards foreigners, combined with the 
Cold War atmosphere, that culminated in President Sukarno’s famous anti-American 
“go to hell with your aid” speech in 1964. This environment was not conducive to 
international NGOs activities. The Ford Foundation closed its office in Indonesia for 
eighteen months from mid-1965 to early 1967.40 In his 2006 memoirs of the Ford
35 Http://www.asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Indobookstest.pdf [accessed on 18 February 2009].
36 Both Ford Foundation and The Asia Foundation published a glossy coffee-table book about their 
work in Indonesia to commemorate the 50 year anniversary of their operations in the country.
37 Ford Foundation, 1970: 29. Other program areas between the 1963-1970 period were agriculture, 
population and humanities. With regards to scholarship provision, this report stated that, up to 1970, 
the Foundation had given approximately 508 individual awards for long-term studies and short-term 
study and observations (Ford Foundation, 1970: 36).
3lS Eldridge, 1979: 131. Anther international volunteer scheme during the early 1960s in Indonesia was 
the U.S Peace Corps. The organisation started in 1963, and sent a total of 36 volunteers to Indonesia 
before communist harassment caused Peace Corps to leave Indonesia in April 1965. See Bresnan, 
2006: 49-50; Ricklefs, 1993: 278.
http://www.peacecorps.gov/index.cfm?shell-learn.wherepc.asia&noflash=y#Indonesia [accessed on 5 
February 2009].
’4 For the participants list, see Southall, 1964: 255.
40 See Bresnan, 2006: 53-64.
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Foundation’s first twenty years in Indonesia, the former Ford Foundation Jakarta 
representative reflected on the unfriendliness towards foreigners in Jakarta during the 
first half of 1960s. According to this source, because of the weakness of public insti­
tutions at the time, the scarcity of English language material as well as the increasing 
political tension:
One did not need to be able to read Indonesian to know what it meant to 
see Uncle Sam being battered by a young man wearing a peci, that dis­
tinct black cap that many Indonesians wear.41
In spite of the chaotic situation in Indonesia during the Sukarno period, the case of 
the Ford Foundation shows there was a close relationship between the Foundation’s 
staff and high Indonesian Government official. At one time this even included Presi­
dent Sukarno himself.42 For example, Adam Malik, the Indonesian Minister of 
Commerce in the early 1960s, personally endorsed the use of blocked funds which 
enabled the Foundation to receive a better exchange rate than the rate normally 
available at the bank.43 Another instance of high-level support was a request of the 
foundation’s representative in 1964 to Sukarno for thirteen Indonesian lecturers un­
dertaking the Foundation scholarship to be able to continue studying in the U.S re­
gardless of Indonesia’s decision to ban Indonesians studying abroad (this was a pol­
icy decision that came after a U.S-Indonesia dispute over Indonesia’s opposition to 
the federation of Malaysia and Sukarno’s pro-Moscow foreign policy)."’"’ Such ex­
amples of close personal relations are highly unlikely to take place today at such sen­
ior levels in the engagement between international organisations and the Indonesian 
government (with the possible exception of organisations like the World Bank). This 
closeness was due to the much narrower nature of the Indonesian political elite at
41 Ibid.: 54. John Bresnan worked for the Ford Foundation in Indonesia during 1961-1965 (as Assis­
tant Representative) and 1969-1973 (as Representative). He started his professional career at the U.S 
Foreign Service, and the Ford Foundation’s headquarter in New York before going to Indonesia. After 
leaving Indonesia, he worked as the Ford Foundation Head of the Office for Asia and the Pacific in 
New York (1973-1982) and afterwards, as Senior Research Scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian 
Institute at Columbia University (Ford Foundation, 2003: 120; Bresnan, 2006). In 2003, President 
Megawati awarded Bresnan with Bintang Jasa Pratama, Indonesia’s highest award for non- 
Indonesians. The third American to receive such award (the other two were George Kahin and Clif­
ford Geertz), Bresnan was nominated by a substantial number of academics who received Ford’s 
scholarship during Bresnan’s tenure (Ford Foundation, 2003: 120).
42 Ford Foundation, 2003: 120.
43 Bresnan, 2006: 82.
44 Ford Foundation, 2003: 120; Bresnan, 2006: 48-49. Frank Miller, the Foundation Representative at 
that time, was said to be well known in the Presidential Palace and he often had breakfast with Su­
karno. In his memoir, Bresnan notes the Sukarno had once told Miller that if he (Miller) “would let 
Sukarno pick out a wife for him, he (Sukarno) would dance at the wedding.” (Bresnan, 2006: 28).
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that time, which allowed senior international agencies to gain closer access to senior 
political figures than is the case today.
The way in which the Ford Foundation first began its engagement with Indonesia 
provides a good explanation of the Foundation’s close relationship to government: 
initially it was Indonesian officials, both in Washington and Jakarta, who first ap­
proached U.S organisations for assistance with English-language and economics 
training.45 The Foundation responded by sending a team to Indonesia in 1952 to con­
duct a needs assessment. Sukarno’s acquiescence resulted in the immediate approval 
of “$ 150,000 to bring teachers of English to Indonesia for the 1953 to 1954 school 
year.”46
However there was relatively little interaction between local and international NGOs 
during the Sukarno era for one simple reason: before the late 1960s and early 1970s 
very few Indonesian NGOs existed.47 Literature on Indonesian NGOs identify the 
Indonesian Planned Parenthood Association, Perknmpulan Keluarga Berencana In­
donesia (PKBI), which was established in 1957, as among the first (if not the first) 
Indonesian NGOs established after independence. 1 One of the earliest records o f a
45 Bresnan, 2006: 31-33.
46 Ibid.: 32.
4' For example, see Hadiwinata, 2003: 91; Suharko, 2005: 99; Fakih, 1995: 113; Hikam, 1999b. It 
should be noted that, as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, one character of the definition of 
NGOs used for this study is that they are non-membership-based organisations. Therefore this defini­
tion excludes voluntary, self-reliant, and religious-affiliated groups and activities that have been 
deeply rooted in Indonesia since the colonial era. Previous rural studies suggest grass-roots level vol­
untary activities done in the spirit of traditional gotong royong [mutual-help] groups, particularly 
among the rural villages had existed for a long time (see Hadiwinata, 2003: 90). In addition, the colo­
nial era saw the establishment of religious and educational organisations such as Budi Utomo, Taman 
Siswa, Sarekat Islam, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah (Fakih, 1995: 113; Suharko, 2005: 99; 
Whitelum, 2003: 148-153; Sinaga, 1994: 81, quoted in Hadiwinata, 2003: 90). Budi Utomo and 
Sarekat Islam are considered the embryos of Indonesia’s nationalist movement (see for example Su­
harko, 2005; Riker, 1998). Furthermore, the 1950s and 1960s witnessed the flourishing of associa- 
tional life with most groups affiliated with the major political parties’ ideological aliran [streams] 
(Bunnell, 1996: 181 quoted in Whitelum, 2003: 152, Aspinall, 2004: 62). Therefore, the character of 
civil society in the 1950s and 1960s, as Aspinall argues, was “deeply polarized as was political life 
more generally” and “influenced by or affiliated to political parties that aimed to hold or seize politi­
cal power, and that had conflicting ideological vision of Indonesian society.” (Aspinall, 2004: 62) 
Examples of such organisations are left-wing grass-roots groups affiliated with the Indonesian Com­
munist Party (PKJ) such as the BTI (Indonesian Peasants Group) and GERWANI (Indonesian Women 
Movement) (Hadiwinata, 2003: 90), and the Pancasila-based Farmers Association (IPP) established 
in 1958, which evolved later into a large NGO, Bina Swadaya (interview with Bambang Ismawan, 27 
October 2005; Bina Swadaya Profile, 2005). However the early New Order era saw these grassroots- 
mass-based organisations dissolve (see Hadiwinata, 2003: 90-91; Aspinall, 2000: 44) and be replaced 
by state-sponsored organisations such as KNPI (Indonesian National Youth Committee) and SPSI 
(All Indonesia Workers’ Union) (Hadiwinata, 2003: 91).
4S See for example, Eldridge 1995 and Riker 1998 quoted in Sakai 2002:162; Suharko 2005: 99. Other 
NGOs established in the 1950s are The Christian Foundation for Public Health (YAKK.UM), as noted 
by Eldridge (1979: 128), and The Institute of Economic and Social Research (LPEM) (Ford Founda­
tion, 2003: 47).
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relationship between an international and a local NGO in Indonesia was the Ford 
Foundation’s assistance to PKBI. The relationship started in the early 1960s in the 
form of “modest assistance” which included the services of a Ford Foundation con­
sultant who was a family planning specialist.49
As the Sukarno administration became increasingly left-leaning in its political orien­
tation in the 1960s, it began severing links with the Western world -  first from the 
United Nations in January 1965, then the International Monetary Fund, Interpol and 
World Bank in August 1965. In this environment it became increasingly difficult for 
international NGOs to work in Indonesia.50 The Ford Foundation, one of the few re­
maining international agencies in Jakarta, closed its office in June 1965 and did not 
return to Indonesia until eighteen months later, after Suharto assumed control of the 
country.51
The New Order Era: 1966-1998
The Suharto period ushered in a massive social, political and economic overhaul in 
Indonesia. One of the top priorities of the Suharto regime was economic develop­
ment, and this remained a priority throughout the entire New Order. The urgent need 
for economic aid saw Indonesia actively restore its formal links with western nations 
in the attempt to attract material aid as well as technical assistance. “ As an illustra­
tion, Indonesia rejoined the United Nations in April 1966, and in May 1966 the In­
donesian Foreign Ministry announced that it would rejoin the International Monetary 
Fund.53
Given the rightwing character of the government, ties with the communist world 
were instantly downgraded. Diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of 
China were formally ‘frozen’ on 31 October 1967.54 This ideological reversal led to 
a boon for western NGOs, whose value for the government’s development program
49 Ford Foundation, 2003: 108. Sukarno opposed the family planning movement. The early days of 
PKBI in the Old Order consisted of “a guerilla coalition of doctors, gynecologists, nurses, and women 
volunteers” who were involved in smuggling contraceptives into Indonesia through the diplomatic 
pouch and receiving, distributing and explaining the use of contraceptives to women in the communi­
ties (Ford Foundation, 2003: 108). It was under the Suharto government that family planning became 
a state policy and the Ford Foundation started providing substantial funding to it (See Ford Founda­
tion 1970: 34-35). For Ford Foundation Consultant’s early account of the national family planning 
program, see Ryder and Suwardjono, 1971: 128-132.
50 Ricklefs, 1993: 280.
51 For a detailed account on the closing of the Ford Foundation’s office, see Bresnan, 2006: 53-64.
52 See Ricklefs, 1993: 290; Hadiwinata, 2003: 92-93.
53 Ricklefs, 1993: 290
54 Ibid.
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was dramatically enhanced. Meanwhile, the U.S Embassy in Jakarta reported in late 
1965 that it had been approached by Indonesian generals asking for support to obtain 
various supplies from military hardware to basic staples.55 Initially sceptical, foreign 
nations soon started to provide assistance to Indonesia after Suharto took power.56
The growth of a development aid sector in Indonesia consequently encouraged the 
growth of both local and international NGOs in the country. Already in 1967, an in­
ternational NGO directory listed fifty international NGOs with activities in Indone­
sia, with almost sixty percent of these groups focused on educational and training, 
followed by health and sanitation.57 This figure is a modest estimate, as the directory 
did not survey American and Australian NGOs. x
In regards to local NGOs, the first decade of the New Order era was defined by the 
growth of NGOs that were mostly engaged in community development. Some schol­
ars have dubbed these early New Order NGOs as the first generation of local NGOs 
in Indonesia.59 Included in this era were organisations such as Bina Swadaya, Dian 
Desa, and YIS which later became mainstream NGOs.60 These organisations “were 
formed and dedicated entirely to community development” and “the promotion of 
self-management activities at [the] village level.”61
Scholars have suggested that the politics of the early Suharto era played a significant 
role in boosting the growth of community development oriented NGOs.6“ When the 
New Order came to power, it banned grass-roots political activities particularly the 
left-wing organisations associated with Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and
55 Simpson, 2003: 337.
See for example, Eldridge, 1993: 7-9; Simpson, 2003: 335-343.
57 See OECD-ICVA Directory, 1967: 1038-1045.
58 At the time of the publication, Australia was not yet a member of the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development who published the directory, while the directory for the US NGOs 
working abroad already existed (See for example, Technical Assistance Information Clearing House, 
1964). For discussion of Australian NGOs working in Indonesia in the first decade of the New Order, 
see Eldridge, 1979: 121-155.
59 For example, Suharko, 2005: 99; Hadiwinata, 2003: 91.
60 The Bina Swadaya foundation was founded in 1967 in Jakarta and focused on fanners, including by 
providing microcredit through small-scale cooperatives [usaha bersama - UB]. The Dian Desa foun­
dation was established in 1972 in Yogyakarta and focused on poor communities through the promo­
tion of “appropriate technology” [tehnologi tepat guna], The Yayasan Indonesia Sejahtera [YIS] was 
formed in 1974 in Solo and works in community development activities. (See Eldridge, 1995: 58-72). 
Eldridge argues that these three large, well-established NGOs “fit broadly” within the first type of his 
classification of Indonesian NGOs, namely “High-level Cooperation Grass-roots Development” 
which “accommodate the Indonesian government” and “mobilize popular self management.” (Ibid.) 
Other similar characteristics of these three NGOs, as noted by Eldridge, were their informal links with 
churches (Eldridge, 1995: 57). For discussion of the influence of religion in the NGO sector and its 
by-products, see Eldridge, 1995: 170-183.
61 Hadad, 1983: 3, quoted in Hadiwinata, 2003: 91.
62 See for example, Aspinall, 2000: 44-46; Hadiwinata, 2003: 91-92; Riker, 1998: 136-140.
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weakened mass-based organisations. The government created a repressive political 
environment which, as Aspinall has argued, did not allow independent space for non­
state discourse in the formal political sphere.64 NGOs thus became an alternative 
means of forming non-state aligned movements as substitutes for the politically 
aligned groups which had defined Indonesian society during the Sukarno era.65 Ac­
cording to Aspinall:
NGOs were tolerated because of the middle class and New Order ori­
gins of their leaders and because of their particularistic, partial goals.
Their leaders became expert in the arts of political survival, consciously 
striving to avoid confrontation with the state. Even where their leaders 
harboured far-reaching social and political aims, NGOs did not claim to 
organise a struggle for political power, nor to mobilise a mass base.66
In line with Aspinall’s observation, Hadiwinata argues that because these early 
NGOs confined themselves to the field of community development, they were able 
to prove to the New Order regime that they were not interested in political activi- 
ties. For the same reason, Indonesian NGO leaders adopted the title Lembaga Swa­
daya Masyarakat [Self-reliant organisation] or LSM in the late 1970s. The original 
term Organisasi Non-Pemerintah (ORNOP), the Indonesian translation of NGO, was 
perceived by Indonesian NGO leaders as having anti-government connotations.
/: *5
63 Hadiwinata, 2003:90-91.
64 Aspinall, 2000: 44.
65 Ibid.: 44-45.
66 Ibid.: 131. Aspinall notes that many influential NGOs were founded by former supporters of the 
military in 1965. He suggested that “some NGOs, even the most liberal like the Legal Aid Institute 
(LBH), initially received political and financial sponsorship form leading officials.” Aspinall, 2000: 
131.
67 Hadiwinata, 2003:91.
6S See for example, Aspinall, 2000: 46; Billah, Busyairi and Aly, 1993: 3-5; Setiawan, 1996: 36-37 
quoted in Sakai, 2002: 162. In addition, some NGO leaders considered the term ORNOP as “too gen­
eral” [terlalu Inas] thus the term LSM was created to label those organisations which “serve in devel­
opment” (Interview with Bambang Ismawan, 27 October 2005). Bambang Ismawan, who admitted 
that his organisation played a role in creating the term LSM, also explained that another reason why 
they proposed LSM was because the term promoted social self-reliance [kemandirian rakyat] -  a con­
cept which development NGOs at the time tried to encourage. Bina Swadaya labelled itself as a Lem­
baga Pengembangan Swadaya Masyarakat [LPSM - Self-Reliant Development Organisation]. This 
type of NGO is one category above an LSM under Eldridge’s system of categorisation. Yappika, an 
organisation formed to channel funding from Canada, is another example of an LPSM. The reformasi 
era saw the term ORNOP being used more frequently than in the Suharto era, along with the more 
common term for NGO since the early 1980s’ LSM (Setiawan, 2000, quoted in Sakai, 2002: 162). 
Bambang Ismawan is one of the leading figures in Indonesia’s NGO sector. He led Bina Swadaya, 
one of Indonesia’s well established NGOs, for four decades before retiring in 2008. He is also one of 
the founders of Seb’etariat Bina Desa, a well known NGO focusing on rural issues that was estab­
lished in 1975. We will learn more about the Bina Swadaya Foundation in later chapters. For Bam­
bang Ismawan and Bina Swadaya's profile, see “Bambang Ismawan: BSF a ‘virus’ to empower the 
poor” in the Jakarta Post, 3 January 2007; “Bambang Ismawan Menginspirasi Indonesia” in Kompas, 
7 June 2007; Sekretariat Bina Desa, 2005: 13; http://www.binaswadaya.org.
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However, the major reason behind the decision of local NGOs to be non- 
confrontational towards the state and to actively engage the New Order administra­
tion was mostly because the NGO founders considered their organisations “means to 
promote participation in the New Order modernisation project” and not because of 
“disappointment with the government.”69 As an example, after 1965 the founder of 
the early NGO Ikatan Petani Pancasila changed the name of his NGO to Bina Swa- 
daya and began referring to his organisation as a “social economic development 
agency.”70 During the early years of the New Order the founder steered his NGO 
into a strategy he described as a “development approach” marked by the “promotion 
of self-help” for rural communities and “having a dialogue with the government.”71
Fakih argues that the conformist approach of Indonesian NGOs in the 1970s was 
typical of the “reformist” attitude that dominated at the time. The main concerns of 
these NGOs, “based on the rationale of underdevelopment,” was to “to change tradi­
tional beliefs, attitudes, values and institutions [to help] people to become modem 
through creating participatory action programs among rural small business groups,” 
without “questioning the existing structure and the dominant hegemony.” Thus Fakih 
argues local NGOs in the early New Order era fell in line with the “the developmen- 
talist ideology being promoted by the modernising elites of the military govern­
ment.”73
A different interpretation of the decision of NGOs to engage with the Indonesian 
government was that they wanted to obtain government support for their programs.74 
Aspinall suggests that many NGOs in Indonesia were founded with government offi- 
cials as their patrons. Examples included the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) with the 
Jakarta Governor Ah Sadikin as its sponsor, and the Institute for Economic and So­
cial Research, Education and Information (LP3ES) which was sponsored by several 
technocrat ministers such as Soemitro Djojohadikusumo, Ali Wardhana and Emil
69 Aspinall, 2000: 45.
70 Interview with Bambang Ismawan, 27 October 2005. During this interview, he explained that Bina 
Swadaya's journey has three phases. Prior to the New Order, he suggested that Bina Swadaya (which 
was then Ikatan Petani Pancasila) was in its “social movement period” characterised by a mass- 
organisation approach, with activities aimed “to mainstream the fight for social economic 
empowerment of poor people.” He labeled after-the-New-Order period as a “social entrepreneur” pe­
riod where the organisation focused on advocacy through cooperation with other organisations.
71 Ibid. Bina Swadaya was renowned for its cooperative engagement with the Indonesian government 
during the New Order era. Bambang Ismawan admitted that his organisation could develop well be­
cause of this approach.
72 Fakih, 1995: 117-118.
73 Ibid.: 114. See chapter one for discussion of Indonesian NGO typologies and “developmentalism.”
74 Aspinall, 2000: 45.
75 Ibid.
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Salim.76 Consequently, as Aspinall argued, numerous Indonesian NGO leaders sup­
ported a “strictly complementary” role to the New Order government.77
However, the 1970s was also a period in which the role of international NGOs as 
foundations become steadily more important in funding local NGOs. For example, 
Sinaga notes that from the year 1971 to 1992, 62% of funds provided by the German 
Foundation, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung [KAS] was channeled to NGOs. While an­
other German Foundation, Friedrich Nieumann Stiftung [FNS] channeled all of its 
funds to NGOs in various sectors. The relationship between international and local 
NGOs in the first decade of the New Order period was above all thus characterised 
by international NGOs providing funding in the field of community development, 
which was in line with the Indonesian government’s policy. As noted by Aspinall 
and Mietzner:
In the 1970s, most support for Indonesian NGOs was framed in terms of 
promoting alternative development and was directed at supporting mi­
cro credit, health and similar programs. In American development cir­
cles, these aid projects were jokingly referred to as “silkworm” pro­
grams, alluding to a particular grant that had focused on income- 
generation for Indonesian silkworm farmers.79
The nature of the relationship between international and Indonesian NGOs during 
this period was also less bureaucratic than it became later. According to a veteran 
NGO activist, Roem Topatimasang, in the 1970s-1980s, local and international 
NGOs could sit together and develop a program. In this era international NGOs did 
not act as what he labeled “brokers” for the programs of other international donors.
O A
According to Roem, this situation changed the 1990s. Moreover, funding to local 
NGOs had been less project-based and instead, international NGOs would some­
times provide long-term institutional support. For example, from 1971 to 1978,
76 Eldridge, 1995: 86; Aspinall, 2000: 46.
77 Aspinall, 2000: 46. As an example, Aspinall suggested the articles in Prisma: The Indonesian Indi­
cator, No. 28, 1983 (particularly articles by Hadad, Hendrata, Hainsworth, Salim and Witular). Start­
ing in the mid-1980s, however, as NGOs became more critical of the government, the government 
responded by increasing restrictions in its regulations and supervision of NGOs. Tension with the 
government started to develop and reached its peak in the 1990s. For discussion of NGOs as an oppo­
sitional movement, see the study of Aspinall (2000: 129-159). For comprehensive history of Indone­
sian NGOs, which include rules and relations which govern NGOs in Indonesia, see Hadiwinata, 
2003: 90-119; Eldridge, 1995: 45-51; Sinaga, 1994: 206-211. As mentioned in chapter one, Hadiwi­
nata continued Eldridge’s insightful study which ended in the early 1990s.
78 Sinaga, 1994: 237.
79 Aspinall and Mietzner, 2008: 19.
80 The notion of international NGOs as “brokers” is popular with a majority of my informants, local 
NGO workers in particular hold this view. Interview with Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007. 
Roem Topatimasang has almost three decades of experience in the NGO sector. More information 
about Roem is in chapter three on Insist.
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LP3ES was completely funded by its major donor, the German Foundation, FNS, 
and the funding enabled them to purchase an office in West Jakarta.81
The early 1980s marked a widening of activities involved in the relationships be­
tween international and Indonesian NGOs, with international NGOs starting to pro­
vide more support to Indonesian advocacy NGOs, such as the Legal Aid Institute 
(LBH) and labour organisations.82 As commentators on the Indonesian NGO sector 
have pointed out, the behaviour of Indonesian NGOs in the early Suharto period pro­
vides an interesting contrast with the behaviour of NGOs in the late Suharto period 
especially the 1990s; this era saw the growth of NGOs that were critical of the gov­
ernment as well as the emergence of advocacy oriented NGOs raising issues like the 
environment and human rights.
An important development marking this shift was the formation of INGI, a network 
of Indonesian NGOs in cooperation with a number of international NGOs. INGI was 
originally formed in 1985 to advise and inform the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group 
for Indonesia) -  a Dutch Government-led international aid consortium for Indonesia 
-  on IGGI-funded development projects in Indonesia. But INGI eventually evolved 
to include efforts to influence the Indonesian government’s development policies. 
As a coalition of local NGOs and their international partners and donors, INGI repre­
sented a dramatic new model of local-international partnership in the NGO sector, 
with at least an understanding that this was a body in which there would be formal 
equality between Indonesian and international NGOs, and where their collaborative 
efforts would be able to bring about policy changes that organisations working in 
isolation would not be able to achieve. It was an idealistic vision.
As previously noted, one of INGI’s controversial acts occurred during its annual 
meeting with donors, known as the “Brussels Incident” in 1989, where INGI 
launched harsh criticism on donor-funded large projects, particularly on the Kedung 
Ombo dam project in Central Java where INGI accused the Indonesian government 
of employing political intimidation and failing to adequately compensate evicted vil-
81 See “Yang Pelat Merah dan Yang Swasta,” in Tempo 10/XXI 4 May 1991. For discussion about 
FNS and other German Foundations activities in Indonesia, see Sinaga, 1994: 231-241.
82 Aspinall and Mietzner, 2008: 19.
83 For discussion of the growth of critical NGOs, see Hadiwinata, 2003: 72-75. For a general discus­
sion of Indonesian NGOs during the period, see for example, Hadiwinata, 2003: 93-101; Fakih, 1995: 
103-123; Aspinall, 2000: 135-142.
84 Hadiwinata, 2003: 98; Eldridge, 1995: 195.
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o c
lagers. ' Scholars note that this act was one of the catalysts behind a change in Dutch 
policy toward Indonesia after 1989, which became more sharply critical of the Su­
harto government’s human rights record. The Dutch attempted to attach human 
rights protection as a condition of development assistance. As noted earlier, the New 
Order responded by refusing to receive further Dutch government aid and disbanded 
IGGIin 1992.86
This response by the Indonesian government towards NGO attacks, apart from dis­
playing the New Order’s strong bargaining power towards the international world at 
that time, also shows the propensity of the New Order government to try to limit the 
influence of Indonesian NGOs. The Suharto government continued to tighten regula­
tions towards NGOs, not only those from Indonesia but also their international 
donors. As a result, a former country director of a prominent international NGO in 
Indonesia in the early 1990s, Paul McCarthy, recalls the difficulties that international 
NGOs had in building relationships with local NGOs during the New Order era:
Certainly during the New Order era [it was] very difficult to have a 
good relationship due to high level of government interference. Cer­
tainly [it was hard] to support Indonesian organisations that were work­
ing in advocacy or with political element at all. Historically, it was dif­
ficult to maintain [a good relationship with local NGOs] except in the 
field of development or complimentary to the government. It was not 
impossible, but certainly it was difficult.88
Yet it should be noted that government regulations concerning international donors’ 
assistance towards local NGOs were limited to international NGOs with offices in 
Indonesia. As Aspinall and Mietzner note, foreign NGOs with members who visited 
Indonesia periodically were not as bound by government restrictions as other foreign 
NGOs in Indonesia and that it was these organisations that supplied most funds for 
politically sensitive issues.89 In this regard, they also suggest the particular signifi­
cance of “European groups (many of which had Christian backgrounds and were in-
85 Hadiwinata, 2003: 99; Sinaga, 1994: 172; Eldridge, 1995: 198.
86 For discussion of INGI and details of this particular incident, see Eldridge, 1995: 195-201; Aspinall 
and Mietzner, 2008: 16-18.
87 See for example, Riker, 1998: 364-365.
88 Interview with Paul McCarthy, 22 September 2005. After working for CARE, Paul McCarthy then 
turned to work as civil society specialist for the World Bank. He followed what is widely considered a 
typical professional career path in the international development sector, in which most international 
NGO staff usually end up working as a consultant for multilateral or bilateral funding agencies. For 
an insightful discussion on this subject, see Dichter, 2003.
84 Aspinall and Mietzner, 2008: 19. NOVIB (Nederlandse Organisatie Voor Internationale Bijstand -  
Dutch Organisation for International Aid) is an example of such an organisation without an office in 
Indonesia. It was the primary source of funding for the Legal Aid Institute (LBH), the leading human 
rights NGO in Indonesia.
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fluenced by the growth of social justice ideas in both Protestant and Catholic interna­
tional development agencies through the 1980s).”90 This factor of unregulated fund­
ing from non-resident international NGOs suggests a loop hole which NGOs took 
advantage of, and points to the partial effectiveness of government control of inter­
national and local NGO activities in Indonesia.91
Generally speaking, local NGO activists look back even to the late Suharto period as 
one in which local NGOs’ relations with their international and partners were rela­
tively open, equal and non-bureaucratic. Long-time NGO workers usually suggest 
the relationships became more bureaucratic and more dependent on bilateral and 
multilateral donor agencies only from the late 1990s, after reformasi. One NGO 
scholar and former international NGO Director in the late 1990s, Kastorius Sinaga, 
recalls: “prior to reformasi, [international and local NGOs] created a program to­
gether. Now the relationship has become industrial: [the internationals] subcontract, 
[their conditions demand] less staff, no joint program.” " Don K. Marut adds, “In the 
past,” he says, “local NGOs could decide the direction of their programs, such as 
what happened with the cooperation of LBH [The Legal Aid Institute] and NOVIB 
[the Dutch Oxfam]. Nowadays of course this is no longer feasible.” 93 He points to 
the fact that international NGOs became more and more dependent on funding from 
Northern governments, which consequently resulted in their policy changes to follow 
donors, the governments of states: “Now international NGO policies have to be 
inline with the general development policy of their countries.” In the end, he ob­
serves this changed the nature of the relationships between international and local 
NGOs.94
Although my research confirms the view among veteran local NGO workers that re­
lationships became more bureaucratic, I have not been able to determine the specific 
origins of this trend in the case of Indonesia. Speculatively I assume that the reason 
why international NGOs began to impose heavier accounting standards on Indone­
sian NGOs was not because international NGOs became more dependent on the aid 
budgets of Northern governments. International NGOs have always been dependent 
on government aid. Rather what probably changed was the volume of funds, which
90 Ibid.
91 The Indonesian government attempted to rectify this matter by issuing several laws and regulations 
which required Indonesian NGOs to report any funding they received from international NGOs.
92 Interview with Kastorius Sinaga, 5 August 2007.
9'' Interview with Don K. Marut, 25 October 2005.
94 Ibid.
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became ever greater after the late eighties. In making this claim I refer to the re­
search of Elliot who claims that the increase in the Northern development budgets 
partly contributed to the increase “Gladstonian concepts of accountancy: that is on 
the rendering of receipted accounts rather than on any form of program or output 
budgeting.” 95
Having discussed the nature of the relationships between international and local 
NGOs in Indonesia in the Suharto era, I will now briefly review the impact of these 
relationships on the Suharto government, especially at the time Suharto fell. Al­
though the NGO sector did not play a direct role in putting an end to the Suharto re­
gime, as Apinall argues, Indonesian NGOs substantially contributed to the ideologi­
cal climate that undermined it.96 They did so by “promoting sensitive issues to do 
with human rights, labour, legal reform and democratization.” In this regard, inter­
national donors were influential because, in the words of Aspinall and Mietzner, 
“growing political assertiveness by a wing of Indonesian NGOs coincided with, and 
was partly enabled by, willingness of international donors to fund them.” 90 Since In­
donesian NGOs heavily rely on international funding, we can thus conclude that the 
relationship between international and local NGOs in Indonesia, particularly during 
the second half of the New Order period played a role in paving the way for greater 
efforts to de-legitimise the Suharto government, and thus played a role -  even if only 
an indirect and minor one -  in bringing that government to an end.
The Post-Reformasi Era
The fall of Suharto was seen as a victory for civil society. It led to an improvement 
in cooperation between NGOs and the government. As Paul McCarthy observes, 
there was a boom in the local NGO sector:
After the New Order, [with regard to the atmosphere for NGOs] the bal­
ance really went from one side of the scale to the other side of scale. It 
became possible to do just about anything in Indonesia. Many... thou­
sands [of NGOs], I would argue nobody knows how many of them, 
whether you call them ORNOP, NGO or LSM, ... From an era of a very 
tight control [of the government] to almost no control."
95 Elliott, 1987: 60.
96 Aspinall, 2000: 158-159.
97 Aspinall and Mietzner, 2008: 18.
98 Ibid.: 19.
99 Interview with Paul McCarthy, 22 September 2005.
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With the end of the Suharto government’s repression of its perceived enemies, the 
hostility between the NGO sector and the central government thawed.100 “Since 
1998, very quickly (Indonesian) NGOs stopped seeing the government as the enemy, 
and started being engaged [and] supportive of the government,” commented Douglas 
Ramage, the Country Representative of the Asia Foundation in 2007.101
As indicated above, the termination of the authoritarian regime and the transition to 
democracy created space for the massive growth of NGOs as well international aid 
to Indonesia.102 As an illustration, in 2001, Indonesia topped the list of 167 country- 
recipients of the OECD’s official development assistance, in that year receiving over 
US$1.3 billion.10-’ The beginning of the post-reformasi period saw increased support 
from donors for local NGOs, and greater international NGO activities. Bilateral 
agencies not only channelled their funding through existing international organisa­
tions in Indonesia, but they also created new organisations to manage funding for 
local NGOs. An example was CSSP (Indonesia Civil Society and Strengthening 
Program). CSSP was a consortium of several international development consulting 
companies and international NGOs to manage USAID funding to support Indonesian 
civil society organisations. Between October 1999 to September 2004 CSSP gave 
over US$ 7.1 million to local NGOs in Indonesia.104 As an example of the rapid 
growth of NGOs during this time, in the four years from 1996 to 2000, as noted ear­
lier, there was a 600% increase in the numbers of local NGOs: from 10,000 in 1996 
to around 70,000 in 2000.105 Many of these NGOs, Hadiwinata notes, exist to chan-
100 For example, the Partnership for Government Reform, a prominent organisation was set up in 2000 
as a fruit of collaboration of international donors (led by the UNDP) and the government (National 
Development Planning Agency), supported by civil society groups and private sector, to advance 
government refonn in Indonesia. See http://www.kemitraan.or.id [accessed on 10 February 2009]. For 
a detailed discussion about the Partnership for Government Reform’s agenda and its international 
donors’ influence, see Crawford and Hermawan, 2002. Other examples, as noted by a scholar on 
NGOs turned advisor to the Head of Police, Kastorius Sinaga, include those in the field of education 
and illegal logging (Interview with Kastorius Sinaga, 5 August 2007).
101 Interview with Douglas Ramage, 12 January 2007. He also noted that this is the difference be­
tween NGOs in Indonesia and in the Philippines, “Many Filipino NGOs took a more oppositional 
position towards their government and many of them kept it that way. In Indonesia, many NGO peo­
ple go in and out of the government.” Yet observations during my fieldwork suggested a wide spec­
trum in Indonesian NGOs’ attitudes towards working with the government. Many NGOs in Indonesia 
are still cautious about engaging with government.
102 McCarthy, 2002: 1-2.
103 See http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=ODA_RECIPIENT [accessed on 4 May 
2009],
104 See CARE International et.al, 2004: 117.
105 Hadiwinata, 2003: 1.
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nel funds from international development organisations in responding to the 1997 
Asian economic crisis.106
There was also a boom in the number of advocacy NGOs, with many new organisa­
tions established -  and funded -  to promote “good governance” themes such as anti­
corruption, accountability and voter education programs. However, McCarthy notes, 
“just how many organisations are actually operational as opposed to existing ‘on pa­
per only’ is an entirely different question.”10' He provides his findings as part of the 
World Bank public expenditure review team in 2001. Despite the local government 
of East Lombok listing 89 registered NGOs in the district, he could only find eight 
out of these NGOs existing in reality, that is having an office, staff and project ac- 
tivities. McCarthy thus argues, “although such statistics cannot necessarily be ex­
trapolated to all parts of Indonesia, it is broadly indicative of the fact that a signifi­
cant percentage of NGOs either never existed or are no longer operational.”109 Along 
a similar line, Hadiwinata notes the existence of what he called “overnight opera­
tors,” which are NGOs “established just to tap development funds for their own 
benefits.”110 These examples indicate the unhealthy growth of Indonesian NGOs in 
the early reformasi era.
Consequently, although the liberalism of the post-New Order era brought about a 
renaissance in the NGO sector far exceeding that of the early Suharto era, there soon 
began to appear growing concern among NGO observers and the wider public about 
the behaviour of local NGOs, particularly about corruption and the misuse of 
funds.* 111 For example, a 2001 international poll result revealed that “Indonesia was 
one of only two countries out of twenty surveyed -  Nigeria was the other -  where 
NGOs were not the most highly trusted institution.” Another survey conducted in 
2002 on public perceptions of Indonesian NGOs also showed a lack of public trust in 
the sector.113
Concerns over the problem of local NGOs’ unhealthy behaviours have generated 
various responses from the Indonesian government, international donors as well as
107
108
Ibid.: 113-114. 
McCarthy, 2002: 1. 
Ibid.: 2.
109 Ibid.
110 Hadiwinata, 2003: 114.
111 For example, see Collins, 2007: 124-125; McCarthy, 2002: 7-8; “A Small Matter of Trust” in Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 20 September 2001.
112 McCarthy, 2002: 8. Chapter six will discuss this topic of NGOs’ accountability further.
113 AC Nielsen/NDI Survey in 2002, quoted in Labsosio FISIP UI, 2002:25.
51
Indonesian NGOs. The Indonesian government responded by, again, tightening its 
restrictions towards Indonesian NGOs. We can see the issuance of the Law No. 16 
on foundations in 2001 as an example.114 Similarly, the fact that international do­
nors’ have moved to implement more bureaucratic oversight procedures toward local 
NGOs can be seen as the donors response to local NGO’s misuse of funding.115 On 
the other hand, mainstream local NGOs start initiatives such as creating NGOs’ code 
of ethics and capacity building training which can be seen as their response towards 
criticisms against them.116
To summarise, we can see that different themes emerged in each of the three main 
historical periods. The Sukarno era saw limited cooperation between international 
and local NGOs. Cooperation focused mainly on education, training and voluntary 
and social welfare activities. Relationships in the Suharto era were mostly directed at 
economic or community development activities. The 1980s and 1990s, however, saw 
the rise of advocacy themes, including the environment, human rights and democ­
racy. We could reasonably hypothesise that globalization was part of the explanation 
for this trend. These issues put the NGO sector at odds with government. The post- 
New Order era continued the wide range of advocacy activities that began in the 
1990s, although many NGOs were now more inclined to engage with the govern­
ment rather than to criticise it.
Nevertheless, one common thread that binds the three main historical periods is the 
significant role of international NGOs as the main source of funding for local NGOs. 
Consequently, international NGOs have been able to influence trends in Indonesian 
NGO activities over the long term. As noted earlier, the ability of advocacy NGOs to 
be critical towards the Suharto government, for example, would not have been possi­
ble without the readiness of international NGOs to fund their activities. We can thus 
conclude that international NGOs, through their provision of funding, have been 
among the most influential elements in shaping the activities of Indonesian NGOs.117
Indonesian Government Regulations and Procedures
The historical overview of both international and local NGOs and their relationship 
in Indonesia presented so far has suggested the Indonesian government has had at
114 See the next section for a discussion of this law.
115 See chapter four for discussion of international funding mechanisms.
116 See chapter six for discussion of local NGOs’ initiatives to improve their accountability.
117 Chapter four will elaborate on this issue further.
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least a degree of impact on these two types of NGOs. It is important to point out, 
however, that this influence has fallen far short of government expectations. The 
next section will review this issue and the range of government regulations concern­
ing the relationships between international and local NGOs. The discussion will 
demonstrate the Indonesian government has tried hard to control NGOs, but this has 
had only limited success.
Prior to 1985, interactions between Indonesian and international NGOs in Indonesia 
were supervised by the Committee of Foreign Technical Assistance established
1 I o
through a special decree No. 81/1967. This Committee, whose members were ap­
pointed by Suharto, had the authority to “monitor and administer all organisations 
receiving foreign assistance.”119 In addition, in 1973, the Ministry of Home Affairs 
issued guidelines on Overseas Technical Cooperation and Assistance which had the 
purpose of regulating foreign agencies in Indonesia. Under its edicts, the Ministry 
required foreign organisations, prior to commencing cooperation with local NGOs, 
to draw up agreements with appropriate government departments in Indonesia.
In 1985 the government overhauled the sector again when it issued Instruksi Presi- 
den [Presidential Instruction] No. 32/1985 which established Biro Kerjasama Teknik 
Luar Negeri [Overseas Technical Cooperation Bureau], under the Minister of the
177Cabinet Secretariat, to oversee all the activities of foreign funded organisations. 
This bureau took charge of issuing permits to international NGOs. Lubis and Sinaga 
stated that in order to receive a permit, an international NGO had to receive clear­
ance from BAKIN (State Intelligence Coordinating Board) and have a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) with the relevant government departments. However, in 
order to receive the clearance and sign an MoU, an international NGO should first 
undergo a registration process which would take approximately three to four 
months.124 This gives some idea of the extent to which the Suharto government de­
ployed bureaucratic control mechanisms over international NGOs.
However, as previously noted, the Suharto government’s attempts to control the ac­
tivities of international and local NGOs in Indonesia were not as effective as it had
118 Sinaga, 1994: 220, quoted in Hadiwinata, 2003: 91.
119 Ibid.
120 Eldridge, 1989: 6.
121 Ibid.: 6.
122 Sinaga, 1994: 222-223; Lubis, 1993: 225, quoted in Hadiwinata, 2003: 94.
123 Ibid.
124 Confidential interview, 16 August 2007. See also Guidelines for International NGO Registration in 
Indonesia -  Excluding Aceh, 2007.
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hoped for. The regulations were not applicable to International NGOs without offices 
in Indonesia. Such organisations were thus able to provide funding for politically 
sensitive issues like human rights and environmental problems. 1“5
In terms of international NGOs’ process to set up an office in Indonesia, the proce­
dure remains the same in the post-New Order era. The process is not only long but 
also daunting in its complexity. The first point of contact for an international NGO to 
obtain a permit to work in Indonesia is the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs 
(DEPLU). The registration procedure starts with the international NGO submitting 
nine required documents, from information about the international NGO and its pro­
posed program in Indonesia to a recommendation from the Indonesian embassy of
1 7 Athe respective country where the NGO’s headquarter is located.
The next step for the international NGO is to conduct a presentation before an inter­
departmental meeting consisting of representatives from the State Secretariat, Direc­
torate General of Taxation, Immigration, Home Affairs, BIN [State Intelligence 
Agency], BAIS [the Military Strategic Intelligence Agency and Police Intelli- 
gence]. The inter-departmental meeting will make the recommendation to accept 
or reject the international NGO’s application to work in Indonesia and decides which 
department is suitable for the NGO MoU should the application be successful. “ In 
addition, the international NGO must come from a country which has a diplomatic 
relationship with Indonesia. 129
The existence of these sets of regulations and bureaucratic procedures reflects the 
government’s attempt to ensure that activities conducted by international and local 
NGOs in Indonesia are in line with government policy. 1’0 Nevertheless, some schol­
ars note that in the New Order era these regulations were more elastic as “govern­
ment officials often offered their personal guarantee to allow NGOs to have a certain
125 See Aspinall and Mietzner, 2008: 19-20.
126 Guidelines for International NGO Registration in Indonesia -  Excluding Aceh, 2007.
127 Confidential Interview, 16 August 2007.
I2S Guidelines for International NGO Registration in Indonesia -  Excluding Aceh, 2007. The experi­
ence of CWS, an American NGO which had an MoU with the Ministry of Social Services is that the 
MoU initially covered the period of one year before being renewed. The second MoU lasted for three 
years, and afterwards, it was for five years. Prior to signing each renewal, the organisation had to 
make a presentation before the inter-deptartmental meeting to explain its activity plan (Interview with 
Irma Sopamena, 5 September 2008).
124 Confidential Interview, 16 August 2007.
130 As an illustration, one of the rules of thumb in reviewing international NGOs’ applications is to 
reject organisations working on three areas: politics, business and religion (Confidential Interview, 16 
August 2007). See also Article 14 of the Government Regulations No. 23/2008 on the involvement of 
international organisations and international NGOs in disaster management.
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degree of freedom of operation.”131 Hadiwinata argued that the New Order govern­
ment’s more generous attitude towards international NGOs was, at least in the first 
part of the Suharto government, driven by its need for development assistance par- 
ticularly in reaching out to the urban and rural poor. “ But the latter part of the Su­
harto regime saw a definitive tightening of conditions over the sector.
On the other hand the government has issued regulations which give concessions to 
the NGO sector.133 Tax concessions for international NGOs, for example, have ex­
isted since 1955 through Peraturan Pemerintah [Government Regulation]: PP No. 
19/1955 issued by President Sukarno. This regulation, which was the reference point 
for other regulations concerning international NGOs, exempts international organisa­
tions from bea-masuk and bea-keluar [import and export duties] on their goods.134
Another government regulation, PP. No. 8/1957, provided international NGOs with 
further tax exemptions for goods relating to their staffs daily operations. The regula­
tion also exempts building materials for the NGO’s offices and houses.135 Finance 
Minister Regulations also preclude international organisations from being subject to 
income tax [subjek pajak penghasilan]. The latest protocol, in February 2009 is Fi­
nance Ministry Regulation No. 215/PMK.03/2008.136
Hadiwinata, 2003: 92-93.
132 Ibid.: 92-93. See also Eldridge, 1995: 30.
133 As existing literature on NGOs in Indonesia largely focus on the relationship between the state and 
the Indonesian NGO, scholars tend to focus on regulations which control and restrict NGOs.
134 See Peraturan Pemerintah No. 19 Tahun 1955 (PP 19/1955) and its explanation. Article 1 of this 
regulation mentioned the United Nations and its organs, diplomatic missions and other international 
organisations. The regulation assigned the Minister of Finance the duty of writing further peraturan 
pelaksana [executive decrees] included drawing up a list of organisations.
135 See Peraturan Pemerintah No. 8 Tahun 1957. As an interesting aside, the Indonesian government 
through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Secretariat of the Cabinet provides international 
organisations with a special code for the number plates of their vehicles. Their plate numbers end with 
the letters of AX, BX, DX. The same regulations also saw a special suffix being assigned to the dip­
lomatic corps’ vehicles i.e. CD or CC, with the plate numbers assigned by the Department of Foreign 
Affairs. See http://www.indonesia-policewatch.com/adil/tips.php [accessed on 9 February 2009], A 
former staff member of CARE International -  one of the first international development NGOs work­
ing in Indonesia’s New Order -  recounted how in the early 1980s due to the local traffic police’s con­
fusion with the regulations concerning import tax-free vehicles, three of CARE’s office cars in its 
Makassar field-office ended up having a red-license plate -  the color plate for the government-owned 
vehicles (Interview with Jopie Sinanu, 9 September 2008). Indonesian vehicles’ license plate consists 
of three color-coded categories: black color-plate for privately-owned vehicles, yellow plates for 
commercial services’ vehicles and red plate for government vehicles. The term NGO Plat Merah 
[‘Red License Plate NGO’] is usually the label for Indonesian NGOs with close connection to the 
government, i.e. NGOs created by government officials mostly to tap the government funding. See 
Holloway, 2001.
136 [Peraturan Menteri Keuangan No. 215/PMK. 03/2008 Tentang Penetapan Organisasi-Organisasi 
Internasional Dan Pejabat-Pejabat Pet~wakilan Organisasi Internasional Yang Tidak Termasuk Sub­
jek Pajak Penghasilan]. This regulation lists a total of 124 international organisations comprising 
thirty organisations under United Nations agencies, twenty eight organisations under Bilateral Tech­
nical Cooperation Agencies (such as USAID, Australia-Indonesia Partnership), four cultural coopera-
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Although the Indonesian government has granted such concessions to international 
NGOs, nevertheless the clear historical trend has been for the Indonesian gov­
ernment to attempt to control international NGOs and their relations with local actors 
in Indonesia. In particular the central government exercises the final say over the va­
lidity of international NGOs activities and has attempted to direct international NGO 
activities into directions that accord with the overall political program of the gov­
ernment. Although one can argue that this style of governance is one bom of the Su­
harto era, recent developments suggest the desire for control is no historical aberra­
tion.
Thus, in 2008 the government also issued Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 
38/2008. Extrapolating on Law No. 8/1985 on Societal Organisations [Undang- 
Undang Organisasi Kemasyarakatan], this regulation aims to regulate the flow of 
assistance between Indonesian societal organisations and foreign parties [.Peraturan 
Menteri Dalam Negeri Tentang Penerimaan Dan Pemberian Bantuan Organisasi
1 T7Kemasyarakatan Dari Dan Kepada Pihak Asing]. Its articles contain very detailed 
requirements and procedures for receiving and giving foreign assistance, including a 
demand that every organisation involved in an exchange of foreign assistance regis­
ter with government agencies prior to receiving and giving assistance, provides a de­
tailed report to the regional authority (governor or mayor or head of district) on the 
international NGO’s funding activities in order to receive permission to proceed. Lo­
cal NGOs are required under the same law to publicly announce in the media when
1 TRthey receive foreign assistance.
Although the government insists that the new regulation aims to create a systema­
tised mechanism for directing foreign funding and improving transparency and ac­
countability, the regulation has sparked outrage among some civil society organisa­
tions who perceive it as an attempt by the government to control and restrain their 
activities.139 Yet the general mood of NGO activists is reported to be unconcerned,
tion organisations and sixty-two other international organisations which are mostly international 
NGOs.
137 See Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 38 Tahun 2008.
138 For example, see Article 7, 11,13, 15, 19-21, 28-33 of the Regulation.
139 See “NGOs Attack ‘Draconian’ Funding Rule,” in Financial Times, 10 December 2008; “Per- 
mendagri No. 38/2008 Wujud Otoritarian Absurd,” in Kompas, 23 December 2008. It should be noted 
that while the buzz on the Revisi UU Ormas [the Law on Societal Organisation revision] has been 
around in the past couple of years, the regulation passed last year is a ministerial-level regulation. See 
also “Revisi Anti-Otoriter,” in Gatra 31,15 June 2006; “Revisi Ormas Untuk Cegah Terorisme Dan 
Pencucian Uang,” in Antara News, 21 July 2008. The UU Ormas Revision draft, prepared by the Min­
istry of Home Affairs, has been on the list of the DPR’s National Legislative Program [Prolegnas] 
since at least 2008 but has not been able to reach the Prolegnas’ priority list (Nugroho 2008: 1). As of
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as most consider the regulation to be something of a “toothless tiger” as there is no 
stipulated sanction for organisations which do not abide by the regulation. 140 In this 
respect, we can say that the government is again not really successful in exercising 
control over activities involving international and local NGOs in Indonesia.
Conclusion
In providing background information for my study, this chapter has looked at previ­
ous studies, and it has provided a historical overview on the relationships between 
international and Indonesian NGOs. The literature review of relationships between 
international and Indonesian NGOs has identified several themes: funding depend­
ence, asymmetrical power relationships and domestic ‘sensitivity’ towards the rela­
tionship between international and local NGOs. The literature thus suggests that the 
relationship between local and international NGOs is a source of tension both within 
the NGO community and more widely in Indonesia.
However, the literature has largely emphasised studying Indonesian NGOs and their 
links with the state, while there has been relatively little of study on the relationships 
between non-state actors such as local NGOs and international NGOs in Indonesia. 
This study is therefore the first in-depth empirical research on the everyday relation­
ships between local and international NGOs in Indonesia.
The discussion in this chapter also suggests that international NGOs play an integral 
role in the Indonesian NGO sector because they have been the main funding source 
of local NGOs. This role is especially important. By providing funds, international 
NGOs have enabled a section of local NGOs to voice critical views of the govern­
ment, which significantly decreased the legitimacy of the New Order administration. 
This support for critical advocacy has continued into the present era.
February 2009, the Prolegnas 2006-2009 list has 229 Bill Drafts (See 
http://legalitas.org/database/lain/nasional/Prolegnas2006-2009.htm [accessed on 21 February 2009])
140 “Permendagri No. 38/2008 Wujud Otoritarian Absurd,” in Kompas, 23 December 2008. Even if 
the regulation contains sanctions it does not imply that enforcement would automatically take place.
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Chapter Three
A Case Study: Insist and Its Relations with 
International Partners
Introduction
As noted in chapter two, in discussing the relationships of NGOs, previous studies of 
NGOs in Indonesia mostly focus on the relationship between NGOs and the state. 
When discussions about Indonesian NGOs’ international links do emerge, funding 
becomes a prominent issue.
This chapter aims to introduce the everyday politics of NGO relationships by pre­
senting an in-depth study of an NGO called Insist (the Indonesian Society for Social 
Transformation), a Yogyakarta-based Indonesian NGO. Insist is an intriguing case 
study. In the story of Insist there emerges a number of themes which become the 
main focus of my later chapters. In the case of Insist we see how divisive interna­
tional funding requirements can be for local NGOs and how local NGOs oppose the 
donor driven funding agenda. We also observe how the relationships between local 
and international NGO relationships can fail and succeed and some of the factors 
behind each of these different scenarios. In addition, we get into the day-to-day de­
tail of how international and local NGOs deal with each other on a routine basis. We 
see how much influence individual leaders have on the sustainability of domestic 
NGOs. In short, this chapter provides us with a living entry point into all the messi­
ness and complexity that occurs in the relationships within global civil society.
The discussion in this chapter starts with an overview of Insist itself, including the 
organisation’s goals, background and structure, and the backgrounds of the individu­
als involved in it. This chapter then looks at Insist’s own reformasi process, a discus­
sion which sheds light on internal management struggles in this local NGO. Follow­
ing that I present two case studies of Insist’s relationships with international NGOs, 
one of which was a successful relationship, and one of which ended in failure. These 
experiences illustrate in microcosm many of the key dynamics in the relationships
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between local and international NGOs which are discussed in thematic context in 
later chapters.
An Overview of Insist
Insist was established in Yogyakarta in 1997 by several NGO activists, including the 
late Mansour Fakih and Roem Topattimasang.1 2*Insist’s founders, board of trustees, 
supervisors and executive consisted of veteran Indonesian NGO activists and some 
people with academic backgrounds. Mansour Fakih, who was the main founder of 
the organisation, for example, prior to establishing Insist wrote his dissertation in the 
field of education at the University of Massachusetts in 1995 on the role of NGOs in 
transforming Indonesian society. Prior to pursuing his advanced degree, Mansour 
had a decade of experience working for several Indonesian NGOs, which included 
serving as the Director for Training and Community Development of P3M, a well- 
established Islamic NGO in Indonesia. After completing his study, he returned to 
Indonesia to continue his work in the NGO sector. This included working as the 
Country Representative of Oxfam in Indonesia, before establishing Insist with his 
friends. Beside founding and directing Insist, he was also actively involved as train­
ing facilitator, research director at REaD, a productive writer and editor for Insist 
Press and Pustaka Pelajar [Student Library -  a well-establish publishing house], and 
as a senior consultant for REMDEC, a development consultancy firm (which is also 
a member of Insist) in Jakarta.4 These various overlapping jobs and connections with 
other organisations are typical for an NGO activist in Indonesia. In some ways the 
establishment of Insist was a follow-up to Fakih’s studies.
1 At the time it was established, Insist stood for “Institute for Social Transformation.” However, in 
2004 Insist leadership decided to transfonn itself, including by changing its name to Indonesian Soci­
ety for Social Transformation.
2 Fakih, 1995. Mansour Fakih also received his masters degree from the same university, focusing on 
adult education and development, while he received his Bachelor Degree in Philosophy and Theology 
from an Islamic State University in Jakarta (IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta). See chapter five for 
further discussion about the nature of Indonesian NGOs and their activities. Despite his many links, 
Mansour was first and foremost associated with Insist. It is fair to say that he was the face of Insist. 
Many in Indonesian NGO circles consider that Mansour Fakih’s passing in 2004 marked the begin­
ning of Insist’s demise.
It should be noted that in identifying quotations from interviews with my informants, I will only 
write down their full names when they first appear in each chapter. Afterwards, I adopt the Indonesian 
convention of referring to people by their first names instead of their surnames. Most Indonesians are 
known by their first names -  some even only have a first name. However, when I discuss their writ­
ings, I will use the general convention of mentioning their last name. In this respect I will identify 
Mansour Fakih as Fakih when discussing his writing, but Mansour when discussing him otherwise.
4 See Fakih, 1995: 138; Fakih, 2002: 364.
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Prior to founding Insist, one of the co-founders of the organisation, Roem Topatima- 
sang, had over fifteen years of experience in community organising as well as being 
a facilitator of critical popular education (pendidikan kerakyatan kritis) in various 
NGOs and community-based organisations across Southeast Asia. He has also been 
active in publishing. He has written many NGO training manuals, translated and ed­
ited the Indonesian version of books such as Pendidikcm Kaum Tertindas which is a 
translation of Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy o f the Oppressed (1986), and produced 
documentary and visual essays for popular education and policy advocacy. As of 
2007, his best-selling book, Sekolah itu Candu (“School is a Drug (addictive)”) has 
been reprinted eight times since it was first published in 1998. Roem studied at the 
Teacher Training and Education Science Institute (IKIP) Bandung before being ex­
pelled as a student in 1980 due to his political activities (he spend 1978-1979 in mili­
tary detention because of his involvement in various critical discussion groups and 
student demonstrations).5
Insist’s other initiators, board members and friends consist of people with a combi­
nation of advanced degrees and long-time experience with NGO activism, including 
Dr. Russ Diltz, Dr. P.M Laksono, Fauzy Abdullah, Rizal Malik, Dr. Ivan Hadar, 
Zumrotin K. Susilo, Willarsa Budiharga, Dr. Sri Kusyuniati, Saleh Abdullah and 
Toto Rahardjo. Each of them bring with them extensive experience and networks 
which enrich Insist’s own network. However, because Insist has a fluid structure ac­
cording to what Insist’s activists call a volunteer-based idealism project [“proyek 
idealisme”], most of these people do not work full-time for Insist or even reside in 
Yogyakarta.6
Mansour Fakih believed that discourses and practices of development in Indonesia 
were a domain of capitalist hegemony. He argued in his dissertation that, “develop­
ment is basically a “new brand” of capitalism which is the most powerful hegemony 
in the modem history of the Third World.”7 He also utilised Gramsci’s theory of he­
gemony and civil society in his thesis. Using what he labelled a participatory ap­
proach, Mansour’s research critically examined the role of NGOs, as part of social
5 Interview with Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007. See also Rahardjo et al., 2005: 248; Topati- 
masang, 2007: 178; La Botz, 2001: 2-7.
6 I use the term ‘fluid structure’ as a device for describing a lack of clear management within the or­
ganisation. This issue will become clearer as my analysis of Insist develops. Fluid structure does not 
always imply a lack of hierarchy, as will be seen in chapter five, many of the most sustainable local 
NGOs have powerful leaders that have almost rusted onto their organisations. Rather, a fluidity of 
structure implies a characteristic which is often seen among local NGOs.
7 Fakih, 1995: 83.
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movement organisations in Indonesia in relation to “the discourse of development, as 
to whether they should be considered as part of the development hegemony or 
counter to it.” He attempted to “construct a theory of social movement organizations 
as a counter-hegemonic movement,” an approach which carried over into his estab-
o
lishment of Insist. Mansour also believed in the importance of the educational role 
of NGOs as what he called, “the appropriate vehicle for a counter-discourse and a 
counter-hegemonic movement,” in transforming society at the grassroots level.9 He 
heavily emphasised the counter-hegemonic goal in Gramsci’s theory and his study 
constituted a normative endorsement of Gramsci and an idealistic declaration that the 
NGO sector could play a role in spearheading social change and countering state and 
capitalist hegemony.
Insist was formed out of this belief. The organisation was intended to serve as a 
vehicle for “social transformation” in Indonesia. The first three paragraphs of Insist’s 
founding declaration formulated in 2004 below explain what its members meant by 
“social transformation.”
We believe that injustice is at the core or root of all of the social problems 
that have occurred at any time and place throughout the history of human 
civilization, particularly those experienced by the groups that have been 
at the lowest, most ignored economic, political, and social-cultural levels;
We also believe that the social structures that have developed thus far are 
unjust, and result in economic, political, and social-cultural inequalities.
As a result, some people have become increasingly prosperous, have a 
high level of access to resources, have broad opportunities to express 
themselves, and can determine the decision making process that impacts 
the broader community. On the other hand, the majority of the people are 
increasingly disempowered, ignored, and turned into objects or victims;
s Fakih, 1995: 51. Fakih adopted a participatory research concept adapted from the historical material­
ist methodology proposed by Kasam who defines the concept of participatory research as “research 
structured by the democratic interaction of the researcher and the oppressed classes of people and 
takes the fonn of a dialectical unification of theory and practice reciprocally between the researcher 
and the oppressed classes.” (Kasam, 1982: 4, quoted in Fakih, 1995: 125). This means that Fakih’s 
research objects, i.e. Indonesian NGOs activists, were heavily involved in his research process (three 
out of eight core team members of his study also joined him at Insist). Thus Fakih argues that his re­
search “also created the possibility for NGO communities to be involved and to control the research 
process as well as the production of knowledge, by placing them as the subject and therefore the cen­
tre of the transformation” (Fakih, 1995: 125).
4 Ibid.: 52. Fakih’s study resulted in the identification of three typologies of Indonesian NGOs which 
he labeled as conformist, reformist, and transformist. This classification is an alternative to previous 
classification made by Korten (1987) and Eldridge (1989). Fakih criticised Korten and Eldridge for 
only looking at NGOs’ program strategies and methodologies and not looking at these NGOs’ para­
digms and basic assumptions. (See Fakih, 1995: 161-167, 171-187). He argued that most Indonesian 
NGO activists were in the reformist paradigm, i.e. they accepted modernisation ideology and devel- 
opmentalism, which is translated in Indonesia into the government’s five-year development plans 
(Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun), but rejected the ‘top down’ and non-participatory development 
approach of the government (Fakih, 1995: 174). Although he was able to identify and classify NGOs 
activists’ position towards developmentalism, Fakih was not able to propose an alternative theory of 
social movement organisations as a counter-hegemonic movement (See Fakih, 1995: 241).
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For these reasons, goals and efforts to eliminate all types and forms of in­
justice must be based on the empowerment of groups that have, to this 
point, been placed in weak, marginalised positions. They must be em­
powered to become active, critical actors in all processes of social trans­
formation, moving towards the realisation of more just economic, politi­
cal, and cultural systems, so that they can make a greater contribution to 
the advancement of civilization and humanity overall. 10
In short, Insist aims to bring change to society by working with and empowering lo­
cal community groups, particularly the marginalized at the grass-roots level.
It is also important to note at this point that Insist’s orientation inclines its members 
to be mostly critical toward international NGOs and their agencies, not surprising if 
we recall Mansour’s own views about developmentalism and hegemony. Most Insist 
workers I interviewed reconfirm this general belief in the activists underpinning of 
NGOs. They are very enthusiastic when talking about “making a change” at the 
grass-roots level, or local empowerment.
They also generally objected to too much ‘foreign intervention’ by international do­
nor organisations in the Indonesian NGO sector. There appears to be a widespread 
understanding among Insist activists that, based on their experiences and observa­
tions, working with international organisations generally equals adopting interna­
tional organisations’ perspectives, issues and concerns." As suggested by Roem:
History has proven that for over twenty, thirty years, NGO works have 
not had a significant result when [they] are only part of international ag­
enda. There has never been a fundamental structural change which has 
truly shaken [menggunccmgkan] and changed society. Insist thus be­
lieves that if [we] want to have a social movement for social transforma­
tion in Indonesia, however small it is [sekecil apapun], it has to start 
from them [local, grass-root communities] . ” 12
Insist’s goals and ideological approach fit well with the transformist category of 
NGOs in Fakih’s classification. As mentioned above, Fakih conducted participatory 
research in studying Indonesian NGOs activists’ perspectives on developmentalism, 
in particular on “the problems of the people” and “their implications for their [NGO] 
action programs.” 13 He suggested that the “transformism” paradigm of NGOs see 
“unequal structures, exploitation and capitalist hegemony” as causes of problems in 
the society. Thus, he argued that the transformist NGOs should aim to build a new
10 See http://www.insist.or.id/index.php?lang=en&page=about_insist [accessed on 5 December 2008].
11 Interview with Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007; Donatus K. Marut, 25 October 2005; Saleh 
Abdullah, 12 October 2006. For example, they fervently shared several experiences when they refuse 
to work with international donors whom they perceived only wanted to implement their own agenda 
and framework thus ignoring the local context.
12 Interview with Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007.
13 Fakih, 1995: 166.
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economic and political structure, to challenge exploitation and to create a counter 
discourse. Fakih identified what he called “conscientisation” or creating critical con­
sciousness through education, an alternative economic development, trade unions 
and co-operatives as program activities to achieve these grand-sounding transforma­
tive goals.14
Among such activities, Insist seems to focus on the “conscientisation” approach, i.e. 
creating critical consciousness through education. This was especially the case dur­
ing the organisation’s first seven years (1997-2004), when Insist established units to 
run education programs, training programs, publications, and human resource devel­
opment. 15
Insist’s trademarks were critical publications, training and popular education, par­
ticularly for NGO activists and community organisers. For example, the publication 
unit, Insist Press, became renowned for its publications about social movements, po­
litical opposition and community organising.16 It published a quarterly journal of 
“transformative social science” called Wacana (Discourse) which contained “critical 
and alternative views with the aim to strengthen community participation.”17 The 
journal has a thematic issue in every edition, with rather controversial and challen­
ging titles, such as the cover of their 21s1 edition in 2005 (Pilkadal [Pemilihan 
Kepala Daerah Langsung] a play on words in which elections for the heads of re­
gional direct elections highlighted the word Kadal, (meaning lizard, which has a de­
rogatory connotation in Indonesian).18
Insist also initiated a Sekolah Aktivis (School for Activists) in 1999 which had a 
unique and utterly democratic style of teaching. Sekolah Aktivis invited NGO and 
student activists to join a one-year program. This program, which was run annually, 
was called Involvement (Indonesian Volunteers for Social Movement) with each
14 Ibid.: 167.
15 Interview with Fitri Andyaswuri, 10 November 2006. Fitri worked for the gender and justice train­
ing unit. Other skill training that Insist specialised in include community organising skills, participa­
tory research and advocacy, training facilitation skills, human rights education, development analysis, 
social analysis, policy analysis, participatory budgeting and organisational/institutional development. 
Interview with M. Miftahuddin 22 January 2007. For more information about Insist’s training spe­
cialty, see also http://www.infid.org/newinfid/print.php7pcH3286 [accessed on 16 December 2008].
16 Insist Press’ slogan of Setiap tempat: Sekolah! Setiap orang: guru! Setiap buku: ilmu! (Every place 
is a school, every one is a teacher, every book contains knowledge) reflects Insist’s critical view on 
education. For Insist Press publication list, see http://bukuinsistpress.blogspot.com and 
http://press.insist.or.id [accessed on 7 December 2008].
17 This statement appears on the bottom of every Wacana's content page.
18 See Wacana No. 21, Tahun VI, 2005.
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batch having 21-33 participants.19 The School used a participatory approach, which 
means that the participants themselves decided on the training process including its 
curriculum and schedule. The Involvement program consisted of extensive discus­
sion and training, followed by a period of living-in or ‘posting’ in one of the mem­
bers of Insist’s national network of local NGOs or at the NGO that sponsored the 
activist.20
The adoption of the participatory approach in the Involvement program has reflected 
Insist’s experimental and rather unconventional view towards education and society. 
An alumnus of the first Involvement program recalled, “I was shocked when I first 
joined this school. We (the participants) were divided into groups, and with each 
group assisted by a facilitator, we were asked to decide our own curriculum!” He 
shared his experience as a student activist, prior to attending Involvement where it 
was he and his fellow student activist friends who prepared training materials when 
they conducted pendidikan politik (political education) for student activist cadres. 
“All we had to do when training was just to buka kepala (opening their minds) and 
fill them with materials that we have prepared for them,” he said, “(and) that’s it.” 
This informant was clearly shocked by the participatory model of Insist’s teaching.
Insist’s alternative school program was also the realisation of Insist’s vision of “cre­
ating critical consciousness through education.” As an illustration, a former student 
in the Involvement Program revealed how hurt he and his student activist friends felt 
during their first week in class, when after studying theories of developmentalism 
and capitalism they came to the conclusion that what they fought for and thought had 
succeeded [i.e. the resignation of President Suharto], was not really “their victory.” 
Instead, he says:
19 Interviews with Dony Hendro Cahyono, 7 November 2006; Saleh Abdullah, 12 and 16 October 
2006. See also Avonius, 2002. Involvement, which is in a way is an experiment, inspired the creation 
of numerous Sekolah Transformasi Sosial [Social Transformation Schools] or Sekolah Raky’at [the 
People’s Schools] by members of Insist’s local networks in various parts of Indonesia. These are local 
community-based information and education centres aiming to provide an alternative non-formal edu­
cation for local people at the grass-roots level. For example, Sekolah Mitra Rakyat [School of Friends 
of the People] in Jambi, Sekolah Banjar [School of the Village Councils] in the rural areas of Central 
and East Bali. See http://www.insist.or.id/index.php?lang=en&page-article&id=48 [accessed on 8 
December 2008].
20 Interviews with Dony Hendro Cahyono, 7 November 2006; Saleh Abdullah, 12 and 16 October 
2006. See also Anvonius, 2002.
21 Interviews with Dony Hendro Cahyono, 7 November 2006. He was the head of Biro Sektor Rakyat 
(Community/People Sector Bureau) of Dewan Mahasiswa Universitas Gajah Mada (the University of 
Gajah Mada’s Student Council) in the late-1990s. After ‘graduating’ from Involvement, he continued 
to volunteer for Insist and in 2001 he was the Kepala Sekolah (“School PrincipaP’/Program Manager) 
of the Involvement program. Dony is a lawyer by training and he represented Insist during the Insist 
Press management problem in 2004. (Interview with Bonar Saragih, 2 September 2008). We will look 
at Insist’s internal problem in the next section.
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[we learned that] what we did was just helping other parties like the World 
Bank and the U.S to get what they want and benefit from the resignation 
of Suharto. And that conclusion was drawn in class by our “teachers” [fa­
cilitators in class] who only “sewed” our own words [menjahit kata-kata 
kamt semua] after exploring the theories together.22
The informant continued sharing his experience by recalling Mansour Fakih’s ob­
session of making Insist’s school the “Akabri” [the Indonesian acronym of the elite 
Indonesian Military Academy] of NGOs and social movements in Indonesia. Sub­
jects taught were theories of social change, community organising, popular educa-
I'Xtion, advocacy, research action, organisational management, and strategic planning.
Apart from its educational program for activists, Insist has also been renowned as a 
service provider in the field of advocacy training and community development. Insist 
has a long list of organisations it has developed and facilitated training programs for 
over the decade since its establishment.24 The organisations ranged from the Interna­
tional Labour Organisation, for its labour rights advocacy training activities, organi­
sations linked to the Catholic Church Diocese of Papua, with peace and justice ca­
pacity building training, UNICEF in training the Indonesian police for children’s 
rights protection, to members of various government bodies such as the Department 
of Health and the Ministry of Female Empowerment for health legislation and repro- 
ductive rights advocacy/ Insist has also worked with numerous international or­
ganisations in running training programs. For example, it has worked with the Inter­
national Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) from the United King­
dom since 1999 in conducting peasant organisation programs in Java and in develop- 
ing Participatory Action Research Methodology (PAR).
But Insist’s democratic style and teaching focus were not its primary strength. Ra­
ther, Mansour Fakih’s personal reputation, his educational background and his ex­
perience as a facilitator in community development, as well as the strong back-
22 Interview with Dony Hendro Cahyono, 7 November 2006. He recalled the program had four quite 
large libraries available for free for Involvement participants. (Well-maintained public libraries with a 
wide range of updated collections were rare in Indonesia in the late 1990s). Those libraries were In- 
sisfs, and the private libraries of Insist’s scholar-activists: Mansour Fakih, P.M. Laksono and Francis 
Wahono.
23 Interview with Dony Hendro Cahyono, 7 November 2006. He remembered that Mansour Fakih 
considered Cahyono’s class as the angkatan uji Cuba (pilot project/try-out class). He also suggested 
that those subjects did not have a proper name and they only started to label it for reporting require­
ments.
24 For example, see http://www.insist.or.id/index.php?lang=id&page=partner [accessed on 16 Decem­
ber 2008],
2:1 Interviews with Fitri Andyaswuri, 10 November 2006; Dony Hendro Cahyono, 7 November 2006; 
Saleh Abdullah 19 October 2006; Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007. For more details on Insist’s 
works, see also http://www.infid.org/newinfid/print.php7pci-3286 [accessed on 16 December 2008].
26 See http://www.insist.or.id/index.php?lang=en&page=partner [accessed 9 December 2008],
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grounds and vast experience of his colleagues at Insist, appear to have played the 
main role in establishing Insist’s reputation. As a former Insist managing director, 
recalled:
Mansour [Fakih] was a well-known individual with good connections. It 
was him as an individual who people approached first. Afterwards, then 
he introduced his organisation, Insist, to these people or organisations to 
work with, because in the end, they need to work with an organisation.
Individual relationships are very determining [in the NGO sector] . 27
This remark about the influential role of an individual in the NGO sector is a widely 
accepted view in the Indonesian NGO scene. Most NGOs need to have a “brand 
name” individual to be able to gain a reputation and be accepted in the NGO circle. I 
will discuss this issue of personalism further in chapter five.
The organisational culture of Insist reflected the ideology of its founder and his em­
phasis on transformative, as well as the extensive experience and local NGO net­
works of its activists. The organisation has vast and tight-knit networks with local 
NGOs in various parts of Indonesia, some of which even established by the founders 
of Insist." As Miftahudin recalls:
Insist started as a Kawah Candradimuka [a training ground]. If some­
body comes to Insist with an idea, Insist would find a way to support 
that person, including finding people to support that person. However, 
when that person thinks they have had enough and would like to leave, 
they are free to go.29
As a further illustration of Insist’s internal culture, a large meeting table in the back­
yard is a dominant feature of the Insist office. There are several smaller discussion 
tables at the office, including a round table at the library.30 Observation during nu­
merous visits to the Insist office showed that the office always had various visitors: 
from an NGO activist from an indigenous community organisation in Southeast Ma­
luku, a young alternative media producer, to the founder of an alternative school for
~7 Interview with Muhammad Miftahudin, 22 January 2007. He briefly joined Insist in 1997, then left 
to pursue his masters degree in Australia. After completing his study, he returned and worked as Insist 
managing director from 2000-2002. He then moved to Jakarta and worked as an education specialist 
for an international NGO, Save the Children UK. During the interview he mentioned two examples 
where it was because of Mansour Fakih that an international NGO ended up collaborating with Insist. 
2S For example, Roem Topatimasang and Donatus K. Marut were heavily involved in the establish­
ment of Baileo, a grass-roots organisation in Maluku, in 1993, including its development consultant 
company, Micros, in 2003. They continue their involvement with Baileo. Most of Insist senior activ­
ists also founded and worked for Remdec, a renowned development consultant company in Jakarta. 
See http://www.baileo.or.id and http://www.remdec.or.id [accessed on 5 December 2008].
29 The term is taken from Javanese wayang stories, to describe a crater which mythical heroes like 
Gatot Kaca jump into for training to increase their kesaktian [power and supernatural abilities],
1(1 Between 2005 and 2008 Insist moved office three times. This is the description of its office that I 
visited during fieldwork in 2006. The former office I visited in 2005 also had a large meeting table at 
the centre of the office.
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indigenous communities. Insist also shares its office with other organisations
o  i
founded by Insist’s activists. The Insist office even used to be a home for “[our ac­
tivists] friends who do not have a place to stay” with lots of activists or visitors 
sleeping there. " All of this stands as testimony to the fact that Insist over the years 
has managed to attract people from different elements of society: students, NGO 
workers, writers, artists and media workers.
Flexibility and informality, characteristics which tend to be associated with NGOs, 
are central to Insist. For example, the organisation’s working hours suggest that eve­
nings seem to be more productive working times instead of mornings for many Insist 
activists. My first interview with Insist activists in 2005 at their office started at 9pm 
and lasted until lam, over a plate of pisang goreng [banana fritter], several cups of 
sweet Javanese tea and the activists’ many cups of strong black coffee and chain- 
kretek-cigarette smoking. During the interview, there were still people working and 
coming in and out of the office. As a female Insist staff member said:
If [we] want to survive at Insist, [we] have to be very masculine indeed.
An easy example is our working hours. [We] tend to have meetings in 
the evening. A woman has to make a very large compromise with her 
family to be able to do that.33
Another example of the organisation’s flexibility is its members’ tendency to ignore 
formal structures and to be flexible with implementation of programs. As illustrated 
by a former managing director of Insist, Miftahudin, “When I was there we were 
very flexible in creating our divisions.”34 “What I mean is,” he continued, “as an im­
plemented people could put different labels on the same role. Sometimes in writing a 
letter they introduced themselves as a general manager, and other time, as an oper­
ational manager.” He reflected on his Insist-experience:
31 For example, the Yogyakarta Cultural Academy [Akademi Kebudayaan Yogyakarta or AKY], AKY 
runs young writers training programs to “produce well-researched literature close to Pramoedya An- 
anta Toer’s works”. See http://www2.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0109/22/jateng/dibu26.htm [ac­
cessed on 8 December 2008].
32 Interview with Muhammad Miftahudin, 22 January 2007.
33 Interview with Fitri Andyaswuri, 10 November 2006. Fitri is a member of the younger generation 
of Insist and one of the minorities of Insist staff who is female. She specialises in gender and justice 
training. Prior to working with Insist in early 2000, she worked for five years for PKBI (the Indone­
sian Family Planning Association) and two years for LSPPA, an ADB-funded advocacy group for 
female-street-children. Gender issues are one of Insist’s concerns and the organisation itself claims to 
be strongly opposed to discrimination against women. (See, for example, Fakih, et.al 1996 and Fakih, 
1996b, which discuss gender and social transformation, and Islamic perspectives on gender dis­
course.) However, according to Fitri, in general women who choose to be involved in activism in In­
donesia are immensely outnumbered by men.
34 Interview with M. Miftahuddin, 22 January 2007.
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In essence nothing is standardised. It’s up to me [suka-suka saja] what I 
want to have as a label. Every unit was fully independent so that even 
Mansour [Fakih], let alone myself, do not have the authority to instruct, 
for example, the Involvement organising committee. Each unit is inde­
pendent in terms of running its program, funding, and staff. [Thus] I 
only have the control to ensure that the program run as scheduled. It is 
the person in charge of that division who decides the program content, 
how it is developed and how to manage it.35
Dony, an alumni-tumed-program-manager of the Involvement program provided a 
further account which confirms the flexible nature of Insist’s organisational structure 
in its early years. He made a remark about what he called the “distinctive” character 
of Insist: “Everybody can be a director (in Insist) . ” 36 For example, he said, “You are 
free to claim to the outside world that you are a program director of a certain pro­
gram at Insist, although in fact you work alone for that program and you don’t have 
anybody else to direct.” This person from the younger generation of Insist continued, 
“For instance, [you can say that you work] as a research director, when formally at 
that time Insist did not have a research wing.”
Insist’s flexibility is also apparent in its decision-making processes, which draw 
heavily on the participatory approach. Dony explained that, “it was an initiative of 
the Involvement alumni to suggest that Involvement graduates would sit in the next 
Involvement organising committee. Insist people agreed with our ideas and that’s it.” 
He said, “We had an alumni meeting in Yogya and established an Involvement 
committee. Involvement since then is fully run by former participants.” He con­
tinued, “I think it’s a very beautiful process in the context of democracy. Yet it also 
creates a sense of arrogance in us [the alumni].” He quoted the positive and encour­
aging response Involvement alumni received from Insist management when they 
proposed their idea: “of course you can. You can even be the Insist director if you
i o
want to.” For Dony, by opening up the management of the Involvement program to 
all former participants -  rather than running the program in a top-down, profession­
alised or closed manner -  Insist demonstrated its commitment to a participatory ap­
proach.
35 Ibid.
36 Interview with Dony Hendro Cahyono, 7 November 2006.
’7 Ibid. In the interview, Dony suggested, “In reality, different people continue to conduct research 
and produce results, which then later were pooled together and became Insist Policy Studies.” The 
organisation conducted policy research in the issues of “health, education, gender-based violence and 
environmental issues for district governments in several districts in Indonesia.” 
http://www.infid.org/newinfid/print.php7pciK3286 [accessed on 16 December 2008].
3<s Interview with Dony Hendro Cahyono, 7 November 2006.
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The above nature of Insist is confirmed in an assessment report of one staff member 
from Insist’s oldest international partner organisation. “Insist has a democratic struc­
ture,” Anu Lounela observed, “whereby any of the staff is able to implement a pro­
ject -  as long as it follows the principles of Insist -  and to become a head of the team
i n
for the project, whereby s/he is responsible for its budget and the process.”' Accord­
ing to her, this nature of Insist’s structure has both positive and negative sides. “The 
staff of Insist,” she said, “is very creative and able to produce much in a very short 
time without drowning in bureaucratic problems.” She noted that Insist “has a strik­
ing capacity to support NGOs and student groups because of its ability to respond 
quickly.” However, she suggested that “at some point it seemed that there was no 
cooperation between different staff members since they all had their own projects.”40 
As will be seen, the problem she indicated in the previous sentence turned out to be 
one of the reasons behind Insist’s decision to restructure its organisational format.
The picture of flexibility and informal organisational structure that I have painted in 
the case of Insist is typical of most Indonesian NGOs. Although many of them have 
a rudimentary organisational structure, in program implementations they tend to run 
without clear organisation and procedures. In addition, as we shall see in chapter 
five, most NGOs are centred on their leaders. The story of Insist explored here thus 
serves as an example or entry point into a wider class of cases. This situation pre­
sents an unexpected vulnerability when it comes to the hegemonic power relations of 
international and local NGOs. The lack of coherence frustrates the capacity of local 
NGOs to posit alternative ideas or challenge the agenda of international NGOs. 
Chapter five will provide more discussion on this topic. For now, the case of Insist 
serves as an interesting case study which sets the scene for the themes of later chap­
ters.
Insist’s Restrukturisasi Process and Its Constraints
As the organisation has grown, Insist’s experimental and flexible nature, along with 
its association with more people, links and activities, began to start creating prob­
lems. Insist activists admitted that, by the early 2000s, Insist’s messy internal struc-
39 Lounela, 1999: 10. Lounela, the author of the report, was the first staff member of KEPA who was 
stationed at Insist office in Yogyakarta. KEPA is an umbrella organisation of Finland NGOs which 
has cooperated with Insist since 1998. KEPA and Insist have a unique partnership whereby KEPA 
sends its staff to work at Insist.
40 Ibid.: 10. She also stated that Insist acknowledge this problem and during her stay the organisation 
has started to deal with the issue by attempting to “integrate the activities of different staff members 
into a more coherent whole.” (Ibid.: 10).
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ture began to create concerns.41 As part of the posi-reformasi NGO boom discussed 
in chapter two, Insist attracted a large amount of funds. For example, the managing 
director at that time said that roughly, around 1999-2001, Insist managed close to 
Rp. 3 billion in funds per year. He furthermore remembered how Mansour Fakih 
once refused an offer of around US$15 million in funds from a bilateral funding ag­
ency as they did not want to become a “broker” [the money was intended as 5-years 
grants program for local NGOs].42 As a result of this inflow of money Insist outgrew 
its internal management capacity, particularly on the administrative side. For exam­
ple, as admitted by Fitri, “we tended to be late in submitting reports as there were not 
enough resources available to conduct these tasks. Insist activists’ energy were also 
burnt out from dealing with the high volume of training requests.”43
Furthermore, there were several cases where Insist members found out that a certain 
amount of the organisation’s funds had become, to use another Insist activist’s word, 
“mysterious.” In other words, the money was unaccounted for.44 Dony added, in a 
situation “when everybody can be a director, it could become a boomerang [i.e. it 
could backfire], especially in terms of internal administration, as there was no con­
trol towards the management.”4^  Mismanagement of funds then became an issue. 
This situation also reflects the wider concerns for NGOs during the period, in which, 
as explained in chapter two, many NGOs misused donor funding.
There was also concern that, as the organisation grew and attracted funding, Insist 
had attracted people who ended up looking at Insist as a place to work instead of the 
place to develop volunteerism and activism, part of its original design.46 According 
to one of its founders, Insist’s NGO-style management [“manajeinen AGO”], which
41 See http://www.insist.or.id/index.php?lang=id&page=profil&id=6 [accessed on 4 December 2007]. 
4' Interview with Miftahuddin, 22 January.
43 Interview with Fitri Andyaswuri, 10 November 2006. She said in a month Insist in Yogya could 
handle three to four training seminars.
44 Interview with Saleh Abdullah, 19 October 2006. He mentioned the sum of Rp. 500 million was 
once reported missing by an internal auditor from Remdec, Insist’s consultancy ann. This issue was 
brought into attention during an Insist meeting. Yet no legal action was taken. Roem Topatimasang 
also indicated funding problems in his article on Insist webpage: “Roem Topatimasang: Dari Warung 
Kopi Kembali ke Warung Kopi” in http://www.insist.or.id/index.php?lang=id&page^profil&id=6 
[accessed on 4 December 2007]. See chapter six for discussion NGOs’ accountability. Saleh Abdullah 
is an Insist senior activist. Prior to joining Insist in 1997, he was actively involved with Skephi (The 
Indonesian NGO Networks for Forest Conservation), a radical NGO established in the early 1980s 
(On Skephi, see Uhlin, 1997: 112-13). He was briefly jailed towards the end of the Suharto regime for 
his role in Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia (PUDI) [the Indonesian Uni Democracy Party], a dissi­
dent party led by Sri Bintang Pamungkas. On Pamungkas and PUDI, see Pamungkas, et al. 1998; Wi- 
jadi et.al, 1997.
4:1 Interview with Dony Hendro Cahyono, 7 November 2006.
46 Interviews with Muhammad Miftahudin, 22 January 2007; Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007; 
Saleh Abdullah 12 October 2006.
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lacked clear rules and responsibility had undermined Insist’s initial objectives, and 
was thus no longer suitable for the organisation.47
Another reason for reform proposed by Insist activists was that instead of providing 
assistance and serving as a support system for social transformation done by organi­
sations at the grass-roots level, as was initially intended, Insist in Yogyakarta had 
grown into an organisation which implemented activities of its own, particularly 
training programs. As a result, there grew a strong sense among Insist activists that 
there was too much centralisation at Insist. According to Insist’s co-founder, Roem 
Topatimasang:
We visualised Insist as a meeting place of those who want to work in 
transforming society, more like a Waning Kopi (cafe) than a formal or­
ganisation. So anybody could and may come to share their ideas and to 
compose their concepts. Yet Insist grew so fast it was like an over­
weight baby [bayi bongsor] ... and it was trapped in implementation 
work.48
Therefore, as it had become clear to Insist activists that the organisation was veering 
away from its goals, they started to think seriously about ways to change Insist in 
2002.49
Noting the fluid and flexible nature of Insist, it is understandable how the organisa­
tion could be swept to follow whatever “current” or influence swayed it. Nonethe­
less, how and why Insist members themselves became focused on implementing 
program activities if they knew that this was not what they intended to do in the first 
place, was never really clear. Although accounts from different Insist activists as il­
lustrated in the preceding pages, shed light on what happened, none were able to 
provide a concise explanation. In various degrees, Insist leaders also appear to be 
hesitant in talking about what had happened exactly to cause them to change, other 
than that they wanted to return to their original form.50
47 Interview with Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007.
4K See “Roem Topatimasang: Dari Warung Kopi Kembali ke Warung Kopi” in Insist Website, 
http://www.insist.or.id/index.php?lang=id&page=profil&id-6 [accessed on 4 December 2007]. Roem 
did not elaborate on what he meant by implementation work, however it is most likely that what he 
meant by that is project implementation. However from my interviews with Insist activists, the closest 
interpretation of what he meant was that Insist was unable to run activities as it relied only on several 
individuals. Therefore the organisation decided to implement its own “decentralization” by delegating 
jobs to members of its regional network.
49 Ibid., and see also Insist profile on http://www.insist.or.id/index.php?lang=en&page=about_insist 
[accessed on 11 December 2008],
50 For example, most of them avoid being specific in admitting administrative problems, particularly 
about corruption cases.
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One explanation about what happened concerns the participatory-approach exercised 
in Insist. Since this approach emphasises for “process” rather than “procedure,” it 
resulted in the organisation being unable to control the outcome of the process. Yet, 
officially, Insist did not formally acknowledge the organisational problem it had in­
ternally as the main reason why it needed to transform itself. Instead, Insist has sug­
gested:
the process of change is constantly happening: the globalization of free 
market ideology, regional economic crises, the rocky reform of the na­
tional political system, and more, tend not to benefit the people at the 
margins. We at INSIST are aware that we ourselves have to change if 
we don’t want to be swallowed up by these changes.51
Arguably, this statement exhibits Insist’s possession of sophisticated skills in pre­
senting big ideas using bahasa aktifis [the language of activists], yet without provid­
ing a clear, unambiguous explanation of what is actually meant. More importantly, it 
implies that Insist saw its need to change as a result of external pressure deriving 
from what was happening globally and nationally in Indonesia and not because of 
what had happened internally. This contradicted Insist activists’ own statements dur­
ing interviews and observations.
Other explanations involve international donors as part of the story of Insist’s or­
ganisational change. As explained above, lack of clear structure and responsibility 
resulted in incidents in which Insist could not fulfil its reporting obligations and 
could not be accountable for its funding agencies. Insist’s reputation was thus tainted 
and it was not as attractive as it had been previously in the eyes of international 
donors. This hypothesis also contradicts Insist’s rhetoric as an independent organisa­
tion which is critical towards mainstream international funding agencies. But more 
importantly, it shows the significance of international donors in shaping the organi­
sational nature of a local NGO, even for an organisation like Insist which is critical 
towards international funding agencies.
After a long process of contemplation and discussion, in 2004 the organisation de­
cided to “transform” itself with the signing of a Deklarasi Perubahan Insist [Insist 
Declaration of Change] in Jakarta on 20 May 2004. That day was significant as it 
also marked the 100th day of Mansour Fakih’s death.52 The transformation involved 
changing the name “Institute for Social Transformation” into “Indonesian Society for
51 See Insist profile on http://www.insist.or.id/index.php?lang=en&page=about_insist [accessed on 11 
December 2008].
52 http://www.insist.or.id/index.php?lang=en&page=about_insist [accessed on 11 December 2008].
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Social Transformation.” This was viewed as significant because by becoming a soci­
ety, the Insist office in Yogyakarta returned to its founders’ original idea, which was 
not to be an institution but a support system for the work of its network of grass-root 
organisations.53
In the form of a society or confederation, the new Insist appears to be clearly defined 
and structured.54 It no longer has its own units focusing on education programs (In­
volvement and Fellowship), gender and justice training, human resources and Insist 
Press as it used to.55 Instead, it consists of member organisations who share similar 
visions and ideals and a secretariat office in Yogyakarta. Insist member organisations 
are now the ones who carry out the type of work that Insist’s units in Yogya used to 
carry out. For example, the “Involvement” program is no longer conducted in Yog­
yakarta, instead, it became the Sekolah Transformasi Sosial [Social Transformation 
School] program and is implemented by several Insist member organisations in their 
own areas. The restructuring process also saw Insist Press become an independent 
company and join Insist as a member.
Insist’s members now are mostly grass-roots organisations and development consult­
ing companies which Insist activists have been, historically and functionally, closely 
linked with, such as Baileo and Remdec. However, Insist is now also in the process 
of admitting new member organisations. As of December 2008, it had fifteen mem­
ber organisations with two prospective member organisations.56 Organisations are 
located in six regions: Maluku, Jakarta, Nusa Tenggara and Bali, Papua, Central and
cn
South Kalimantan and Sumatra.
The role of the Insist office in Yogyakarta is now only to offer support in conducting
r o
studies, research and education to strengthen member organisations. The Insist 
secretariat now serves as a facilitator for member organisations, such that when it
53 According to Roem Topatimasang, by becoming a society, Insist no longer has a legal form as an 
institution. See http:/Avww.insist.or.id/index.php?lang=id&page=profil&id=6 [accessed on 4 Decem­
ber 2007]. However, the fact that Insist still signs agreements with international donors on behalf of 
its members which lack management capacity contradicts his two statements.
54 See http:/Avww.insist.or.id/index.php?lang=en&page=about_insist [accessed on 11 December 
2008].
55 Fellowship is Insist’s initiative to invite activists to turn their experiences into a book. It is a yearly 
program which started in 2001. Interview with Fitri Andyaswuri, 10 November 2006; Saleh Abdullah, 
12 October 2006.
56 Ibid.
57 See http://www.insist.or.id/index.php?lang=id&page=profil&id=6 [accessed on 4 December 2007].
58 Ibid. This again shows that Insist is in essence the same as its former self, except that the organisa­
tion is more clearly defined and structured, and focus to its members. Thus this supports my argument 
earlier that the real reason why they change is to avoid internal management problems.
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receives a request to conduct training or to implement projects, the secretariat would 
now pass the request to the appropriate member organisation which will then carry 
out the activity. In this way, its founders envisage that it is the member organisa­
tions, and not the activists associated with Yogyakarta Insist office, that will be in­
volved in activities thus enabling them to develop their capacities themselves.59
Yet the transition period did not go easily for Insist. It took four years to complete 
the process. The first two years mostly consisted of reshaping Insist’s organisational 
structure and what members call strengthening the capacity of member organisa­
tions, which included capacity building training. The transition process also involved 
the establishment of an executive board. During this process the Insist secretariat 
was run by an interim caretaker team, which consisted of six members of what they 
called a ‘task-force’ team.60 The secretariat had a few regular activities, particularly 
in 2005-2006. All in all, this was a period of significant crisis for the organisation.
Several factors contributed to the difficulties. First, in the view of several Insist ac­
tivists, there was a technical problem.61 Since the organisation is based on volunteer- 
ism, Insist decision-makers do not exclusively work for Insist. Like many prominent 
NGO figures in the post-Suharto period, they have high mobility and over-stretched 
schedules. “ Moreover not all of them reside in Yogya. As a result, even getting a 
signature to authorise the release of funds in response to member organisations’ re-
59 Interviews with Saleh Abdullah, 19 October 2006; Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007.
60 Interviews with Fitri Andyaswuri 10 November 2006; Saleh Abdullah 19 October 2006; Roem To­
patimasang 27 January 2007.
61 Interviews with Fitri Andyaswuri 10 November 2006; Saleh Abdullah 19 October 2006.
62 For example, an Insist activist’s normal schedule in any given month consists of at least two weeks 
of traveling. The traveling activities range from visiting member organisations, becoming a training 
facilitator or conducting needs assessment and evaluation programs in different places scattered from 
Papua to Aceh. Interview with Saleh Abdullah 16 October 2006.
6'’ As an illustration, in 2006 a member of the Insist task-force team in charge of Insist’s external rela­
tions, Donatus K. Marut, was appointed the Executive Secretary of INFID, the International NGO 
Forum for Indonesian Development, a prominent NGO forum. He is based in Jakarta where INFID’s 
office is located. Don was the Executive Director of Insist from 2003-2004. Prior to that, he briefly 
worked as the Regional Coordinator of SEAPCP (Southeast Asian Popular Communication Program) 
based in Jakarta and as the Regional Coordinator of SEACA (Southeast Asian Committee for Advo­
cacy) based in Bangkok, Thailand from 2000-2003. He has also been actively involved with Baileo 
and Remdec, both are member organisations of Insist. In addition, he has experience working for Ox- 
fam UK/Intemational in Yogyakarta. Don holds two Masters degrees (M.Sc in Natural Resources and 
Environmental Economics from Chulalongkorn University in Thailand and M.Phil in Development 
Studies from the University of Cambridge, U.K) as well as a BA in International Relations from Gad- 
jah Mada University.
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quest could be difficult.64 Consequently the effort of drawing them together for 
meetings was a challenging task.
The second problem related to the nature of Insist with its participatory approach. 
Beside the problem of “having bosses in different cities,” Fitri, who in 2004-2006 
was the secretary of the task-force team, mentioned that the difficulties derived from 
the fact that “all of them [task-force team members] have equal power to govern and 
sometimes it could be difficult to manage as different people give different orders.”65 
In other words, she was caught up in a situation where, as the common saying puts it, 
there were too many chiefs and not enough Indians. According to her, it could take 
time for the task-force members to synchronise their views on a particular problem.06
An additional problem mentioned by several Insist staff is that, admittedly not by 
design, Insist had been too ‘centralised’ for too long and therefore the gap between 
people at the Insist office and its member organisations at times was significant. 
What they mean by this is that prior to its reform, it was Insist activists from the 
Yogyakarta office who had been actively involved in training programs and other 
project implementation. Thus when it came time for the Insist member organisations 
to implement a project, many among them did not have the capacity to do so.67 For
example, Saleh Abdullah points to weaknesses in “English language skills, proposal
68and report making, [and the] finance system.”
At the same time, Insist activists also complained that other organisations still pre­
ferred to work with the individuals whom they had already knew, either by reputa-
64 Interviews with Fitri Andyaswuri 10 November 2006. Between 2004-2006, she was the secretary 
for the task-force team, or in her own words, “pembantunya para dewa” [“the servant of the gods”]. 
She is also the Program Manager of Insist’s program in Aceh.
65 Interviews with Fitri Andyaswuri 10 November 2006.
66 Ibid.
67 Interviews with Saleh Abdullah, 19 October 2006; Henri Myrtinen, 16 October 2006.
68 Interview with Saleh Abdullah, 19 October 2006. However, he also acknowledged the need to be 
careful in looking at member organisation’s lack of capacity. According to Saleh, since Insist started 
to think about making organisational changes in 2002, there were those in Insist who rejected the idea. 
They then used this lack of capacity and the issue of the unreadiness of member organisations as the 
reason for not changing Insist. This statement, which implies that Insist conforms with the interna­
tional development organisation standards of practice in a sense contradicts Insist’s strong belief in 
striving for alternatives approach, as a transformative NGO, against the developmentalism of donors. 
Saleh admitted that the disagreements contributed to the reasons it took two years for Insist to for­
mally have its transformation. Saleh also suggested the reason why there was resistance was partly 
because the new format would eliminate individual projects. On the other hand, Roem saw the resis­
tance among member organisations as due to their misunderstanding of the new concept and because 
they had gotten used to the “old patterns” of Insist (Interview with Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 
2007).
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tion or past cooperation.69 This resulted in outside partners choosing to work with 
experienced people at the Insist office in Yogyakarta -  in other words, the old Insist 
-  rather than with its member organisations or the lesser known Insist activists. A 
younger Insist activist recalled his ‘training-days’ experience as a facilitator of Insist 
where he was asked to leave [‘diusir’] four times by training organisers as they pre- 
ferred to have a more senior facilitator from Insist. This, again, illustrates the im­
portance of trust and individual reputation in the Indonesian NGO sector.
As a result of Insist’s top-heavy organisational practices and the important role of 
individuals discussed in the previous page this resulted in the inability of Insist to 
promote its member organisations and conduct decentralisation as smoothly as it was 
intended. Insist addressed this issue by persistently explaining to donors about their 
new organisational format and strengthening its member organisations in various 
ways, including by giving them more opportunities to interact directly with donor 
organisations, for example by having them act as co-facilitators in donor training- 
activities. This means that in facilitating a training seminar or workshop, Insist 
would send two persons: a senior activist and an activist from one of Insist’s member 
organisations.71
At the same time, two major disasters that hit Indonesia in December 2004 (the Aceh 
Tsunami) and May 2006 (the Yogyakarta earthquake) naturally distracted Insist from 
its organisational reform. For Aceh, the Insist Secretariat collaborated with its net­
work of local organisations and member organisations in conducting emergency re- 
lief efforts, followed by reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts. “ In response to the 
6.3-magnitude earthquake in Yogyakarta, the home of the Insist secretariat, Insist 
pooled its resources to mobilise the local community in providing assistance to the 
quake victims (unlike some local NGOs which had their buildings damaged by the 
quake, Insist was fortunate that its office was located in a safer area). During the
64 Interviews with Saleh Abdullah, 16 October 2006; Roem Topatimasang 27 January 2007; Dony 
Hendro Cahyono 10 November 2006.
70 Interview with Dony Hendro Cahyono, 10 November 2006. According to Miftahudin, the former 
Insist Managing Director, when he was working at Insist, Insist already faced this issue and they dealt 
with it by charging extraordinarily high fees for individuals like Mansour and Roem to ‘force’ people 
to turn to Insist as an organisation and agree to work with whoever represented Insist (Interview with 
M. Miftahudin, 22 January 2007).
71 Interviews with Saleh Abdullah, 16 October 2006; Dony Hendro Cahyono, 10 November 2006.
2 For more information on Insist’s work in Aceh, see “What Needs to be Done in Aceh: Basic 
Framework” on http://insist.or.id/index.php?lang=en&page=article&artid=9 [accessed on 16 Decem­
ber 2008], “What Needs to be Done in Aceh: Emergency Relief’ on
http://insist.or.id/index.php?lang-en&page=article&id=l 1 [accessed on 16 December 2008], “What 
Needs to be Done in Aceh: preparation to the next stage: reconstruction and rehabilitation” on 
http://insist.or.id/index.php?lang=en&page=article&id=12 [accessed on 16 December 2008].
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Yogyakarta reconstruction and rehabilitation process, the organisation was critical of 
the Indonesian national government’s willingness to consider taking on new foreign 
debt from international donors to manage the disaster. Instead, Insist promoted 
local resource mobilisation when necessary, combined with grants from international 
donors.74 This preference for local resource mobilisation instead of international 
donors and lenders is typical of Insist’s rejection of developmentalism and its prefer­
ence for alternative methods and people’s self-reliance.
With Insist being in a virtual state of “vacuum” particularly between 2004-2007, 
many people in Indonesian NGO circles came to believe that its ‘golden era’ had 
passed.75 They saw Mansour Fakih’s death as the turning point for Insist. For exam­
ple, a former Insist Press director observed, “Without Mansour Fakih, Insist has lost 
a great leader which in turn affected its openness to alternative ideas from young 
people as well as the democratic atmosphere it used to have.”76 Such statements, in­
cluding observations about Mansour Fakih’s immense personal influence, were 
common in my interviews. This indicates again the significant role an individual can 
have in an NGO like Insist. In the opinion of another former Insist staff member, “it 
could be said that if Insist is a human being, Mansour is its vital organs, its body, and 
its arm -  its everything. When Mansour passed away, well, [they were] gone too.”77
People involved in Insist were aware of the external doubts caused by the death of 
Fakih, yet they disagreed with their critics.78 According to Roem:
Almost every day we receive comments asking why we are now diam- 
diam saja [just quiet], unlike the way we used to be in the past, when 
almost every week we held a press conference. We do not know how to 
explain it. Well, we are indeed changing. We no longer want Insist to be
73 See “From CGI Meeting in Jakarta: IDR 17 Trillion Needed for Recovery of Yogyakarta and Cen­
tral Java?” http://www.insist.or.id/index.php?lang=en&page-article&artid=23 [accessed on 15 De­
cember 2008].
74 For Insist’s stand, see “Moral Call on Disaster Management In Yogyakarta and Central Java” in 
http://www.insist.or.id/index.php?lang=en&page=article&artid=20 [accessed on 16 December 2008]. 
For examples of local mobilisation efforts and promotion, see “Teladan Hidup Kepedulian Sosial” in 
http://www.insist.or.id/index.php?lang-id&page-profil&id=7 [accessed on 16 December2008]; “Four 
Weeks after the Earthquake, People’s Solidarity continues: Contributions of More than USS 1,000,000 
per week” in http://www.insist.or.id/index.php?lang=en&page=article&artid=27 [accessed on 16 De­
cember 2008].
7? Interviews with many NGO workers. Most of the time, the topic of Insist came out inadvertently 
when my interviewees asked about my case studies. The general response I received was that they 
were wondering what had happened to Insist as they had not heard much about the organisation after 
Mansour Fakih passed away in 2004.
76 Interview with Eko Prasetyo, 11 November 2006.
77 Interview with M. Miftahudin, 22 January 2006.
78 Interviews with Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007; Saleh Abdullah, 12 October 2006; Don 
Marut, 25 January 2007.
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big. We want our members to grow vast and become strong. Whether or 
not Insist is well-known does not concern us [tidak jadi soal].”79
Insist’s senior members are also critical of the nature of mainstream Indonesian 
NGOs, which they perceive as ‘NATO’ or ‘No Action Talk Only’ (a commonly used 
epithet for Indonesian NGOs), particularly when it comes to criticising the Indo­
nesian government yet the NGOs themselves are unable to provide alternative solu-
O A
tions. Therefore the organisation rarely joins local NGO meetings. As a result, 
Roem said, “Insist is considered (by other NGOs) as stubborn and binatang aneh 
sendiri [weird animal by itself].”81 Insist seniors also admit that because of their new 
post-2004 style, they feel isolated [dikucilkan] by mainstream Indonesian NGOs. 
This perspective of Insist leaders sheds light on factionalism among Indonesian 
NGOs, which I will discuss further in chapter five.
Insist activists also admit the organisation’s transformation process is going slower 
than expected, but they remain committed to the internal reform process. At least, 
they say, they are trying to transform themselves to adapt to the new social and po­
litical environment and to overcome their problems. This sort of introspection is ar- 
guably very uncommon for Indonesian NGOs.
Having discussed Insist’s reform process and its constraints, I will now turn to In­
sist’s internal organisational struggles, which as we shall see, affects its relationships 
with its international counterparts.
One thing worth noting in the story of Insist is its internal organisational dynamics. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the organisation was established by several In­
donesian NGO activists who shared a strong commitment to the transformative 
model of NGO activism. However, the rhetoric of transformism turned out to be oc­
casionally at odds with reality. As has been shown above, the participatory approach, 
which was characterised by heavy and lengthy discussions, lack of organisational 
structure, and an emphasis on process rather than results, turned out to be an obstacle 
as the organisation grew.
7y Interview with Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007.
8(1 For example, Saleh Abdullah said of most Insist seniors believe that being “super critical” of the 
government, the way activists used to be before refonnasi, without providing alternative solutions is 
unacceptable in the 2000s. He admits that after reformasi, many radical activists have toned down 
their anti-developmentalism approach and begun to work with the Indonesian government. (Interview 
with Saleh Abdullah 19 October 2006).
81 Interview with Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007.
82 Interviews with Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007; Saleh Abdullah, 12 October 2006; Don 
Marut, 25 January 2007.
83 Ibid.
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Several people at Insist revealed that over the years, certain individuals within the 
organisation became too dominant and this created a gap between Insist’s “promi­
nent names” like Roem Topatimasang and Don Marut and those who came into the 
organisation later and who were younger. Some of the younger generation felt that 
the knowledge gap between themselves and the older leadership generation made it 
difficult for them to understand their seniors. As one younger member suggested, the 
gap between the prominent names at Insist and their juniors was so wide that “No 
matter how hard we tried, it was impossible for us to keep up with these ‘Insist gods’
o c
[<dewa-dewa Insist].” ~ The difficulty this person referred to in particular was that the 
seniors tended to speak using “big ideas and concepts” and assumed that everybody 
automatically would know what to do about them, in other words, how to translate 
into real action without further detailed explanation. Moreover, because Insist’s sen­
iors had been working with each other for decades, they “were able to read each 
other’s minds.”86 The seniors at Insist, however, deny the allegation that there is a 
knowledge gap between generations. They claimed that they were always open for 
discussion and provided assistance and materials to anybody who asked for it.
Nonetheless, generational differences at Insist added to the problems of the organisa­
tion. There were several cases when the younger generation felt under-appreciated 
and marginalised. The most notable example of this was an internal conflict that 
happened in 2003 which resulted in the firing of Eko Prasetyo, the then-director of 
Insist Press, and his colleagues at the Press. He left Insist together with the entire In­
sist Press staff which consisted of fourteen young people. This incident happened 
after Eko and his collegues rejected the restructuring of the Press proposed by Insist 
management. During an interview, Eko said the term ‘fired’ was rather “unique” as 
he was never formally hired by Insist. “Anybody can come and go at Insist,” he said. 
Yet according to Roem, Eko’s statement reflects the internal problem Insist had at 
that time. Fluid and flexible NGO-style management did not work well, and thus 
they decided to make changes which included auditing Insist Press and making it an
84 Insist’s younger generation are usually the alumni of one of Insist’s education programs, such as 
Involvement. Prior to 2004, Insist Press had young people as its staff. Its director, Eko Prasetyo, was 
an alumnus of the first Involvement program. Other younger staff of Insist, included Doni Hendro 
Cahyono and Fitri Andyaswuri, who both joined Insist after participating in training conducted by 
Insist. A typical Insist’s ‘recruitment’ pitch, started with Insist Director or seniors introducing Insist 
and asking participants to come to Insist to meet with Insist people and get involved. Interviews with 
Fitri Andyaswuri, 10 November 2006; Saleh Abdullah, 12 October 2006; Eko Prasetyo, 11 November 
2006; M. Miftahudin, 22 January 2007.
88 Confidential communication, November 2006.
86 Ibid.
87 Interviews with Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007; Saleh Abdullah, 12 October 2006.
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independent, private unit. Roem claimed that the conflict started when Insist Press 
people under Eko’s leadership refused to be audited and as a result, they all were 
fired. However, according to Eko, he and his colleagues at Insist Press were deeply 
insulted and could not accept Insist management’s sudden change of heart and its
o o
top-down interference which did not give any room for discussion.
Their bitter separation from the organisation was big news in NGO circles. Accord­
ing to Eko, the prolonged conflict between Insist Press and Insist management was 
also due to the busy travel schedule of Insist leaders involved “many incidents, back- 
and-forth letters-writing, propaganda and deadlock” and that both parties had ap-
OQ
pointed lawyers and were ready to go to court. Insist even called the police to guard 
the publishing property.90 However, in the end both parties decided to resolve the 
conflict by having a meeting to settle the assets-division process, before going sepa­
rate ways.91
After the split, together with former Insist Press staff, Eko established an independ­
ent publishing unit called “Resist,” which continued to provide alternative, left- 
leaning materials in a provocative but easy to read format. “ Their publications con­
tinue to be well received particularly by university students. Eko, a lawyer-by­
training, was also heavily involved in a Community Policing program in Yogya- 
karta.93
88 Interviews with Eko Prasetyo, 11 November 2006; Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007.
89 Interview with Eko Prasetyo, 11 November 2006.
90 Interviews with Saleh Abdullah, 12 October 2006; Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007; Bonar 
Saragih, 2 September 2008.
91 Interviews with Eko Prasetyo, 11 November 2006; Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007. When I 
interviewed them, they admitted that they had not spoken to each other since their last meeting in 
2003.
92 Resist’s publication series themes resemble Insist’s themes, which included of social movements, 
anti-globalisation and critical education. However, unlike Insist, Resist packages its books in an easy- 
to-read format aiming at mainstream young people. See http://www.resistbook.or.id [accessed on 2 
January 2009]. For example, Resist published popular books under the series of Orang Miskin Di­
larang [“It is Forbidden for the Poor to be..”] which included titles like Orang Miskin Dilarang Sakit 
[“It is Forbidden for the Poor to be Sick”],Ora/7g Miskin Dilarang Sekolah [“It is Forbidden for the 
Poor to Go To School”], and Demob-asi Tidak Untuk Rakyat [“Democracy is Not for the People”]. 
Other book titles are Awas: Penguasa Tipu Rakyat [“Beware: Leaders Deceive the People”]. Eko 
Prasetyo authored all these books. Noting this, many people in the NGO sector regret the Eko vs In­
sist’s incident as Eko was seen as the backbone of Insist Press. (For example, interviews with Stanley 
Prasetyo, 14 October 2005; M. Miftahuddin, 22 January 2007; Farid Wajidi, 26 August 2008). How­
ever, Insist people said that Insist Press is doing fine without Eko. After Eko left, Insist Press com­
pleted its transformation as a private publishing house, and continued its work. Insist leaders admitted 
their books might not be as frequently published and as provocative as Resist, because they are not 
interested in making money but were more interested in producing quality works. (Interviews with 
Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007; Saleh Abdullah, 19 October 2006; Bonar Saragih, 2 Septem­
ber 2008).
93 This pilot program, involving collaboration with the Indonesian police, the Centre for Human 
Rights Studies Islamic University of Indonesia [Pusham UII] and the Asia Foundation, is regarded by
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Eko was not the only person, who after leaving Insist, went on to do well elsewhere 
in the NGO sector. The list also includes a former Insist managing director who, as 
of 2007, was working as a Technical Advisor for a prominent international NGO fo­
cussing on children in Jakarta. When I interviewed him, he admitted that when he 
met his local NGO friends he sometimes felt unease as they half-jokingly said that he 
had become a ‘traitor’ working for a foreign organisation.94 In addition, another for­
mer managing director who as of 2008 worked as the executive director of a major 
NGO Forum in Jakarta. These people, including Eko, agreed Insist had been influen­
tial in shaping and equipping them and they think highly of the old generation of In­
sist and the basic ideas of the organisation.
The generational contlict in Insist raises the issue of Insist’s leadership succession, a 
very common problem in Indonesian NGOs, especially those which depend on the 
charisma and star-qualities of individual leaders. For a decade after, the decision 
makers and leaders of Insist remained the same. This situation has led to criticism 
among NGO workers, particularly from those who were formerly associated with 
Insist.9'^ They suggest the organisation has struggled with succession because it did 
not develop a solid ‘second-layer’ of leaders with the skills and confidence to take 
over the leadership.
Insist seniors acknowledged they had problems dealing with leadership succession. 
They suggested that the difficulty of finding a good second layer of “cadre” lay 
largely in the different nature of activism during the era of Insist’s seniors’ (the late 
1970s-1980s) and the next era (the generation of the 1990s). Roem claims:
Young people who started in the 1990s grew in the era when money 
flooded in from donors [banjir donor] thus they did not have the same 
experience in building their own organisations by using their own 
money as those who started in the 1970s-1980s. My generation have 
these kinds of experience. As a result, the 1990s generation mostly is 
not capable of holding major responsibilities.”96
the police and the Asia Foundation as being a success. Beside founding and working for Resist, Eko 
also works as the program director for Pusham UII. This again demostrates the complex links Indone­
sian NGO workers have.
94 Interview with M. Miftahudin, 22 January 2007.
95 This appears to be the general characteristic of Indonesian NGOs. Most well known NGOs are led 
by the same persons (who usually found the NGO) over decades. See chapter five for further discus­
sion on this issue.
96 Interview with Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007.
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In addition, Roem said that he believed that not many from the younger generation 
were ready to live as unpaid volunteer workers like the old leadership of Insist.97 On 
the one hand, this statement could be seen as a pretext for Roem’s inability (or un­
willingness) to hand over the organisation’s leadership. My observation of the 
younger people on the other hand suggests that there are those who agree with Roem 
(that they are not ready thus they keep learning) but there are also those who dis­
agree and in the end leave the organisation. The discussion has introduced the im­
portance of a leader for an NGO, and one of the by-products of a dominant leader is 
the problem of organisational succession. I will discuss this issue of “personalism” 
among local NGOs further in chapter five.
What to Make of Insist’s Internal Problems?
Thus far this discussion has looked at the journey of Insist. The story has been very 
detailed, focusing on various internal matters. But this detail has served a purpose. It 
has served as an introduction to the everyday world of an NGO in Indonesia. It is my 
contention that it is only by developing such a finely-grained picture of local NGOs 
that we can begin to appreciate the broader dynamics of how they interact with other 
organisations, including international NGOs. To that end, in this chapter we have 
looked at the founding ideals of Insist, the strong influence of individuals within it 
and their backgrounds, and the interactions and even conflict between Insist’s inter­
nal groupings. Using the account of the NGO activists themselves, the discussion 
shed light on the complexity and dynamics of the NGO’s internal affairs. We have 
seen how the idealist visions of Insist’s founder struggled to survive when the strong 
personality which led the organisation passed away. We have seen how the inability 
to plan generational succession divided the organisation. We have even seen how 
Insist had to reform itself as, to a certain extent because of international donors, due 
to some inability on its part to be accountable to donors.
47 Ibid. He said that Insist’s executive committee runs solely on the basis of volunteerism. However, 
as Insist’s program coordinator and task force team member in 2007, Saleh Abdullah stated that he 
receives Rp. 3.1 million a month from Insist. According to Saleh, this amount is much lower than the 
average for directors of large Indonesian NGOs in Jakarta (Email communication with Saleh Abdul­
lah, 8 August 2007). At the same time, as a comparison, discussion with a number of international 
NGO workers revealed that Rp.15 million is the bottom range salary of a senior management position 
for an Indonesian at an international NGO in Indonesia. While the International NGO’s expatriate 
staffs salary usually starts from US$2000 a month with housing and bills paid (which included main­
tenance, water and electricity bills and security guard at their house), schooling expenses for their 
children (up to three children per family) and a return airfare to visit their country every two years. A 
typical expatriate international NGO director’s salary could be up to $25,000 per month. International 
NGOs staff also have health insurance coverage on top of their salary while health insurance for local 
NGO staff is usually deducted out of their salary.
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In unearthing these issues I have attempted to look beyond NGO rhetoric and to 
present the reality of an NGO’s life. Insist’s journey as an organisation has provided 
a clear example of the gap between the rhetoric and reality of an NGO. Insist was 
one of the more overtly “idealistic” of Indonesian NGOs, proposing an exact 
“counter-hegemonic” model of participatory education. Yet in reality it became in­
volved in the sort of program implementation and project management that domi­
nates the Indonesian NGO world.
In the case of Insist, the contradiction between rhetoric and reality came to a head 
when the activists that succeeded Mansour Fakih realised the difficulty of translating 
Insist’s grand ideals into more realistic actions or achievable goals.98 When it be­
came apparent that the egalitarian philosophy of its founder ran into practical prob­
lems in implementation -  such as the fact that the many individuals in Insist held dif­
fering points of view and that creating consensus among them actually impeded de­
cision-making -  the organisation decided to reform and, in a way, distance itself 
from its original ideology. As a result when Insist came to embrace reform it ap­
peared to become, unintentionally, trapped in its own rhetoric; it become what it pre­
cisely set out to resist.
While NGOs tend to be perceived in ideal terms, such as having democratic values, 
being egalitarian and existing to promote the social good, the preceding discussion 
exposes the fact that in practice NGOs have internal problems which, if not directly 
contradicting these values, can impede their realisation, and push NGOs in the direc­
tion of professionalisation. Weak management which frustrates program implemen­
tation, hierarchy and seniority cliques which undermine egalitarianism, internal or­
ganisational conflicts which challenge consensus-based decision making; all these 
things can be found in the Insist example, and are at odds with the idealistic rhetoric 
of the NGO sector.99 The preceding discussion has also introduced the important role 
played by individuals in the NGO sector.
These characteristics above have taken a part in shaping and influencing the relation­
ship between international and local NGOs, which is the core topic of this research. 
An individual can, in many instances, make or break a local NGO and hence make or 
break the relationship between a local NGO and an international NGO. The preced-
98 As an extreme example: the difficulties of achieving gender balance with the male dominated realm 
of the Indonesian NGO sector (including at Insist).
99 This finding, which is familiar among Indonesian NGOs encountered in this study, will be further 
discussed in chapter five.
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ing discussion in this chapter thus has introduced the importance of internal organi­
sational culture in local NGOs in the relationships between international and local 
NGOs, and vice versa, the importance of international NGOs in shaping the internal 
nature of local NGOs. In other words, it suggests that understanding the internal or­
ganisational dynamic of an NGO provides a key to understanding the nature of its 
relationships with international NGOs. I will discuss this issue in greater detail in 
chapter five.
The preceding discussion has shown Insist’s internal organisational struggles. The 
following section discusses Insist’s relationship with international NGOs. First, I 
look at a relationship both parties consider to be successful, then I discuss a relation­
ship that broke down. Most of the evidence for this chapter will come from the per­
spectives of the NGO activists themselves -  both from Insist and its international 
counterparts.
The Relationship of Insist and Kepa: An Ideal Case?
As previously noted, Insist has worked with many international NGOs. Based on 
interviews with various Insist activists, a rough estimation of the number of interna­
tional agencies that Insist has worked and has been working with (which include 
multilateral agencies, such as the UNDP, and bilateral government aid agencies such 
as CIDA) point towards more than 40 organisations. Out of the many international 
NGOs Insist has cooperated with, there is one organisation that has been Insist’ 
longest ‘partner.’ That is Kepa (The Service Centre for Development Cooperation), a 
Finnish NGO which has been working with Insist since 1998.
In starting the discussion on Insist and Kepa’s relationship, it should be noted that I 
am interested in looking at Insist’s relationship with Kepa as Insist is the only group 
from any Indonesian NGO interviewed in this study (out of 30 in total) that stated 
they had an equal relationship with an international NGO. In terms of developing 
programs, the two sides claimed they develop their programs together. According to 
Insist activists, Kepa provides them with complete freedom to decide what it wants 
to do. This is an arrangement which, according to Insist leaders, is rarely found in 
relationships between international and local NGOs.100 Studying the Insist-Kepa re-
100 Interviews with Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007; Saleh Abdullah, 12 October 2006; Don 
Marut, 25 October 2005. It should be noted that in mentioning Insist leaders’ opinion here, I am 
merely conveying the reason why Insist perceived their relationship with Kepa to be equal: because
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lationship not only enables us to assess Insist’s claim about the equality it suppos­
edly has with Kepa, but more importantly, it helps to provide an answer to the ques­
tion of what makes an NGO relationship work. Looking at the perspective of the 
NGOs themselves also enables us to uncover things about the nature of domination 
and resistance in the relationship between international and local NGOs.
This section will first introduce Kepa, and then look at the relationship. The latter 
part of the section will discuss the challenges these NGOs encountered and factors 
that have shaped the success of their relationship. I will look at how the NGO activ­
ists themselves describe their relationship, in addition to their official materials such 
as reports, to obtain a more comprehensive analysis. It should be noted that, as men­
tioned earlier, my research looks at the relationship of international and local NGOs 
from the perspectives of the NGO staff members themselves. Consequently, I adopt 
the views of these NGO workers in setting the indicators of a successful relationship, 
which in this case includes continuous support from international NGOs to local 
NGOs.
Introducing Kepa
Kepa was established in 1985 by 56 Finnish NGOs. As its name suggests, the or­
ganisation is a service centre for Finnish NGOs interested in development work and 
global issues, with the aim to “encourage, support and organise Finnish civil society 
to enable participation in actions that promote global responsibility.”101 During the 
last decade it has focused its work on broader global issues as well as developed as a 
trustee and umbrella organisation for over 270 member organisations across a large 
spectrum of Finnish civil society.102 Kepa’s membership spans “from development 
aid organisations, cultural societies, educational institutions, missionary organisa­
tions to political groups, trade unions, and human rights and environmental organisa-
they had the freedom to decide on their program. It is not my intention to claim that the provision of 
block grants was uncommon in the 1990s.
101 Kepa, 2006: 3. See also http://www.Kepa.fi/internationaFenglish/index_html [accessed on 6 Janu­
ary 2009] for Kepa’s profile overview. Kepa’s major issues of interests are international and fair 
trade, globalization, environmental issues, human rights and development. (See Kepa, 2006: 5-7).
102 Http://www.Kepa.fi/intemational/english/index_html [accessed on 6 January 2009].
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tions.”103 Yet the organisation asserts that it operates independently without any ide­
ology, political or religious affiliation.104
Kepa’s activities can be grouped into two main functions which they call quality ser­
vices and policy work.105 Kepa’s quality services program involves providing sup­
port to “strengthen the capacity of Finnish and Southern NGOs,” while its policy 
work entails achieving policy changes by “drawing on cooperation with Finnish civil 
society groups, Kepa’s Southern partners and international Networks” to “transform 
the structures that cause and sustain inequality in the world.”106
Kepa employs a range of activities in carrying out these two main functions, includ­
ing the provision of training and advice on development issues, logistical assistance 
to Finnish NGOs working in places where Kepa staff are located, the publication of 
magazines, bulletins and reports, to the maintenance of a website and library, as well 
as the implementation of policy analysis, networking, campaigning, advocacy, 
lobbying and the provision of financial support and technical assistance to its South­
ern partners.107
Kepa’s presence and activities in developing countries are carried out through three 
means. First (and most importantly), they are carried out through the presence of its
i no
country offices, which as of 2008 are in Mozambique, Tanzania and Nicaragua. 
Second, Kepa also exchanges activists and shares liaison officers in development 
cooperation projects, and lastly, Kepa sends individual employees or “information
103 Ibid. See also Avonius, 2002: 10. In her evaluation report of Kepa, Avonius noted that, “While this 
wide variety of organisations offers Kepa immense possibilities and know-how it also makes the or­
ganisation occasionally rather bureaucratic and slow” (Avonius, 2002: 10). We will get back to this 
issue later in this chapter when discussing the challenges faced in the relationship between Insist and 
Kepa.
104 Avonius, 2002: 10; Kepa profile in http://www.Kepa.fi/intemational/english/index_html [accessed 
on 6 January 2009].
105 Interview with Henry Myrttinenen, 16 October 2006; Salminen 2006: 5.
106 Salminen, 2006: 5; http://www.kepa.fi/intemational/english [accessed on 7 January 2009]. This 
aim of Kepa’s development policy work is similar to Insist’s broader goal as described earlier.
107 Salminen, 2006: 5; http://www.kepa.fi/international/english [accessed on 7 January 2009]. As of 
January 2009, Kepa states that individual Finnish organisations (of which many are associated with 
Kepa) have projects in 60 countries. See http://www.kepa.fi/intemationaFenglish/kepa_in_south [ac­
cessed on 7 January 2009], Kepa’s involvement in developing countries started in the mid-1980s with 
a volunteer program in which Finnish volunteers were posted at NGOs in these countries and eventu­
ally in the mid-1990s grew into a more long-lasting and effective development cooperation among 
Finnish and Southern NGOs (Avonius, 2002: 10).
108 Up to 2007, there were four field offices which were located in Mozambique, Nicaragua, Tanzania 
and Zambia (See Salminen, 2006: 5). However, the latest reform in Kepa saw the closing of its Zam­
bia office by the end of 2007 and the posting of a new officer in Thailand in 2008. The interests of 
Kepa’s member organisations’ and the amount of Finnish aid in the global South are the two major 
factors that determine the location of Kepa’s field offices. See 
http://www.kepa.fi/internationaFenglish [accessed on 7 January 2009].
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officers” to work in their counterpart organisations in the developing countries.109 As 
shall be seen later, Kepa and Insist adopted the third model.
Similar to Insist, since the late 1990s, Kepa has been reforming itself, or undergoing 
its own “Refonnasi period,” as they like to call it.110 Kepa’s organisational reform 
included the transformation of the Finnish headquarters into eleven task-oriented 
teams in 2003, the creation of two networks (the Policy and the Quality Networks) in 
2004, and another assessment and planning process for its future in 2006.* 111 Much 
similar to Insist’s prolonged restructuring process, Kepa’s slow organisational re­
form and unclear organisational structure at times caused frustration for both Kepa’s 
own staff members and its member organisations. " This fact becomes important 
when we discuss challenges in Kepa and Insist’s relationship later on.
Initially Kepa’s member organisations became interested in cooperation with Insist 
in the late 1990s because they desired to find a local partner, who would help them 
monitor the activities of Finnish forestry companies in Riau (Eastern Sumatra) and 
West Kalimantan.113 Before that time, Kepa was not involved in Indonesia. Insist’s 
name first appeared as a possible partner organisation when Kepa held a meeting 
with an international NGO, Oxfam, in Yogyakarta during Kepa’s first fact finding 
mission to Indonesia in 1997.114 Insist’s senior leaders had a close association with
109 Salminen, 2006: 5. Salminen noted that other terms such as “program officer”, “liaison officer” 
and “program advisor” have been used interchangeably with “information officer” in some documents 
as they all have the same meaning in Finnish (“yhteystiedottaja”). Ibid.
110 Avonius, 2002: 11; Interviews with Henry Myrttinen, 16 October 2006; Saleh Abdullah, October 
2006.
111 See Avonius, 2002: 12; Salminen, 2006: 5. By 2006 Kepa has four field offices in Mozambique, 
Nicaragua, Tanzania and Zambia. These countries are the partner countries of Finland’s development 
aid. Other partner countries are Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Namibia, Nepal, Peru and Vietnam (Kehity- 
syhteistyo as quoted in Avonius 2002: 15).
112 Interview with Henry Myrttinen, 16 October 2006; See also Avonius, 2002: 12. Avonius noted in 
2002 that “According to many, continuous change has had negative effect on working processes and 
perhaps also on working atmosphere” (Avonius, 2002: 12). She gave examples of the less than clear 
procedures for handling proposals from member organisations or the field offices, and the fact that 
teams are not always aware of each others’ activities. Furthermore, she stated that “this ambiguity has 
apparently affected Kepa’s Indonesia program as well” (Ibid). During an interview in 2006, Kepa’s 
staff member acknowledged the frustration felt towards Kepa headquarters, but he said that things 
were getting much better (Interview with Henry Myrttinen, 16 October 2006).
llj Interviews with Saleh Abdullah, 12 October 2006; M. Miftahudin, 22 January 2007; See also 
Avonius, 2002: 15-17. Avonius noted that Finnish environmental NGOs are one of the three types of 
Finnish organisations with major interests in Indonesia and Southeast Asia more generally. The other 
two are missionary organisations and human rights organisations. Furthermore she stated that the in­
formation provided by Kepa’s information station at Insist has helped Kepa’s environmental cam­
paign to be one of the main factors behind the withdrawal of a Finnish pulp and paper company from 
Riau (Avonius, 2002: 15-18).
114 Avonius, 2002: 16. During this first fact finding mission Kepa also had meetings with local envi­
ronmental NGOs (Skephi, Walhi -  the Friends of the Earth Indonesia, Konphalindo) and local 
women’s NGOs (Solidaritas Perempuan and Kalyanamitra). Afterwards, Kepa also conducted a short
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Oxfam and Skephi (one of the environmental organisations that Kepa also had a 
meeting with in 1997). When Kepa conducted its follow-up mission to Indonesia in 
early 1998, Kepa and the newly established Insist came to know each other in a 
meeting. This meeting led them to begin cooperation.115
Insist officially started working with Kepa in May 1998. In their relationship, Kepa 
provided financial support for Insist’s publication and training activities, such as the 
Wacana [“Discourse”] Journal and the Involvement program, and for a Kepa-Insist 
staff exchange program.116 Kepa also supported Insist’s publication and advocacy 
work by placing a Finnish information officer in Insist, an officer who was fully 
funded by Kepa. In return, Insist implemented the activities previously mentioned in 
accordance with an agreed work plan, which involved fulfilling administrative and 
financial reporting requirements.117 In addition, Insist also acted as a host organisa­
tion for the Kepa information officer, which entails providing the officer with work­
ing facilities, as well as providing input for Kepa’s publication and advocacy 
work.118 In terms of the amount of funds involved in their relationship, data indicates 
that annually Kepa provided around €30,000 to €40,000 for Insist’s activities, and 
around the same amount to fund its information officer in Indonesia.119
The first information officer was Anu Lounela, who was officially stationed at Insist 
in 2000-2002 (however during 1997-1999 she also spent considerable time at Insist 
conducting assessment and preparatory work). She ended up marrying one of Insist’s
leaders. The second officer was Henry Myrtinnen. He started his posting at Insist in
1202003 for a two-year contract, which was extended until the end of 2006.
visit to the Netherlands and to Great Britain to interview Dutch (Novib, Hivos) and British (Oxfam) 
organisations with activities in Indonesia. See Avonius, 2002: 16-17.
115 Ibid.: 15-16. Avonius stated that during this second visit, Kepa also conducted meetings with Ox­
fam and Walhi, two NGOs that Kepa was also considering to be possible host organisations for 
Kepa’s information officer in Indonesia. She noted that the fact finders reported that Oxfam was unin­
terested in becoming a host for Kepa and recommended Kepa to find a local organisation instead, 
while Walhi was seen as “possibly a risky partner” due to its blunt criticism of the Indonesian gov­
ernment at that time (Avonius, 2002: 16-17). On Walhi’s history and outspoken activism, see for ex­
ample Aditjondro, 2003: 124-146; Parian & Adi, 2005; Sinanu, 2006.
116 What they mean by staff exchange is during the first several years of their relationship, the two 
organisations’ representatives conducted short visits to each other’s offices to leam more about each 
other’s work. For example, there were four visits between Kepa and Insist between 2000-2002 
(Avonius, 2002: 20). The visits usually included meetings with other local NGOs as well as collabo­
rating and participating in seminars. For more details about these visits, see Ibid.: 20-21.
117 See chapter three for NGOs’ reporting procedures.
118 Avonius, 2002: 19; Interviews with Saleh Abdullah, 12 October 2006; Henry Myrttinen, 16 Octo­
ber 2006.
119 Avonius, 2002: 22; Kepa-Insist Partnership Agreement 2006.
120 Interview with Henry Myrttinen, 16 October 2006. See also Salminen, 2006; Avonius, 2002.
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The job of Kepa’s Information Officer in Indonesia basically has two components: to 
work for both Kepa and for Insist. “Theoretically,” said the Kepa Information Offi­
cer in 2006, “I am supposed to work fifty percent of the time for Kepa and fifty per­
cent for Insist. But in practice that just depends on what is happening at the mo­
ment.”121
The type of tasks the officer does for Insist are varied. For example, Henry Myrttinen 
said, this involved “working on Wacana [Insist’s journal called Discourse] and pol­
icy studies, occasionally helping out with training projects and coordinating interna- 
tional research projects. But it changes along with changes in Insist.” " The liaison 
officer’s Kepa-related job components are to contribute to Kepa’s policy and quality 
work, such as trade and development policy issues, to provide information for Kepa
i
and its members, and to integrate Kepa's policy work with Insist’s policy work.
Comparing Kepa’s and Insist’s Perspectives on Challenges in Their Relationship
The Insist-Kepa model of cooperation, with the stationing of an international NGO 
staff member at the local NGO counterpart’s office, is very rare in the development 
sector.124 For many Indonesian NGO workers, this model of relationship is an ideal 
one. Having an international NGO staff member embedded in a local NGO helps to 
create a sense of equality between the two. It also helps the NGOs to maintain a 
good flow of communication. However, although both Insist and Kepa’s staff mem­
bers state that they support this model of a relationship, they admit that challenges 
still occur.
For Kepa’s information officer, the challenges he encountered working with Insist 
were mostly related to Insist’s very flexible style of work and its organisational re­
structuring process. “With Insisfs restructuring”, Myrttinen said, “it is hard to know 
who is being responsible for what, and people tend to move around to different or- 
ganisations. It is very confusing.” He also felt that there had been “a lot of wasted 
effort”, for example, he was coordinating an international research project of Asian
121 Interview with Henry Myrttinen, 16 October 2006.
122 Ibid. This admission suggests flexibility of the job descriptions in the Kepa-Insist relationship, and 
how internal changes in Insist affect its external partners.
,2j Ibid.; Salminen, 2006: 14.
124 Beside Indonesia, Kepa also has had an information officer stationed in an environmental NGO in 
Thailand since 1998.
125 Interview with Henry Myrttinen, 16 October 2006.
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Social Movements but when he tried to continue to the second stage, suddenly, he
1 7Asaid, “Insist did not want to do it -  after one year of preparation.”
On the other hand, the information officer also revealed that he experienced a similar 
situation within Kepa, his own organisation, due to Kepa’s organisational restructur­
ing process. Myrttinen admitted that he sometimes felt that he was being abandoned 
as there was very little feedback and an unclear structure and few specific objectives 
from Kepa in Helsinki. For example, he said, “When I started (working in 2003) I 
was coordinating all Kepa’s field offices and partner (organisations) to the World 
Social Forum in Mumbai which took up about four months of my work.” He con­
tinued, “But when I finished that, there was supposed to be follow up from Helsinki 
but [then] nothing happened.”127
This lack of feedback and clarity appears to have been a chronic problem in Kepa. 
The previous Kepa information officer at Insist also made similar complaints, and 
other Kepa evaluation reports over the years have identified these officers’ frustra- 
tion. “ On top of that, high turn-over of staff in Kepa headquarters added to the offi-
• 17Qcers’ problems: “They changed so fast and they don't keep the papers,” he said. 
However, Myrttinen observed that with the progression of the restructuring process 
at Kepa, things had started to improve.130 Thus while much will be made in this dis­
sertation of the disorganisation among local NGOs, this trend is one that is common 
among the sector as a whole.
Another challenge that the Kepa officer encountered related to reporting. It takes a 
lot of time to get reports from Insist. He suggested they are too “action oriented” 
with busy schedules and heavy workloads, and that writing reports was not seen as a 
priority for them. In contrast, international NGOs prioritise this type of administra­
tion. According to Myrttinen, “It is important to put something on paper to make
1 71sure something is happening.”
127 Ibid.
12s See Salminen, 2006: 16; For examples of the evaluation reports, see Salminen 2006; Avonius 
2002.
129 Interview with Henry Myrttinen, 16 October 2006. Over his three years working in Indonesia, the 
information officer stated that he had to deal with 13 different Kepa Indonesia-desk officers at the 
headquarters back in Finland. He mentioned Finnish law which guarantees people’s job while they are 
away to take sabbatical leave, and maternity and paternity leave, as one of the reasons behind the ex­
istence of temporary staff.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
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Insist staff also mentioned this reporting issue as a challenge in working with 
Kepa. They see reporting more as a burden and have actually logged official com­
plaints with Kepa about it. They consider writing four reports in a year as being too 
much. However, Kepa insists that this reporting is vital and that the quantity they ask 
for is not excessive. Interestingly, Insist staff mentioned the issue of reporting as the 
only challenge they face in working with Kepa. l j3 Otherwise they were generally 
satisfied with the relationship.
Lessons From the Relationship between Insist and Kepa
From the preceding discussion, we can identify several factors which have contri­
buted to the reasons why the relationship between Insist and Kepa went well. Part of 
the reason why the relationship works is because Kepa and Insist had similar ideals 
and similar broad objectives. In other words, they were very close in their ideologi­
cal orientation thus there was no element of local NGOs’ resistance that tends to ex­
ist in other relationships between international and Indonesian NGOs.
An additional reason why the relationship went well is because Kepa’s slow organi­
sational change, unclear organisational structure and high staff turn-over at its head­
quarters meant that it virtually ignored its relationship with Insist. In fact, these or­
ganisational problems also probably -  perhaps ironically -  helped the relationship. In 
other words, the relationship works well because Kepa put little energy into it and 
did not try to control Insist. This condition can be seen as one of the factors that con­
tributed to Insist being able to gain such freedom and equality in its relationship with 
Kepa.
Although Insist and Kepa had similar ideals, and similar broad objectives, the rela­
tionship between the two organisations worked because the international NGO un­
usually went out of its way to treat the local NGO as an equal partner. Secondly the 
international NGO itself was going through a period of internal restructuring that led 
to a lack of focus and disorganisation in its relationship with its Indonesian counter­
part. These factors emerge as reasons why the relationship between Insist and Kepa 
was a success (using their own indicators of success mentioned earlier namely the
L’2 Reporting consists of a narrative report (program activities report) and a financial report. Other 
obligations include Insist must “hire an independent auditor to audit the accounts and do book keep­
ing,” and “to keep the vouchers [receipts] for six years after the actual years of activities” (Partnership 
Agreement Between KEPA and Insist, 2006),
133 Other concerns on the part of Insist, related to the uncertainty of their cooperation as Kepa is com­
pleting its organizational change, but this complaint is one devolving from an extraordinary set of 
circumstances.
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existence of a continuous relationship or support), and thus have shed light on influ­
ential factors for a successful relationship between international and Indonesian 
NGOs.
Several points emerge from this discussion which are worthy of note and which will 
be examined further in later chapters. First, the flexible and informal nature of NGO 
relationships needs to be highlighted for attention. This informality can be seen in 
the absence of clear or focused job descriptions for Kepa’s information officer sta­
tioned at Insist and Insist activists, and in the way these two organisations evolved 
and restructured themselves. Although most NGOs and their proponents consider 
their flexibility to be a positive feature (because it is linked to and promotes values 
such as informality, anti-bureaucracy, anti-establishment, egalitarianism), it turned 
out that this flexibility caused frustration and problems, both internally in the two 
organisations, and in the relationship between them.
A second theme that arises from the section on the Kepa-Insist relationship concerns 
how international and local NGOs form their relationships. Discussion about how 
Insist and Kepa came to know each other illustrates the strength of the professional 
networks of the Insist leadership. Kepa got to know and approach Insist from its 
network of organisations in Indonesia. Of equal importance was the leadership’s own 
experience in the development sector and their visions, which brought them into co­
operation with Kepa. This situation reveals that strong links between international 
and local NGOs are to a large extent dependent on relations among domestic NGOs 
in Indonesia. Obviously, networks and the “brand name” of individual NGO leaders, 
along with the endorsement of other NGOs in the sector are critical for local NGOs 
which want to become known by, and establish relations with, international NGOs. 
This condition implies that for local NGOs without an influential figure, a long repu­
tation or a big network of allies, the chances of being successful in making relations 
with international organisations are rather bleak. This discussion raises broader is­
sues of who gets the foreign funding and why, along with questions about rivalry 
among NGOs. Subsequent chapters will address this issue, chapter four will discuss 
international development funding mechanisms while chapter five will discuss the 
micropolitics of local NGOs and the relations among domestic NGOs.
How Insist and Kepa established their cooperation also reveals that it was Kepa who 
initiated the meeting and searched for the local partner organisation. A potential 
contradiction arises here. What does this circumstance say about the nature of the
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relationship between local and international NGOs: who actually needs who in the 
relationship? Here, it appears that it was the international NGO which needed a local 
partner. This prompts us to rethink the widespread notion in the development sector 
that it is generally only the local NGOs that seek international backing. It also makes 
us question the common perception about the asymmetrical nature of relations be­
tween international and local NGOs. Through discussion in chapter five, this thesis 
will attempt to investigate these issues by looking at the perspectives of the NGO 
activists themselves on their relationships, particularly on challenges they encounter 
in working with each other, a topic that also arises in the next section.
When a Relationship Breaks Down: Insist and IMD
Having scrutinised a relationship between a local and international NGO in which 
both organisations considered the relationship to be successful, now I will look at a 
relationship which broke down: that between Insist and The Netherlands Institute for 
Multiparty Democracy (IMD). I will provide a brief overview of IMD, followed by a 
discussion of its relationship with Insist. This discussion focuses once again on the 
two parties’ perceptions of their relationship and challenges they encountered.
An Overview of IMD
IMD was established in 2000 by seven Dutch mainstream political parties with a 
mandate to encourage the process of democratisation in young democracies by work­
ing with political parties.134 In this respect, IMD was one part of a much larger 
growth of “democracy” aid provided by advanced democracies to countries under­
going democratic transition in the 1990s and 2000s. Specifically, the organisation 
declares that it supports activities in three broad categories which, as of early 2009, 
are stated as “1. Joint initiatives by parties to improve the democratic system in their 
country; 2. The institutional development of political parties; 3. Efforts to improve 
relations between political parties, civil society and the media.” IMD’s back­
ground, being the product of political parties, with a specific aim makes it a very dif­
ferent organisation to that of Kepa. IMD is a much more mainstream and conserva­
tive organisation.
IMD started working in Indonesia in 2003 with a program the organisation called 
Sekolah Demokrasi [Democracy Schools], This program has two aims, as stated in
134 http://www.nimd.org/page/about_nimd [accessed on 19 January 2009].
135 Ibid.
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its program profile, namely: “to train young regional politicians and activists in 
democratic values and create a new generation of politicians who can build bridges 
between the civil society and political institutions.”136 The decision to create the Se- 
kolah Demob'asi program, as stated in IMD’s 2005 Annual Report, came after 
“widespread consultations during the identification phase” which “led to the conclu­
sion” that IMD’s aims could “best be reached by supporting democracy education at 
the regional level, building bridges between political and civil society in Indo-
i  ' i n
nesia.” IMD envisioned Sekolah Demokrasi as a political education training pro­
gram for local politicians at the district level.138
IMD’s decision to be involved in a long-term program in Indonesia was influenced 
by “the complex political culture in Indonesia and the new democratic space that has 
emerged since the reforms that commenced in 1998.”139 According to the IMD con­
sultant in Indonesia, initially the organisation wanted to work with Indonesian politi­
cal parties but because of the condition of these parties, and the fact that IMD could 
not find suitable political parties who wanted to work with IMD at that time, IMD 
decided to work with civil society groups instead.140 IMD then approached Mansour 
Fakih, who we have already seen was well-known for his experience in providing 
political training, recommended by an IMD acquaintance.141 This suggests that it 
was IMD who first sought out Insist and it came to know Insist through the reputa­
tion of Insist’s leader and an informal link. This again, suggests the important role an 
individual’s profile can play as the public face of an NGO in Indonesia, and that in­
ternational NGOs need local NGOs too.
The Breakdown
IMD and Insist’s relationship started in 2003 with several initial meetings, followed 
by Insist carrying out a needs assessment to gauge the feasibility of setting up the
136 http://81.23.231.81/programme/indonesia [accessed on 19 January 2009]. The second aim is a 
modification as up to 2007, IMD stated the program’s two aims are “to train young regional politi­
cians, women and activists on democratic values and practices, and, to help educate the next genera­
tion of democratic politicians in Indonesia.” (See for example, IMD, 2006: 41).
137 IMD, 2006: 41. As will be seen later, Insist was also involved in this consultation and identifica­
tion phase.
138 Interview with Benny Subianto, 25 January 2007.
139 IMD, 2006:41.
140 Interview with Benny Subianto, 25 January 2007.
141 Ibid. Prior to making the approach, IMD had already hired an Indonesian, Benny Subianto, to be­
come its consultant in Indonesia. According to Benny Subianto, it was he who collected information 
about Mansour Fakih and suggested Mansour to IMD in the Netherlands.
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school in five regions across Indonesia.142 However, Insist and IMD got into a seri­
ous disagreement which resulted in Insist pulling out of the program. This case made 
waves in NGO circles in Indonesia for some time in 2004. It was unusual for a local 
NGO to pull out of a program. Usually, it is the international NGO which cuts off a 
relationship. IMD and Insist have different perceptions on the breakdown and on the 
causes of their disagreement.
IMD perceived Insist as being too “idealistic” and too “rigid.” According to Benny 
Subianto, the IMD consultant in Indonesia, IMD and Insist started their relationship 
with IMD hiring Insist to conduct a needs assessment for the Sekolah Demob'asi 
program in October 2003. But the needs assessment report, which IMD wanted to 
use to create the blue print of Sekolah Demokrasi, turned out to be “not convincing” 
with “a lot of political jargon” for IMD.143 “We knew that Insist is always against 
neoliberalism, capitalism blah blah blah, and were fighting for the people,” the IMD 
Consultant said. But IMD still hoped that Insist could revise the document and dis­
cuss how to improve it.14"* Benny elaborated:
The blueprint should not refer (mengacu) to one rigid ideology. We (the 
IMD) are not against neoliberalism - it is okay, but it (Insist) should real­
ise that as an organisation, IMD consists of rightwing groups as well as 
leftwing groups. Therefore, [they] should not stiffly refer to one particu­
lar ideology only. But with Insist, it’s their ideology first. There are many 
principles of anti-neoliberalism that are good. It is not that 1 am not 
supporting anti-neoliberalism, but also when this anti-neoliberalism be­
comes just a jargon, a mantra, that is dangerous too.145
There was thus a fundamental difference of political vision between IMD and Insist 
(suggesting that, going back to the discussion in the previous section, one reason that 
Kepa and Insist could work together was that they were ideologically like-minded).
Furthermore, IMD was interested in Insist because of what it saw as Insist’s associa­
tion with the basic principles of democracy, which IMD viewed in mainstream lib­
eral-democratic terms. But it turned out Insist had a more populist version. To il­
lustrate this, Benny Subianto shared his account of what he claimed was a “very 
tense meeting” between IMD and Insist in Bogor in 2004. He explained, “when be­
ing asked about what Insist’s concept of democracy was, Insist answered: well, pro- 
people [ya berpihak ke rakyat] blah blah blah, (and) that they would consult the peo-
142 Interviews with Benny Subianto, 25 January 2007; Saleh Abdullah, 12 October 2006.
143 Interview with Benny Subianto, 25 January 2007.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
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pie.” 146 Even in a situation when what the people wanted was something very un­
democratic (such as undemocratic local practices), according to the IMD Consultant, 
Insist still insisted that it would attend to locals’ concerns and customs. 147
Insist’s pro-people ideology raised two concerns for IMD: ideological and technical. 
At the ideological level, IMD favoured a universal concept of democracy. The or­
ganisation did not want to use the term local democracy, as, according to Benny 
Subianto, this term has a meaning that “could be twisted [dipelintir].” He ex­
plained further, “We want universal democracy with a local context, yet this does not 
mean localising universal democracy as it is dangerous: Suharto adopted this ap­
proach. He localised everything during the New Order era.” 149 Benny continued:
Insist disagreed with us. [Insist believes] democratic principles that you 
would like to develop in an area should depend on the people there. [Yet] 
we have to admit that in principle, many places [in Indonesia] are anti­
democracy. That is why they [Insist] claimed that we promoted “pre­
designed democracy” as if IMD already has a certain design of democ­
racy which would be enforced on the program participants in Indo-
• 150nesia.
On the technical level, Insist’s “let the people decide” approach invited IMD to ac­
cuse Insist of not having the ability to translate its ideas into concrete action. Accord­
ing to Benny, “the most difficult thing about Insist’s proposal is [that] they could not 
translate their ideas into something operational.” 1^1 He added, “we are not talking 
about an academic paper [here] where you can do anything. But this is for kabupaten 
[district]-level local politicians. We need something concrete.” This accusation is 
ironic as operationally speaking, Insist activists have decades of work experience in 
the field. But it also points to a gap between Insist’s grandiose rhetoric and the re­
ality of program implementation, as perceived by the donors.
In addition, IMD was concerned because Insist rejected the idea of administering the 
program through a national steering committee consisting of respected academics 
and or Indonesian democrats, to which Insist would be accountable. The idea behind 
having this committee was that IMD envisaged the program being “owned” by Indo­
nesians. 153 IMD interpreted Insist’s rejection of this model as unwillingness to be
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
153 Ibid. See also IMD, 2006
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transparent and accountable. The 1MD consultant stated “they wanted their friends to 
be appointed as committee members, and rejected certain names [of committee 
members] that Insist thought would not be fair to them. This is a matter of accounta­
bility.”154 He went even further by saying that Insist refused to be audited.
Underlying IMD’s account of its disagreement with Insist was IMD’s deep disap­
pointment with Insist’s unwillingness to compromise, which led to a failure to reach 
consensus, particularly after the death of Mansour Fakih.155 Benny Subianto said that 
Insist’s needs assessment presentation was held in a seminar format attended by 
around fifty people who were representatives of IMD, politicians and, academics 
there by invitation. This Insist seminar was heavily criticised. In the aftermath, IMD 
suggested that Insist revise its concept draft. However, he expressed that Insist staff 
were “quite confident with what they had already produced” and repeatedly refused 
suggestions for revisions conveyed in several meetings and through IMD’s long 
comments sent to them afterwards.156
Insist, on the other hand, accused IMD (including Indonesians who were involved in 
the program) of trying to “import” and impose their own ideology on Indonesia, thus 
totally neglecting the local context. While Insist believed that if the program was 
to be successful, it had to be about the local people. “For us,” Saleh Abdullah ex­
plained, “democracy must take sides to solve the problem of injustice; therefore, the 
Sekolah Demob'asi we envisioned does not start with theories but begins with real 
problems (of the people) and how to solve them. That is what democracy is.”158 As 
an illustration, Saleh shared his experience in conducting an assessment in East Nusa 
Tenggara, where he interviewed a woman at a traditional market in a place called 
Sikka. He questioned her on the meaning of democracy. The woman answered say­
ing that she did not see the importance of it. He cited the woman’s strong response: 
“What good does it do me? What matters for me is whether or not democracy could 
address economic injustice and poverty. I do not care what people say about democ­
racy.” Saleh continued, “This kind of democracy is exactly what we [Insist] de­
sire.”159 Instead, Insist offered a bottom-up and decentralised model of democratic
154 Ibid.
155 Mansour Fakih passed away shortly after the seminar where Insist presented its need assessments 
reports.
156 Ibid.
157 Interviews with Saleh Abdullah, 13 October 2006; Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007; Don K. 
Marut, 16 August 2007.
158
159
Interview with Saleh Abdullah, 13 October 2006. 
Ibid.
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education, in which local participants would design the curriculum (which is ex­
plained more below).
When Insist presented this assessment result in a seminar, Saleh said they were heav­
ily criticised by other participants. According to him, a prominent Indonesian politi­
cal analyst labelled their research result as “categorically kacau [incoherent].” Saleh 
quoted the analyst’s comment on Insist’s concept: “Democracy has universal princi­
ples. If it clashes with the people in the market in Sikka, you should not attend to 
those people.”160 To his critic Saleh recalls replying, “if so, according to the 
democratic principles that I understand, a state should be secular and there should be 
no religous-based state,” and he continued, “let us together then make an appeal to 
the (Indonesian) president to liquidate the religious affairs department as its exist­
ence is against democratic principles.”161 When his critics disagreed with this propo­
sal, Saleh responded that his showed, “there is no such thing as universal democ­
racy.”162 “In the end,” Saleh self-reflectingly suggested, “the project [Insist-IMD] 
failed because of ideological problems and a deadlock of discussion.”16 ’
Another principal source of disagreement, according to Insist people, was the cen- 
tralistic approach that IMD introduced, including by creating a national blueprint for 
the Sekolah Demob'asi and appointing “Jakarta people” as steering committee mem­
bers. 164 As Roem put it, “1 do not believe that all the social transformation that you 
think of can only be done by the elites from Jakarta,” said Roem. He concluded, “We 
[i.e. Insist and IMD] have a different starting point, we depart from different beliefs. 
Though we perhaps share the same terminology, we have very different basic as­
sumptions.” He also said that since he considered it as a matter of principle he re­
fused to compromise on this issue: “If the compromise is on a technical issue, that is 
alright, but for this one, no way.”165
Insist people also objected to the lecture style of training that IMD favoured, because 
Insist believed that the top-down approach does not work effectively at the grass­
roots level. As Don explained IMD’s idea:
They bring the Jakarta intellectuals to give lectures here and there; peo­
ple who most likely don’t have the ability to travel to remote areas and
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid.
164 Interviews with Saleh Abdullah, 13 October 2006; Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007; Don K. 
Marut, 16 August 2007.
I6’ Interview with Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007.
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do not posses the ability to conduct popular education the way Insist 
does. No way would democratic education, conducted by inviting peo­
ple to the city and training them in a hotel, be effective.166
Roem further explained that, “our philosophy is to work with what exists in the 
community instead of [providing] something unfamiliar” therefore, “even if the ex­
isting situation [local practices in the community] contradicts our ideals, fine for me. 
That condition is indeed the challenge of transformation.” As an illustration, 
Roem shared his experience of working with the indigenous community of Kei Is­
land in Southeast Maluku in the 1990s:
It took me six years working in that community and convincing the in­
digenous council [majelis adat\ to implement a more democratic voting- 
style and to include women in their general assembly. I was even able to 
do so not by design but slowly just as the opportunity arose. In a strong pa­
triarchal and fcudalistic society like that, I would straight away be butch­
ered [tdiparangi] if I, newly arrived, just came and lectured them about 
gender equality and democracy. We can’t just come and expect people to 
change their hundreds of years of tradition in one night. Even after these 
people adopted gender equality and democratic values, they would not re­
cognise the term jender [gender] or demokrasi [democracy] as I never dis­
cuss those terminologies with them. In six years (I was there) never once 
have I mentioned these words as what is important is their understanding 
and willingness to implement the concepts, not the definitions.168
In concluding his story, Roem thus reasserted his conviction, “I believe that many 
existing local systems in Indonesia could develop their democratic format them­
selves. I believe so because I have lived among these people for a long time.” He 
continued, “But if we use the western standard of measurement, well, they are not 
compatible.” 169
Insist’s principle of empowering local communities, according to Insist people, 
caused them to refuse to work with an IMD-appointed board from Jakarta. Insist 
claimed that doing so was not what Insist signed on for. “We felt bound hand and 
foot half-way into the process,” explained Saleh, “these people from the Netherlands 
came with an agenda and they already determined people they wanted to employ and
170crossed out the names we recommended.”
According to Insist, the initial agreed-upon plan was that it was Insist, together with 
its NGO network across Indonesia, who would implement the program. This would
166 Interview with Don K. Marut, 16 August 2007.
167 Interview with Roem Topatimasang, 27 August 2007.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid.
17(1 Interview with Saleh Abdullah, 13 October 2006.
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mean that the local people in the communities they worked with would be the high­
est decision makers, not “outsiders.” In Insist’s plan, each local Sekolah Demokrasi 
would have its own board, which in Insist’s terms would be called Dewan Guru 
[Board of Teachers], consisting of a group of locals from various backgrounds such 
as academics from local universities, community and religious leaders and local poli­
ticians. Insist envisioned these people would decide on curriculum and program de-
171sign appropriate for their community’s school, and act as facilitators themselves.
Consequently, in Insist’s plan, having local boards would leave the people at the 
national level in Jakarta with only the minimal role of coordinating. Insist staff al­
leged that this is the real reason why IMD did not agree with Insist: IMD has prom­
ised several prominent Indonesian academics positions in a national board that they 
would create, which would enable them to decide on the curriculum. “No way,” said 
Roem, “We could not see eye to eye if this was the case.” 172
Insist was seriously insulted by the establishment of this board and conveyed their 
opinion to IMD. However, according to the IMD consultant, Insist misunderstood 
the plan. He explained, “Perhaps our mistake was that in the beginning we did not 
properly explain to Insist that they, as implementing agency, should be accountable 
too. But this is all purely logical.” According to him, IMD’s arrangement was to 
work with Insist and others in creating a blueprint for their Sekolah Demokrasi [De­
mocracy School] program. Then they would have NGOs in the five regions to im­
plement this program through an open bidding process. 174 IMD offered Insist to 
work in one region, without going through the bidding process, in an attempt to 
“compromise.” But Insist rejected the offer and heavily criticised the bidding system 
which they perceived as evidence of IMD’s neo-liberal approach and as unsuitable in
1 7Sthe Indonesian context.
The conflict became rather bitter with accusations flying between both sides. The 
IMD consultant said Insist’s real motivation in rejecting IMD’s plan to have a 
national steering committee and bidding process was because Insist wanted the entire
171 Interview with Roem Topatimasang, 27 August 2007.
172 Ibid. The people on the board included Dr. Ignas Kleden, Dr. Daniel Sparinga, Dr. Thamrin Toma- 
gola and Ratih Hardjono.
173 Interview with Benny Subianto, 25 January 2007.
1 4 Open bidding is a typical method of international funding agencies to implement development 
programs. NGOs and development contractors would then compete to get the funds. This is again part 
of neo liberal philosophy, which is in contrast with Insist and Kepa’s style of cooperation. Chapter 3 
will discuss the issue of international mechanism funding further.
] 1 ~ Interview with Roem Topatimasang, 27 August 2007.
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program funds for themselves.176 On the other hand, Insist accused the IMD consult­
ant and the people on the national steering committee as only being interested in 
profiting themselves.177
In the midst of these complaints, Insist took an extraordinary step. It released a 
document which it called a White Paper which explained its account of the story to 
other NGOs - internationally and locally -  as well as the wider community. Insist 
explained that their target was the Dutch political parties who funded IMD. How­
ever, the IMD consultant argued that circulating the document was Insist’s attempt to 
sabotage IMD’s bidding process. He said:
I think they expect that none of the [local] NGOs would be willing to 
participate in the open bidding [after reading the White Paper]. But so 
many NGOs applied. We received around ninety bidders from five re-
178gions.
According to Insist, it was able to draw attention to the practices of IMD in Indo­
nesia and the program was suspended for a while. Insist claimed that up to 2007 
there has been no Sekolah Demokrasi in Indonesia. However, according to the IMD 
consultant, the program was running. He admits that progress was slow as without 
Insist they basically needed to build everything from scratch.
What to Make Out of the Conflict Between Insist and IMD
We can identify several matters of interest from analysing the collapse of the rela­
tionship between Insist and IMD. First, when we compare this breakdown to the re­
lationship of Insist with Kepa, above all we can see that it was the lack of ideological 
similarity between Insist and IMD that proved fatal to their partnership. Both Insist 
and IMD agreed on the importance of democracy, yet the two organisations differ on 
what the concept actually means. IMD believes in “universal”, standardised liberal
176 Interview with Benny Subianto, 25 January 2007.
1 Interviews with Saleh Abdullah, 13 October 2006; Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007; Don K. 
Marut, 16 August 2007. When being asked for clarification, both parties denied these accusations.
178 Interview with Benny Subianto, 25 January 2007. However, he admitted that the first bidding 
process was only able to select NGOs in three out of five regions. Benny said that IMD experienced 
difficulties in finding suitably qualified NGOs.
174 The schools started in 2006, adopted some of Insist’s ideas of incorporating local wisdom, but with 
a standardised curriculum and modules. For more information about Sekolah Demokrasi, see its pro­
file on http://www.komunitasdemokrasi.or.id/sd.php [accessed on 5 January 2009]; 
http://www.nimd.org/page/indonesia [accessed on 5 January 2009].
180 The program is run by an organisation which was set up by the people who were initially asked by 
IMD to be the members of the supervisory board for Insist. Interview with Benny Subianto, 25 Janu­
ary 2007. For information about this organisation, Komunitas Indonesia Untuk Demokrasi [Indone­
sian Community for Democracy], see its webpage: http://www.komunitasdemokrasi.or.id [accessed 
on 5 January 2009].
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democracy, while Insist believes in popular democracy. This irreconcilable differ­
ence underlay the break down of the relationship between Insist and IMD.
Second, the discussion has provided an introduction on how international NGOs op­
erate: they have certain sets of fixed standards and procedures. These are central to 
the way most international NGOs operate. Local NGOs usually have a weak bargain­
ing position in dealing with those standards. If a local NGO tries to oppose interna­
tional NGOs on such matters, they will almost certainly lose their funding support 
and they will most likely end up being marginalised within the NGO sector.
The above case is to some extent unusual. Insist chose to prioritise its values over 
international funding. It took a path not of hidden, subversion and non-compliance, 
but of frontal -  even anti-hegemonic -  opposition. But not many domestic NGOs 
choose to make such a trade off. The fact that IMD’s program attracted the interests
I o  1
of ninety other local NGOs is a reflection of this. Insist could take this stance and 
survive partly because it did not rely on just one international funding agency. It al­
ready has a steady relationship with Kepa, among other international donors that In­
sist had been working with. Insist was able to do so because it already had a good 
reputation in the NGO sector. Another reason was that Insist’s flexible and volun­
tary-based nature meant that most of its leaders did not rely on Insist as their income 
source and thus has greater personal leeway to stand up for their beliefs.
Third, another source of disagreement between the two NGOs was accountability. 
International NGOs often consider local NGOs resist accountability. This implies 
that when coming to work in a country, international NGOs tend to have precon­
ceived ideas about how programs should run, including how accountability is 
achieved. Usually there is not much space for negotiation. The local context as 
well tends to get shunted aside.
However, the discussion of accountability in the Insist-IMD example begs questions 
about accountability itself: to whom are NGOs accountable? Is it to their donors or to 
the people they work with and represent at the grass roots? Why do local NGOs, as 
Insist has demonstrated in this chapter, appear to be uncomfortable with the issue of 
accountability? What are the underlying issues behind it? I will explore this issue of 
accountability more in chapter six and there I suggest that part of the answer is that 
because international NGOs exploit this issue as a way to assert their standards and
181 See chapter four for scrutiny of the issue of international funding mechanism.
182 For example, see Eliott, 1987: 60-64.
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control in the relationship with local partners. Local NGOs, with their flexibility and 
unclear internal procedures, are prone to being labelled as unaccountable. In other 
words, the international organisation’s standard of accountability is not always com­
patible with and adoptable in the local NGOs’ context.
Conclusion
My purpose in this chapter has been to ground the discussion about relations be­
tween international and local NGOs in subsequent chapters in a close case study that 
reveals all the complexity and the contention that infuses NGO life in Indonesia. 
This chapter has thus introduced two detailed case studies of relationships between 
international and local NGOs through presenting the organisational journey of Insist, 
and its successful and unsuccessful relationships with Kepa and IMD.
As I have suggested earlier, I use the account of the NGO themselves as a starting 
point for my analysis in an attempt to look beyond NGO rhetoric and to present the 
reality of an NGO’s daily life and its relationship with international NGOs. More 
importantly, this methodology helps us to understand the dynamics of power rela­
tions between the international and local NGOs. In subsequent chapters I will look 
more closely at many of the key issues raises in this study of Insist.
The first part of the chapter’s discussion about the formative ideology of Insist, its 
powerful leaders and their backgrounds, and Insist’s interactions with international 
organisations has provided an insight into the everyday world of an NGO in Indo­
nesia. The complex case of Insist reveals the organisation’s struggle to ensure the 
rhetoric of its founders corresponded with the reality of program implementation and 
sustainability.
The Insist case study also has introduced several issues which I argue are important 
in shaping and influencing the relationship between international and local NGOs. 
First, internally, many NGOs are characterised by weak management, hierarchy and 
non-egalitarian generational conflict, all of which are at odds with the idealist rhet­
oric associated with the NGO sector. Second, individuals play a disproportionately 
strong role in the NGO sector in Indonesia. I elaborate more on these issues in chap­
ter five.
The second part of this chapter examined the relationship between Insist and two 
international NGOs. The discussion has shed light on different spectrums of interna­
tional NGOs’ variety, as IMD and Kepa have exhibited. The Insist-Kepa relationship
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survived arguably because Kepa had a fluid structure (due to its own internal re­
forms) and because it went out of its way to develop a partnership of equals with In­
sist. The discussion demonstrated that the flexible elements of the two organisations 
were one of the determinant factors. If Insist and Kepa had clear and focused job de­
scriptions, their relationship would be much harder to sustain. In part, it is arguable 
that the relationship prospered precisely because Kepa was not focused on its work 
with Insist, and thus made few demands of it. This indicates how influential an inter­
national NGO is in the relationship, even for an organisation with strong counter- 
hegemonic idealism like Insist. This model of relationship is rare in Indonesia. Most 
relationships between international NGOs and local NGOs occur on a short-term and 
project-oriented basis.
The discussion of Insist and IMD has drawn our attention to factors which can trig­
ger the discontinuation of a relationship between international and local NGOs. Ideo­
logical similarity appears to be a decisive factor. The discussion of the failure of In­
sist’s relationship with IMD has also introduced the potential dissonances which can 
be caused by funding accountability.
Both types of cases presented here are not common in Indonesia. The relationship 
with Kepa was unusual because there was even relatively no “off-stage” or hidden 
resistance from Insist. The breakdown of the relationship with IMD was unusual be­
cause Insist did not use “weapons of the weak” but engaged in frontal conflict. Most 
relationships between local and international NGOs in Indonesia tend to be neither 
so ideal nor so problematic. This reflects the nature of Indonesian NGOs as being 
heavily influenced by or even dependant on international NGOs. Because of asym­
metrical power relations between local and international NGOs, resistance tends to 
be both common and muted. What the Insist-Kepa and Insist-IMD relationships have 
served to do is to introduce some of the biggest themes in the relationships between 
international and local NGOs in colourful detail. I will expand on these themes in 
subsequent chapters.
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Chapter Four
The Politics of NGO Funding in Indonesia
Introduction
One of the issues that emerged from the discussion in the previous chapters is the 
significance of funding. Chapter three introduced the notion of how international 
NGOs try to enforce an agenda of accountability. In addition, as has been pointed out 
in chapter two, previous authors writing on the topic of the relations between interna­
tional and local NGOs in Indonesia have isolated funding as both the core and the 
most sensitive aspect of the relationship. For instance, although Eldridge and Hadi- 
winata do not discuss the issue of the relationship between international and local 
NGOs at length, both of these writers argue that international funding is the lifeblood 
of Indonesian NGOs. 1 Meanwhile Fakih has shown the unequal nature of many rela­
tionships between the two classes of NGOs, and argued that the dominance of inter­
national donor agencies is one of the problems confronting Indonesian NGOs.2 But 
all of these accounts have not provided much detailed explanation of the mechanics 
of funding. They have not explained how international NGOs use funding to impress 
their agenda on Indonesian NGOs.
This chapter thus analyses the issue of funding in the everyday politics of the rela­
tionship between international and local NGOs. It aims to explain the international 
NGOs’ funding mechanisms, and links them with the concepts of hegemony, public 
transcript and hidden transcript of resistance introduced in chapter one. In this chap­
ter, therefore, I show how international NGOs use the financial dependence of the 
domestic Indonesian NGOs to impose conditions and standards of behaviour that are 
determined purely by the international NGOs. This circumstance leads us to an ines­
capable reality: the international NGOs are able to enforce a hegemonic agenda. 
Crucially, however, I find that this domination is not complete. Local NGOs do have 
special tactics by which they attempt to defend their own autonomy and challenge
1 See Eldridge, 1985, 1995; Hadiwinata, 2003.
2 See Fakih, 1995.
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the will of the international agencies. An example of this is their efforts to achieve 
financial independence. Therefore, this chapter argues that although we find that 
there are hegemonic power relations between them, the hegemony of the interna­
tional NGOs is resisted by local players.
NGO Funding
At the heart of the relationship between international and local NGOs is the issue of 
funding. Although ‘self-sustainability’ has been popular NGO jargon for many 
years, in reality most NGOs in developing countries continue to depend on foreign 
organisations as their main source of funds. Many people criticise the asymmetrical 
power relationships between international and local NGOs, as the result of the lat­
ter’s dependence on foreign funding. As an international consultant puts it:
Once funding enters the equation, the relationship can change fundamen­
tally from one of partnership to donor-client. Indigenous civil society or­
ganisations often resent the inequality that tends to pervade relationships 
based too much on the availability and provision of funds.3 4 5
Clark argues that “Partnership implies a basic equality”; however, “this is not possi­
ble when the relationship is characterised by money flowing in one direction and ac­
countability in the other.’0 As a result, according to Smilie, some major international 
NGOs have become for local NGOs “what government was too often to them: a bu­
reaucratic, project-oriented, paternalistic source of money.”6
In terms of NGO funding sources, as chart 4.1 below demonstrates, international 
NGOs receive funds from government and citizens in the Northern countries. Inter­
national NGOs then make use of the funds by forming relationships with local 
NGOs. Some international NGOs raise large proportions of their funds privately. 
However, Northern governments’ development funds constitute the majority of in­
ternational NGOs’ funding sources. In this sense, international NGOs are similar to 
local NGOs: both depend on external funding sources. We can thus see that, in this 
regard, many international NGOs operate basically as intermediary agencies between 
Northern governments and local NGOS in Indonesia.
3 Links with local NGOs mainly provide international NGOs with access to the domestic sphere in 
Indonesia, and the same links enable Indonesian NGOs to access a range of benefits like networks, 
material resources, ideas exchange, leverage and, most importantly, funding.
4 McCarthy, 2000: 20.
5 Clark, 2001: 27.
6 Smillie, 1993: 35.
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Basic Figures on NGO Funding in Indonesia
It is rather difficult to provide a chart explaining the exact amount of overall funding 
provided by international NGOs to Indonesian NGOs. The range of organisations 
and activities involved is very diverse and the task of sorting out the many activities 
and funding sources of NGOs is very difficult. The amount of funding can be from 
as little as US$ 10,000 to run a one-week workshop or training event, to US$ 
1,000,000 for a two-year program.8 Making this task even more difficult is the fact 
that most international NGOs tend to be discreet when disclosing detailed informa­
tion about their funding. During my fieldwork, some NGOs readily shared informa-
7 Biekart, 1999: 79.
8 For example, Ford Foundation’s grant database for its Indonesia program lists 193 grantees during 
the period 2004-2008. The large majority of the grantees are NGOs. On that list, the largest grant for 
an NGO is US$ 1.3 million for a two-year HIV/AIDS program. For the foundation’s database, see 
http://www.fordfound.org/grants/database/searchresults?all&all&resultsPer-
Page=10&yearFrom=all&yearTo=all&amountFrom=ANY&amountTo=ANY&fields=all&regions=in 
&programs=all [accessed on 19 February 2009],
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tion about their budgets. Others were willing to do so under certain conditions of 
confidentiality. Some publicly announced their budget.9 But many do not, with the 
result that there is overall relatively little transparency in the world of international 
funding for Indonesian NGOs.
One method of getting an approximate figure of international NGO funding in Indo­
nesia is by looking at the budgets in the annual reports of international NGOs.10 As 
an illustration, CARE International Indonesia allocated US$ 35,062,000 for its pro­
jects in 2007.* 11 Meanwhile, Save the Children UK assigned GBP 8,606,171 for its 
programs during 2006-2007. " The budget of World Vision International in Indone­
sia 2007 was US$ 41,946,458.13 Furthermore, in 2007 the Asia Foundation an­
nounced that it was managing US$ 60 million in programs in Indonesia.14 The com­
bined 2007 annual budget of these four large international NGOs alone was thus 
more than US$ 150 million. As mentioned in chapter two, there are more than 100 
registered international NGOs in Indonesia. Not all international NGOs have budgets 
as large as these four, and not all of their allocations are channelled exclusively to 
local NGOs. Therefore these figures are just to give a rough picture of how much 
money international NGOs operating in Indonesia have.15
9 For example, CETRO (Centre for Electoral Reform) is arguably the first NGO to publish its audit 
results in the newspaper (Interview with Douglas Ramage, 12 January 2007). CETRO posted its 
audited balance sheet and expenses for the year 2000 on its webpage: http://www.cetro.or.id [accessed 
on 19 February 2009], Another organisation which has been publicly announcing its annual audit re­
sult since 2006 is ICW (the Indonesian Corruption Watch). See http://www.antikorupsi.org [accessed 
on 20 February 2009]. In addition, in 2000, twenty-five BINGO (‘Big NGOs’ -  a label for large, 
prominent NGOs in Indonesia) were surveyed for a civil society directory, and the survey included 
their funding sources (see Ibrahim, 2000). It should be noted that Law No. 16/2001 on Indonesian 
foundations and its revision, Law No. 28/2004, require a foundation to be audited yearly and display 
the audit result on a notice board of the foundation’s office if the foundation receives external funding 
below the amount of Rp. 500 million or has assets of more than Rp. 20 billion. If the foundation re­
ceives funds above Rp. 500 million or has assets above Rp. 20 billion the foundation must publish its 
audit results in a local newspaper (see article 52 of both Law No. 16/2001 and Law No. 28/2004). 
However, many foundations ignore these requirements and continue to treat their funding as confiden­
tial.
10 Most international NGOs do not publish a country-specific annual report but instead incorporate the 
country program into their international annual report. This obviously adds to the challenge of obtain­
ing specific information about their funding operations in Indonesia.
11 CARE International Indonesia 2008 Portfolio brochure.
12 Of which 65% of the fund was for an emergency program in Aceh-Nias and another 17% % for an 
emergency program in Yogyakarta and Klaten. See Save The Children UK Annual Report 2007: 4-5.
13 Again, a large part of the funding (US$ 18,059,659) was for the Aceh Program. See World Vision 
Indonesia, 2007: 23.
14 Indonesia program overview brochure obtained from http://www.asiafoundation.org. The Asia 
Foundation also uploaded its tax return form for its tax exemption in its Headquarters on this web­
page. The form revealed that during the period of October 2006-September 2007, the organisation 
provided USS 7.1 million grants to close to 100 Indonesian NGOs.
15 Another example of information on international NGO funding for local NGOs is when such an 
international NGO releases an open invitation announcement for local NGOs, such as the one made 
by Hivos to ask for proposals for € 435,000 block-grant funding for its gender, sexual rights and re-
108
A different way to come at an estimate of funding flows from international to local 
NGOs in Indonesia is by looking at the issue from other way around -  that is to as­
sess the amount of funding received by Indonesian NGOs from their international 
counterparts. For example, in 2005 Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) received a 
total of over Rp. 4.7 billion (approximately US$ 470,000) from eight international 
NGOs.16 Several prominent Indonesian NGOs’ financial reports indicate that on av­
erage they receive around Rp. 1.5 Billion (approximately US$ 150,000) yearly from 
their international counterparts.17
Again, we cannot generalise because Indonesian NGOs, as with their international 
counterparts, have different sizes, capacities and activities, but the above figures do 
shed some light on the amount of money available at the receiving end. We could 
estimate that an established, professional, mainstream Indonesian NGO could be ob­
taining around US$ 150,000 a year or more, but the number of local NGOs earning 
in the high hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars annually is likely to be very 
small.
Before further discussing funding, it should be noted that the above discussion is 
limited to international NGOs and local NGOs. Funding provided to Indonesia by 
multilateral and bilateral agencies, for example the Organisation for Economic Co­
operation and Development Assistance (OECD) official development assistance 
(ODA), is measured in the billions of dollars.19
There are various ways in which multilateral and bilateral agencies channel their 
funding in Indonesia. It could be through working with the government (for example 
through technical cooperation), setting up an office or organisation for a specific pro­
ject, and issuing an invitation to submit a proposal submission (in which case usually
productive rights, and the rights of minority groups in Indonesia programs for the 2008-2010 period. 
Http://elektra.hivos.nl/index.php/content/download/8846/46625/file/Hivos%20%20Proposals%20Info 
%20Sheet%20English.pdf [accessed on 19 February 2009].
16 The ICW 2004/2005 Audit Report in http://www.antikorupsi.org [accessed on 19 February 2009].
17 Confidential reports; “Ulil Abshar: 1.4 Milyar Itu kecil” in Hidayatullah, 6 December2004, 
http://www.hidayatullah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1499:ulil-abshar- 
ql4-milyar-itu-kecilq&catid=71:wawancara&Itemid=73 [accessed on 20 February 2009],
1X For example, the chance of receiving funding for NGOs working in the themes of democracy, good 
governance, pluralism and gender is evidently greater than those who are not focussing on the donor- 
favoured issues.
19 For example, the British Government’s Department for International Development (DFID) pro­
vided £34.4 million (approximately US$ 51 million) to Indonesia in 2007/2008 (see 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/indonesia-factsheet.pdffaccessed on 21 February 2009]), while the 
total grants disbursements of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor coun­
tries to Indonesia in the year 2007 reached the amount of close to US$ 1.3 billion (see 
http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=ODA_RECIPIENT [accessed on 21 February 
2009]).
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parties like international NGOs and international development consulting companies 
compete to get funding -  this is the more common practice). In addition, some agen­
cies also work directly with a small number of local NGOs, which are usually well- 
established ones. A survey of twenty five prominent NGOs in Indonesia in 2000 re- 
vealed that 34% of their foreign funding comes from ODA. While this chapter will 
not touch on the dynamics of government-local NGO funding relations, it should be 
borne in mind that ODA sources are also important for local NGOs.
Local NGO Dependence on International Funding
It is commonly understood that most Indonesian NGOs are highly dependent on in­
ternational funding. So much so there is a popular joke among Indonesian NGO 
workers “Marilah kita berdoa sesuai funding masing-masing” [“Let us pray accord- 
ing to our own funding (source)”]. The joke derives from the fact that it is common 
for government officials at ceremonies in Indonesia to have prayers, which usually 
begin with the announcement of “Marilah kita berdoa sesuai agama dan keper- 
cayaan masing-masing” [“Let us pray according to our own religion and belief’]. 
An international NGO director once shared an observation about the use of the term 
‘funding’ within the Indonesian NGO community. The American director, a long­
time resident of Indonesia, recalled that one of his colleagues was addressed as 
“funding” by some local Indonesian NGO staff. The fact that local NGO staff would 
say, “funding datang!” [“here comes funding”] when they saw the international 
NGO officer visit the local NGO’s office, according to this director, implied two 
things: “funding” has become a noun in the Indonesian language, but more impor­
tantly it also reflects the perception of local NGOs that the international NGO is a
77wellspring, not of water but rather of money.
Available figures support the common perception that local NGOs are dependent on 
foreign funding. As an illustration, Sinaga notes that for his three case studies of In­
donesian NGOs a very high percentage -  between 85 to 100% -  of their funding 
came from foreign donor agencies.24 In addition, of twenty-two other organisations
20 See Ibrahim, 2000: 11.
21 Interview with Benny Subianto, 25 January 2007.
22 Interview with Douglas Ramage, 12 January 2007.
23 Ibid.
24 The percentage of funds and NGOs are as follows: 85% (CUCO-I), 97% (YLBHI) and 100% (Yas- 
anti). See Sinaga, 1993: 142-145.
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surveyed in Sinaga’s 1993 study 52% were started with foreign capital.27' An assess­
ment by Ibrahim of twenty-five prominent Indonesian NGOs in 2000 revealed that 
international funding made up 65% of these organisations’ revenue, with 64% per­
cent of the international funding coming from international NGOs and seven out of 
these twenty-five groups dependent completely or nearly 100% on international do­
nors for their financing.26 While a more recent study of NGOs still revealed that, al­
though they have made more efforts to raise funding domestically, the majority of 
NGOs in Indonesia are still reliant on foreign funding as their major source of in-
27come.
The case of the YLBHI (Indonesian Legal Aid Institute Foundation), a prominent 
Indonesian NGO and a long time critic of the New Order government, provides a 
classic example of of the importance of international funding. The NGO has suffered 
significantly after the fall of the Suharto government as its foreign donors discontin- 
ued their funding. The story of YLBHI was mentioned frequently during interviews 
with local NGO workers. YLBHI’s first major blow was in the mid 1990s, when the 
government rejected foreign assistance from the Dutch government, which chan­
nelled through Dutch NGOs, including YLBHI’s main donor, NOVIB. This was the 
result of the Brussels Incident discussed in chapter two. After refonnasi, YLBHI 
continued to suffer as its major donors stopped their funding due to, in the words of 
Antlov et al., “management quality and internal governance issues, particularly the 
conflicts between the board of trustees and the executive office.” In July 2003, the 
lack of operational finance saw the number of YLBHI staff in fourteen branch of­
fices plunge from 410 to 172, and it only had Rp. 5 million (approximately US$ 500) 
left in its account.31
The high dependence of Indonesian NGOs on international financial support has 
made the sector vulnerable to the accusation that it serves the interests of foreign do­
nors over the interests of beneficiaries (a topic I return to in greater depth in chapters
2:1 Ibid.: 142-145. The survey also found that 68% of these twenty-two organisations consider a for­
eign donor agency as their first priority for sources of funds (Ibid: 144).
26 Ibrahim, 2000: 10. International donors in this survey include international NGOs and official de­
velopment assistance from multinational and bilateral funding agencies.
27 Tetanel, 2004: 115-116. Tetanel surveyed NGOs in Yogyakarta, which indicated that six out of the 
eight NGOs studied relied on international donors for their main source of income.
28 See Bunnell, 1996: 184, quoted in Hadiwinata, 2003: 100.
29 Ibid.
30 Antlov et al., 2006: 156.
31 See “Balada Lokomotif yang Terseok,” in Tempo 36/XX1I, 3 November 2003. See also “Mobil 
Kijang Pun Melayang,” in Tempo 09/XXII, 28 April 2003, “Lokomotif Kehabisan Solar,” in Tempo 
09/XXII, 28 April 2003, “Melego Meja, Mengharap Maitua,” in Tempo 36/XXXII, 3 November 2003.
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four and six). There is an extensive debate over this issue, which has a long history
' l lin Indonesia. “ In the New Order era some people accused the local Indonesian NGO 
community of selling themselves to suspect foreign interests that could undermine 
the sovereignty -  but reading between the lines one could interpret them to mean the 
dignity -  of the state. This nationalistic criticism still remains strong. As mentioned 
in chapter two, even in the post-refonnasi period, when the relationship between 
NGOs and the Indonesian government vastly improved compared to the New Order 
era, leading government figures still remain suspicious of local NGOs and their con- 
nection with international NGOs.
Another broad cluster of criticisms of local and international NGO funding relation­
ships comes from the anti-developmentalist and anti-free market critics who perceive 
foreign-funded NGOs as instruments of neo-liberal agencies and interests.34 Re­
cently, however, the discourse has changed. Today some Indonesian critics attack 
funding relationships on the basis of religion. These critics, who are generally from 
Islamist groups, criticise Islamic NGOs that receive funding from Western NGOs as 
part of what religious hardliners see as the West’s (and especially the United State) 
attempt to spread the principles of liberalism which “attack” Islam from within. 
Thus, from the local NGO community itself and Indonesian society more broadly, 
there is a dominant sense that local NGOs are subordinate to the international NGOs 
because the former needs the funding of the latter. This reality is the cause of con­
siderable angst.
I wish to make it clear that this power imbalance is one of the underlying realities of 
the NGO sector in Indonesia. The idealised rhetoric of civil society theorists (and the 
sector itself) falls flat when faced with the evidence that the international NGOs who 
distribute the money have more power than the local NGOs who depend on it. We
,2 For example, see Hadiwinala 2003: 98-100; Lounela 2002; For discussions on Islamic organisations 
see Sabili (http://www.sabili.co.id); Hidayatullah (http://www.hidayatullah.com); Swaramuslim 
(http://swaramuslim.net)
33 One could also refer to the government’s allegedly draconian new laws on NGOs passed in 2008. 
Although the government claims such legislation is aimed at promoting transparency and accountabil­
ity, many NGO workers see it as an attempt to reassert government control over the NGO sector.
34 For discussion about anti-developmentalism see chapter one.
35 For example, see Jaiz, 2002, 2004; Handrianto & Husaini, 2007; “Paham Liberal: Menjual Islam 
Demi Dolar” in http://swaramuslim.net/more.php?id=A1256_0_l_0_M [accessed on 25 February 
2009], “Membongkar Kedok AKKBB” in http://sabili.co.id/index.php/20081111173/Indonesia- 
Kita/Membongkar-Kedok-AKKBB.htm [accessed on 25 February 2009]; “Di Sini ada CIA” in Sabili, 
No. 10/XII/3 Desember 2004; “Dari Pluralisme Sampai Gender” in Sabili, No. 10/XII/3 Desember 
2004; “CIA dan Ford Foundation” in Sabili, No. 10/XII/3 Desember 2004.
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will see in detail in the next section precisely how international NGOs enforce their 
agenda.
However, I also wish to remind the reader at this point that this situation is not the 
only reality. As we will explore later on, local NGOs do have the ability to passively 
resist the will of their international NGO donors by using the “weapons of the 
weak.”
Towards a More Demanding Relationship
When discussing relationships between international and local NGOs in Indonesia, 
as mentioned in chapter two, long-time NGO workers usually point out how the rela­
tionship became more bureaucratic and more dependent on bilateral and multilateral 
donor agencies in the late 1990s, after reformasi. Roem Topatimasang suggests:
Today ... they [international NGOs] now come in and just announce to 
local NGOs: we have this [certain] amount of funding to do this [par­
ticular] program and we want to cooperate with you [on that specific ac­
tivity only]. [In the past] International and local NGOs developed their 
program together starting from scratch. It was even the international 
NGO who sometimes ended up drafting a proposal with ideas from local 
NGOs, and trying to get funding for the proposal.36
Also, since the late 1990s Don Marut says that international NGOs have developed 
an attitude that was “too managerial”, which in turn has forced local NGOs to adopt 
such an approach. According to Don, NGOs nowadays are more concerned with 
“managerial and administrative standards” instead of their “program capacity.” He 
continued, “dirty, hand-written proposals used to be more appreciated as it was the 
result that was important. But nowadays, it is the sophisticated proposal [“proposal 
canggih ”] that gets approved.” These comments reflect a broad trend that is not 
only happening in Indonesia. Observing international NGOs practices in the late 
1980s, Elliot notes:
As their budgets rise -  and given the current enthusiasm for the volun­
tary sector in official aid circles, both bilateral and multilateral, that now 
seems unstoppable -  so they demand more and more projects on which 
to spend their money: most northern NGOs dislike a carryover of funds 
as much as any government department. This puts huge pressures on the 
local NGOs. They need to generate more projects, process more paper,
[and] render more accounts.38
36 Interview with Roem Topatimasang, 27 January 2007. 
,? Interview with Don K. Marut, 25 October 2005.
38 Elliott, 1987: 60.
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On the other hand, there is one reason to assume the trend towards tighter control by 
international NGOs may not necessarily be as uniform as the informants suggest. 
There are different types of international NGOs with different managerial styles, 
which we could reasonably expect would result in different types of relationships 
with the local Indonesian NGOs. For example, international NGOs which do not rely 
on external funding for grants provision, such as the Ford Foundation, should ac­
cordingly have more freedom than other international NGOs which lack internal 
funding sources. We should also expect that block grants extended over longer pe­
riods of time from some funding agencies, instead of project-based or program-based 
grants, should give greater freedom to international NGOs. Counter-intuitively there­
fore, when international NGOs still retain their autonomy, we can reasonably expect 
them to be less bureaucratic or managerial in their approach towards the local NGOs.
Yet the overwhelming opinion of veteran NGO workers is that the shift towards pro­
ject-based relationships, such as that described by Don Marut, has been the dominant 
trend in the sector. This general shift has happened because, as discussed in chapter 
one, most donor agencies have taken up common themes, notably “strengthening 
civil society” and “promoting good governance”. The entry of these terms into the 
Indonesian NGO vocabulary in recent years suggests that funding agencies, which 
are mostly bilateral and multilateral funding organisations, have had increasing in­
fluence on international NGOs from where the terms have in turn been transmitted to 
local NGOs.40
The International NGO Agenda Setting Process: What to Fund?
Several factors contribute to the process of determining an international NGO 
agenda when working in a specific country, such as Indonesia. These factors can ba­
sically be divided into two categories. The first group consists of factors which exist 
at the global or international level, and the second category comprises nationally- 
derived factors.
'9 Ford has its own endowment fund thus it does not seek external funding for its activities. See 
<http://www.fordfound.org>.
40 See chapter six for more discussion of this trend. Another example of the influence of foreign gov­
ernments on the activities of international NGOs is the understanding, common among NGO workers, 
that even an international NGO’s geographic work location can be influenced by the interests of the 
government of the NGO’s country of origin. Anecdotal examples mentioned included the presence of 
PT. INCO, a Canadian nickel mining company, in South Sulawesi as supposedly behind the existence 
of CARE Canada’s operations on the island since the early 1980s; and the preference of Australian 
NGOs to work in Eastern Indonesia is a result of the Australian government giving development pri­
ority to the area.
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Factors included at the global level are the international NGO’s broader agenda 
which mostly derives from, or is in line with, the mission statement established by 
the headquarters of the international NGO. The international agenda typically comes 
in the form of a relatively general agenda statement. For example, CARE USA’s 
mission statement is “to serve individuals and families in the poorest communities in 
the world.” 41 Following that sentence, this International NGO adds “Drawing 
strength from our global diversity, resources and experience, we promote innovative 
solutions and are advocates for global responsibility,” before continuing the explana­
tion about what the organisation does as follows:
We facilitate lasting change by strengthening capacity for self-help, 
providing economic opportunity, delivering relief in emergencies, influ­
encing policy decisions at all levels and addressing discrimination in all 
its forms. Guided by the aspirations of local communities, we pursue 
our mission with both excellence and compassion because the people 
whom we serve deserve nothing less.42
Although the second sentence of CARE’s mission statement above (“Guided by the 
aspirations of local communities ....”) provides more information, it is still rather 
general.
Another example is the Asia Foundation. The Asia Foundation homepage states that 
the organisation is:
A non-profit, non-govemmental organization committed to the devel­
opment of a peaceful, prosperous, just, and open Asia-Pacific region.
The Foundation supports programs in Asia that help improve govern­
ance, law, and civil society; women's empowerment; economic reform 
and development; and international relations43
Again, just like the CARE example of the previous paragraph, the Asia Foundation’s 
statement is very general. There is no further explanation about, for example, how 
they set out to achieve their goals or why they are doing what they do. These kinds 
of statements, which explain the international NGO’s mission without going into too 
many details, are typical. Admittedly these mission statements are for public con­
sumption, thus one may argue that there could be more detailed and real global pri­
orities in their internal documents. However, as will be seen later, I argue that such 
general statements nevertheless provide international NGOs with room for interpre­
tation and thus enable them to be highly flexible in tailoring their programs.
41 <http://www.care.org/about/index.asp>.
42 Ibid.
43 <http://www.asiafoundation.org/About/overview.html>.
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Locally-derived factors also affect international agenda setting. In the country where 
the international NGO works, the regional international NGO branch office usually 
creates the details of policy for the local level. At the national level, the broader ag­
enda established internationally by the international NGO’s headquarters serves as a 
guideline, however subsequently the broader agenda is usually adjusted into the con­
text of the country concerned -  be it in terms of the political and social context or its 
specific development needs.
However, even the publicly announced country-specific agenda is mostly still gen­
eral. For example, the Asia Foundation’s Indonesia-office information page states 
that “in partnership with government agencies, civil society organizations, and the 
private sector, the Foundation continues its support of Indonesian initiatives to fur­
ther consolidate its democracy, improve government services, and reduce poverty.” 44
An additional example of a general mission statement for a specific country comes 
from Church World Service (CWS), an international development NGO working in 
Indonesia, which declares “CWS Indonesia strives for a just and sustainable devel­
opment in Indonesia by improving the quality of life of poor Indonesians through 
strengthening people's institutions and improvement of livelihood using empower-
,,45ment strategies.
It is only through various program implementations of the international NGO that 
such general country-specific agendas are transformed into specific goals. Different 
international NGOs have different methods of determining the focus of their pro­
gram activities in Indonesia. The Asia Foundation, for instance, claims that it is a 
matter of matching the international NGO’s mandate and expertise with the needs of 
the community. As expressed by the Asia Foundation Country Representative for 
Indonesia, Douglas Ramage:
In part it is driven by our mandate or major thematic areas. So, we don’t 
work with street children, environmental reform, HIV/AIDS, cultural 
affairs. In part, we have developed some institutional expertise over the 
years and we’ve made them available to local organisations. Our staff 
are made up of Indonesian experts in their fields. So we rely on our 
staff for strategic planning programs, etc and problems, and see whether 
or not we can contribute to that with our background and expertise.46
44 <http://www.asiafoundation.org/Locations/indonesia.html> [accessed on 23 February 2008].
45 <http://www.cwsindonesia.or.id/en/organization.php?cws_langu=#lms> [accessed on 23 February 
2008].
46 Interview with Douglas Ramage, 12 January 2007.
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Meanwhile, other organisations tailor their programs based on a specific need as it 
arises in the country. By way of illustration, according to CWS Program Develop­
ment Advisor, Michael Koeniger, when drought brought food insecurity to West 
Timor in the early 2000s, it was local counterparts of CWS Indonesia, along with the 
regional government that informed CWS of the situation and CWS senior represen­
tatives in turn approached USAID to fund their program to address the drought crisis 
in West Timor.47
An international NGO could also create a program to match the availability of donor 
funding. USAID, for example, sometimes issues a document called “request for ap­
plication” (RFA) explaining that it has a certain amount of money and is interested 
in supporting specific programs in a country. In the words of Koeniger:
So you realise that there is money available and then you think whether 
this is part of programs that we do and whether we would be able to get 
some of the funds -  are we eligible and can we put together a concept 
paper and send it to the donor to get the money? 48
Another method by which international NGOs create a program is to combine a lo­
cal community’s needs with the international NGO’s expertise, capacity and priority, 
as well as the donor’s funding availability. As explained by CWS Indonesia Direc­
tor, Maurice Bloem, a long-time resident of Indonesia:
(CWS) Indonesia’s strategic plan is the combination of needs identified 
within the country, the strengths and weaknesses of the organisation it­
self, and also what CWS does worldwide, and also the donor factor -  
whether you are able to find money to do what you want to do. Those 
are the important factors.49
The discussion above has looked at different processes that international NGOs go 
through in setting up their programs in Indonesia. Factors such as the international 
NGO’s international mandate, capacity and expertise, the needs of the local commu­
nity -  as understood by the international NGOs -  and the availability of funding 
from donor agencies have been identified as determining aspects of the international 
NGO program agenda-setting process in Indonesia. In addition to these factors, as 
mentioned earlier, the political and social context of the country is also important. In 
the case of Indonesia during the New Order era, for instance, a program such as 
prison reform, although badly needed, was considered as “out of the question” for
47 Interview with Michael Koeniger, 22 April 2005
48 Ibid.
49 Interview with Maurice A. Bloem, 23 April 2005.
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NGOs as there was no political support for it.50 It was only during recent years that 
several NGOs were established and funded to work on the issue of prison reform.51
Apart from showing that there are many elements involved in the international NGO 
agenda-setting and program-making processes above, as I have indicated earlier, the 
discussion so far has revealed that some aspects of the processes are unclear. Al­
though international NGO country-specific public statements are more specific than 
the worldwide agenda established by their headquarters, such statements are rela­
tively broad and thus are flexible.
One of the implications that arise from this condition is that international NGOs are 
able to tailor their programs to fit their donors’ interests, which suggests the top- 
down nature of this sector. This condition is also reinforced by the fact that, as the 
discussion suggests, local NGOs have a minimal role to play in setting international 
NGO country priorities and in the decision making processes of international NGOs.
Translating Agenda into Action: Who to Fund?
The discussion in the previous section has scrutinised how international NGOs set 
their own agendas. This section takes a further step by discussing what happens after 
the creation of an agenda or a program. In other words, this section discusses the 
process of how an agenda is translated into action, a situation which demands build­
ing relations with local NGOs. The discussion suggests that international NGOs, as 
“the ones with the money,” have more power in setting the agendas for the relation­
ships.
As chapter two has identified, the provision of funds from international NGOs to 
local NGOs is the most common form of interaction between them. How does a rela­
tionship between an international and a local NGO typically begin? From the discus­
sion in chapter three on the relationships between Insist and its international part­
ners, we can identify one method of forming a relationship, namely that the interna­
tional NGO seeks a local partner to cooperate with. In this respect, international 
NGOs look for local NGOs that match their requirements. When a local NGO, such 
as in the case of Insist and IMD, does not fit their criteria, the relationship breaks 
down. This method suggests that even though it appears international NGOs initiate
50 Interview with Douglas Ramage, 12 January 2007.
51 Ibid.
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relationships and thus need the local NGOs, they in fact dominate the relationships 
in the end by determining the lifespan of their relationships.
Another method by which international and local NGOs start their relationships is 
when a local NGO submits a program proposal to an international NGO. Often, the 
local NGO will submit a proposal in response to a public call for proposals by the 
international in a particular program area; less commonly the local NGO will have 
simply identified for itself the international NGO’s funding priorities and tailored its 
proposal accordingly. In either case the local NGO is responding to the agenda set 
by the international “partner”. If the international NGO selects the proposal, after 
having carried out a selection process usually involving a field visit and intensive 
program discussions to ensure that all will accord to its guidelines, the two NGOs, 
international and local, would embark on a relationship.' Again it is the interna­
tional NGO that has the last say.
Some international NGOs can be specific in setting the agenda of the relationship 
between them and their local counterparts. In such cases, local NGOs act as program 
implementers and thus resemble sub-contractors. Other international NGOs are more 
flexible in the sense that they provide a block grant and a set of general themes, and 
let the local NGOs come up with their own ideas on program implementation. In 
such cases, local NGOs have more room to manoeuvre, nevertheless the opportuni­
ties to do so still exist within the parameters set by the international NGOs.
Themes that are considered important -  using a term common among local NGOs -  
“sexy” -  by international NGO inevitably become influential and popular among 
local NGOs. People often talk about the sudden prominence of “good governance” 
in response to changing donor tastes from the late 1990s; or, a little earlier, about the 
fashion for gender programming. For example, we can see the popularity of issues 
such as good governance, including anti-corruption programs, and gender in the 
NGO sector (which I will further discuss in chapter six). In the end, regardless of the 
method by which a relationship is formed, one key characteristic of the process is 
the dominance of international NGOs in the decision making process involved in 
their relationships.
52 The selection process usually takes place within three to four months. For an example of steps in­
volved in an international NGO’s local partner organisations selection process, see: 
<http://www.cwsindonesia.or.id/en/programs.php?cws_langu-l#pilar> [accessed 1 February 2008],
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International Funding Mechanisms: the “Public Transcript ”
In this section I shall show in detail how international NGOs use funding to impose 
their agendas on Indonesian NGOs. Most international NGOs usually have devel­
oped various standards of procedure concerning the provision of funding to local 
NGOs. This is especially true when it comes to local NGOs’ reporting system to­
wards international NGOs.
As an illustration of the procedures, I shall look at the Asia Foundation’s detailed 
protocols for its grantee organisations. The Asia Foundation’s detailed procedure 
enables us to understand what is involved in the reporting requirements. Prior to 
signing a Letter of Agreement (LoA) that formally initiates a relationship, the Asia 
Foundation requires its prospective local grantees to fill in a “Survey Questionnaire” 
and “Questionnaire on Internal Controls, Policies and Procedures.” These question­
naires are basically surveys on “the management and finance” competencies of the 
local NGO.53 The two-page Survey Questionnaire asks general questions about the 
local NGO’s organisation and structure, including its government registration num­
ber, its accountant’s qualifications and the accounting software it uses, its financial 
policy and procedures manual available to the organisation, bank account details (to 
be used solely for the Asia Foundation funds) and external audit information.54 
Meanwhile the Questionnaire on Internal Controls, Policies and Procedures contains 
twenty-one detailed questions concerning financial procedures of the Indonesian 
NGO, which includes questions related to payment vouchers, petty cash, and the se­
curity of financial documents and data.55
The next step after the completion, return and approval of the Asia Foundation sur­
veys is for the Indonesian NGO to sign an LoA with the Asia Foundation. According 
to Dwiyanti Wiratmi (Yanti), an accountant at one of the Asia Foundation’s long­
time local partner organisations, the Asia Foundation would send copies of LoAs
53 Interview with Dwiyanti Wiratmi, accountant at Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial (LKiS), 28 
August 2008. LKiS and the Asia Foundation’s relationship started in the late 1990s. For LKiS’ pro­
file, see http://www.lkis.or.id>.
^  Survey Questionnaire form - The Asia Foundation -  for LKiS. The Asia Foundation put a special 
note on the questionnaire: “Please note that the provision of information in response to this question­
naire will not automatically entitle your organisation to any funds from the Foundation. Funds may 
usually be committed by way of a properly drawn and signed “sub-grant agreement” between the 
partner organisation and the Foundation.” On the bottom of the form there is a section for the Asia 
Foundation’s examination and recommendation. Included in the checkmark for The Asia Founda­
tion’s consideration is the question of whether the Asia Foundation officer has visited the organisation 
or not.
55 Questionnaire on Internal Controls, Policies and Procedures -  The Asia Foundation -  for LKiS.
120
signed by its Country Representative to be counter-signed by the local NGO Direc- 
tor.56
Following Indonesian government regulations, the Asia Foundation also requires the 
local NGO to arrange for the LoA to be approved in writing by a representative of 
the Indonesian government, which should be at least an echelon II official. The lo­
cal NGO keeps one signed LoA copy and send the other copy back to the Asia 
Foundation.
Following that, the Asia Foundation transfers the funds to the account of the local 
NGO which usually happens between five days to two months after the counter-
c o
signing date of an LoA. According to Yanti, The Asia Foundation usually divides 
funds transfers for long-term programs into two batches: the first batch is sent after 
the LoA is approved, while the second payment is made after the submission of the 
second or third report as prescribed in the LoA.59
The Asia Foundation sends other documents and guidelines too. A complete LoA 
package from the Asia Foundation consists of a letter from its program officer or 
program assistant, three copies of an LoA, Panduan Pengisian the Asia Foundation 
209 [Guideline to fill in the Asia Foundation 209 Form/Grantee Financial Report and 
Certification], Panduan Singkat Pengisian Formulir Kontribusi Dana Pendamping 
[Short Guideline for Counterparts Contributions], Keterangan Jasa Sukarelawan 
[Volunteer Service Information Form], Keterangan Penggunaan Peralatan [Utilities 
Usage Information Form], Keterangan Penggunaan Tempat [Office Building Certi­
fication Information Form], Keterangan Kontribusi Donor [Donor Contributions In-
>6 Interview with Dwiyanti Wiratmi, Accountant at Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial (LKiS), 28 Au­
gust 2008.
?7 Interview with Dwiyanti Wiratmi, 28 August 2008; Interview with Anick H.T., 15 August 2007. 
Different international NGOs apply this rule differently. Some organisations do not require govern­
ment officials to sign the LoA with local NGOs. Some, like the Ford Foundation, apply a stricter rule 
which requires the involvement of the Secretariat Cabinet (Interview with Roem Topatimasang, 27 
January 2007).
58 Ibid.; LKiS financial documents.
59 Ibid. For reporting requirement see next page.
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formation Form], and Grantee Financial Report and Certification.60 All documents 
are in Bahasa Indonesia, except the LoA.61
In regard to the reporting requirements for the Asia Foundation’s grantees (which 
consist of narrative program reports and financial reports), Yanti explained that this 
reporting usually follows the Asia Foundation’s requirements as expressed in the 
LoA -  the Asia Foundation’s requirements by-and-large follow the requirements of 
its donors. " For example, the reporting period for its program under its U.S Agency 
for International Development (USAID) grant is every five months, therefore the 
Asia Foundation demands reports from its grantees every five months. The Asia 
Foundation’s program under the Danish International Development Agency 
(DANIDA) requires the local NGO to provide a timesheet to measure the contribu-
ATtion of staff time to the program.
In cases where it does not have specific requirements from its own donors, the Asia 
Foundation’s standard reporting system for grantees usually consists of two reporting 
periods: a mid-term report (completed obviously mid-way through the program) and 
a final report, to be submitted no later than a month after the program ends.64 To as­
sist its grantees with their report writing, in 2003 the Asia Foundation issued a narra­
tive reporting guideline which requires the report to have four parts: general informa­
tion, a maximum of fifteen pages of executive summary which includes qualitative
60 LKiS financial documents. With regard to counterpart contribution (cost-sharing), the Asia Founda­
tion requires its grantees to contribute to the relationship at a nominal rate of five to ten percent of the 
program’s value. This contribution can be in-kind, such as volunteer works or office space. According 
to Yanti, LKiS usually contributes seven percent in form of in-kind contributions. She also added that 
different donors have different policies regarding cost-sharing. For example, Hivos, a Dutch NGO, 
does not require cost-sharing (ibid.).
61 There is an anecdotal story about a staff member in one of the Asia Foundation’s recipient organi­
sations who signed the LoA without understanding the content because he only looked at the amount 
of money involved. Later the local NGO staff member was surprised to learn from fellow The Asia 
Foundation grantees about a particular item in the agreement, "loh, ada toh isinya seperti ini?" [“I 
didn’t know that the content (of the LoA) said something like that”]. The Asia Foundation officers in 
turn were willing to translate the LoA and encouraged grantees to ask them for clarification should 
they be unclear about their LoA. However, the LoA itself continues to be written only in English 
(ibid.). Different international organisations naturally have different policies concerning their 
M0U/L0A. Although English appears to be the predominant language of the MoUs/LoAs, some inter­
national NGOs made their M0U/L0A bilingual -  Bahasa Indonesia and English (Observations of 
various MoU documents at LKiS). Since its inception in 1998, LKiS has worked with various interna­
tional funding agencies included USAID -  The U.S Agency for International Development, AusAID 
-  The Australian Agency for International Development), Hivos -  the Humanist Institute for Devel­
opment Cooperation -  a Dutch NGO, the Ford Foundation and the Toyota foundation).
62 Ibid.
6j Ibid. The Asia Foundation Country Representative stated that the organisation is also a grantee in 
the relationship with its donors, so knows how it feels to be a grantee organisation (Interview with 
Douglas Ramage, 12 January 2007).
64 Observation of other international NGOs and local NGOs during fieldwork confirms that this is the 
standard reporting procedure.
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and quantitative impact analysis [<an a lisa dampak kuahtatif dan kuantitatif), a unit 
activities report [laporan satuan kegiatan], and finally, attachments (which consists 
of the documentation of program activities, such as clippings of news coverage of 
the activity, conference or seminar papers produced, and photographs) . 65
The Asia Foundation also provides its grantees with a booklet of Standard Proce­
dures, which contains obligatory standard procedures [Ketentuan Standar Wajib] 
concerning funding.66 The eleven-page-document covers regulations under twelve 
headings as follows: “Allowable Expenses”, “Financial Report”, “Audits and Re­
ceipts”, “Payment, Advance Payments and Funds Return” \pengembalian dana], 
“Revision of Grants Budget”, “Grants Termination and Postponement”, “Disputes”, 
“Non-liability”, “Amendment”, “International Air Travel” (which includes a clause 
under the U.S government Fly America Act that requires all grantees receiving 
American money to use only American airlines where available), “Materials and 
Services Procurement” [pengadaan barang dan jasa], “Counterpart Contributions” 
[kontribusi dana pendamping] and “Notification” (which requires all communication 
to be done in writing) . 67
To summarise what we can conclude from the example of the Asia Foundation, it is 
apparent that when an Indonesian NGO signs an agreement with an international 
NGO, the local NGO accepts that it must act on its donor’s terms. Yanti, the ac­
countant at LKiS, for example, said she does not have a problem with donor re­
quirements as she perceives this as a legitimate consequence of being in a relation- 
ship with them, and also because the instructions are clear. Commenting on the
68 LKiS Documents. This program guideline was developed by a program officer of the Asia Founda­
tion. He was fonnerly an LKiS activist and one of its founders. For financial reporting, the foundation 
uses a specific form and a ‘Quickbook’ in which the accountants of grantees receive training in how 
to write the Asia Foundation standard financial reports.
66 These are for non-USAID funded programs, USAID has its own standard procedures. This docu­
ment, according to Yanti, has only been used in the past few years as the Asia Foundation administra­
tion became tightened (Interview with Dwiyanti Wiratmi, 28 August 2008). Requirements for USAID 
grants (through the Asia Foundation) are stricter and are usually included in the LoA. For example, 
for the purchasing of equipment valued at a minimum of $50,000, such as computers, USAID requires 
the local NGO to purchase American-made products unless, as stated in the LoA, “American products 
are not available or are more than 50% more expensive than comparable products from other free- 
world countries, or if there are pressing concerns such as compatibility with existing equip­
ment/availability of maintenance services.” Furthermore, the LoA stated that “the purchase of any 
non-American made products must have the prior approval of The Asia Foundation.” The local NGO 
also needs to “obtain and submit to the Asia Foundation at least three written competitive bids for 
comparable products prior to purchasing the computer” using the grant.
6 Booklet -  “Ketentuan Standar Bagi Penerima Dana Asia Foundation (Untuk Non USAID grants).” 
The obligation to apply the Fly America Act demonstrates the Asia Foundation’s close relationship 
with the U.S Government.
68 Interview with Dwiyanti Wiratmi, 28 August 2008.
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LKiS- the Asia Foundation relationship, Yanti suggested that she generally collabo­
rates well with the Asia Foundation finance officers and grants trainers, although the 
high turnover of finance staff at the Asia Foundation sometimes makes cooperation 
difficult [“bikinpusing”] .69
The above discussion on funding and procedures has provided an example of an in­
ternational NGO approach, but different organisations have different procedures 
concerning their local grantees. The Asia Foundation appears to be an organisation 
with especially detailed regulations and procedures.71 The development of meticu­
lous processes concerning financial matters signals an effort by international NGOs 
to codify their relationships with grantees: international NGOs enforce procedure in 
exchange for funding. This takes place under the pretence of avoiding the problems 
of funding misuse and corruption, but as we shall see in my review of the opinions of 
the local NGO workers, the dynamic of ‘ensuring accountability’ does not capture 
the entire scope of the international NGO agenda.
The finance-related procedures illustrated above also shed light on how the adminis­
trative and bureaucratic terms in the relationship between international and local 
NGOs are largely defined by the international NGO. In other words, on paper, by 
signing an agreement with an international NGO, a local NGO agrees to abide by the 
terms set up by the international NGOs in exchange for receiving funding.
In addition, the fact that most Indonesian NGOs rely heavily on international funding 
could naturally lead to the conclusion that they are dominated by international 
NGOs. All of this, I believe, constitutes the public transcript of the relationship, in 
which local NGOs are the subordinates and international NGOs are those who domi­
nate. Scott has said:
it is precisely this public domain where the effects of power relations [be­
tween NGOs] are most manifest, and any analysis based exclusively on 
the public transcript is likely to conclude that subordinate groups endorse 
the terms of their subordination and are willing, even enthusiastic, part­
ners in that subordination.72
69 Yanti mentioned seven names of the Asia Foundation’s ‘come-and-go finance staff that she had 
been working with over the past six years. For every new staff member, Yanti has to explain and re­
tell matters related to the Asia Foundation and LKiS cooperation (ibid, 28 August 2008).
70 For example, USAID is notorious among Indonesian NGO workers for its onerous requirements. 
USAID distributes a thick book of regulations for its grantees (see also Holloway, 2001). Other or­
ganisations have simpler procedures, for example DANIDA only has a one-page financial report tem­
plate (Interview with Dwiyanti Wiratmi, 28 August 2008), while some are even still developing their 
reporting formats. As with the Asia Foundation the so-called best-practice standard is evolving.
71 The regulation also includes a provision for local NGOs to return the interest from their grants.
72 Scott, 1990: 4.
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I argue that the reporting system and procedures discussed earlier constitute the pub­
lic transcript of the relationships between international and local NGOs, because 
these terms are set by international NGOs and it is implied that local NGOs comply 
with these rules. Nevertheless, without scrutinising local NGO perspectives on their 
funding situation, (“the hidden transcript”) or the “the discourse that takes place off­
stage, beyond direct observation by powerholders” it might be premature to draw 
conclusions. By focusing on the agenda of the dominant party we may unwittingly 
accept at face value the (mistaken) premise that the ‘subordinate’ are content to be 
subordinate. I argue this is an error. Thus, the following section will discuss funding- 
related issues from the perspective of local NGOs. First it will briefly look at the dif­
ficulties of being financially independent of international donors, and secondly, at 
how local NGOs quietly attempt to assert their own autonomy.
Overview of Local NGO Fundraising Efforts and Constraints
As mentioned earlier, most existing literature on Indonesian NGOs as well as popu­
lar assumptions in NGO circles indicates that NGOs are heavily reliant on foreign 
funding.74 On the other hand, international funding agencies tend to fund only a par­
ticular set of programs or project activities with very specific budget items agreed in 
their MoU or LoA. Holloway notes that international NGOs in Indonesia often re­
fuse to pay the overhead costs of local NGOs.7' Indeed, it is a common practice of 
international NGOs to ask local NGOs to contribute to the international NGO’s pro­
gram, as mentioned in the example of the Asia Foundation discussed earlier. In other 
words, international donors, as Holloway puts it, are not “user-friendly to [the] 
NGOs who are the user of the funding.” 76 Sinaga argued that “the stability of NGOs’ 
finance is closely related to the proportion of the net balance (between revenue and 
expenditure) to the revenue in the previous year.” This means that in order for an 
NGO to survive, it has to be able to save its income from the previous year. Sinaga 
has suggested NGOs should keep around ten percent of their previous year’s income 
as reserve funds to cover minimal overhead costs in case they do not obtain projects
73 Ibid.
74 Using data compiled by LP3ES in 1999, Sakai states that there are more NGOs who rely on mem­
bership dues (240) in comparison to assistance from abroad (160) and income from activities (160) as 
their funding source (Sakai, 2002: 166). However Sakai noted that “there is still a heavy dependence 
on outside funds” which indicates that although the number of organisations receiving assistance from 
abroad and income are much fewer than those who receive membership dues, the quantity of outside 
funding is more significant than membership dues (ibid.).
75 Holloway, 2001: 11.
76 For more examples, see ibid.
77 Sinaga, 1993: 145.
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or income.78 Holloway has composed a list of the financial necessities of an NGO in 
Indonesia that would suggest Sinaga’s figures are probably conservative:
the actual program activities, the overheads of the organisation which 
need to be paid to keep the organisation alive (part of management time, 
rent, utilities etc), staff capacity building, staff benefits (e.g. housing, 
pensions, health insurance), savings for program development.79
The temporary nature of international NGO funding has led many local NGOs in In­
donesia to struggle against their reliance on external funding; one of the creative 
ways in which local NGOs have struggled against this system is through trying to 
develop their own income streams, albeit often with difficulty. A number of NGOs 
in Indonesia have experimented with public fundraising. For example, WALHI and
orv
YLBHI have set up bank accounts for public donations. WALHI is among the first 
organisations to approach public fundraising seriously. It has a special public fund­
raising division and has set up an ambitious goal to have at least 50,000 domestic
81individual donors by 2013 in order to be independent from international donors.
While western civil society organisations have been in the business of direct fund­
raising for over a century, the idea of tapping the domestic market for funds is rela­
tively new to the developing environment of Indonesia. Some Indonesian NGOs 
(like Insist at one time) developed their own business units, publishing houses and 
consultancy operations. Yet despite these creative attempts to develop their own in­
come streams, it is not easy to find an NGO in Indonesia that has managed this task 
with enough success to liberate itself from dependence on foreign funding.
Among the few local NGOs operating on a large scale with financial independence is 
Bina Swadaya. This forty-year veteran NGO claims a total turnover of US$9.8 mil­
lion in 2004, of which 95% of its budget came from its own activities and only five 
percent from foreign funding.82 How does it manage this considerable achievement? 
Bina Swadaya has eight subsidiaries which consist of everything from a publishing 
house to a travel agency. Another part of Bina Swadaya owns four rural banks, in­
cluding BPR [Bank Perkreditan Rakyat] which operates across Java and has a rela­
tively well established brand name for its microfinance services, as well as two train-
78 Ibid. However he did not explain the rationale behind the ten percent figure.
79 Holloway, 2001: 11.
80 See http://www.walhi.or.id and http://www.ylbhi.or.id [accessed on 5 February 2009],
81 Ginting, 2004: 202.
s: See Bina Swadaya Brochure 2005; <http://www.binaswadaya.org>.
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ing and study centres and a consulting service. This NGO has an astonishing total of 
900 staff.83
As Bina Swadaya entrenched and developed its fundraising activities, other NGOs 
began to perceive Bina Swadaya critically as more of a profit-making organisation 
than an NGO. However, Bina Swadaya’s long-time director, Bambang Ismawan, in­
sisted on continuing the organisation’s philosophy of financial independence. Bam­
bang has said the “foreign funding era will pass away one day and therefore we need 
to be self-reliant.” He also stated that Bina Swadaya’s profit-making activities are 
not inconsistent with its social activities. Indeed Bina Swadaya argues that its busi­
ness operations even have positive social impacts. For example, the microfmance 
section of Bank Perb'editan Rakyat serves poor people.84 While the example of Bina 
Swadaya does show how local NGOs can make themselves financially independent, 
Bina Swadaya is a rarity in the Indonesian NGO community.
The most common and easiest method for local NGOs to be financially sustainable is 
by having what is widely known in NGO circles as “savings.” The term is a more 
benign name for what one NGO observer has labelled “hoodwinking donors”.85 
Other terms I have heard included “reserve funds” \Dana Cadangan] and “perpetual
o z
funds” [Dana Abadi]. This practice is an important illustration of domination and 
subversive resistance to it. I will argue that, through the practice of savings, local 
NGOs are at least partially able to get around the issue of financial sustainability and 
make use of, borrowing Hilhorst’s term, “room for maneuver” in their relationship
8 7with international NGOs for their own benefit. Closer scrutiny of funding relation­
ships that appear to be dominated by an international NGO actually reveals the act of 
conscious non-compliance and thus resistance by local NGOs towards the hegemony 
of the international partner. Importantly, what international NGOs perceive as cor­
ruption, is considered by local NGOs to be “saving” and a prudent response to their 
financial insecurity.
Bina Swadaya Brochure 2005; Interview with B. Sigit Jati Waluyo, 27 September 2005. Literature 
indicates that the level of financial independence of NGOs engaging in the development sector is usu­
ally better than those who engage in advocacy. One explanation for this is because they can generate 
money from their activities.
84 Interview with Bambang Ismawan, 27 September 2005. As mentioned in chapter two, Bambang 
had been the Director of Bina Swadaya since its inception in 1967 to 2008. The name Bina Swadaya 
is thus associated with Bambang Ismawan. For discussion about personification of an Indonesian 
NGO, see Chapter 5.
85 Holloway 2001: 11.
86 Confidential communication with several NGO workers, October 2006 and August 2007. See also 
Sinaga, 1993: 145.
87 See Hilhorst, 2003: 103.
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As I shall demonstrate later, savings practices fit well with Scott’s term, the hidden 
transcript, and expose the weakness of any analysis which terminates at only the 
level of the public transcript. Local NGO subordination to international NGOs is far
o o
from absolute. To reiterate the concept explained in chapter one, Scott argues that 
previous theories of hegemony neglect the ability of subordinate groups to use means 
and opportunities available to them to “penetrate and demystify the prevailing ideol-
o n
ogy.” Therefore any analysis which overlooks “both the hidden transcript and the 
necessity of routine and pragmatic submission to the compulsion of economic rela­
tions as well as the realities of coercion” may understate the capacity of the subordi­
nated to resist hegemony. The following section will thus demonstrate how local 
NGOs use available opportunities to resist international funding mechanisms.
Local NGO Savings Practices: the “Hidden Transcript”
Indonesian NGOs have several methods of “saving” in practice.90 The most famous 
and common practice is for NGO management to deduct money from staff income. 
One source, Endang, who is on the finance staff of an advocacy NGO says:
we have an agreement among us to deposit 30% of staff fees that we re­
ceive from conducting facilitation, training, or consultancy jobs into our 
organisation’s account [“has organisasi”]... this way, our organisation 
could survive when we do not have funding.91
Not only does the NGO apply this rule to its own staff, according to Endang, but it 
also does so to external sources hired for the organisation’s activities, such as to fa­
cilitators of their workshops and training events. She admitted that the nominal 
amount written on the receipt the workers sign for the purpose of financial reporting 
to their donor is thus different from the actual amount her colleagues and guest fa­
cilitators receive.
88 Scott suggests the term hidden transcript as “the discourse that takes place offstage, beyond direct 
observation by power holders” (Scott, 1990: 4).
89 Scott, 1985: 317-318.
90 It should be noted that my experience when conducting fieldwork was that it was not easy to get 
Indonesian NGO staff to talk in detail about their organisation’s finances. There was a variety of dif­
ferent levels of openness among NGO workers on the subject: from those who were more than willing 
to talk freely and specifically, including providing me with access to their financial documents, to 
those who were very defensive. It generally took many meetings over a long period of time before I 
was able to gain access and obtain detailed information on this subject. Furthermore, although some 
NGO staff do not mind speaking on the record, many do. Therefore I have decided to use pseudonyms 
for the names of sources and their organisations in this section.
91 This is a pseudonym and so are all the names of NGO workers and their organisations in this sec­
tion. I also decide not to be more specific about the field and activities of these NGOs as doing so 
would risk revealing their identity. Endang’s decade-old NGO has thus far never been in the position 
of not having an international donor.
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As this has been a common practice in NGO circles in Indonesia, Endang said she 
has not yet encountered protests from any guest facilitators who question the differ­
ence between the amount they receive and the nominal amount stated on the receipt 
they sign. She added, “Well, they understand. This has become a norm among us, 
like an unspoken agreement.” When questioned about how her donors respond to 
this practice, Endang simply said, “We have never had problems with our financial 
reporting (to our donors).” Her boss, Ali, the director of the NGO agreed. “As long 
as we accomplish the points stated in the agreement, with orderly reports and suffi­
cient supporting evidence, they (the donor) are not really concerned about savings. 
We can even be fictitious [‘bikin fiktif juga bisa’\ .” This indicates that as long as 
NGOs have proper receipts and reports, donors “turn a blind eye.”
In regard to this practice of deducting money from staff salaries, Holloway has iden­
tified it as “the largest and the most extensive” corrupt practice among Indonesian 
NGOs.92 He argues:
A budget is agreed with the donor to pay a staff person, for instance, Rp.
2,000,000 a month, but that person is actually only paid 1,500,000 per 
month, and the balance is put into the overhead pool for the organisation 
to pay for expenditures that are essential, but which the donor refuses to 
countenance. This means two sets of books -  one that can be shown to 
the donor, and one for internal use.93
Holloway does indeed have an argument, at least in cases unlike those of Endang’s 
organisation, which only ‘taxes’ external activities. Holloway’s point is that there is 
an element of deception about this particular saving practice. He is right -  deception 
is the essence of the “off-stage” practices that Scott identifies as part of the hidden 
transcript. But the complacency of international NGOs is a crucial enabling element 
of this savings process, as donors usually just audit a particular program that they 
fund with a local NGO, rather than scrutinising the entirety of the NGO’s budget. 
This situation makes it easier for local NGOs to tailor their books and reports to 
comply with the donor’s particular program requirement.94 However, the latest de-
92 Holloway, 2001: 11.
93 Ibid. While agreeing with Holloway on the existence of double book-keeping practices of Indone­
sian NGOs, my findings indicate that there are NGOs that only asked for a percentage of the income 
their staff obtained from external jobs. For example, a former staff member of a prominent local NGO 
which specialises in training and consultancy said, “My former organisation is very strict in its finan­
cial matters. We do not keep double books.” He continued, “Yet we do not need it. My former boss 
has received so many training jobs that he donates up to Rp. 600 million per year from his consulting 
and training fees alone!” (Interview with Wishnu, 2008). According to Wishnu, the standard rate for 
an international donor agency consultancy or facilitator job is US$300 per day. My interview with 
other NGO workers confirmed this information.
94 Interviews with NGO workers, including Ali and Endang.
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velopments indicate that more international funding agencies are starting to demand 
more comprehensive financial status reports beyond their specifically-funded pro­
gram.9^  In such instances, decisions by local NGOs to continue requesting part of 
their staffs salaries become a deliberate act of disobedience towards the hegemonic 
system.
Another method of saving is to subcontract. In this situation, a local NGO would 
sign an agreement with an international donor agency to conduct a certain project. 
However, instead of implementing the project itself, the NGO would hire an external 
party to carry out the project for a lesser amount than the NGO received from its do­
nor. The NGO would then keep the remaining funds to support its other non-donor 
funded activities. As an illustration, Ali, the director of a prominent advocacy NGO 
admitted that in early 2008 he hired an external party to conduct a one-year project 
funded by an international NGO in the field of democracy. The NGO kept twenty 
percent of the total amount of funding for the project for the organisation which, ac­
cording to Ali, “was enough to support our twice monthly discussion program for 
one year.”96 He suggested pragmatism was the main reason for the decision. “Sav­
ings is one reason and it just happened that around the same time a good old friend 
of mine came to me and asked for a job. I then hired him for this particular project 
only, so our organisation did not have to set up a new division to carry the project.”97
While Ali’s example was a one time act of pragmatism-cum-nepotism there is an­
other case of subcontracting from his NGO that provides a clearer example of ex­
ploitation. Ali said that in the mid-2000s, during the leadership of his predecessor, 
his organisation once engaged in a two-year project on the strength of the name of 
his NGO alone. In a “brokering” act, Ali’s NGO, let us call it NGO A, lent its name 
to another local NGO, NGO B, to enable this NGO B to receive international fund­
ing for its activities. NGO A only received a percentage of the total value of the in-
93 For example, Ali expressed his concern that, starting 2009, an international NGO with which his 
NGO cooperates with demands to audit the NGO as a whole instead of its funded program only and 
he stated that this would mean that he and his colleague would have to find a new strategy to deal 
with this.
96 For this particular project, the NGO received over Rp. 130 million from its funding, thus it enabled 
the organisation to have savings of around Rp. 26 million from this project alone.
97 It is important to put this case in context. As indicated earlier, Ali’s organisation is one of the well- 
known NGOs in its field. Its founders and leaders are mostly prominent activists in their field. In ad­
dition, the donor for this project is its long-term partner which also engages in other projects with the 
NGO. Had Ali’s organisation not have a good reputation and track record working with its donor or­
ganisation, as well as good relationship with the international NGO program officer, the story would 
probably have been different.
130
temational donor-funded project in return.98 This operation was necessary because 
NGO B’s organisational structure included one of the officers of the international 
NGO, a conflict of interest which forbade the international NGO from working di­
rectly with NGO B. “1 sense that,” reflected Ali, “the international NGO officer was 
determined to give funding to NGO B. Yet he could not do it directly.” As the solu­
tion, Ali said, “the international NGO signed an agreement with my NGO [NGO A], 
but immediately afterwards we transferred fifty percent of the funds to NGO B’s ac­
count.” Commented Ali, “this shows in practice how an international NGO program 
officer can abuse his or her power.”
In the case of the NGO where Ali and Endang work, substantial funds are generated 
from their saving activities. As an illustration given by Endang, during ten years of 
its relationship with international NGOs, the NGO has been able to fully cover the 
office’s overhead costs and run regular non-donor-funded activities such as discus­
sion programs, as well as having a “perpetual fund” of Rp. 1 billion [Dana Abadi 
Satu Milyar]." Confidential interviews with different NGO workers also confirm 
that this NGO’s savings practice is common and that some NGOs could generate 
substantial amount of money from it.
The discussion on international NGO funding procedures and local NGO savings 
practices in this section illuminates the everyday politics of international and local 
NGOs in Indonesia. Here I adopt Kerkvliet’s definition, as explained in chapter one, 
that everyday politics consists of “the debates, conflicts, decisions and cooperation” 
among international and local NGOs in Indonesia regarding the control, allocation, 
and use of resources and the values and ideas underlying their activities.100 The dis­
cussion has shed light on the local NGO practices of using the opportunities avail­
able to them to carve out some marginal autonomy from the international
98 Both local NGOs were the grantees of this particular international NGO.
99 On a different topic, it is interesting to observe the revealing language of the two NGO workers. 
Endang, an accountant by training, tends to be very cautious and vague in speaking about the NGO’s 
savings. She also emphasises “voluntary commitment,” and “ideals and willingness” as the main drive 
behind their NGO’s sustainability, rather than its savings. In addition, she claims that they can survive 
without international donors and be independent as they have been demonstrating their capacity to do 
so by their ability to save. Yet Ali, a veteran NGO activist, was more direct and blunt in making his 
statements on the practice of creating savings. Ali suggested that his NGO would not survive without 
funding and that international donors’ funds are a major determinant of the NGO’s survival. Most 
tellingly he points out that even their savings originate from international funding. The different opin­
ions of these two sources demonstrates the different layers that exist among local NGO staff, which 
also illustrates the fact that the rhetoric of the “public transcript” is not confined only to relationships 
between international and local NGOs, but can in fact go on within the NGO itself. I will discuss this 
topic of intra-NGO relationships in chapter five.
100 Kerkvliet, 2002: 11. See also Hilhorst 2003: 4 and Leftwich 1984: 64-65.
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NGOs.l()1The discussion in this section reveals the discrepancy between the public 
transcript and the hidden transcript of the relationship between international and lo­
cal NGOs. Under the surface there is non-compliance and resistance by local NGOs 
towards their international counterparts. The public transcript of the financial rela­
tionship is defined by two points: firstly the imposition of thorough, bureaucratic 
procedures by the international funding agencies on local NGOs. Secondly and most 
importantly, the weaker local NGOs comply with the financial reporting standards of 
the dominant international NGOs. In this public sphere the hegemony of interna­
tional donors might seem at first blush to be complete. All is “open,” “accountable” 
and “transparent”, according to the dominant good governance paradigm.
However, as demonstrated in the above discussion about local NGOs’ savings prac­
tices, closer scrutiny reveals a hidden transcript, in which local NGOs engage in cal­
culated non-compliance with international NGOs’ demands. All local NGO savings 
methods, in the words of Holloway, “require lying to donors consciously and inten- 
tionally.” Local NGOs are anything but submissive to international NGOs. Local 
NGOs have different ideas from their international counterparts about how they 
should manage and allocate their funding for activities, in the same way as Kerkvliet,
in his study of hegemony, described how poor villagers resisted the authority of
1
more powerful groups in the village of San Richardo. Local NGOs also articulate 
specific and general reasons for their actions. Notably, the say they must skim off 
money from their donors to raise funding for their regular off-donor-funded pro­
grams and to maintain their sustainability. This again is much the same as Kerkv- 
liet’s findings about the anti-hegemonic practices of San Richardo villagers. 104
Conclusion
In this chapter I have provided an historical overview of international NGOs’ fund­
ing of local NGOs in Indonesia. I have followed this with a scrutiny of international 
funding procedures and practices and the implications of these financial relations for 
hegemony and resistance.
101 For other examples of NGOs’ common methods in obtaining income for their operational costs, 
see Holloway, 2001: 11. Furthermore, in his paper which addresses corruption, Holloway warned that 
while the practices are for a “good cause”, corrupt practices “encourage corrupt mentalities which will 
not blink at augmenting personal income, particularly when the society around the NGO person is 
doing such things all the time” (Holloway, 2001: 12). For discussion dealing with corruption among 
NGOs, see chapter six.
102 Holloway, 2001: 12.
103 Kerkvliet, 2002: 262.
104 Ibid.
132
The discussion about international funding procedures indicates rigorous and bu­
reaucratic procedures are involved in the relationship between international and local 
NGOs. In this section I have demonstrated the influential role of international NGOs 
in setting up the terms of funding in the relationship, and I have linked this with 
Scott’s concept of the public transcript in power relations. I conclude by discussing 
the practices of local NGOs in overcoming their financial constraints. The discussion 
reveals a “hidden transcript” in the relationship, in which local NGOs have devel­
oped passive tactics of non-compliance which attempt to claw back some autonomy 
from the international NGO community.
The discussion in the last section reinforces Scott and Kerkvlief s critique of Gram- 
sci’s theory of hegemony. According to Kerkvliet, Gramsci “does not allow much 
room for continuous struggle between subordinate and dominant people over ideas 
and values.”10' The general theory of hegemony is inadequate in explaining power 
relations between superior and subordinate groups, both in the context of a rural vil­
lage and in the context of global civil society. The next chapter will take up the 
theme of power relations between international and local NGOs by examining the 
characteristics of local NGOs and how they affect and are affected by the relation­
ships between international and local NGOs.
105 Ibid.
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Chapter Five
The Micropolitics of NGOs in Indonesia: 
Personalism and Rivalry
Introduction
Chapter three provided a case study of the everyday life of a local NGO in Indo­
nesia. We saw in that example how a leader within an organisation can have a great 
influence on it. This chapter takes up the issue of the internal dynamics of local 
NGOs and holds it up for further scrutiny, this time teasing out how internal organi­
sational issues influence local NGOs’ relationships with international NGOs and he­
gemony, and, conversely, how the domination of international NGOs generates in­
ternal problems. In other words, in the context of the relationships between interna­
tional and local NGOs, the discussion in this chapter argues that the internal prob­
lems of local NGOs are both a result and a facilitator of domination by international 
NGOs.1 2
In discussing the theme of local NGOs’ internal characteristics, I employ Elliot’s 
term micropolitics. Elliot coined this term when discussing asymmetrical power 
relations between international and local NGOs. As Elliot does not specifically el­
aborate on the definition of micropolitics, here I borrow the definition from Blase 
who says:
Micropolitics is the use of formal and informal power by individuals 
and groups to achieve their goals in organizations. In large part, politi­
cal actions result from perceived differences between individuals and 
groups... Although such actions are consciously motivated, any action, 
consciously or unconsciously motivated, may have political signifi-
1 It should be noted that it is not my intention to argue that the internal problems of local NGOs are 
the sole result and the one and only contributing factor which facilitate domination by international 
NGOs. As we will see later, 1 acknowledge other factors that may play a role in triggering local 
NGOs’ problems and in facilitating international NGOs’ domination. However, in the context of the 
relationships between international and local NGOs, the domination of international NGOs appears as 
both a main contributing factor to, and a significant by-product of, the internal problems of local 
NGOs.
2 Elliot, 1987: 65.
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cance in a given situation. Furthermore, both cooperative and conflic- 
tive actions... are part of the realm of micropolitics.3
In other words, as Spaulding notes, “micropolitics describes the ways in which indi­
viduals attempt to influence others in order to attain desired goals.” 4 Thus our defini­
tion of micropolitics has two components: it is action within the NGO, and it is ac­
tion (either unconscious or conscious) to advance the cause of a particular group or 
person in competition with another.
Looking at the micropolitics of local NGOs enables us to understand that hegemony 
works as an intentional consequence of how the system of global civil society is or­
ganised. I argue that some of the internal characteristics of local NGOs -  especially 
personalism and rivalry in and between local NGOs -  have helped international 
NGOs to exercise their domination over local NGOs. Thus in this respect hegemony 
can occur due to the internal weaknesses of local NGOs which enable the hegemonic 
system to function more effectively.
On the other hand, the discussion in this chapter also reveals how the internal char­
acteristics of local NGOs can also be the result of the international NGOs’ domina­
tion of local NGOs. International NGOs prefer to deal with individuals they know 
well: this causes personalism in the NGO sector. Similarly, international NGOs 
sometimes unwittingly encourage rivalry and competition between local NGOs by 
making them compete for a limited pool of resources, and rewarding only the fa­
voured few who can make their programs conform to international donors priorities.
Although I frame the characteristics of personalism and rivalry among local NGOs 
as both a result and a facilitator of the domination of international NGOs, we should 
keep in mind there are other reasons for personalism and rivalry. I do not argue that 
personalism and rivalry exist exclusively because of international NGOs. They can 
occur in situations where there is no international NGO influence. We can also put 
personalism and rivalry in the wider social and political context in Indonesia, where 
these characteristics also exist in other sectors such as political parties. However, in 
the context of the relationships between international and local NGOs, my research 
leads me to argue that they are a result and a facilitator of the domination of interna­
tional NGOs.
3 Blase, 1991: 11.
4 Spaulding, 2000. Available from http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR4-l/spaulding.html [accessed on 
23 March 2009],
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The discussion in this chapter starts with an examination of personalism in an NGO, 
by looking at an example of when a leading figure comes to dominate an NGO. The 
second half of this chapter looks at rivalry in the NGO sector. By rivalry I mean 
competition between NGOs for professional opportunities. In concluding this chapter 
I relate all these themes back to a discussion of hegemony by arguing that the char­
acteristics of local NGOs discussed in this chapter both have enabled and been af­
fected by the domination of international NGOs.
Personalism in the NGO sector
In starting this section I will firstly elaborate on the term personalism. I use the word 
personalism to describe the way in which a local NGO is closely associated with or 
becomes a personification of its leader. The aim of the discussion is to demonstrate 
how personalism within local NGOs affects and is affected by the NGOs’ relation­
ships with international NGOs. International NGOs’ emphasis on individuals rather 
than organisations in finding partners has encouraged personalism among local 
NGOs. On the other hand, local NGOs’ lack of management systems and tendency 
to engage in conflict reflect their willingness (if sub-consciously) to be co-opted into 
the domination of international NGOs. At least, by their weak management and con­
flicts, local NGOs make themselves more vulnerable to the hegemony of interna­
tional donors.
The Story of Meth Kusumahadi and USC- Satunama
The Unity Service Cooperation Foundation (Yayasan Kesatuan Pelayanan Ker- 
jasama), which is usually referred to as USC-Satunama, was established on March 
23, 1998, in Yogyakarta. Previously, USC-Satunama was the Indonesia office of 
USC Canada which has been operating in Indonesia since 1975.* 5 USC Canada is an 
international NGO that was founded in 1945 as the Unitarian Service Committee of 
Canada, a voluntary organisation with close links to Unitarian congregations across 
that country.6 In describing what the organisation does, USC states:
While it began as an emergency assistance organisation, USC has been 
carrying out long-term development for decades. We work with partner 
organizations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America to strengthen com-
? See Direktori LSM Yogyakarta published by LP3ES <http:www.lp3es.or.id>, USC-Satunama web­
site <http:www.satunama.org>.
6 USC claims to be “one of Canada’s very first internationally-focused NGO” (http://usc- 
canada.org/lotta/usc-history/). For the year 2007 to 2008, its largest donor was the Canadian Interna­
tional Development Agency (CIDA) (USC Annual Report 2008: 7). The report is available online 
from http://usc-canada.org/UserFiles/File/USC_AR_2008.pdf [accessed on 20 March 2009].
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munity livelihoods, promote food security, and support peoples’ actions 
for social justice and equality.7
In Indonesia, USC Canada “provided development program assistance to Indonesian 
NGOs and grass root organisations in the areas of Community Development, Sus­
tainable Agriculture, Small Business Development, Health, Education and Training,” 
with a total annual budget of “between C$300,000 and 1 million.”8
According to Satunama’s director, Methodius (Meth) Kusumahadi, in the early 
1990s, when USC Canada no longer considered Indonesia to be a poor country, the 
Canadian head office started to consider closing down the office in Indonesia.9 That 
decision naturally prompted a reaction from the Indonesia office. Meth Kusumahadi, 
who was the Indonesian country director of USC, did not see the need to close the 
office. He proposed to keep the Indonesian office open by becoming independent 
and finding its own source of income.10 That episode marked the beginning of an 
effort to establish an independent organisation. This succeeded in 1998 with the es­
tablishment of USC-Satunama. Since then USC-Satunama has become one of the 
best-established NGOs in Indonesia, committed to “the eradication of poverty and 
the attainment of an Indonesian society that is self-reliant, democratic, socially just, 
and upholds human rights.”* 11 With seventy-six staff and around Rp. 12 billion funds 
in late 2005, the NGO is one of the largest in Indonesia. In early 2009, Satunama 
had relationships with three international NGOs -  the Centre for International Mi­
gration and Development (CIM), Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) and the USC 
Canada.13
In NGO circles, the name USC-Satunama is undoubtedly identified with Meth Ku­
sumahadi, who started working for USC Canada in Indonesia in 1988 and has since 
become the ‘face’ of the organisation. The following paragraphs discuss the crucial
7 See http://usc-canada.org/who-we-are/usc-todayfaqs/ [accessed on 20 March 2009], 
s See the pengalaman kerja section in http://www.methkusumahadi.com [accessed on 23 February 
2009]. According to Meth Kusumahadi, when they were about to establish Satunama, USC Canada 
office in Indonesia has seven staff (Interview with Meth Musumahadi, 23 October 2005).
9 Interview with Meth Kusumahadi, 23 October 2005.
10 Ibid.
11 USC-Satunama website [http:www.satunama.org]. The quote is USC-Satunama’s vision, while its 
mission statement is, “USC-Satunama strives for the development of local resources and universal 
values through intercommunity partnerships at local, regional, national and international levels in 
democratic and non-violent ways.”
12 Interview with Meth Kusumahadi, 23 October 2005. According to him, 67% out of Rp. 12 billion 
comes from internal fund raising. He says most of the organisation’s income derives from consultan­
cies.
13 See http://www.satunama.org/index.php?lang=id&page=links [accessed on 23 March 2009].
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significance of this person for the growth of USC. His personal journey shows what 
can make a person like him become the dominant force in an NGO.
Pak Meth has a colourful background with over thirty years of experience in the 
NGO sector.14 He worked for Bina Swadaya for twelve years, before joining USC as 
its representative in Indonesia in 1988. Meth held various positions with Bina Swa­
daya, including Senior Trainer for almost a decade. His last position at Bina Swa­
daya was as the head of the division for developing self reliant groups [Usaha Ber- 
sama or UB] where his tasks were designing and managing rural development pro­
grams with a US$1.5 million annual budget provided by a German foundation - the 
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. While at Bina Swadaya, Meth started to attend various 
courses in NGO management as well as developing his skills as a trainer.1'7 As we 
shall see, this experience became critical for the later growth of USC.
The thirty years of accumulated experience of its leader is one of the bed-rock 
strengths of USC. Meth’s experience clearly shows up in the programs that Satu- 
nama administers. In Satunama, Meth and his team have regularly run training mod­
ules with “catchy” names such as CELOP (Civic Education for Local Politicians), 
CEFRUL (Civic Education for Rural Leaders), CEFIL (Civic Education for Future 
Indonesian Leaders) and HOT (History of Thoughts).16 Up to 2005, Satunama de­
veloped sixteen training modules.17
By early 2009, Meth had built a firm reputation as an expert in community devel­
opment, particularly in generating training and providing consultancy services.18 The
14 See the penga/aman kerja section in <http://www.methkusumahadi.com>.
15 His detailed biography lists ten courses that he attended between 1977 to 1995 in places as far as 
New York and Ethiopia. In addition, during 2000 and 2001 he attended six more training programs 
abroad on subjects like community-based conflict resolution, fundraising and training of trainers on 
integrated strategic and financial planning. Ibid.
16 Interview with Meth Kusumahadi, 23 October 2005; http://www.satunama.org [accessed on 10 De­
cember 2007],
17 Ibid.
Is As indicated in previous footnotes, Meth Kusumahadi has developed a personal website, 
http://www.methkusumahadi.com. Launched in mid 2007, the website contains comprehensive detail 
on his work and his writings. The bilingual (English and Indonesian) website introduces him as “Sen­
ior Consultant for Major International Donor Organization and Embassies (Germany, Australia, Can­
ada, Britain, Denmark, USA) operating in Indonesia on the areas of Capacity Building, Community 
Management, Empowerment Program Design, Projects design, research, and feasibility studies, Re­
sults Monitoring and Evaluation of projects/Program.” He also claims that he is “One of the six certi­
fied Indonesian ZOPP Moderators (Ziel Orienterte Project Planung = Objective Oriented Project 
Planning) a standardized German development planning approach, and the only ZOPP Moderator 
who combines ZOPP with LFA (Logical Framework Approach), MBO (Management by Objective), 
PCM (Project Cycle Management), Result Based Management (RBM), TOPP (Team Oriented Pro­
gram Planning), AURA (Auftrags Rahmen), Gennany.” In addition, he states that he is “Currently 
The only Facilitator who mastering [sic] the various Development Planning Mechanism: MBO, LFA, 
ZOPP, PCM, TOPP, RBM, AURA (Auftrags Rahmen). Special areas of expertise include General
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list of Meth’s consultancy jobs in various places from early 2000 to January 2009 
alone amounts to ten pages, with 162 activities and up to four activities on any given 
month.19 By way of illustration, Meth’s schedule in November 2006 shows that he 
travelled to four different places in Indonesia in one month for various consultan-
As an experienced facilitator and trainer in the NGO sector, Meth’s people skills, 
passion and idealism about community development can be detected the minute one 
starts a conversation with him. I interviewed Meth once in Salatiga, while he was 
there for a week long evaluation program of a local NGO. Despite his reputation as 
an NGO expert, he was very friendly and humble. Our meeting lasted for several 
hours in which he talked passionately about the NGO world and tirelessly answered 
my questions. To further illustrate Meth’s public speaking abilities Sunaryo Broto, a 
participant of one of Satunama-organised training in organisational development in 
2008, says (in publicity material for Satunama):
What strikes me [about the training] is the all out performance [penam- 
pilan all out] of the training instructor, Pak Methodius Kusumahadi. At 
the age of 62, he shows high stamina and speaks tirelessly. The volume 
of his voice could go up or down or turn to jokes which keeps the train­
ing participants attention to the training and discussion materials. He 
would approach a sleepy participant and start a discussion with them.
He resembles a main actor at the theatre. When we are slowing down 
and some of us display the signs of-boredom, he would invite us to sing 
a motivational song, to be sang interchangeably by male and female 
participants, [the song goes like this:] I am captain of the ship/1 am cap-
Management, Training, Community Development, Empowerment Program, Organizational Devel­
opment, Strategic Planning, Co-operative Studies, Small Business Development, Rural Credit, Peace 
Building and Conflict Resolution.“ [sic.] See http://www.methkusumahadi.com [accessed on 23 
March 2009], These statements appear in English in both the English and Indonesian version of the 
webpage. This indicates that the website targets international development practitioners. In quoting 
these statements I also aim to demonstrate the language used by well-established local NGOs adopts 
mainstream international development jargons. This control of the language in the sector is a subtle 
hint of the hegemony of international development organisations.
14 See http://www.methkusumahadi.com [accessed on 23 March 2009]. His biodata also shows that 
apart from working for USC-Satunama and undertaking consultancies, the past two decades saw Meth 
actively involved as a board member of several NGOs and chairperson of NGO groups and forums. 
This again confirms the characteristic discussed in chapter three, that managers of successful NGOs 
depend on wide professional networks. This system makes local NGOs disproportionately dependent 
on the strength of their leaders.
20 He started his consultancy work on that month in Banda Aceh, where from 7 to 9 November he was 
the facilitator of OXFAM Strategic Planing for Aceh Partnership Program Fiscal Year 2007 to 2011. 
Afterwards, from 13 to 17 November he facilitated a Strategic Planning workshop to draft the Five 
Years Integrated Planning Program of a local NGO, Maha Boga Marga, in Denpasar. Then, from 20 
to 23 November he was the Lead Facilitator of the Second EED-Germany Partners NGOs Indonesia 
Consultation on the Practice of Good Governance in Makassar. And finally, from 27 November to 1 
December he was the Facilitator and Trainer on Organizational Development organized by Satunama 
in Yogyakarta. See Ibid.
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tain of my fate/ Yes I am, Yes I am, Yes I am/ Whatever you can do/1 
can do, I can do better than you/ Yes I can, Yes I can, Yes I can.21
Meth’s fine professional network, public exposure and experience are directly pro­
portionate to the flow of funds to Satunama. Meth admits that the success of USC- 
Satunama, particularly in attracting international funds, is heavily influenced by the 
personal relationships he has managed to build with donor organisations:
You should be known by the decision makers or donors. You have to 
present your ideas [on] Indonesian development and this has to be done 
at the personal-point-of-view level, from heart to heart.22
Meth Kusumahadi continued to stress the importance of good personal relations by 
providing an example of his relationship with the then-Ambassador of Denmark:
I have a story about the beginning of our relationship. The Ambassador 
once offered me some funds but I rejected them. My principle is that the 
initiative should come from the community in need, not based on a do­
nor’s order. Apparently the Ambassador agreed with my approach. He 
even visited my office. Finally, when we were approached by the com­
munity, we started working together. From then on, we sailed smoothly.
When we requested Rp. 1.5 billion funds for Aceh, we were even given 
Rp. 3.5 billion. That’s the example of a personal relationship which has 
helped me obtain funding.23
Another example of the benefit of Meth’s personal contacts for USC is his ability to 
retain old donor relationships. Even in 2009 he still receives funding from the same 
international organisation - Konrad Adenauer Stiftung - that funded his program 
when he was working for a different organisation in the early 1980s. Throughout his 
career movements, the funding follows him from organisation to organisation. This 
condition shows how a prominent individual like Meth can be a lifeline for his or her 
organisation.
Characteristics and Causes of Personalism
The above case study of Meth Kusumahadi and USC Satunama shows how a promi­
nent individual can become crucial to the success of an NGO and become the virtual 
“public face” of the organisation. The dominant role of individuals, including the 
association or attachment of an individual to a well-established NGO, is a familiar 
characteristic in the Indonesian NGO sector. This association between individual
21 See http://www.satunama.org/index.php?lang=id&page=news&id=21 [accessed on 23 March 
2009].
22 Interview with Meth Kusumahadi, 23 October 2006.
23 Ibid.
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and organisation usually happens when the founder of an organisation goes on to 
work for the organisation after it is established.
At other times this relationship develops simply when a prominent individual works 
for a significant period of time with a particular NGO. The discussion in chapter 
three, for example, has introduced how influential Mansour Fakih was to Insist as 
the founder and director. In addition, the discussion in chapter two introduced Barn- 
bang Ismawan who founded Bina Swadaya in 1967 and led the NGO for forty years. 
Other associated names and organisations include Adnan Buyung Nasution and Ab­
dul Hakim Garuda Nusantara with YLBHI [The Legal Aid Institution Foundation], 
Anton Sujarwo with Dian Desa, Ema Witoelar with WALHI [Friends of the Earth 
Indonesia].24 Sometimes, the association can last even when the person has left the 
organisation.25
Scholars writing on Indonesian NGOs have noted the influence of personalism. For 
instance, in discussing the leadership style of Indonesian NGOs, Hadiwinata pro­
vides two examples of organisations dominated by strong individuals, namely Bina 
Swadaya Yogyakarta [BSY] and Yayasan Annisa Swasti [Yasanti], In observing 
the leadership style of BSY which is a spin off of Bina Swadaya in Jakarta, Hadiwi­
nata notes that:
The fate of the organisation depends entirely on the presence of Aleks 
Wiyarto, its long-term director and co-founder, who controls almost all 
of the organisation’s decision-making and operation (programme plan­
ning, proposal writing and fund-raising). His long association with the 
organisation and long experience in community development activities 
(longer than anyone else in the organisation) have made staff members 
hold him in such high esteem that they grant him the privilege of deter­
mining BSY’s strategy and action. Moreover, its small size and family­
like management style have prevented BSY from developing procedures 
of operation. Rather than functioning as a bureaucracy, BSY operates in­
stead on the basis of guidance from its director.27
Meanwhile, from his study on Yasanti’s early years, Hadiwinata writes:
24 It should be noted that this is not to imply that all these names exhibit behaviour discussed in this 
chapter.
2:1 During an interview with Charles (a pseudonym), the executive director of a prominent advocacy 
NGO, the interviewee described an incident that happened to him at an international meeting abroad. 
The interviewee said he was really surprised when introducing himself to someone at a meeting. The 
interviewee’s new acquaintance said, “So, your organisation has two executive directors, doesn’t it? I 
just met a woman who said she’s an executive director of [the name of his organisation].” Apparently 
the woman was the former executive director of the interviewee’s NGO. The person could just have 
made a mistake in identifying the former director as the current one; however, the interviewee be­
lieved that this was an example of how one person ‘mencatut nama besar organisasi' [uses the good 
reputation of the organisation for their own benefit],
26 Hadiwinata, 2003: 163-165, 201-205.
27 Ibid.: 164.
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Yasanti relied on a prominent figure, Sri Kusyuniati, also known as 
Mbak Kus (a Javanese term for sister Kus). She was one of Yasanti’s 
founders and a long-serving director. This organisation’s success during 
its ‘high’ period in the late 1980s and early 1990s was a result of the in­
defatigable effort of Mbak Kus whose hard work had attracted foreign 
funding agencies. Indeed, for many years Mbak Kus came into sight as 
the personalisation of Yasanti.28
These observations suggest that the domination of a prominent leader within his or 
her NGO is not only recognised in the elite circles of NGO managers and donors. 
This recognition also occurs within the organisation itself. In other words, the issue 
of personalism discussed here is not only whether an individual becomes the “public 
face” of an NGO, but also whether he or she dominates the internal life of the or­
ganisation, and all aspects of it, in fact. The quotations also suggest that, as with the 
story of Meth Kusumahadi, individuals attracts funding and not necessarily the local 
NGO. This view is widely shared by NGO workers in Indonesia. For example, one 
deputy director of an Indonesian NGO says:
With regard to donors, their parameter is not solely on the organisation 
but on personal trust. Naturally there are other considerations. However, 
a donor will not fund an organisation without knowing the person in 
that organisation... Their consideration in choosing an NGO as a part­
ner, firstly, is based on personal relations. After that, comes the NGO’s 
performance.29
The deputy director of ICIP (the International Centre for Islam and Pluralism), 
Syafiq Hasyim, shares his experience of being offered funds by a prominent interna­
tional NGO director to develop a “good program proposal” on the basis of what he
T O
calls “a personal guarantee.” He says he and his team then wrote a program pro­
posal which was approved by the international NGO with one condition. Syafiq re­
cited the words of the international NGO director: “you should not go anywhere dur­
ing the three years of the agreed program.”
Similarly, an international NGO staff member once said:
If I need a partner organisation, I would run to individuals I know first, 
[who are] my friends. Then I ask what my friend’s organisation is. In 
my experience, it is very, very, rare that “nama besar” [a good reputa­
tion] of an organisation outmatches that of an individual’s in Indo-
• „31 nesia.
28 Ibid.: 204.
2y Interview with Syafiq Hasyim, 30 January 2007.
30 Syafiq explains that he has a long working history with this international organisation which started 
in the mid-1990s when he was still working for a different local NGO which was funded by the inter­
national NGO.
31 Interview with Muhammad Miftahudin, 22 January 2007.
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A local NGO worker, Hetifah Syaifudian, adds, “The incentives offered by interna­
tional organisations (study, travel abroad and networking opportunities) tend to be 
oriented to the individuals, not the organisation or the community the organisation 
serves.” " In defining the type of individuals in the NGO sector who benefit the most 
from international aid, this local NGO worker says “most of the time, the same peo­
ple (the charismatic, the articulate and the powerful) benefit over and over again [in 
the division of funding] .” 33
This phenomenon of the domination of well-connected individuals in the NGO sec­
tor is not exclusive to Indonesia but is a widespread condition of NGOs in many de­
veloping countries, where NGOs “are known by who is leading them, rather than by 
their proper name.” 34 In analysing this condition, Fowler argues that:
This is not a function of charisma as such -  an aspect of NGDO (Non- 
Governmental Development Organisations) which is more myth than 
reality -  but of who the individual is seen to be in the wider society. In 
NGDOs, leadership and management are highly personalised. No mat­
ter what the formal position and job description may specify, the indi­
vidual occupying it is expected to make a qualitative difference to how 
things get done. This is a natural outcome of voluntary commitment and 
co-ownership -  each person counts as a person not simply as a func­
tionary occupying a chair.35
While Fowler’s observation is as applicable to Indonesia as to any other developing 
country, there is something special about the Indonesian context which amplifies the 
power of the individual. In Indonesia, NGOs widely adopt the form of the yayasan 
[foundation] as their chosen organisational model. But the yayasan has a very top- 
down legal structure. This system encourages the domination of NGO leaders.36 As 
scholars have noted, the institutional structure of a yayasan is very undemocratic, as 
its highest decision makers are appointed-members of an executive body usually 
consisting of the organisation’s founders and management team. As a result, 
Sinaga observes that the form of yayasan “has converted NGOs into static, steeply 
hierarchical, authoritarian organisations.” 38
32 Hetifah Sjaifudian, “The Activists’ Dilemma” in Inside Indonesia 84, October-December 2005.
33 Ibid.
34 Fowler, 1997: 74.
35 Ibid.
16 One of the main reasons many NGOs opted to establish themselves in the form of a foundation was 
to avoid government control.
’7 Soemitro, 1993: 164 quoted in Hadiwinata, 2003: 167; Sinaga, 1993: 154.
38 Sinaga, 1993: 154.
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Other sources note that international donors have a role in emphasising the import­
ance of individual leaders in domestic NGOs. For example, one Indonesian NGO 
director has said:
Funding agencies usually need prominent figures who are trustworthy 
for disbursing funds. For example, a prominent person’s name appears 
in many boards of NGOs but perhaps this person doesn’t know much 
[about the details of these NGOs] and does not have a clear commit­
ment [towards these NGOs]. This phenomenon possibly shows that 
donors trust individuals more than the NGO’s performance.39
There are two points that we can draw from the preceding discussion. First, the dis­
cussion indicates, at least to a degree, the emptiness of the egalitarian rhetoric of 
NGOs. Most NGOs use a language of “participation,” “community empowerment” 
and “bottom-up democracy” when describing their activities. In reality, many are 
dominated by a few personalities.
The second point relates to the origin of personalism and how this is linked to inter­
national NGOs’ domination. As the illustration of my meeting with Meth Kusuma- 
hadi in the beginning of this chapter, and the discussion about characteristics of In­
sist leaders in chapter three, suggest, people who form NGOs exhibit special charac­
teristics of being idealistic, forceful and strong-minded. Consequently their traits 
generate personalism. They tend to be people who have strong ideas, attract devotion 
and like to get their own way. In addition, the social convention in Indonesia with its 
budaya sungkan [a culture of being deferential] and being respectful to the elders 
contributes to personalism.
Therefore, I see a combination of factors as leading to personalism: the NGOs’ his­
torical background (especially if most of its founders continue to lead the organisa­
tion), the type of people who form NGOs, and the organisational structure. How­
ever, we can also see that an influential factor giving rise to this personalism lies in 
international donors’ tendency to emphasise “personal guarantees” in their relation­
ships with local NGOs.
Why Personalism Helps the Relationships between International and Indonesian 
NGOs
Having identified the characteristics and causes of personalism in the Indonesian 
NGO sector, I now look at the implications of personalism for the relationships be-
Interview with Stanley Prasetyo, 14 October 2005.
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tween international and local NGOs. I first look at the advantageous implications of 
personalism before discussing the drawbacks.
As pointed out in the preceding discussion, the benefits of personalism for local 
NGOs are that these links provide easy access to international funding. Being identi­
fied with a prominent NGO leader can result in a rich flow of funds to a local NGO. 
Prominent NGO figures sometimes even receive more funds than their organisation 
requests from a donor (as in the experience of Meth Kusumahadi) and they are also 
often sought after by international NGOs who initiate programs and funding, rather 
than having to ask international NGOs for funds (as in the case of Mansour Fakih in 
chapter three, as well as the above illustration of Syafiq Hasyim).
Easy access to international donors consequently guarantees such local NGOs se­
curity of funding, something that is rare in the Indonesian NGO world. In explaining 
the benefits at the individual level, a local NGO worker says, “besides expanding 
our horizons and allowing us to experience new situations and gain new knowledge, 
these opportunities also bring us direct financial gain. Honorariums are paid in US 
dollars, and they’re substantial.“40 As an illustration, according to many NGO staff, 
the minimum daily rate for consultancy work in the international development sector 
is US$250.4'
As for international NGOs, personalism serves as a tool for them to separate the 
wheat from the chaff, to borrow a phrase. International NGOs maintain links with 
proven individuals for a simple practical reason: by entrusting their projects to 
proven performers international NGOs can have greater confidence in the success of 
their projects. The reputation of prominent individuals serves as a guarantee for 
international NGOs.
Besides their reliability, dealing with prominent individuals also carries a potential 
efficiency dividend. By operating through personal networks, international NGOs 
minimise the time and funds that would otherwise be spent in identifying and select­
ing new partner organisations while reducing the risks associated with unknown or­
ganisations, such as the misuse of funds or inexperience in conforming to interna­
tional NGOs’ reporting mechanisms.
40 Hetifah Sjaifudian, “The Activists’ Dilemma” in Inside Indonesia 84, October-December 2005.
41 Conversations with NGO workers during fieldwork. The term “consultancy work” in the NGO sec­
tor is a general term which covers a range of jobs, from facilitators and trainers to external program 
evaluator.
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Why Personalism Hurts the Relationships between International and Local NGOs
Two broad inter-related issues emerge when identifying the drawbacks of person­
alism. The first is how personalism affects the internal relationships within a local 
NGO and how it affects and is affected by the relationships between international 
and local NGOs. The second issue concerns how personalism affects the external 
relationships of the local NGOs with other local NGOs and how these inter-local 
relations affects and are affected by the relationships with international NGOs.
The influence of prominent individuals on the internal organisation of local NGOs 
can have three negative consequences. First, the strong domination of these NGO 
leaders creates conditions for undemocratic decision making processes. As shown in 
the case study of Insist in chapter three, younger NGO workers believe that certain 
individuals within their organisation are too “dominant.” In particular, the younger 
generation at Insist felt under-appreciated and marginalised. This leadership tension 
actually led to internal conflict in Insist with one such incident resulting in the firing 
of the Insist Press director, who left the organisation with his entire staff of fourteen 
young people.
Although such internal conflicts happen across society too, it is more prevalent in 
NGOs. Sinaga provides an example of such conflict in a well-known legal aid NGO, 
the Jakarta branch of YLBHI [the Legal Aid Institute Foundation], which involved 
its executive director and the legal staff, and also concerned undemocratic leader­
ship:
Young lawyers and volunteers from the Jakarta office demanded the 
withdrawal of Mrs. K from her position as director of the Jakarta office.
She had been appointed as director because she was the sister-in-law of 
the director of central YLBHI. This protest finally resulted in the resig­
nation of six young lawyers.42
One of my informants who is a former deputy director of a well-established NGO 
(let us call it “NGO X”) led by a prominent NGO figure, claims that the domination 
of the leader inside his organisation is real and not just an impression,43 According 
to Wishnu, who worked for five years before resigning from NGO X, his boss was 
“a much feared [sangat ditakuti] figure at the organisation. There are only two peo­
ple [in the organisation] who could talk with him. They are his long-time best bud-
42 Sinaga, 1993: 153.
43 Wishnu is a pseudonym. Prior to working for the local NGO, Wishnu worked for an international 
NGO which funded and developed a program with the local NGO. According to Wishnu, he was in­
terested to join the local NGO because he likes living in the city where the NGO is located.
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dies who have been working in the organisation for a long time too.” Wishnu also 
observed there is often an “an inner circle” in local NGOs which consists of indi­
viduals who hold top positions at the organisation. These individuals, according to 
Wishnu, usually share a similar background with the prominent NGO figure. 
Wishnu says, “This [situation] reflects the organisation’s lack of transparency, par­
ticularly in staff recruitment.” Such conditions cause frustrations among those out­
side the inner circle like Wishnu, who, in the end, chose to resign from his organisa­
tion. These phenomena are very common in the NGO sector in Indonesia.
It goes without saying that these practices again contradict NGO rhetoric about de­
mocracy, egalitarianism and transparency. My discussion with Wishnu reveals that 
even the direction of programs in NGO X -  which made the organisation gain its 
reputation -  were heavily influenced by the predilections of the leader of NGO X. 
“He [the NGO leader] would feel unwell if he couldn’t run his favourite sort of pro­
gram activity. If two weeks went by without him being able to conduct the activity, 
he would gather us, his staff, for a meeting to create one,” recalled Wishnu. How­
ever, Wishnu also notes his former boss’s high dedication to his organisation: “He 
[the NGO director] lives for NGO X. Twenty four hours a day for the NGO.” Such 
dedication can help to establish the authority of the leader, so much so that the NGO, 
including its program direction, is personified in the people who lead it.
The domination of an NGO leader inside his or her organisation can mean that the 
NGO serves as the vehicle of the NGO leader’s interests, including the NGO 
leader’s preferences for international donors. Dominant individuals can monopolise 
information about, and personal contacts with, donors. For example, my conversa­
tion with several staff members of another prominent local NGO reveals that despite 
having been running programs which were heavily funded by an international NGO, 
these local NGO workers had very little knowledge about their organisation’s rela­
tionship with the international NGO. “We are here just as kuli [labourers] and we 
just do what our director tells us,” says one staff. His colleague adds, “We do not 
know about donor-related matters as they are exclusively handled by our director.” 
In the case of their NGO, their organisation ended up working with one international 
NGO only due to their director’s personal preferences. Yet in this particular case, 
other international NGOs were also willing to cooperate with them and could have 
diversified the local NGO’s funding sources.
147
What does the domination of individuals mean for the relationships between local 
NGOs and international NGOs? This question brings us to the next topic which con­
cerns sustainability. Since most local NGOs greatly depend on international NGOs 
as their main funding sources, a heavy reliance on an individual NGO leader has the 
potential to jeopardise the NGO’s sustainability. The influence of a prominent leader 
can be an effective guarantee of international funding, at least for a time. But, by the 
same token, it can also make the NGO concerned very vulnerable should the leader 
abandon it. The story of a local NGO, Yasanti, and its founder, Sri Kusyuniati 
(Mbak Kus), illustrates this point.44 The organisation suffered when Mbak Kus, left 
to pursue her advanced education abroad. Acording to Sih Handayani, a staff mem­
ber of Yasanti, after Mbak Kus left in 1993 Yasanti had to “scale down or even can­
cel” some of its programs.45 Sih Handayani explains the reasons for Yasanti’s deci­
sion:
There were no other staff with the same degree of competence and con­
nections to take over Mbak Kus’ role, especially in attending interna­
tional conferences or in maintaining contacts with the national and in­
ternational NGO networks. For example, we were no longer able to 
raise funds to pay for travelling costs to participate in those activities 
because we were relatively unknown to those who used to be ap­
proached by Mbak Kus......  Funding bodies began to leave us, partly
due to the changing policies of international donors to Indonesian 
NGOs and partly due to our failure to convince them that we could pro­
ceed in the absence o f Mbak Kus.4(’
As I have mentioned earlier, this discussion on NGOs’ funding sustainability and 
personalism could therefore also be read the other way around: i.e. it is the interna­
tional donor’s emphasis on prominent individuals and local NGOs’ funding inse­
curity that encourages personalism in the Indonesian NGO sector. In other words, 
personalism not only facilitates the domination by international NGOs, but it also 
exists as the result of domination by international NGOs.
The last issue we can identify in discussing the impact of personalism on local 
NGOs concerns regeneration. When the NGO is all about one particular person, 
generational change within the organisation consequently becomes problematic. It is 
a common criticism that local NGOs fail to manage regeneration or succession well. 
In his study of twenty two NGOs back in the early 1990s, Sinaga suggests that “the
44 Hadiwinata, 2003: 204.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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leader who is the founder of the NGO tends to hold on to the top position for a life­
time.” 47
During my research, I found concern over succession planning in local NGOs 
mostly originates with the younger generation of volunteer and staff in the NGO sec­
tor and those coming from an advocacy-NGO background. Commenting on one last­
ing NGO director, one of my informants says, “[name of Director] has not been will­
ing to be replaced. He thinks of himself as the sun, so there can only be one sun [in 
the organisation] and not two.” 48
Some local NGO workers compare the prominent NGO leaders who have been lead­
ing an NGO for several decades with dictatorships where the ruler just wants to keep 
in power. Another local NGO staff member sees the style of senior NGO leaders as 
the result of a dilemma: “[they] got stuck on the top position and [they] do not know 
where to go to from there.” 49
However, several “older-generation” leaders reject the accusation that they are un­
willing to step down. For some, succession mechanisms are already in place in most 
NGOs and it is just a matter of “timing”, as suggested by Meth Kusumahadi:
We have discussed this topic of regeneration and we actually have im­
plemented it in our organisation. Even now I rarely show up at the of­
fice any more but all of us are on the same page already. I communicate 
with the office through my mobile phone and over the internet. Since 
2001 I already have a deputy, which is a two-year-term. Therefore up 
until now we already have had three deputies. And since 2003 I have al­
ready offered, ‘whoever feels ready for it, please take over’. It is work­
ing now. I am still the recognised figure but actually we already have a 
system in place, everything has its own division and staff.50
For others, it is just a matter of the “readiness” of the next generation. As shown in 
the case study in chapter three, Insist leader, Roem Pattimasang, states that Insist’s 
“regeneration” was slow as it was rather difficult to find people who wanted to fol­
low Insist’s organisational philosophy of not being dependant on external funding. 
According to Roem, younger-generation NGO workers were mostly brought up in a 
relatively comfortable environment with ready funding available, and thus are not 
prepared to struggle to raise their own funds.51 Thus, Roem argues that regeneration
47 Sinaga, 1993: 154.
48 Interview with Wishnu.
49 Confidential communication with a local NGO worker.
50 Interview with Meth Kusumahadi, 23 October 2005. However, my confidential communication 
with one of his former staff suggests that despite having a deputy, Meth still runs the organisation. He 
is still the leader and the decision maker in Satunama.
51 Interview with Roem Pattimasang, 27 January 2007
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is not stalled by the unwillingness of the older generation to leave power. Rather it is 
stalled by the inability of the younger generation to ready themselves to take greater 
responsibilities. Roem may have a point, but some people in the NGO sector see re­
sponses of this sort as self-serving and even contradictory, insofar that younger 
workers cannot prove themselves responsible leaders unless they are given leader­
ship responsibility.
At the first glance, the topic of NGO regeneration might not be seen as connected 
with the discussion of the relationship between international and local NGOs. How­
ever, since local NGOs rely heavily on international funding, local NGOs need to be 
careful about leadership change to ensure that whoever eventually takes over the 
prominent leader’s position should not jeopardise the NGO’s funding security. As an 
illustration, Yusuf (a pseudonym), a board member of one local NGO active in pro­
moting democracy and pluralism, recalled sitting at the local NGO’s steering com­
mittee meeting when it discussed the selection criteria for a new director. Yusuf says 
their discussion ended up focusing on “the mission of finding somebody who is 
marketable to donors.”
The same could be said of the topic of NGO internal conflict, which often occurs as 
a by-product of personalism: internal conflict might not be seen as being connected 
with the discussion of relations between international and local NGOs. Nevertheless, 
as the discussion of YLBHI in chapter four has demonstrated, internal conflict of an 
organisation can result in the cessation of international funding.
In summary, in discussing the links between personalism and local NGOs’ internal 
management, I have identified two reasons why personalism can cause internal con­
flict. First, the prominent individuals can themselves become dictatorial. Second, the 
atmosphere of favouritism and hierarchy fostered by personalism can lead to poor 
succession planning.
Linking the discussion of internal conflict with the relationship between interna­
tional and local NGOs, we can see that internal conflicts result in the inability of 
local NGOs to focus on its program which weakens the local NGOs in dealing with 
international NGOs or can lead to the discontinuation of funding by international 
NGOs. Personalism and internal conflict can serve to facilitate the domination of 
international NGOs.
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However, as the preceding discussion has shown, personalism and internal conflict 
in the NGO sector are also a result of the international NGOs’ domination. They oc­
cur because the international NGOs system tends to operate through personal net­
works among the elite directorship of local Indonesian NGOs. We can thus see here 
that personalism is also the result of international NGOs’ domination.
Having looked at how personalism affects the internal organisational relations of 
local NGOs, and is in turn linked with the relationships between international and 
local NGOs, I will now discuss how personalism affects the external relations of 
local NGOs. Included in the discussion are the relationships local NGOs have with 
other local NGOs, and the relationship between international and local NGOs.
One of the effects of personalism is that it leads to favouritism and special support 
being lavished by international NGOs on prominent individuals. As put to me by an 
international NGO consultant, there are “Barons and Baronesses of Indonesian 
NGOs.”52 With their international funding connections, these NGO elites and the 
NGOs they lead dominate the development sector in Indonesia. Consequently, fa­
vouritism can create hierarchy among Indonesian NGOs. The small Indonesian 
NGOs then become dependent on the large Indonesian NGOs. This issue can be 
considered as one of the classic issues in the Indonesian NGO sector. For instance, a 
meeting of an NGO working group consisting of thirteen local NGOs and six inter­
national funding agencies in 1993 have identified the domination of BINGO (“Big 
NGOs”) over LINGO (“Little NGOs”) as one of the main problems confronting 
Indonesian NGOs. The meeting report states:
BINGOs also tend to develop hierarchical relationships with small 
NGOs in the regions and tend to dominate the small NGOs’ decision 
making process on [NGOs’] issues and programs that should be imple­
mented -  just like the existence of the hegemony of [international] 
funding agencies towards NGOs (BINGOs). Funding agencies’ blocked 
fund [“block fund”] encourage this hierarchical and dominative rela­
tionship/3
A local NGO worker comments, “Well, what happens is the emergence of some 
kind of a monopoly as the small organisation without a name would not get a chance 
[to get international funding]. This puzzles me too as it becomes unfair.”54 More-
52 Interview with Benny Subianto, 25 January 2007. He introduced this term to label prominent NGO 
figures whose names could be found in many NGOs.
53 Billah, et al., 1993:9.
54 Interview with Syafiq Hasyim, 30 January 2007.
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over, international donors’ favouritism can also result in rivalry among local NGOs. 
I will explore these issues in the next section.
Rivalry among Local NGOs
This section will explore the existence of rivalry and jealousy between Indonesian 
NGOs and link these phenomena with the heavy reliance of Indonesian NGOs on 
international funding as well as the dominant presence of personalism in the NGO 
sector. The discussion will demonstrate that, although there are clearly other factors 
which contribute to the development of rivalry among local NGOs, their relation­
ships with international NGOs are one of, if not the most important factor behind the 
presence of rivalry among Indonesian NGOs. In other words, I argue that, just as 
with personalism, rivalry can be a by-product or a result of the relationships between 
international and local NGOs.55 I also argue that at the same time, rivalry among lo­
cal NGOs is a factor that helps to facilitate the domination of international NGOs 
too. I will provide a case study later in this section to illustrate my points.
Rivalry among local NGOs has been identified widely as one of the most ubiquitous 
characteristics of local NGOs. For instance, a local NGO worker notes:
Competition [in getting international funding] is fierce. I have watched 
hundreds of local activists communicate with donors (especially for­
eigners). They treat them as potential patrons, or even as deities. ...
Those activists who have access to international networks live a life­
style that is unimaginable for those who don’t. Their laptops, passports 
and mobile phones create deep-seated jealousies and undermine social 
solidarity within the NGO community. The resulting conflict at the lo­
cal level is difficult to resolve.56
The above observation identifies rivalry as one of the by-products or results of the 
relationships between international and local NGOs. Competition in securing fund­
ing can produce rivalry.
Previous studies on Indonesian NGOs have identified the existence of widespread 
rivalry between local NGOs. For example, a study of Indonesian NGOs in 1999 
mentioned that “the relations between these groups have not always been smooth, 
largely because the imbalance of resources and influence with both funding agencies
55 Other factors that may play a role include culture, agency (i.e. individual choices by business man­
agers) and human nature. However, it should be kept in mind that I only explore these issues in the 
context of the relationships between international and local NGOs.
56 Hetifah Sjaifudian, “The Activists’ Dilemma” in Inside Indonesia 84, October-December 2005.
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and the Government.” Furthermore, in her study of Indonesian labour NGOs, Ford 
notes the existence of “strong rivalry” among labour NGOs and argues that “conflict 
between labour NGOs was a major obstacle to their effectiveness in the rebuilding 
of the Indonesian labour movement/ 8 In her study, Ford observes that NGO work­
ers’ interpretations of their resentment towards each other, which range from those 
who blame “not enough communication between labour NGOs because each NGO 
believes they are right (merasa diri benar)” to those who see “the relationship be­
tween some labour NGOs as being one of mutual disparagement (saling ejekan).”59 
She provides a view of one local NGO worker:
Different labour NGOs have different paradigms. There’s nothing 
wrong with having different opinions in a democracy. The problem 
doesn’t arise out of not cooperating -  it arises when NGOs start de­
nouncing each other. Then they get exclusive because they think that 
they are right (merasa diri benar).60
Having observed the relationships among local labour NGOs and their links to inter­
national funding, Ford argues:
Sometimes actions taken in response to pressures to take on donor- 
promoted programs, to compete for donors’ funds, or to prove to donors 
that one NGO was more effective than another, resulted in accusations 
that workers were ‘sold’ (dijuaf); ‘kept’ (dipelihara); and ‘subdivided’ 
(dikapling-kaplingkan) for organisational gain/’1
By rivalry I mean firstly, as alluded by Ford, to an atmosphere of criticism, includ­
ing destructive criticisms exchanged among local NGOs. My observation during 
meetings with NGO workers reveals that they were often not hesitant in expressing 
their criticisms of each other, particularly those NGOs active in the same sector. 
Secondly, rivalry involves an avoidance of or failure to cooperate on issues of joint 
interest. When local NGOs disagree with each other, or see themselves in competi­
tion for the same limited source of foreign funds, conducting program coordination 
can be difficult. Thirdly, rivalry involves unnecessary duplication of work carried 
out by different NGOs. Local NGOs often implement very similar programs. Rather 
than coordinating their activities and avoiding wasteful repetition, local NGOs
57 ADB, 1999: 5. The report grouped Indonesian NGOs into three categories: Big NGOs (BINGOs) 
who generally have access to external funding and high-government influence, Little NGOs (LIN- 
GOs) who are more traditional, grass-roots NGOs, most often without significant access to resources 
or political power, and Red Plate NGOs which indicate they have a direct affiliation with the govern­
ment.
58 Ford, 2003: 257-260.
59 Ibid.: 259.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
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sometimes effectively repeat the work done by others. Part of the reason for this is 
because NGOs have access to different donors who have the same types of pro­
grams.
Of course, a healthy rivalry, in which local NGOs compete with one another in pur­
suing their interests (which includes securing international funding), can contribute 
to each organisation striving to perform at its best and increase the quality of its pro­
grams. I do not deny that such healthy rivalry, and some of its positive effects, oc­
curs in Indonesia.
However, the negative aspects of rivalry -  manifested in an NGO culture of what 
Ford called “mutual disparagement” -  are far more visible. “ Moreover, rivalry 
among NGOs also weakens their positions not only collectively but individually vis- 
a-vis the international NGOs. In this sense, rivalry among local NGOs thus affects 
the relationships between international and local NGOs and facilitates the domi­
nance of international NGOs. To illustrate my points, I will discuss the relationship 
between Muslim NGOs which received international funding from the same NGO, 
the Asia Foundation.
It should be noted that the discussion in this section focuses on rivalry between local 
NGOs. Therefore, although I start this illustration by describing the relationship be­
tween the Liberal Islamic Network (JIL) and the Asia Foundation, I will not provide 
an in-depth discussion of their relationship. Yet it is necessary to briefly discuss this 
relationship to provide us with background information before looking at the rivalry 
between JIL and other Asia Foundation-funded Islamic NGOs, which can be seen as 
one of the contributing factors leading to the end of the JIL-the Asia Foundation re­
lationship.
The Relationship between Islamic NGOs: the Controversy Surrounding the Lib­
eral Islam Network
JIL or Jaringan Islam Liberal [the Liberal Islam Network] was established in 2001, 
initially as a division of ISAI -  Institute for the Study of the Free Flow of Informa­
tion [Institut Studi Arus Informasi] in Jakarta, before it formally became an inde- 
pendent foundation in 2003. According to its activists, JIL was set up in response
62 See ibid.
63 ISAI was established in 1995 after the New Order government shut down three print media, Tempo, 
Editor and Detik. It is part of a larger community of progressive Indonesian journalists, intellectuals 
and writers which aimed to act as what they call “a pocket where alternative art, thought and 
journalism could mutually support each other in creating a network for freedom of expression.” This
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to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and aimed to promote religious tolerance and 
alternatives to literal interpretations of Islam.64 As one of its key figures, Hamid 
Basyaib, explains:
If there were no conservatives, there would be no need for us to have this 
organisation. What for? Things would be fine. But we emerged as a reac­
tion towards the incredibly intolerant take of the hardline Islamic groups, 
who use their religion as a justification for hating foreigners, destroying 
churches, beating fellow Muslims such as the Ahmadiyah [a Muslim 
sect], all in the name of religion. Others remained quiet thus it was un­
balanced [tidak sebcmding\.
The main aim of JIL was thus “to show the discourse on liberal Islam as widely as 
possible in the society.”65 JIL had three points as its missions, namely:
Firstly, to develop a liberal interpretation of Islam in accordance with 
the principles we believe in and also to promote it to the society. Sec­
ondly, to open spaces for dialogue free from the pressures of the con­
servatives. We believe open dialogues can nurture a healthy Islamic 
thought and movement. Thirdly, to foster the creation of a social and 
political structure that is just and humane.66
JIL’s primary actors were young pesantren (or religious school) educated activists, 
who overwhelmingly had a Nahdlatul Ulama [NU] background, such as Ulil Abshar- 
Abdala, Luthfi Assyaukanie, and Nong Mahmada. The organisation mainly worked 
through the media. Its programs included media syndication (a weekly column pub­
lished in newspaper and a radio talk show), publications, a mailing list, regular dis- 
cussions and public service advertisements.
According to one if its activists, Nong Mahmada, JIL was formed following a work­
shop organised by the Asia Foundation in late 2000 in Bandung. At that time the 
Asia Foundation invited various Indonesian civil society groups that were its part- 
ners to a meeting to discuss its program development. Nong, who attended the 
workshop representing ISAI, recalls:
community is called Komunitas Utan Kayu [the Utan Kayu Community], after their location in a 
complex of old warehouses and offices at 68H Utan Kayu street, a small but busy street in East 
Jakarta. The complex has a small cafe in its leafy backyard and is the home of other members of 
Komunitas Utan Kayu: Lontar Galery, Utan Kayu Theatre, Radio 68-H, and later, the Islamic Liberal 
Network (JIL). <Http://www.utankayu.org/en/index.cfm?action=about&tick=l 591712125>.
64 Interview with Nong Mahmada, 24 January 2007; Hamid Basyaib, 18 August 2007; Anick H.T., 15 
August 2007; Burhanuddin Muhtadi, 23 March 2007.
65 See http://islamlib.com/en/pages/about/ [accessed on 20 March 2009].
66 Ibid.
67 Interview with Nong Mahmada, 24 January 2007; Hamid Basyaib, 18 August 2007; Anick H.T., 15 
August 2007; Burhanuddin Muhtadi, 23 March 2007.
68 The Asia Foundation has been working with various civil society organisations in Indonesia for 
more than three decades. The Asia Foundation’s first grantee organisation in Indonesia was an Islamic 
women’s organisation, Aisyah, in 1975 (interview with Robin Bush, 27 October 2005). The fact that
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The agenda of the workshop was to discuss what kind of programs were 
suitable for the contemporary situation in Indonesia. This is what I like 
about the Asia Foundation. In formulating its program, the Asia Founda­
tion always had a discussion with its partners first. [At that time] I pro­
posed [to create] a public campaign to counter hardline Islam [Islam garis 
keras] because it would be dangerous if we didn’t do it. After the work­
shop, I came back to Utan Kayu and shared the discussion with other 
friends. We then submitted a proposal to the Asia Foundation. The or­
ganisation enthusiastically responded to it.69
As JIL’s proposal was approved by the Asia Foundation, JIL started to run its pro­
grams in 2001 with the support of the Asia Foundation.
JIL enjoyed a close association with the Asia Foundation. For many, including JIL 
members themselves, JIL was known as the Asia Foundation's “golden child.” For 
example, according to Nong, “JIL was always mentioned by the Asia Foundation 
everywhere, including in its reports to its headquarter in San Francisco, as its [The 
Asia Foundation’s] success story.” JIL activists also developed good personal rela­
tions with the Asia Foundation staff members and leaders. The Asia Foundation for 
instance provided scholarships for some of JIL’s activists to study abroad, an ac­
tivity which was not part of their initial program agreement.71 Furthermore, in the 
aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, it was JIL, after being 
approached by the Asia Foundation, which did a series of public service announce­
ments to promote peaceful, tolerant and plural Islam.72
However, the relationship ended abruptly in early 2006. This outcome created a ma­
jor stir within Islamic NGO circles in Indonesia, as the Asia Foundation’s decision 
was widely seen as being somewhat sudden and arbitrary.
its first grant was for an Islamic women group says something about The Asia Foundation’s history. 
In the late 1990s, the Asia Foundation established “Islam and Civil Society” program in Indonesia. 
Through the program, the Asia Foundation claims it has worked with over thirty Islamic NGOs to 
support these NGOs “in their efforts to promote the concept that Islamic values can be the basis for a 
democratic political system, non-violence, and religious tolerance.” (See “Indonesia” The Asia Foun­
dation Brochure, 2004). In political terms, this program was significant as it served as a bridge be­
tween the Asia Foundation -  an International NGO and arguably a face of the Western World (the 
U.S.) -  and peak development groups within Islamic civil society. The Islam and Civil Society pro­
gram gained even more significance in the period after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks when 
anti-American sentiment rose in Indonesia as a response to the American government’s “war on ter­
ror” which many Indonesians perceived as discrediting Islam.
69 Interview with Nong Mahmada, 24 January 2007.
70 Ibid.
71 Interview with Burhanuddin Muhtadi, 23 March 2007; Anick H.T., 15 August 2007; Douglas Ram- 
age, 12 January 2007; Hamid Basyaib, 18 August 2007.
72 The protests by hardline-Islamic groups forced several TV stations to stop airing the ad. According 
to JIL people, this left an unresolved financial issue (the Asia Foundation, through JIL, had paid for 
the costly time-slots yet when a TV station cancelled the ad one-sidedly, the station did not refund the 
money). Interview with Anick H.T., 15 August 2007.
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The official explanation from the Asia Foundation leaders of why it stopped provid­
ing funds for JIL was that the Asia Foundation’s decision simply followed a natural 
program cycle in the NGO sector: JIL and the Asia Foundation’s yearly program 
agreement finished in 2006 and the Asia Foundation opted not to extend it. The 
Asia Foundation had to make an adjustment as the result of a policy change which 
caused the organisation to re-evaluate its programs with local NGOs. The change 
included ending the “Islam and Civil Society” program in 2008 and instead creating 
a new program division, “Islam and Development”.
The Asia Foundation stated that it is an international development NGO working in 
Indonesia and it wanted to stay “mainstream.”74 Since it had to prioritise its recipi­
ents as it could not fund all NGOs, it decided not to renew its program agreement 
with JIL.7' According to the Asia Foundation Country Representative in 2007:
It seems that JIL’s main interests are theological rather than develop­
mental, that’s normal. But does that fit The Asia Foundation’s mandate 
now? Maybe not. So I think it’s [i.e. ending the cooperation] natural, 
normal. I just hope that people can put things in that context. [The] Asia 
Foundation is not a political party, [it is] non-profit, non-partisan, and we 
are here to have good relationships with everybody and we are very 
proud of that.76
However, it must also be pointed out that JIL had made no alterations to its own 
programs, and did not do anything it had not done in the past. The references of the 
Asia Foundation officials to their desire to remain “mainstream” and “non-partisan” 
point to the underlying political sensitivities of the issue.
The unofficial version of the event, as it is widely understood in Muslim NGO 
circles, is that prior to making its decision, the Asia Foundation had been having in­
tensive discussions, both internally and externally with parties such as other Islamic 
partner organisations. Basically, the Asia Foundation members were “calculating” 
the gains and losses of having JIL as a partner. At that time JIL already had a high 
profile and it had caused much controversy in the media. For example, an article by 
Ulil published in a newspaper in 2002 infuriated Islamic religious scholars. In de­
scribing the event, Fealy notes:
73 Interview with Douglas Ramage, 12 January 2007.
74 Ibid. According to him, the Asia Foundation’s mandate is for government reform, poverty reduction 
and women’s rights.
7:1 But that did not mean that they cut off the relationship as they were still related through JPPR (Peo­
ple's Voter Education Network) program. The Asia Foundation also continues to provide scholarships 
for JIL members.
76 Interview with Douglas Ramage, 12 January 2007.
77 See “Menyegarkat 1 Kembali Pemahaman Islam” in Kompas, 18 November 2002.
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A number of groups demanded that the police charge Ulil with blas­
phemy and that the Council of Indonesian Ulama [MUI] declare JIL to 
have deviated from Islamic teachings. The strongest reaction came from 
the Bandung-based Forum for Islamic Community Ulama (FUUI), 
which stated that Ulil’s writings fell into that category of offences for 
which the maximum penalty was death.'8
In the heat of anti-American sentiment and the rise of radicalism in Indonesia, JIL 
was the target of massive verbal attacks and threats from hardline Islamist organisa- 
tions who accused it of being an enemy of Islam. Many people believe that in that 
context, the Asia Foundation's close association with JIL was somehow too much for 
the Asia Foundation to handle. Conservative Islamic magazines such as Sabili and 
Hidayatullah provided a special coverage on the Asia Foundation, which linked it 
with CIA and questioned the Asia Foundation interests in funding what they per- 
ceived as “non-mainstream” Islamic organisations. During this turbulence, for the 
first time in almost five decades of its existence in Indonesia, the Asia Foundation’s 
office in South Jakarta had to be guarded by the elite unit of the Indonesian police, 
Brimob [Mobile Brigade], due to threats of attacks by hardline Islamist groups.
For JIL, the Asia Foundation's decision came as a huge surprise. Prior to the Asia 
Foundation’s cessation of relations with it, JIL had already gone through a series of 
preparations with the Asia Foundation to extend their cooperation. The Asia Foun­
dation had sent a consultant to work with JIL in solving their problems and in de- 
signing JIL’s future programs. Together the Asia Foundation and JIL had even 
prepared a draft budget. According to JIL, they were already at the final stage of 
preparation. “The Asia Foundation program officers indicated to me that, say, 99.9%
87of the program would work,” said JIL’s program coordinator.
JIL people say they were very hurt [sakit hati] after going through the lengthy prepa­
ration process and anticipating its success, when the Asia Foundation suddenly de­
cided not to continue their relationship. Commenting on the Asia Foundation’s rea­
son for discontinuing the relationship, Nong says,
78 Greg Fealy, “A Conservative Turn” in Inside Indonesia 87, July-September 2006. He further ex­
plains that “it was later revealed that several JI [Jemaah Islamiyah]-affiliated militants planned to kill 
Ulil but abandoned the attempt after an ulama declared that only a religious court could impose a 
death sentence.” Ibid.
74 Ibid. See also historical overview discussion in chapter two.
80 See Sabili, No. 10/XII/3 Desember 2004 and Hidayatullah, December 2004.
81 The discussion included a serious consideration of not using the name JIL to repair the “bad image” 
associated with the name.
82 Interview with Nong Mahmada, 24 January 2007.
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If that is the case [that the Asia Foundation changed its policy which in­
cluded a cessation of the Islam and Civil Society program and therefore 
stopped funding JIL], then the Asia Foundation should discontinue its re­
lationship with all religious-affiliated NGOs. But that is not the case, is 
it? This gives the impression that JIL is just the scapegoat for the Asia 
Foundation’s fear [kambing hitam dari ketakutan Asia Foundation] of 
being attacked from everywhere. This is their main reason. That’s alright 
for me. It’s normal for them to do that. But if that’s the case from the be­
ginning, then why didn’t they tell us right from the start so I did not 
waste my time to negotiate, to write a proposal, etc?83
Similarly, Nong’s colleague, Anick H.T., says:
Their explanation is irrational because we [JIL and the Asia Foundation] 
were already in the middle of the final stage of budget negotiation. We 
even had agreed on the budget. It was then we found out about the dis­
continuation.84
The JIL program coordinator said that although they occasionally worked with other 
organisations such as JICA and UNDP, JIL's main funding source had always been 
the Asia Foundation. She admitted that they probably should have thought of di­
versifying their funding sources earlier, but they felt that working with the Asia 
Foundation was enough and clearly they were not expecting that the Asia Founda-
o r
tion would stop funding them so abruptly. ‘ However, the Asia Foundation said that 
it has no obligation to permanently fund any organisation. After the Asia Founda­
tion’s decision, JIL was not able to continue its programs on their previous scale.
As well as being disappointed with the Asia Foundation, JIL members were also 
deeply disappointed with the critical attitude they encountered from some other 
moderate Islamic NGOs which were also funded by the Asia Foundation. Pressures 
from these groups, JIL members believe, were one of the crucial factors behind the 
Asia Foundation deciding to stop funding JIL. JIL members believe that the Asia 
Foundation conceded to the complaints of other moderate Islamic NGOs rather than 
remaining loyal to JIL. Nong explains:
We are saddened because we are under attack by our own friends [di- 
gempur teman-teman sendiri], We are saddened because essentially all of 
us are the same. In the beginning, there was a division of labour among 
us. Utan Kayu focuses on media and campus, Rahima, P3M and Lakpes- 
dam [these are the names of other influential Islamic NGOs] focus their 
work in the pesantren. JIL does not work in pesantren. From the begin­
ning we did not want to engage in grassroot-level activities as the grass­
roots was the focus area of LKiS and Lakpesdam. Consequently, JIL was 
more “popular” [i.e. higher profile] -  this is normal as we worked
83 Ibid.
84 Interview with Anick H.T., 17 August 2007
8:1 Interview with Nong Mahmada, 24 January 2007.
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through media. We fought [menghantam] people in the media. If there 
was a division of labour, when JIL was criticised, our friends should have 
backed us up. They should have explained to the community that “we are 
actually similar to JIL.” What happened instead was that they [other 
NGOs] accused us of being extreme-fundamentalist. I am truly hurt 
[Saya sakit hati betuf]. From the beginning I am consistent in this work 
area, I did not want to intrude on our friends’ work focus even though we 
could.
On the other hand, members of these other Islamic NGOs admitted that they had dif­
ficulties in their work because they were associated with JIL. Some were under 
verbal attack and threats of physical violence from hardline groups. Some also com­
plained they had been rejected by some grass roots communities where they focused 
their activities, because of their association with JIL. These local NGOs complained 
that JIL people were “stubborn” and “too abrasive” in their approach, therefore these 
organisations did not want to be associated with JIL.86
They also raised their concerns with the Asia Foundation who funded all of them. In 
the years leading to the discontinuation of JIL funding, Islamic NGOs cooperating 
with international NGOs were frequently accused by Islamist groups that they were 
agents of foreign interests. In ‘countering’ these accusations, NGOs with grassroots 
links, be it in the form of links to a local community they worked with or strong af­
filiations to other groups like NU, considered themselves to be in a more advanta­
geous position than the NGOs without a grassroots organisation like JIL. However, 
other moderate NGOs that also received funding from the Asia Foundation were of- 
ten put in the same category as JIL by hardline Islamist groups. Therefore these 
organisations did not want to be associated with JIL and since 2006 even reportedly 
went as far as refusing to work with international donors who funded JIL. This re­
portedly made it difficult for JIL to find international donors who wanted to work 
with them.88
S<1 Interview with different Islamic NGO workers.
s My interviews with various Islamic NGO workers and international NGO staff provided detailed 
accounts of complaints and criticisms from both parties (JIL and other Islamic NGOs). For example, 
one topic of concern was JIL’s take on liberalism, which was different from the other Islamic NGOs 
which emphasised ‘liberation’ [i.e. liberating people from poverty and injustice] instead of liberalism. 
They accused JIL of neglecting the social justice aspect, including raising concerns about the fact that 
JIL leaders also worked for The Freedom Institute, an allegedly neo-liberal think-tank. Interviews 
with Syafik Hasyim, 30 January 2007; Farid Wajidi, 26 October 2005; Ahmad Suaedi, 23 January 
2007.
88 Many in the NGO circle also see the Asia Foundation’s act of discontinuing its relationship with 
JIL as affecting other donors’s willingness to work with JIL. As the international donor community is 
small, what one funding agency -  particularly an influential one like the Asia Foundation -  thinks of 
an NGO matters for other donors. Confidential communication, 2008.
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JIL people said they sensed that other NGOs were jealous of them because JIL was 
“popular” and had become successful in gaining a high media profile and generating 
discussions about moderate Islam. Because of that, other NGOs started to become 
argumentative with JIL: “This is more about the existence of egos in the NGO 
world. When one NGO emerges and starts to become popular, then the others would 
knock them down so they do not “emerge” [and fully succeed]. This situation is 
normal in the NGO sector,” comments Nong.89
Although my observation during fieldwork indicates that there is indeed a tendency 
for NGO staff members to criticise others, which suggests that rivalry exists among 
them, I consider this comment to be exaggerating the issue. I see NGO rivalry 
mostly as a matter of securing self-interest rather than a deliberate attempt to sabo­
tage other NGOs.
As noted earlier, the case of JIL and the Asia Foundation is unusual in its causes. 
The rivalry between JIL and the Asia Foundation’s other Islamic NGOs was trig­
gered by “attacks” by hardline Islamic groups on JIL. The hardline groups attacked 
JIL, so other moderate groups said, because JIL was too direct and confrontational in 
its approach to conservative Islam. The rivalry was basically about strategy: JIL’s 
approach was frontal, high-profile, with the media as its medium, while the other 
Islamic NGOs were more subtle and involved implementing activities at the grass­
roots level. However, their differences in strategy spilled over into affecting their 
relationship with their international counterpart, the Asia Foundation, who funded 
both of them. If JIL had not had conflict with other Islamic NGO partners of the 
Asia Foundation, it would have had a better chance of maintaining its initially excel­
lent relationship with the Asia Foundation and other international NGOs. The other 
Islamic NGOs may have supported JIL, instead of abandoning it.90
We can thus conclude that this case, despite other political aspects which also con­
tributed to it, demonstrates how rivalry among local NGOs can affect their relation­
ships with international NGOs. In this case, rivalry even diminished the local NGO’s 
opportunity to receive support from international NGOs. Other Islamic NGOs’ com­
plaints about JIL, and their refusal to associate with JIL, became factors that contri-
89 Interview with Nong Mahmada. 24 January 2007.
90 Reportedly even during the Asia Foundation’s meeting with its local Islamic NGO partners in early 
2009, when one consultant brought up the issue of JIL and whether or not the Asia Foundation should 
reconsider its decision, he received strong responses and criticisms from these Islamic NGOs who 
apparently still did not want to have any association with JIL. Confidential communication, April 
2009.
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buted to the eventual decision of the donor, the Asia Foundation, to discontinue 
funding JIL. The Asia Foundation’s decision created a bad precedent for JIL as it 
made other donors very cautious about funding it. Although NGO rivalry can affect 
the relationship between an international and a local NGO, this case, again, displays 
the domination of international NGOs in their relationships with local NGOs.
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the micropolitics of NGOs in Indonesia and touched on 
the broad issues of personalism and rivalry among local groups. The discussion of 
personalism has scrutinised this common characteristic of local NGOs and looked at 
its implications for the relationship between international and local NGOs.
I argue that on the positive side, personalism makes it easier for local NGOs whose 
leaders are “trusted” by international NGOs to short-cut international donors’ bu­
reaucracy and easily obtain program approval. Their easy access to international 
donors consequently guarantees those local NGOs’ security of funding for their own 
activities. Meanwhile, personalism enables international funding organisations to 
simplify the process of identifying trustworthy grantees and to obtain a type of per­
sonal guarantee for the international NGO’s programs. We can thus see that the sys­
tem works for both sides: for the international NGO sector which gets a guarantee 
on the completion of their contracts and for the small elite of local NGOs which are 
trusted by the international NGOs, who get funding. In this sense, we can see that 
personalism is at least encouraged by the domination of international NGOs over 
local NGOs.
However, personalism encourages undemocratic practices in local NGOs and contri­
butes to internal conflicts within them. These conditions can harm the ultimate sur­
vival of the local NGO concerned as it can ultimately lead to a cessation of funding 
from donors upon the exit of the dominant leader. Internal conflicts also frustrate the 
ability of the NGO to unite on a common agenda and program, and weaken the 
NGO’s leverage with international NGOs. This condition thus makes the NGO more 
vulnerable to the international NGO’s influence in the relationship. In this respect, 
we can see personalism acts as a facilitator of international NGOs’ domination.
The discussion in this chapter has also identified rivalry as one of the characteristics 
of local NGOs, despite the rhetoric of the development sector which tends to depict 
NGOs as having similar interests and thus working in the same direction of pursuing
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the public good. But more importantly, similar to the discussion about personalism, 
my discussion of rivalry demonstrates that it can be both a result and a facilitator of 
the domination of international NGOs. Local NGOs need to secure their funding and 
this can lead them to have conflicts with other NGOs. Moreover, as the case study of 
JIL has displayed, local NGOs can also campaign against one another when their 
interests are in direct conflict of competition. Such situations demonstrate the ability 
of local NGOs to ignore the value systems which rhetorically underpin the develop­
ment sector. Because local NGOs fail to acknowledge such inconsistencies between 
the language they espouse and their attitudes towards one another, the high-sounding 
values of development arguably ring somewhat hollow. Moreover, the ease with 
which local NGOs can sacrifice unity for the sake of self-interest makes the hege­
monic system of international NGOs easier to maintain. International NGOs already 
-  effectively if not by intent -  pursue a “divide and conquer” strategy by forcing lo­
cal NGOs to compete for funding. Failing to unite, local NGOs enable this system to 
function more easily.
This situation indeed opens up the final significant point I wish to make. In the 
course of my research I have encountered a number of interviewees who engage in a 
“dance of complaints” about the unfairness of their subjection to international 
NGOs.91 Many interviewees bemoan the state of their dependence on international 
NGOs. But what the evidence from this chapter shows is that such belief in their 
own victimhood can only be taken so far. It is true that the system of development in 
Indonesia is hegemonic. But local NGOs themselves are responsible in at least a mi­
nor way for failing to take actions which would offer them some defence against the 
domination of the international NGOs. Local NGOs could develop processes of suc­
cession planning for their leadership teams. They could rally to back one another and 
avoid unconstructive clashes. By not doing these things local NGOs share a small 
element of responsibility for the hegemony of powerful international actors they all 
face. In other words international NGOs are not entirely at fault.
In conclusion, an analysis of the micropolitics of NGOs in this chapter suggests that 
the local NGO sector’s characteristics of personalism and rivalry have both enabled 
international NGOs to smoothly function and exercise their domination over local 
NGOs, and can be the result of the domination of international NGOs. In other
1,1 See chapter six for examples and more detailed discussion about local NGOs complaints. I borrow 
the term “dance of complaints” from John Lindsay, an international organisation staff member in Ja­
karta, email communication, 24 April 2009.
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words, local NGOs make themselves more vulnerable to the domination of interna­
tional NGOs by allowing internal conflicts, personalism and rivalry.
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Chapter Six
Contending Views: The Perception Gap between 
Local and International NGOs
Introduction
The previous chapter discussed the characteristics of local NGOs and how they 
shape and are shaped by their relationships with other local NGOs. This chapter 
takes the discussion further by looking at the perspectives of international and Indo­
nesian NGOs regarding their relationship with each other. Specifically we will look 
at the sources of tension that occur as they work together and how individuals in 
both types of organisation talk about these tensions. By doing so, we open up other 
dimensions of the topic, the issues of domination and resistance.
The discussion will shed more light on how international NGOs assert dominance 
over Indonesian NGOs. Yet at the same time the chapter also reveals more evidence 
for resistance by local NGOs towards their international counterparts. Part of this 
resistance is evidenced by the deep resentment local NGOs show towards interna­
tional NGOs, specifically in response to the ways in which international NGOs try to 
use the relationship to their own advantage.
This chapter starts by looking at the dominant issues, or problems, in the relationship 
as defined by international NGOs. Their concerns focus on accountability and lack 
of capacity in local NGOs. Following this, the chapter analyses the major problems 
in the relationship identified by Indonesian NGOs. Local NGOs see the relationship 
as being driven by donors. The discussion thus shows that local and international 
NGOs have different perceptions of the challenges they face in their relationship.
Many of the issues at the heart of these differing perceptions, namely accountability, 
capacity and donor dominance, are closely related and even overlap with one an­
other. However, for analytical purposes, this chapter dedicates one section for each 
of these issues, i.e. accountability, capacity and donor dominance. Dealing with these
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issues separately will enable me to illustrate the underlying tensions better and there­
fore clarify my arguments.
As I have demonstrated in my discussion throughout the previous chapters, I borrow 
the approach of Scott and Kerkvliet that looks at everyday practices of domination 
and resistance. Here, I employ Kerkvliet’s concept of everyday politics in discussing 
the perspectives of international and local NGOs on the sources of tension in their 
relationship. 1 I also borrow Scott’s concept of the public transcript and the hidden 
transcript in the attempt to study domination and resistance in the context of the rela­
tionship between international and local NGOs in Indonesia.2
The findings of this chapter support the argument of both Scott and Kerkvliet who 
argue that Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is inadequate in explaining power relations 
between superordinate and subordinate groups. We will see that the “hidden tran­
script” of local NGOs views about their international partners demonstrates con­
siderable anxiety about international NGOs and contestation and even rejection of 
their views. As will be seen, the discussion about international and local NGOs’ 
views of their relationship draws a striking parallel with Kerkvliet’s eloquent study 
of how people in different status groups in a Philippine village see their relationship 
with each other.3
The discussion in this chapter reveals that although the domination of international 
NGOs is apparent, local NGOs’ deep resentment of that domination and their ability 
to make use of “hidden” or “off-stage” opportunities for their own benefit, demon­
strate non-compliance by Indonesian NGOs’ towards the domination of international 
NGOs. Because consent is absent, the system of hegemony is incomplete.
The issue of NGO accountability
As has been demonstrated in chapter four, when it comes to working with local 
NGOs, most international NGO workers say the issue of accountability is one of the 
most prominent challenges they face. For example, an international NGO worker 
suggests:
[Indonesian] LSMs [NGOs] have a major problem when it comes to ac­
countability and transparency. As different grantees have different ca-
1 As I have introduced in chapter one, Kerkvliet argues that “politics consists of the debates, conflicts, 
decisions, and cooperation among individuals, groups, and organisations regarding the control, alloca­
tion, and use of resources and the values and ideas underlying those activities.” (Kerkvliet, 2002: 11).
' See chapter one for the definition and discussion of these concepts.
3 See Kerkvliet, 2002: 164-201.
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pacities, their [approaches to] accountability are also different. Prob­
lems tend to occur with repetitious frequency. [There usually are diffi­
culties with their] financial reports. In Papua, we gave money for law­
yer’s training, but we found out that the money ended up being used for 
unclear expenses. The “naughty” ones do exist.4
Another international NGO country director lamented, “the issues with local NGOs 
concern accountability and govemmentality.” 5 This dissatisfaction with Indonesian 
NGOs’ accountability profile is also repeated in much of the secondary literature on 
Indonesian NGOs, particularly in the post-Suharto period.6
The discussion in this section scrutinises the accountability issue. First, it examines 
the issue of accountability in the NGO sector, before scrutinising the dominant ac­
countability mechanisms employed by international NGOs. Following that, I discuss 
the problems that typically arise in realising the international NGO’s vision of ac­
countability.
I note two basic issues concerning accountability. First, there is a basic conflict con­
cerning the question of whom an NGO is accountable to: is it to their funding pro­
vider or is it to the people in whose name the local NGO speaks and whose interests 
the local NGO says they serve? The second issue is the nature of the accountability 
mechanisms themselves: what they are and how do they make domestic NGOs ac­
countable? In scrutinising this issue it is apparent that many local NGOs feel that ac­
countability only flows in a one way direction -  from them to their donors.
Within the development sector, Brown and Moore define accountability in the fol­
lowing way: “an actor (whether an individual or an organisation) is accountable 
when that actor recognises that it has made a promise to do something and accepted
*7
a moral and legal responsibility to do its best to fulfil that promise.” The term ap­
pears to be simple and straight-forward. However, for many, accountability is “a
o
nebulous concept subject to multiple interpretations and understandings.” In the
realm of development, Gaventa suggests:
Accountability is a real buzz word used in many ways -  in development 
contexts it is argued that greater accountability will allow aid to reach the
4 Interview with Martin (pseudonym), 3 January 2007. I am mostly going to use pseudonyms in this 
chapter due to the sensitivity of the material.
5 Interview with Brian (pseudonym), 12 December 2006.
6 Davis, 2007: 45. See also Hadiwinata, 2003; Demos, 2005; Ganie-Rochman, 2002; Stanley Prasetyo 
et al., 2005; Suharko, 2005.
Brown and Moore, 2001: 570. See also Cutt and Murray, 2000; Fox and Brown, 1998; Najam, 1996; 
Paul, 1992.
s Blagescu and Lloyd, 2006: 12.
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people for whom it is intended. But as we know, making accountability 
count in the lives of ordinary people is a different matter altogether.4
When people in the NGO scene talk about accountability, my observation during 
fieldwork suggests that they usually mean financial accountability.10 For instance, 
when talking about the problem of accountability, an international disaster and hu­
manitarian NGO director says: “Problems happened because NGOs are used as a 
personal business. It is easy to create an NGO in Indonesia.” He then blamed the 
government oversight system saying, “there is no requirement to register with the tax 
office and audit.” This makes it easy to “double [duplicate] funding [sources] and 
[commit] dubious practices which include multiple accounting systems.”* 11 This re­
mark is in tune with the complaint of an international NGO consultant: “one charac­
teristic of Indonesian NGOs is that they just want money.”12 Such comments are 
typically made by people from international NGOs, reinforcing the idea that ac­
countability is expected to operate in a single direction, from local NGO to interna­
tional NGO. As the discussion in chapter four has illustrated, financial accountability 
mechanisms often take the form of rigid reporting procedures which international 
NGOs impose on their local counterparts.
The Rise of an Accountability Agenda
The emergence of concerns among international NGOs about accountability in Indo­
nesia corresponds with increasing coverage of this issue in both the international lit­
erature on NGOs and among international NGOs in general. As noted by Edwards:
When the first systematic writings on NGO accountability became 
available in the mid-1990s, NGOs still occupied a relative backwater in 
politics, international affairs and academic research. Ten years on, both 
NGOs in general and the accountability question in particular have 
moved to centre stage.13
According to Jordan and Van Tuijl, accountability initially was a “by-product of the 
prevailing paradigm regarding the role of NGOs in development,” but by 2006 had 
“become a hard issue at the centre of NGOs’ political and organisational profile.”14
9 One World Trust, “Making Accountability Count: Citizens, NGOs and the State Discussion.” Events 
notes. March 21 2007.
http://www.oneworldtrust.org/documents/Making_Accountability_Count_21_March_2007_Event_No 
tes.pdf [accessed on 15 October 2008].
10 There are of course those NGO workers who discuss accountability beyond the financial dimen­
sion. For this view, see Baswir, 2004.
11 Interview with Brian (pseudonym), 12 December 2006.
12 Interview with Tony (pseudonym), 25 January 2007.
13 Edwards, 2006.
14 Jordan and van Tuijl, 2006: 9.
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One explanation for the emergence of accountability as an issue of significance is the 
increasing awareness of “good governance” as a part of the ‘New Policy Agenda’ 
promoted by multilateral and bilateral funding agencies. 15 In this context, multi­
lateral and bilateral funding agencies, which oftentimes function as an extension of 
their respective governments, evidently perceive accountability as one of the key is­
sues in good governance. One international NGO worker confirmed this notion by 
noting that it was the bilateral funding agencies, instead of international NGOs, that 
first promoted the issue of good governance in the context of international develop­
ment in Indonesia. 16 The discussion thus suggests that the accountability agenda is 
above all imposed by donors.
The media has also amplified the accountability issue in the public arena, as news of 
accountability failures in NGOs can create controversy and helps to “sell” media 
time. For example, internationally, Jordan provides three examples of media scrutiny 
of “scandals” in the NGO sector which grabbed the attention of the media, including 
a case where journalists in the Netherlands questioned the salary of a senior NGO 
official who asked for a higher wage than that received by the Prime Minister, and a
• • 1 7practice of trading relief supplies for sexual favours in Africa.
Looking specifically at the Indonesian context in the search for answers as to why 
accountability failures emerge as an attention grabbing issue, Davis locates the trend 
within the circumstances of Indonesia’s democratic transition. He suggests that:
Increased opportunities for political parties and other social organisa­
tions mean that advocacy NGOs’ lack of accountability and transpar­
ency to the broader Indonesian public and their target groups is increas­
ingly evident. 18
Furthermore, Davis notes that the mass media has given significant attention to the 
issue of NGOs and accountability, with no less than thirteen feature articles with ti­
tles like “Questioning NGO Accountability” and “Gerakan Masyarakat: Tuntutan 
Akuntabilitas LSM, Isuyang Berulang” [“People’s Movement: the Demand for NGO 
Accountability, a Recurring Issue”] appearing in various leading Indonesian news-
15 Edwards and Hulme, 1996: 2. For the discussion of the ‘New Policy Agenda’ see Robinson, 1993. 
The term “good governance’’ is usually associated with accountability, transparency, participation, 
openness and the rule of law. For example, according to the World Bank, “good governance is epito­
mized by predictable, open and enlightened policy-making, a bureaucracy imbued with a professional 
ethos acting in furtherance of the public good, the rule of law, transparent processes, and a strong civil 
society participating in public affairs.” (World Bank, 1994: vii).
16 Interview with Muhammad Miftahudin, 19 October 2005.
17 Jordan, 2005: 6.
18 Davis, 2007: 55.
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papers between the year 2002 to 2007.19 The point is that democratisation, by freeing 
up access to information and provoking debate over issues of public concern, has 
visited questions of accountability on the NGO community. In addition, as explained 
in chapter two, the massive amount of foreign development funding that flooded into 
the country in the post-Suharto era has raised public interest in how the money is 
spent. In an ironic twist, the community that championed the struggle against auth­
oritarianism is having to answer uncomfortable questions about itself under the very 
system it wished to create.
The debate over accountability and civil society internationally can be observed 
through an array of public discussions, seminars and workshops, as well as an ample 
number of reports and publications produced around the theme of accountability. 
Chamovitz notes that “a voluminous literature exists on the accountability (or lack 
thereof) of NGOs.” At the international level for example, two books with the 
theme of “Making accountability count: citizens, NGOs and the state” were launched 
in London in March 2007. One organisation, One World Trust, has even been pub­
lishing an annual Global Accountability Report since 2003. Each year, the report as­
sesses the accountability performance of a set of thirty international organisations in 
three categories: public, private and non-governmental to see “how accountable 
thirty of the world’s most powerful organisations are to civil society, affected com- 
munities and the wider public.” The Global Accountability Project, conducted by 
an international organisation called One World Trust came up with what they call 
“four core accountability dimensions” which they perceived as “critical to managing 
accountability claims for both internal and external stakeholders.” The four dimen­
sions are transparency, participation, evaluation and complaint and response mecha­
nisms. Each dimension has a set of key indicators which are used to measure ac­
countability. The end result is what they called as “Global Accountability Index.” 
These initiatives are some of the examples of attempt to address the issue of ac­
countability within civil society at the international level.
19 These articles appeared in the Jakarta Post 11 April 2006 and Kompas 24 April 2004 respectively. 
Davis, 2007: 55.
20 Chamovitz, 2006: 24. Other publications include Bendell, 2006.
21 The two books are ‘Rights, Resources and the Politics of Accountability’ edited by P. Newell and J. 
Wheeler and ‘NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles ands Innovations’ edited by L. Jordan and P. 
van Tuijl. See www.oneworldtrust.org/pages/download3.cfm?did=514 [accessed on 20 October 
2008],
22 Blagescu and Lloyd, 2006: 13. The thirty organisations consist of ten intergovernmental organisa­
tions, ten international non-governmental actors and ten transnational corporations.
23 Ibid.: 14. See also: http://www.oneworldtmst.org/ [accessed on 20 October 2008].
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At the national level, in the case of Indonesia, examples of the ways in which ac­
countability has become an obsession in the NGO sector are many and various. One 
example is a series of public discussions in seven cities in Indonesia which started 
with a workshop held in September 2002 organised by a local NGO called PIRAC.24 
This workshop “gathered various NGOs which are concerned with and are imple­
menting accountability programs in their organisations and networks.”^  The papers 
from those events were then compiled and published as a book titled “Kritik dan 
otokritik LSM: membongkar kejujuran dan keterbukaan lembaga swadaya masyara- 
kat Indonesia” [“Criticisms and Self-criticisms of NGOs: Scrutinising the Honesty 
and Openness of Indonesian NGOs”].
These kinds of activities are usually done with the funding support of international 
NGOs, in this case, the event was funded by the Ford Foundation. That this work­
shop and book were funded by an international organisation could itself be taken to 
reflect the influence of an external agenda, or at least as an attempt by Indonesian 
NGOs to respond to the criticism addressed to them by international NGOs.
What do international NGOs think of local NGOs regarding accountability? Because 
of the diversity of international NGOs, we can find a range o f opinions from reason­
ably positive remarks on the issue to very negative views. This was certainly my 
finding during my fieldwork. For example, a country director of an international 
NGO who has an optimistic view of Indonesian NGOs says:
It [accountability] is the big responsibility of donors. Do not give 
money without giving appropriate financial support and training. The 
other dimension of accountability is absorptive capacity. It is our obli­
gation to give not just a grant to a project but to help the organisation 
run itself professionally according to international standards.27
On the other hand, a different country director of another international development 
NGO said that with the mushrooming of NGOs after Suharto stepped down:
The interesting thing was that these NGOs that came out from that time 
did not necessarily have constituencies. So using the term that we call
24 PIRAC stands for Public Interest Research and Advocacy Center. The organisation was formed in 
Jakarta in 1998 and its core activities are research, training and advocacy as well as disseminating 
information on philanthropy and strengthening civil society organisations in Indonesia. For more in­
formation on PIRAC, see <http://www.pirac.org>.
25 Abidin and Rukmini, 2004: 14.
26 Another example is the workshop “Remote Sensing and forest governance in Indonesia: Increasing 
transparency and accountability” in Bogor in June 2004. See
http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_files/events/remote_sensing.pdf [accessed on 15 October 
2008],
27 Interview with Douglas Ramage, 12 January 2007.
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them, they were civil society groups. But (what) we often call them -  
these so called NGOs, it’s just a bunch of guys sitting around, and 
smoking cigarettes, having a drink of coffee and thinking about (how)
Indonesia should be, good governance, (how) it should be improved.
They don’t have any sustainability. And also they are not representa­
tives of people. And lots of NGOs are like that.28
However, my observation suggests that even those international NGO workers who 
sound upbeat about local NGOs, often still make comments about the local NGOs’ 
lack of accountability. For example, a program development specialist admits:
The technical part of this job is that we have to engage in conversation 
with our local partners not over substantial issues but about a missing 
ticket, a fake address, and that sort of stuff. Often tensions arise from 
this -  from missing money or failed documentation.29
Meanwhile, a veteran international development consultant suggests:
Whatever it is, there’s a hundred and one ways for it [misuse of funds] 
to be done. Unfortunately, sometimes it is inevitable ... Many cases of 
these cases actually involved the plat merah [Red Plate] NGOs. Donors 
may say we want to support the kabupaten [district] government but we 
want you to tender it to NGOs. One solution is the government creates 
its own NGO. You get [an NGO headed by the] kepa/a BAPEDA [the 
head of the Regional Planning Agency] and istri kepala BAPEDA [the 
wife of the head of the Regional Planning Agency] and that type of 
thing happening. I am sometimes encouraged by the developments at 
the provincial level but sometimes discouraged. It’s never a straight 
story; it’s never a black or white in terms of the development and pro­
gress of the civil society organisations in Indonesia.30
This situation indicates there is a widespread assumption among international NGOs 
that local NGOs flout or are incapable of following the international NGOs’ ac­
countability system.
The majority of international NGO workers I interviewed would give me, on aver­
age, at least one illustration of a case of financial irregularity with local NGOs that 
they have worked with. For instance, Daniel (a pseudonym), an international pro­
gram consultant in governance reform says:
Things [misuse of NGO funding] happen and there’s much more things 
[that are] happening than what I know of. To be very frank, we know 
that a lot of their documentations [i.e. receipts submitted by NGOs as 
part of their reporting to international NGOs] is fake: [from] vendors, 
you know this is Indonesia, [for example, reporting] 20,000 photocop­
ies, so we have to be satisfied with that. But there are all sorts of ways 
to siphon money even from an in-kind project because we can’t take 
care of all the photocopying that’s been done and often we also say you
"x Interview with Thomas (pseudonym), 14 September 2005.
29 Interview with Daniel, 27 September 2005.
30 Interview with Jonathan (pseudonym), 22 September 2005.
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know, hey, we can’t send somebody so you do it on the ground. Hotels 
-  prices are marked up. So there’s a lot happening and frankly I don’t 
want to know what’s happening. Or salaries: where a salary has been 
paid, but the organisation [then takes a] cut.
This kind of view suggests that international NGO people tend to turn a blind eye to 
what goes on.
As the discussion in chapter four indicates, corruption is pervasive among local 
NGOs. Richard Holloway, also a long-time international development sector practi­
tioner in Indonesia, has written extensively on the issue of corruption. In one of his 
papers on civil society and corruption in Indonesia, Holloway discussed two issues. 
Firstly, he looked at the Indonesian NGOs working in the anti-corruption area and 
secondly, the corruption practices in Indonesian NGOs. He provided a long list of 
common practices of corruption:
false invoicing from hotels for the cost of meetings, false invoicing from 
the NGO for activities that they have not carried out (maybe because they 
have chosen to do other activities with the money that seem more import­
ant to them), shuffling of funds between budget heads supported by false 
receipts, writing of false reports documenting non-existent activities to 
keep the funds flowing, taking of funds from two sources for the same ac­
tivity, and taking funds for one activity and using them for another activity 
(particularly to bridge periods where funding has not come on stream) . 31
Holloway’s paper takes the form of a briefing or policy recommendation paper for 
international donors and is thus revealing of the way in which international actors 
view the Indonesian NGO sector. It is understandable that those in the Indonesian 
NGO community want to create a standard for Indonesian NGOs given the explosive 
growth in the number of domestic NGOs in the post-reformasi era, when many of 
these organisations were only performing what some scholars called ‘cheque-book
' X ' )activism.’ However, as the earlier discussion in chapter four suggests, many of 
these things can be seen as a form of resistance by local NGOs.
At the national level, Indonesian NGOs’ quest for better accountability mechanisms, 
as Antlov et al. have noted, has resulted in at least five initiatives. The initiatives 
range from the formulation of an NGO code of ethics and the establishment of an 
Indonesian NGO certification program, to attempt to legislate changes in the organi­
sational form of Indonesian NGOs from closed foundations into “broad based 
membership organisations” in order to “obtain better social legitimacy.” These ef-
Holloway, 2001: 11. 
j2 Nugroho and Tampubolon, 2007.
33 Antlov et al., 2006: 157-161. See also Kelompok Kerja Akuntabilitas OMS, 2004.
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forts, which are mainly initiatives of prominent NGOs, in part respond to pressures 
from international funding agencies.
Apart from acknowledging the accountability problem, international NGO workers 
also point out that they find it difficult to broach the issue of accountability with 
local NGOs. As an illustration, an international development worker explains “the 
dilemma for donors”:
On the one hand you would want to empower local NGOs and not try to 
tell them what to do. But if you send out those signals [of] “I don’t want 
to tell you what to do but you tell me what your plan is and we support 
you” they smell, that and then you get an outrageous proposal of bil­
lions of rupiahs. They hire twenty people for a job that can be done by 
two, and then you have to come in and you have to be the bu/e 
[“whitey”] [and say to them], “We can’t do this, why are you doing 
this?” But then you have their reaction sometimes: “You guys, you 
come from abroad and you don’t really understand the Indonesian con­
text -  you really should empower us and not be so authoritarian,” and 
so on and so on. That’s the balance.......There’s no compromise be­
tween these two. I always feel [that I am] balancing these two. If I get 
too liberal to the partners I get these hilarious proposals but if I’m too 
authoritarian then they complain about foreign interference so it’s al­
ways back and forth between these two extremes. There’s never the 
middle ground. Once the balance tips to one direction, you should al­
ways get problems.34
According to an international program consultant who has been a long-time resident 
of Indonesia, local NGOs become defensive when it comes to accountability because 
many of them assume that any impositions on the local NGO are heavy-handed in­
terference. This source, Daniel, recalls a “horrendous” and prominent Indonesian 
NGO leader as:
The one who runs into town telling everybody that all the donors are 
neo-colonial bastards and all that sort of thing, when you just tried to 
explain to that person that we have standards as well. We have to be ac­
countable to [the name of a bilateral funding organisation who funds his 
organisation] and they have to be accountable to [their citizens’ repre­
sentative] who release the money so we need to put this on paper. We 
need to know -  sorry -  where did the money go? [the name of the per­
son] is notorious.
In addition to shedding light on the perspective of the international NGOs, this illus­
tration also indicates the dynamic nature of the relationship between international 
and local NGOs concerning the issue of accountability.
In recalling the discussion of the NGO funding mechanism in chapter four, local 
NGOs try to avoid accountability, presumably partly because they are tying to cream
'4 Interview with Daniel, 27 September 2005.
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off funding to provide stable incomes for their organisations. On the other hand, as 
the preceding discussion in this chapter suggests, international NGOs’ motive is to 
ensure that local NGOs are efficient and honest, as they see it. The international 
NGOs fear that if there were no accountability regime, they would be exploited. 
These are both legitimate concerns.
The example also shows that international NGOs are aware that the accountability 
agenda causes opposition from the local NGO community and makes them feel 
dominated or subordinated. At least some officials from international NGOs feel un­
comfortable about this but they do not feel they can change. This is partly because 
they view accountability standards as not only making the local NGOs work for their 
money, so to speak, but mainly because the international NGOs themselves also have 
to be accountable to their donors.
The system of hegemony of international NGOs then is a personless machine: the 
international NGOs are responsible for perpetuating the system of hegemony but 
they themselves are not in total control of it. Furthermore, the above example intro­
duces the multiple layers of actors and agendas involved in the relationship between 
international and local NGOs, an issue we turn to now.
Accountability to Whom? Serving Multiple Agendas
As the above illustration demonstrates, the accountability relationship between inter­
national and local NGOs involves many stakeholders. Besides the local and interna­
tional NGOs themselves, we can also see an important role is played by the donors 
of the international NGOs, and if the donor is a bilateral funding agency, the gov­
ernment of the country concerned as well. In addition, we also have target benefi­
ciaries of the local NGOs (the recipients on the ground) and the local government 
and the wider community where the local NGOs work. In illustrating this complex 
web of interests, Brown and Moore argue that:
An international NGO may be accountable to donors for the proper 
handling of donated resources; to clients and beneficiaries for the deliv­
ery of high-quality, responsive services; to staff for continued support 
of the mission that drew them to the organization; or to partners and al­
lies for living up to commitments for action made in the course of de­
veloping and executing a joint project.'1'''
Edwards and Hulme elaborate on these “multiple accountabilities” by placing ac­
countability in two broad types namely “downward” accountability to NGOs’ “part-
35 Brown and Moore, 2001: 571.
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ners, beneficiaries, staff and supporters” and “upward... to their trustees, donors, and
t /:
host governments.” An immediate question emerging out of this debate is which 
form of accountability should come first -  the “upward” or the “downward” ac­
countability.
Ideally, according to NGO rhetoric, an NGO should be accountable to all of its 
stakeholders: the donor, program beneficiaries, partner organisations and gov­
ernment. As some observers note, NGOs’ donors demand NGOs be accountable for 
the “integrity, efficiency, and impacts of programs that they have funded”; at the 
same time, beneficiaries put pressure on NGOs to “live up to their rhetoric about fos­
tering locally determined development rather than imposing their own priorities;” 
and NGO partners, such as other NGOs and government agencies, “expect the NGOs 
to live up to promises they made in forging their partnerships.”
Yet these different expectations are likely to be in conflict. One frequent example is 
when a local NGO expects to engage in a long-term partnership with an international 
NGO while the international NGO is only able to make a short-term commitment. 
This project-based paradigm is in contradiction with the fashionable rhetoric on 
NGO accountability. In the words of Edwards and Hulme:
O f course, equal accountability to all at all times is an impossibility.
M any of the concerns expressed about the weak accountability o f NGOs 
relate to the difficulties they face in prioritizing and reconciling these 
multiple accountabilities.38
In the case “when the expectations and claims of the different stakeholders are not 
aligned”, as suggested by Brown and Moore, an NGO “must decide which of the 
claims should be honoured” and the problem is that “it is not clear which of the 
stakeholders should be so honoured.” 39 Although these two writers were referring to 
an international NGO when discussing this particular issue, I find it totally appropri­
ate to apply their discussion to local NGOs in Indonesia because local NGOs deal 
with this very same problem. In the end, an NGO has to decide and in many cases, 
NGOs prioritise the more powerful stakeholder, which as the above illustrations sug­
gest, is almost always their donor. The result is that ultimately what exists in many 
cases is, at least on paper, the one-way, upward model of accountability, from the
36 Edwards and Hulme, 1996: 8.
37 Brown and Moore, 2001: 570.
38 Edwards and Hulme, 1996: 9. 
34 Brown and Moore, 2001: 73.
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NGO to its donor (but with that decision to prioritise the donor’s expectations, there 
is plenty of space for small-scale and hidden acts of resistance).
My field research on Indonesian NGOs mostly confirms local NGOs are accountable 
in an upward direction. For example, a researcher from a multilateral funding organi­
sation in Indonesia shared his research result which indicated that most NGOs only 
give their report to their donors and not to their other stakeholders.40 However he 
added that the reason for this was, “Because basically these NGO activists make a 
living out of their projects.” 41
Furthermore, in the context of international development projects, Ginting compares 
the patterns of funding with the flow of accountability. Both patterns go in one direc­
tion, with funds flowing from international donors to local NGOs, then to the com­
munity; at the behest of the international NGOs, accountability flows from the local 
NGOs upward to donors.42 Rizal Malik, a country representative of an international 
NGO in Indonesia offers a similar view to Ginting but notes that local NGOs do not 
offer an alternative for dealing with upward accountability:
As most relationships between the Northern and Southern NGOs con­
tain the element of funding cooperation, there will always be big ques­
tions about to whom they [local NGOs] are accountable: is it to donors 
who give them the money or to their beneficiaries i.e. those who these 
NGOs base their funding requests for? The Northern NGOs who re­
ceive financial aid from [their] governments usually pass on the burden 
of financial reporting to their Southern partners. This situation usually 
overloads the burden of the Southern NGOs. On the other hand, the 
Southern NGOs themselves are often unable to provide the alternative 
for acceptable [forms of] accountability. Is there another option? Say 
for example, a relationship without a funding element and solely based 
on similar values and ideas? The majority of Northern and Southern 
NGOs still can not accept these options because they are deeply gripped 
by the aid industry. We can even say that NGOs are the products of this 
aid industry.43
Although funding dependency is a natural by-product of the nature of a development 
sector in which aid mostly travels from the West to the developing world, my field­
work suggests that the entrapment of local NGOs in this one-way accountability 
model also derives from the fact that many local NGOs lack constituencies of their 
own. This observation is particularly true in the case of advocacy NGOs which, un­
like development NGOs, do not usually engage in community-based activities. Be-
40 Although one could argue that you do not need reports to be accountable, having a report at least 
suggests the intention of local NGOs being accountable to the public.
41 Interview with Luthfi Ashari, 31 August 2005. For his research result, see Ashari, 2004.
42 Ginting, 2004: 188.
43 Smeru, 2000: 42.
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cause this type of NGO speaks for a cause or movement, many of them do not have 
geographically bounded constituents. A director of a Yogyakarta-based advocacy 
NGO, for example, recalls that “we just realised that our grassroots links in Yogya- 
karta were very limited when the [Yogyakarta] earthquake hit us.” 44
In addition, it is significant that the organisational form of many local NGOs comes, 
as mentioned in chapter five, in the form of a foundation with the highest decision 
makers the foundation’s executive board. This organisational model specific to 
Indonesia has strengthened the upward accountability in the relationships of Indo­
nesian NGOs with international NGOs. As Edwards and Hulme suggest, “Legally, 
most NGOs, as non membership organisations, are accountable to their trustees, who 
often exercise only a light hand in governance. NGOs cannot be formally account­
able to their beneficiaries, however much they want to be.” 45
The issue of NGOs lacking constituents also raises questions of legitimacy and rep­
resentation, or, to put it simply, there is the question of “who does the NGO repre­
sent? ” 46 Peruzzotti notes that this is a common question asked by “elected authori­
ties, corporations or bureaucrats when confronting challenges by specific social ac­
tors.” 47 In the context of Indonesia, an international development consultant for a 
donor agency provides an example of what he perceives as the resistance of some 
Indonesian government officials towards NGOs:
They ask [donors]: who are these NGOs accountable to? We are at least 
elected. Donors pay attention to that so when things go wrong with 
NGOs, donors move away from them and focus on local governance in­
stead. Part of this is not [the] NGO’s fault but it is partly because of the 
government’s resistance. This might be solved in what I would call a ma­
turing process of civil society here that involves constituency building, 
developing real constituents in Indonesia, building accountability -  not 
only in funding, but in terms of public accountability.48
These observations suggest the vulnerability of local NGOs, particularly the critical 
ones, in answering the question of representation and legitimacy posed by gov­
ernment officials. Although we can see some government officials’ questioning of 
local NGOs’ status as just their way to divert attention back to local NGOs who are 
often critical towards the government, nevertheless these sorts of questions indicate 
the local NGO’s weak position.
44 Interview with Tarik (pseudonym), 13 November 2006.
4:1 Edwards and Hulme, 1996: 8.
46 Peruzzotti, 2006: 49.
47 Ibid.
48 Interview with Paul McCarthy, 22 September 2005.
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NGOs Accountability Mechanisms
Various attempts have been made to address the issue of accountability within civil 
society. For example, at the international level, a range of reports and initiatives have 
come out recommending NGOs establish more structured and rigorous reporting sys­
tems by donors and international NGOs and the creation of the International NGO 
Accountability Charter.49
However, even where there are accountability mechanisms, other observers warned 
that “it is unrealistic to expect an organisation to use the same type of mechanisms at 
all times and to be equally accountable to all stakeholder groups; this would lead to 
paralysis.” 50 One clear solution for this is to offer different kinds of accountability 
mechanisms for different types of NGOs. Brown and Moore provide a useful chart to 
identify accountability to stakeholders for different kinds of NGOs. They classify 
NGOs into three categories: service delivery NGOs, capacity-building NGOs and 
policy and institutional NGOs. The stakeholders of each category are then identified 
using three stakeholder categories. In the first category are the “value creation” 
stakeholders, then “support and authorization” stakeholders and lastly, “operational 
capacity” stakeholders/ 1 The chart is actually made for international NGOs, but as I 
mentioned above, I find it useful to adopt their arguments for local NGOs as well. 
However, Brown and Moore, although acknowledging the constraints for each type 
of organisation in being accountable to their stakeholders, only stop at ‘identifica­
tion’. They do not really go further and provide a real solution to how to measure 
accountability and the concrete steps to achieve accountability.
As I have discussed at length in chapter four, the basic accountability mechanism 
used by international NGOs in Indonesia is through their reporting system, which 
consists of two components: financial and program reporting, with a varied spectrum 
of rigidity and instruments. Some international NGOs, as several illustrations in 
chapter four suggest, have rather detailed and rigid mechanisms which starts before 
local NGOs can even enter a relationship with the international NGO, while other 
international NGOs have a simpler two-page reporting system. “ Yet my observation
49 For example, see the Global Accountability Project with its annual Global Accountability Report 
<http://www.oneworldtrust.org>, the International NGOs Accountability Charter 
<http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org>, and publications by the United Nations-Non Govern­
mental Liaison Services <http://www.un-ngls.org>.
50 Blagescu and Lloyd, 2006: 13.
51 Brown and Moore, 2001: 579.
52 See chapter four for more discussion of reporting mechanisms.
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of various international NGOs reporting requirements leads me to conclude that 
international NGOs usually are more rigid in the financial aspects of their reporting 
requirements rather than in the program aspects of their reporting requirements.
Different international NGOs evidently have developed different reporting styles and 
frequencies. However, a typical reporting period for an annual program has at least a 
mid-year report and an end-of year report/ In terms of content and style of a pro­
gram reporting, most international NGOs usually ask for a narrative report describ­
ing program activities, achievements and constraints, which is sometimes accompa­
nied with a tool called a LogFrame.54
One key point that emerged from the discussion concerning international NGOs’ re­
porting mechanisms in chapter four is that their reporting system is usually deter­
mined by the international NGOs’ donors. As an illustration, an international devel­
opment NGO program officer who works with local NGOs recalls:
When we introduce a new reporting system to our local partners, I re­
ceived complaints from them. One organisation even told me directly 
that our organisation is penjajah [a coloniser]. I was a bit insulted and 
shocked by that. However I told them that although I consider them my 
equal, in certain matters, particularly when it comes to funding-related 
issues, I have to position myself as your superior in the way my donor 
[organisation] treats me.55
Although one can perhaps sympathise with this individual’s feeling of discomfort, 
her statement does also clearly illustrate the existence of the upward accountability 
in the relationship between international and local NGOs.
My observations of international NGOs’ reporting systems also suggest that their 
systems largely depend on the requirements of their donors. A clear example of this, 
as has been shown by my discussion in chapter four, is that the reporting period im­
posed by an international NGO to their local counterparts generally follows the in­
ternational NGOs’ own donor’s reporting period. A seasoned local advocacy NGO 
director shared his experience: “We have been working with this particular interna­
tional NGO for about a decade. Thus we have become pretty familiar with its report-
53 Some international NGOs also require a quarterly report.
>4 LogFrame or Logical Framework is a USAID-pioneered tool which is widely used and modified by 
bilateral agencies in planning, monitoring and evaluating projects. It basically consists of a four by 
four matrix. The four rows contain overall objectives, project purposes, expected results, and activi­
ties; the four columns contain intervention logic, verifiable indicator of achievements, sources and 
means of verifications, and assumptions. For the example of LogFrame, see 
<http://www.jiscinfonet.ac.uk/InfoKits/project-management/InfoKits/infokit-related-files/logical- 
framework-information>.
55 Interview with Sinta (pseudonym), 5 August 2005.
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ing system.” Throughout the decade, the director claimed no significant reporting 
problem occurred. However, recently the international NGO changed its reporting 
system rather drastically:
We had to adjust ourselves with this new and more complicated report­
ing requirement that even the international NGO’s program officer him­
self is having a hard time understanding; he complained to me about the 
headache he got because of this new system. '’6
Apparently, what happened was that this international NGO recently changed its 
donor for this particular program. The new donor has a stricter reporting system.
Some donor reporting systems which are designed to enhance accountability argu­
ably seem to ignore the local context. Several local NGO workers mentioned the dif­
ficulties they encountered in following their donor reporting guidelines when trying 
to reconcile their receipts with their expenses. For example, a common complaint is 
that not every service provider, particularly in remote areas in Indonesia, is equipped 
with a proper receipt book and stamped tax invoices: “Can you imagine if you are in 
the field at some remote village and asked for a receipt from the people there who 
feed you?” or “do you think an ojek-driver (motorcycle taxi driver) or a boatman 
would be able to give you a stamped receipt every time you use their services?” 
One can question whether international NGOs really ask for such details. As the fol­
lowing discussion will show, local NGOs’ expenses in question are often settled 
amicably. Nevertheless, as I have discussed in chapter four, most international NGOs 
do require rigid book keeping and administrative arrangements from their local 
counterparts.
Some NGO workers even add that rigid reporting systems actually “encourage us to 
engage in unconstructive practices such as creating fake receipts” in order to meet
C O
the reporting requirements. “Wouldn’t this create a backlash to the very concept of 
accountability and transparency promoted by the international donors?” added an­
other senior local NGO worker.69 In recalling chapter four’s discussion, in the end 
local NGOs find ways of abusing international donors’ rigid reporting systems.
Another way to look at the above problem is to see it as reflecting different attitudes 
to the issue of accountability: internationals see the issue as one of evidence based
Interview with Ali (pseudonym), 26 August 2008.
’7 Interviews with Charles, 25 October 2005, Lesmana, 11 September 2008, Omar, 27 January 2007 
(all pseudonyms).
58 Interview with Kamal (pseudonym), 16 October 2006.
59 Interview with Omar (pseudonym), 27 January 2007.
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performance (“seeing is believing”) which would assist them in being accountable to 
their donors, while the locals see it as an issue of trust. Therefore, for local NGOs to 
have international NGOs constantly checking on them and demanding accountability 
for what locals perceived as trivial matters means a violation of trust.
Naturally these negative views are not held universally, as many Indonesian NGO 
workers do not find problems with the reporting system imposed by their interna­
tional counterparts. Local NGO staff often see the program and finance training of­
fered by donors as well as their cooperation with the international NGOs’ program 
and finance officers, as being relatively effective. Usually problems over receipts can 
be settled “peacefully” by the local NGO signing a statement acknowledging the oc­
currence of an expense in question.60
Indeed, many of the accountability agreements found in this research lacked sanc­
tions or enforcement mechanisms in instances where the local recipient NGO failed 
to comply with the accountability guidelines of its international counterpart.61 Thus 
the accountability arrangements were something of an “on-paper only” affair. But 
presumably the local NGOs would not be funded again if they violated them.
Some local NGO initiatives, like the Indonesian NGO certification program men­
tioned earlier, also caused strong resentment in the Indonesian NGO community. 
The scheme is “intended to improve NGO public accountability and management 
performance in order to strengthen partners’ trust in NGOs and to make NGOs capa- 
ble of serving their advocated groups well.” In 2005, the scheme task force’s ac­
tivities included establishing “solid instruments, procedures and certification stand­
ards,” creating “an NGO certification agency” and in the future, creating NGO certi-
Z T
fication with NGO accountability and transparency programs as its core.
The resentment particularly came from those NGO workers who had particularly 
strong pro-egalitarian views and therefore perceived such schemes as products of the 
Indonesian NGO elite.64 One person asks, “Who do they think they are to be in a 
position to accredit us -  can they be objective? What are the indicators used?”65 This
60 Interviews with Lesmana, 11 September 2008; Endang (pseudonym), 26 August 2008.
61 My observation in the field indicates it is very rare for an international NGO to bring the financial 
irregularity of its local partner to court. Instead, the common practice is for the international NGO to 
stop funding the local NGO and blacklist that organisation. An infonnant says that since the NGO 
community in Indonesia is a small community, once an international NGO blacklists an NGO, usually 
no international donor would want to work with that organisation. (Interview with Marcus Mietzner, 
27 September 2005). This social sanction has been proven to be effective.
62 Satunama Foundation, 2002, quoted in Antlov et al., 2006: 158.
63 Antlov et al„ 2006: 158.
64 For a critical view of the initiative, see Abdullah, 2002.
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sition to accredit us -  can they be objective? What are the indicators used? ” 65 This 
response itself offers a fascinating glimpse into the fractiousness of the local NGO 
sector, as introduced in chapter five. That the agenda of international NGOs was 
taken up by some local NGOs itself shows the hierarchy and rivalry between Indo­
nesian NGOs, and more importantly, it arguably shows how one part of the local 
NGO sector aligns itself with the interests and outlook of the donor community and, 
arguably, seeks to play the role of agents of the dominant international actors within 
the local NGO community. To the critics, the accountability initiatives benefit only a 
certain type of NGO: those who are willing to accommodate themselves with the cri­
teria and standards established by mainstream international NGOs but fail to ac­
knowledge the heterogenous nature of local NGOs.
An additional common criticism of international NGOs’ accountability mechanisms 
concerns their reporting systems. A local NGO worker questions the tendency for 
donors to ‘limit’ the pages of local NGOs’ reports: “I find it ridiculous that a one- 
year-program report must have a maximum limit of only twelve pages and the report 
must always include pictures which show, for example, banners with their name and 
logo.” 66 This type of resentment about international NGOs or international donors’ 
logos is actually very common among local NGOs. This local NGO worker said 
that when he asked his international counterpart why this was necessary, the answer 
was “you have to do this as part of your accountability.” This kind of answer was 
clearly unsatisfying to him as he continued suggesting that this method of reporting 
only benefited the donors. My conversation with various other local NGO workers 
during fieldwork confirms that this informant’s view of international NGOs’ pre­
ferred reporting style is common in the NGO sector.
Double Standards? Demanding Accountability from Donors
The reporting requirements for local NGOs might be detailed or simple but that in 
itself is not the main problem. The main problem for local NGOs is that they see that 
their donors expect them to be transparent, yet these donors themselves are not
65 Interview with Omar, 27 January 2007. As indicated earlier, the indicators were still being formu­
lated and it appears that this program is not running yet.
66 Interview with Arya (pseudonym), 11 November 2006.
67 However, since the recent development of anti-American sentiment in Indonesia, some American 
organisations have become more flexible towards local NGOs. Interviews with Yusuf, 30 January 
2007; Ali (pseudonym), 26 August 2008.
6X Interview with Arya, 11 November 2006.
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transparent to them. A former local NGO worker who is now working for an interna­
tional NGO suggests:
They [international NGOs] scream for anti-corruption [measures], they 
call for transparency, but they do not want to challenge their own struc­
ture, mechanisms and bureaucratic culture. If we demand change, (then) 
it should be reflected in ourselves [the international NGO sector]. This 
means that we ourselves need to change.69
This section will review the responses of local NGOs towards international NGOs’ 
demand for their accountability. In other words, this section discusses local NGOs’ 
demand for international NGOs’ transparency and accountability towards them -  
downward accountability -  particularly on the issues of funding mechanisms and 
procedures.
Unsurprisingly, the question of funding is at the centre of local NGOs’ concerns 
about “one-way accountability.” Local NGOs rarely know how much money is 
available for them or for work carried out in their sector. The usual procedure is for 
them to just make a request to their international counterparts, starting with an in­
formal request followed by a written one. The international NGO will then decide 
whether or not they have funding available. Local NGOs perceive this whole scen­
ario as being “highly secretive.” A local NGO worker says:
I do not know how much funds they have inside their pundi-pundi 
[purse]. They always conduct their meetings in hotel mewah [luxurious 
hotels], with a very lucrative amount of money for their per diem.
Where does their money come from? What do they use the money for?
They demand our report [it is therefore fair that] they should also tell us 
how much their budget allocation [for us] is. I think it is rather naive for 
them to behave like that and to claim that they are promoting clean gov-
70emance.
The above observation is rather extreme. As the discussion in chapter four suggested, 
some international NGOs do publicise their own budgets and some announce how 
much money is available for work in particular areas. However, my observation sug­
gests that international NGOs tend to disclose this kind of information rather 
broadly, i.e. this information is usually included in the general annual report pro­
duced by their headquarters, and if it is a detailed one, selectively to their donors and 
prospective donors rather than to local NGOs. The consequence of this lack of trans­
parency from the donor side is, according to this informant, that local NGOs face 
difficulties in dealing with questions and comments such as “I thought you had the
69 Interview with Adam (pseudonym), 19 October 2005.
70 Interview with Arya, 11 November 2006.
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money for this [request or activity]?” [ “Iho, Anda kan punya uang? ”] from their 
constituents at the local level. According to him, the constituents do not know that 
the local NGO has a very restricted ruang gerak [literally meaning “wiggle room” 
or, as put by Hilhorst, “room to manoeuvre” ] when it comes to financial matters 
because donors impose strict rules. On the use of their funds, there are stories of do­
nors who are even so ‘ferocious’ that they would demand an explanation over things 
such as “one rupiah spent for a parking fee.” 72
Some local NGO workers’ moral outrage regarding this one-way accountability can 
become very sharp. For example, a vocal NGO activist working in the field of ad­
vancing democracy admits that it has become a common secret among Indonesian 
NGOs that the percentage of project funds spent by international NGOs on their op­
erational costs including expenses for running an office, salaries and the like is actu­
ally higher than the percentage of funds that were spent for the actual projects. 
“Their [the expatriate donor staff] [monthly] salaries” he says, “could reach over one 
hundred million [rupiah].” ' He continued, “Therefore, if they talk about accounta­
bility, I think that’s nonsense.” 74 The resentment among the local NGO community 
runs very deep.
In response to my questions about their budget reports, some international NGO staff 
give answers that all but confirmed the local NGO workers’ frustration. As an exam­
ple, one international NGO staff expressed her view:
The situation is self-explanatory. We are [the] funding provider. [So] 
why do we have to provide a report to our recipient? They are the one 
who should be publishing their report. Why [should we] take-off [our] 
clothes in public? Do you see the United Nations [agencies] disclosing 
their program budget [for local NGOs] to the public?7>
According to this Geraldine, local NGO representatives frequently raise this question 
during NGO forum meetings and receive the same response. While not all persons I 
interviewed expressed the point so starkly, her view does represent a common opin­
ion in the international NGO world: accountability is not an affair for them, it is an 
affair for the local NGOs.
7’ See Hilhorst, 2003: 103-124.
72 Interview with Arya, 11 November 2006.
73 More than USS10,000.
74 Interview with John (pseudonym), 23 January 2007. The discourse about expatriate’s salaries in 
international aid sector is one of the “hot” issue that comes up frequently during my discussions with 
local NGO workers.
75 Phone conversation with Geraldine (pseudonym), September 2007.
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One obvious method of cross-checking the propositions of local NGO workers about 
the lack of transparency of international NGOs is to consult the annual reports of the 
internationals. In theory it should be relatively easy to check the claims that interna­
tional NGOs spend most of their project funds on their own operational expenses. 
But therein lies the problem. As the discussion in chapter four suggests, teasing out 
precisely how much money an international NGO allocates to a specific local NGO 
or its project requires clever detective work. Some organisations, like The Asia 
Foundation and Ford Foundation, have their annual reports produced internationally 
from their headquarters. This means that a specific country program budget, like 
Indonesia for example, only occupies a tiny part of the overall budget or even is 
incorporated into the organisation’s programs or regional categories, making country 
specific data impossible to find. The annual report is often descriptive and provides 
only an overall budget allocation per sector or program. Some international NGOs, 
like Save the Children UK (SC-UK) and World Vision Indonesia (WVI) do produce 
their own separate annual reports for Indonesia. However, just like the international 
versions, their country annual reports also only provide general information. For 
example, for the 2006-2007 annual report, both SC-UK and WVI provided a chart of 
funding allocation based on particular programs without providing information on 
funding allocation based on implementing partners such as local NGOs. In sum, the 
task of looking at international NGOs’ budget allocation is a difficult assignment, 
particularly for local NGOs.
In highlighting this issue, I should mention that it is not my intention to insinuate 
that by not revealing their budgets to local NGOs, international NGOs are “misus­
ing” their funds. I am aware of the rigid accounting system that exists within most 
international NGOs.771 am, however, merely trying to illustrate a one-way accounta­
bility tendency that exists in the relationship between international and local NGOs 
in Indonesia and to show how donors use the accountability discourse as means to 
insert their authority into the everyday life of Indonesian NGOs and to order their 
everyday practices. Yet at the same time the discussion of accountability has also
76 Save The Children in Indonesia, 2008; World Vision Indonesia, 2008. It should be noted that in its 
report, SC UK also provided a chart of funds distribution according to location.
7 An auditing system for an international NGO, as explained by several international NGO workers, 
usually consists of two types: external and internal. Internally, an international NGO usually conducts 
an audit once every three months. While the frequency of external audits depends on its donor’s re­
quirement. For example, an international NGO Human Resource Director said that although an exter­
nal audit at this informant’s organisation normally happens once a year, there was one case, with their 
tsunami program where their donor insisted on auditing them six times in a year. Interviews with Irma 
Sopamena, 6 September 2008; Galuh Savitri, 14 September 2005.
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revealed deep resentments that local NGOs have towards their international counter­
parts.
Thus far it appears that international NGOs are being deliberately evasive on the 
subject of their budgets. However, closer scrutiny reveals that one reason why inter­
national NGOs do not reveal their budgets to local NGOs is because they wish to 
deflect attention from their own role as financiers. For example, a country represen­
tative of a prominent international NGO says:
Money is important, but we believe there is more than that. If there is an 
NGO or government agency that we feel only seeks funding without a 
real partnership, it makes them less interesting. It sounds idealistic ... 
we want to make the world a better place .. [So] let’s start with the is­
sue. We will come to funding later. But if they come and ask us, “What 
do you give money for?” we will usually ask them “what does your or­
ganisation do? What is your concern? What do you worry about? And 
let’s see if we can come to some agreement.78
Similarly, an international development consultant explains:
When they [local NGOs] come and say, “I need the money so what do 
you want me to do?” I often say, “Don’t do that. You tell me what you 
want to do and then we talk about the funding.” I hate these phone calls 
when people call me up and ask: “What do you want to fund?” I say,
“That is the wrong question. What do you want to do?” Of course I can 
say, “You know, this is our area of interest,” but then they would really 
have changed [their proposals] so they would have to ask me that ques­
tion. My experience is .. those programs when they ask, “what do you 
want me to do” are just a proyek [project], you had better not touch it. 79
These illustrations suggest that one reason why international NGOs do not reveal 
their budgets is to avoid opening opportunities for local NGOs to abuse the funding. 
In other words, not publicising their budgets is their way of anticipating the project- 
seeker type of NGOs. This demonstrates that international NGOs are aware of the 
existence of local NGOs who are just interested in funding and not serious about 
working with international NGOs. Viewed in another light, this attitude suggests that 
the international NGOs still seek to monopolise relevant information and to maintain 
their exclusive power to judge what sort of activities and organisations deserve fund­
ing. The discussion thus reveals some perception gaps between international and lo­
cal NGOs concerning the accountability issue.
7!n Interview with Russell (pseudonym), 12 January 2007. 
79 Interview with Daniel, September 2005.
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The Accountability Issue: Summary and Conclusion
Four points can be identified as being most important from the preceding discussion 
on accountability issue. First is the emphasis that international NGOs put on finan­
cial accountability. This emphasis suggests, that international donors, as Edwards 
and Hulme put it, tend to favour “accountancy rather than accountability, audit rather 
than learning.” 80 On the other hand, financial accountability is not all there is to ac­
countability, it is just one aspect.81 Yet in relationships between international and 
local NGOs in Indonesia this aspect is perceived as being by far the most important. 
Because it is the internationals who above all promote this issue above all others, and 
in a way that suggests one-way accountability, one can conclude that the way ac­
countability is dealt with confirms the imbalance of power relations between interna­
tional and local NGOs.
The second point that can be drawn out of the preceding discussion concerns the 
question of what is the real power behind the international NGOs. If financial ac­
countability is a key indicator of power relations and if international NGOs are not 
accountable towards the local NGOs, then to whom or what are they accountable? 
Does this mean that the real power lies with those who provide funds to international 
NGOs? It is necessary to answer in the affirmative. Our discussion thus far indicates 
that although rhetorically, both local and international NGOs, are supposed to be ac­
countable to their many stakeholders, in reality they practice a one-way or an upward 
accountability, where they are more accountable towards their donors than towards 
their other stakeholders. The discussion of how international NGOs’ dependency on 
their own donors shapes their own strategy of accountability illustrates how hierar­
chical the system is. Thus the discussion confirms Hilhorsf s suggestion that “the 
accountability process itself is as vulnerable to power, hierarchy, conflicting interests 
and interpretations, and as much informed by culture, as the ‘real’ situation it aims to 
provide an account of.” 82
On the other hand, the discussion of accountability in this section also reveals a third 
point, namely that local NGOs deeply resent the accountability agenda of their inter­
national counterparts, which local NGOs see as patronising, interfering and even hy-
8(1 Edwards and Hulme, 2006: 13; See also Bendell, 2006: 17.
81 Other aspects of accountability include political and social accountability. For an informative dis­
cussion of alternative aspects of accountability in the development context, see Hilhorst, 2003: 125- 
145.
82 Hilhorst, 2003: 144.
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pocritical. This reality contradicts common NGO rhetoric about “partnerships” and 
about the ideal values that supposedly motivate their relationship.
The fourth point the discussion in this section raises is about the nature of domina­
tion and resistance in the relationships between international and local NGOs. Al­
though on the surface we can see the domination of international NGOs in stressing 
the importance of the accountability agenda and in determining accountability 
mechanisms in their relationship with local NGOs, the discussion suggests that local 
NGOs are sometimes extremely critical towards this international NGOs’ issue of 
concern. This situation indicates the lack of consent international NGOs possess 
which thus suggests that the domination of international NGOs towards their local 
counterparts is at least incomplete. I will come back to this point and elaborate in 
greater detail in the last section of this chapter.
The Question of Indonesian NGO “Capacity”
This section continues our discussion of the perspective of international NGOs about 
problems in their relationships with local NGOs by looking at another common 
source of complaint: local NGOs’ capacity, or rather their alleged lack of it.
Alongside the word “accountability”, “capacity” has become one of the popular 
catch phrases used in the NGO world over the last decade or so. Although the con­
cept could be traced as far back as the beginnings of development assistance, accord­
ing to Smillie, it re-emerged more forcefully alongside of the discourse about civil 
society in the aid sector in the 1990s. Workshops and training seminars with the 
theme of capacity-building now regularly fill the schedule of Indonesian NGO work­
ers. Many international NGOs, the United Nations agencies and international devel­
opment consulting firms incorporate capacity building in their programs and ser­
vices. The literature on capacity building in the international development literature 
is massive.
This section will first look at the reasons why Indonesian NGOs’ capacity (or per­
ceived lack thereof) has come onto the agenda of international NGOs. I then analyse 
the implications of this agenda and critically discuss issues that arise from interna­
tional NGOs’ complaints about capacity. Criticisms of local NGOs’ “capacity” can 
be seen -  arguably -  as subtle and patronising ways that international NGOs seek to 
dominate Indonesian NGOs. I argue that it was the international NGOs who defined
83 Smillie, 2001: 13.
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and put meaning to the word “capacity”, usually drawing on a “Western” under­
standing of how NGOs should “professionalise” and improve their proposal writing, 
reporting, and other skills. In other words, the international NGOs used the discourse 
of capacity not to acknowledge the diversity of ways and contexts in which capacity 
can be interpreted, but rather as a way of imposing their own vision of how an NGO 
should operate.
I conclude by pointing out that by raising the issue of capacity, international NGOs 
demonstrate their superior position in the unbalanced relationship between interna­
tional and local NGOs by constructing a discourse in which it appears that the inter­
national NGOs are the “enlightened bringers of knowledge”. At the same time, this 
discussion also reveals the critical, sometimes resentful attitude of local NGO work­
ers towards this agenda of international NGOs.
As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, I am aware that the discussion of ac­
countability and capacity contains some overlapping elements. I try to minimise the 
overlap by considering the issue of capacity mostly as an administrative issue. This 
way of viewing capacity is more in line with the way international NGOs perceive 
capacity.
It should also be noted that it is not my intention to show that local NGOs are being 
patronised by the international NGOs into thinking they need capacity building. I am 
aware that many local NGOs have problems with the quality of their human re­
sources and that they often want training.
But the point with the capacity building discourse is that it is constructed by the 
international NGOs to remake the Indonesian development sector in their own 
image. Regardless of the benefits it may or may not bring, it is still the image of the 
international NGOs. In this sense, the process taking place here resembles a classic 
process of hegemony construction in which subordinate groups appear to take on and 
support the values espoused by the dominant group. When they buy into this ca-
84pacity building agenda, the local NGOs are buying into hegemony.
s4 However, as will be seen later, this research argues that the hegemony of international NGOs is not 
complete.
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What Do International NGOs Mean by “Capacity” and Why Has It Become a 
Problem?
As with the issue of accountability, many international NGO workers complain a lot 
about local NGOs’ “lack of capacity”. This issue is perhaps more an issue for the 
officers who deal directly with their local counterparts rather than a concern of the 
country director of an international NGO.
To start the discussion in this section, I will first provide a glimpse of what interna­
tional NGO workers mean by “capacity,” based on my interviews with many of 
them. In these interviews a common pattern emerged from the international NGO 
workers when asked about the challenges they encounter in working with local 
NGOs: workers in international NGOs have strong impressions that their counter­
parts in local NGOs lack organisational and administrative skills. For example, a 
veteran international NGO worker complains:
It is hard to find a local NGO to work with. They have limited capacity, 
in this case human resources. There are no capable staff. Those with ca­
pacity ran to work for more promising NGOs: the international NGOs.
It is rare to find somebody who wants to work and be stationed in a re­
mote area.85
When being asked about the tantangan [challenges] of working with local NGOs, 
another funding organisation director immediately responds, “Kapasitas rendah 
[(they have) low level of capacity].” He continues by making a list:
They have a low sumber day a [human resources], including low ability 
to read and write, they do not have strategic planning capacity, [they] 
lack internal management, and they are not used to the concept of ac­
countability and transparency.86
A staff member of another international NGO adds:
Local NGOs lack coherent strategic planning ... they do not know how 
the international organisation works ...[they have no knowledge of]... 
program content, which includes program design, monitoring, manage­
ment and, in terms of finance, accountability and institutional adminis­
tration.87
The above views reflect the complaints of many international NGO staff towards the 
administrative competence of local NGOs.
One way to interpret the views of such international NGO staff members is that they 
give us an accurate picture of the lack of organisation and managerial skills among
8:1 Interview with Gunawan (pseudonym), 1 February 2007.
86 Interview with Erlambang (pseudonym), 18 October 2005.
87 Interview with Kevin (pseudonym), 18 October 2005.
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local NGOs. By recalling the discussion in chapter five about internal management 
conditions in local NGOs, conditions that are characterised by strong personalism 
and unclear decision-making structures, we can see there is some truth to the propo­
sition. On the other hand, this prevalent view of international NGO staff also hints at 
the desire of international NGOs to impose their own management and programming 
standards and practices on domestic, Indonesian NGOs. In other words, this interpre­
tation reveals the imbalanced nature of the relationship between international and 
local NGOs. The following example eloquently illustrates this point for us.
In early 2003, an international development NGO in Jakarta announced that it had 
grants available and invited submissions from local NGOs in the form of concept 
papers. One of the submitted concept papers came from a small yayasan [founda­
tion] that I will call Yayasan A in a town in Central Java. The yayasan was founded 
and led by a middle-aged female doctor and it had been running a small community 
clinic and health program for children in the heavily populated slum area of the town 
for a number of years. This local NGOs’ work of running a community clinic ex­
posed it to a large number of malnourished babies. Therefore, the local NGO pro­
posed to participate in a supplementary feeding program for malnourished babies 
combined with nutrition classes and a micro-credit scheme that it would provide for
their mothers (as the yayasan discovered that apart from being poor, the mainour-
88ished babies’ parents did not have adequate knowledge of nutrition).
The international NGO accepted Yayasan A ’s program idea and invited the local 
NGO to the next selection round. The next round required a full proposal submission 
using the international NGO’s proposal guideline and a field visit by the interna­
tional NGO to the local NGO. However, during the selection meeting, the yayasan 
was very close to being rejected. Most of the international NGO program division 
members who attended the meeting considered that this local NGO’s proposal did 
not meet the international NGO’s high proposal writing standards which required, 
among other criteria, a comprehensive background, explicit program objective, pro­
gram goals, program activities, budget and budget narrative, logical framework and 
program schedule.
ss It should be noted that I do not wish to engage in the discussion of program effectiveness here. One 
could argue this approach is a typical local NGOs’ method of conducting their program by assuming a 
more powerful role (e.g. as the outsiders, teachers or trainers) than their target group thus revealing 
the existence of an unequal relationship between the NGO and their beneficiaries (see for example, 
Ford, 2003; 260-268; Hadiwinata, 2003: 108). But it is not the intention of this dissertation to explore 
this set of relationships.
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The local NGOs’ proposal was approved only because the program officer who con­
ducted the field visit and met the people at this yayasan fought on behalf of it. She 
was heavily criticised by her colleagues for her decision. However, the program offi­
cer realised that the senior director and her staff -  who were mostly in their late 50s 
or older -  were not very computer literate. According to the program officer:
They still do their bookkeeping by writing in a big notebook instead of 
the MYOB software promoted by most international donors. Do they 
have to be “punished” because of that? They have a very clear idea of 
what they are going to do and they already have the experience of work­
ing with the community. It’s just they are not used to working with the 
international NGOs’ system.89
In the end, this program officer had to sit down with the local NGO staff and spend 
hours revising their proposal together. She said:
I didn’t mind doing that. But many times international program officers 
can be very rigid and do not want to tambah kerjaan [add to their work­
load]. They prefer to accept a well-written proposal, even though it is 
written by a bunch of university-graduates who do not have any contact 
with their proposed beneficiaries.90
She then mentions an alternative experience of sitting down in a community hall dur­
ing a field visit to assess a local NGO and their well-written proposed program, only 
to find out that the community in that village, which supposedly were the target 
beneficiaries, did not even know the name of that local NGO bidding for the grant, 
let alone the local NGO’s staff.
The previous example points to the tendency of international NGOs to insist on ap­
plying their own standards in their relationships with local counterparts, standards 
which may not necessarily account for realities on the ground. Sometimes a mis­
match happens because of the local NGO’s limited human resource skills, but at 
other times it is because the local NGOs do not see -  or agree with -  “the import­
ance” of the administrative measures demanded of them. As noted by a senior inter-
89 Interview with Sarah (pseudonym), 18 December 2006. MYOB [Mind Your Own Business] is a 
popular accounting software.
90 Ibid. An international NGO program officer’s workload often includes report writings, meetings 
and field-visits. For many officers, traveling is a main feature of their work. In a month, they can 
spend at least two weeks away in the field to visit local partners. This creates a widespread perception 
in the development sector that the job of an international NGO staff member is comparable to that of a 
flight attendant. For both of them travel is the main feature of their career. Even this travel practice 
can be a source of tension. It is widely known that most international NGO program officers are Ga- 
ruda Frequent Flyer members. Many international agencies require their staff to travel with the high- 
standard Indonesian national air carrier only. Although the requirement derives from safety concerns 
over the other Indonesian commercial airlines (as most of them are budget carriers), it adds to the 
jealousy felt by many local NGO staff, for those who work with the internationals.
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national NGO practitioner in Indonesia: “Sometimes donors make very specific bu­
reaucratic requirements for project reporting or administration which the NGO finds 
either irrelevant, or overly burdensome or plain unnecessary.” For instance, he sug­
gests, one could look at “the volumes of regulations that USAID demands NGOs to 
be familiar with, and to comply with.” 91
One explanation for the creation of these exacting standards of report writing is that 
they benefit international NGOs, because they make their reporting procedures to 
their donors easier. As a country director of an international NGO points out: “The 
Northern NGOs who receive funding from [their] government usually pass on the 
burden of financial reporting to their Southern partners. This situation often gives 
Southern NGOs an overloaded burden.”9“ The discussion in the previous section of 
accountability, about how a local NGO has to change its reporting format to match 
that of its long-time international counterpart, supports the argument. The interna­
tional NGO apparently just switched to a different donor with a different reporting 
style than the international NGO’s previous donor.
In other words, international NGOs tend to mimic the reporting style of their own 
donors, transmitting the directives and practices they are subjected to from above 
down the chain to their own recipients. When they receive an inadequate proposal or 
report from local NGOs, international NGOs have to struggle to “adjust” the local 
NGOs’ reports to the international NGOs’ standard. This may require the interna­
tional NGO program officer concerned to talk to his or her local counterpart, visit 
their office and sit down and work on the particular proposal or report of concern. 
However, this outcome can greatly add to the international NGO’s staff workload 
and expenses. Moreover, just as some international NGOs do not reveal their budgets 
to local NGOs to avoid opening opportunities for abuse, as I discussed above, in re­
vising poorly written reports or proposals from local NGOs, international NGOs 
could also open opportunities for abuse.
Nevertheless, the bigger point to make here is that the relationship between interna­
tional and local NGOs is unequal, with international NGOs largely defining the 
terms of the relationship. For international NGOs, what is meant by “capacity” is 
that the recipients of their grants have the ability to be legible or “user friendly” for
91 Holloway, 2001: 16. Available from: <http://www.10iacc.org/download/workshops/cs30a.pdf> 
[accessed on 7 November 20081. USAID is one of the major donors for both international and local 
NGOs.
92 Smeru, 2000: 42.
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them. Such capacity is not necessarily the most important criteria for success in the 
field that local NGOs prioritise: “capacity” for the local NGOs to meet its beneficiar­
ies’ needs. In all my discussions with international NGO staff I rarely heard them 
complain about the “capacity” of local NGOs to be user friendly for the beneficiar­
ies.
Training and Capacity Building
One of the typical ways international NGOs attempt to improve the “capacity” of 
local NGOs, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, is through “capacity 
building” programs and support. Eade notes that the term “capacity building,” along 
with “empowerment”, “participation” and “gender equity,” is seen in the interna­
tional development sector as “an essential element if development is to be sustain- 
able and centred in people.” As an illustration, a survey among western interna­
tional NGOs reveals that nine out of ten respondents describe the core activity of 
what they do in the South as “capacity building” .94 One bilateral funding agency 
staff member explains that capacity building training and workshops are typically a 
basic component of any grant program for local NGOs in Indonesia: “First there is 
the initial program introductory workshop then there is also an on-going workshop,
• • «95on-going training, etc.
Capacity building training typically involves standard themes, such as program im­
provement or financial management. It can also include specific activities, such as 
health or agriculture, or specific technical issues such as using the internet as an ad­
vocacy tool. However, criticisms of the concept and the way development agencies 
employ ‘capacity training’ have been around for many years. For example, Moore 
questions the broad interpretation of the concept:
What is “capacity building”? That is the problem. It includes everything 
that was covered by the different definitions of “institutional building” 
and much more besides .... Aid agencies would be wise to have no 
truck with the new jargon of “capacity building” and to insist on using 
language and terms that have identifiable and precise meanings.96
Meanwhile, Oxenham and Chambers criticise the basic idea behind capacity build­
ing, which they perceive as an effort to impose changes on local NGOs and commu­
nities by outsiders:
93 Eade, 1997: 1.
94 James, 1994, quoted in Eade, 1997: 2.
95 Interview with Henri Pirade, 6 January 2007.
96 Moore, 1995, quoted in Eade, 1997: 1.
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By providing specialist people-services, it necessarily implies that they 
have the expertise which the people lack and must transmit it [the ex­
pertise] to the people. So the people ‘to be developed’ start out on an 
unequal footing ... the fairly strong human bias towards authoritarian­
ism is legitimised and reinforced through the explicit authority of pro­
fessional expertise.97
My observations in the field show that local NGO workers have similarly critical 
views of capacity building training in the international development sector. For ex­
ample, there is a common view among Indonesian NGO workers that training pro­
grams and workshops do not produce anything but jago training [training cham­
pions] or ahli workshop [workshop experts]. These are commonly used labels for 
those individuals who spend most of their time attending workshops or seminars. A 
local NGO worker comments how donors themselves do not have a “standard” in
n o
conducting capacity building training. By standard he means a thoroughly thought­
ful concept and training materials which suits the needs of local NGOs. Another in­
ternational NGO worker blames international NGOs’ lack of preparation and their 
tendency to rely on superficial activities:
The main problem is that actually there are many training courses on of­
fer, but they are applied without proper consideration beforehand. 
[Consequently] what happens is that we waste money, hard work and 
energy. [We] hire expensive facilitators, and also hire expensive train­
ing venues and accommodation but without any significant result... The 
only outputs or indicators or means of verification are certificates and 
participants’ attendance record.99
In short, even when a training program is well-intentioned, in the end NGO workers 
often perceive that it fails to achieve its expected result and merely becomes part of a 
program’s bureaucratic machine or mechanism. They often see training as not effec­
tive because the topics are sometimes irrelevant, and there are often no follow up 
activities, and frequent training does not guarantee successful implementation in the 
field. However, in recording these views I also observed that local NGO workers of­
ten complained about the ineffectiveness of donors’ training programs, without of­
fering alternative solutions or preferred topics or methods of training.
Of course it would be inaccurate to conclude that all local NGO staff harbour re­
sentment towards the motives behind capacity training. Occasionally, I have also
97 Oxenham and Chambers, 1978, quoted in Lecomte, 1986: 45. 
w Interview with Rahman (pseudonym), 18 September 2006.
99 Interview with Seth (pseudonym), 6 January 2007. International NGOs are known for conducting 
training and workshops at upmarket hotels. Local NGOs would then be invited, housed at the hotel 
and received a per diem according to the international NGOs’ standard.
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heard local NGO workers praise certain dedicated international NGO workers they 
deal with in such contexts. It is not my intention to present the critical view that 
arises from local NGOs as if it was a voice that chimes in unison.
The point I am trying to convey here is that the existence of the critical view among 
local NGOs over the issue of capacity once again suggests the unequal relationship 
between international and local NGOs, e.g. if one theme is most common in all the 
criticisms I have heard of capacity building programs, it is that international NGOs 
tend to design programs that do not necessarily conform to the needs and interests of 
local groups and their recipients, but are instead most interested in ensuring that lo­
cals understand and follow their own ways of doing things.
Concerns over “Donor-Driven” Assistance
Thus far, this chapter has looked at two issues, accountability and capacity. Both de­
rive from the perspective of international NGOs on issues they face in their relation­
ships with Indonesian NGOs. The discussion has helped to shed additional light on 
the power imbalance between international and local NGOs in Indonesia, because 
both issues are centrally concerned with the ways in which international NGOs try to 
assert their influence in the relationship, and the frustrations they experience while 
doing so. On the other hand, the discussion in this section has also revealed that the 
Indonesian NGO community is critical of these parts of the international NGO ag­
enda.
To reiterate my observations of the preceding section, some local NGO workers are 
very cynical and bitter when talking about their relationships with international 
NGOs. During my fieldwork, I often heard accusations such as “the donor only 
wants to work with those who they can control” or “no matter how good our idea and 
proposal is, if they do not like our organisation, our proposal won’t be accepted.” 100 
Many local NGO staff also insist that, no matter what the rhetoric, programs they run 
that are funded by international NGOs always have to follow the international 
NGOs’ agenda. 101 In addition, many long-time NGO workers suggest that the role of 
most international NGOs is comparable with the role of a “broker,” in which, they 
see international NGOs just as intermediary parties in channelling funds from their
100 Interview with John, 23 January 2007.
101 A high percentage of NGO workers I interviewed stated this, in different degrees.
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1 0 ?donors to local NGOs. " One international NGO worker for example, says that since 
donors see international NGOs’ ability to “spend the money” as one of “the indica­
tors of a successful program,” international NGOs appear to be interested only in 
“how to spend money.”103 Although these critical opinions sound too black and 
white, they nevertheless starkly indicate where local NGO workers see the real 
power as lying in their relationships with international NGOs.
It should also be noted that the degree of bittemess on the part of local NGOs varies. 
On one end of a continuum there are local NGO workers who are totally antipathetic 
toward international NGOs. At the other end, there are local NGO workers who are 
very keen to work with international donors and perhaps who seek to become staff 
members of international NGOs. Those local NGOs whose proposals are rejected by 
international funding agencies say things that are likely to be more negative.
Having this general observation in mind, this chapter will now turn to look more 
closely at the perspectives of Indonesian NGOs in viewing problems in their rela­
tionships with international NGOs. Of course, discussions throughout this thesis 
have already shed light on how local NGOs view their international partners. Now I 
want to focus more conceitedly on these perspectives. The remaining discussion in 
this section therefore will look at two prominent issues mentioned by the majority of 
the local NGO workers 1 interviewed for the study: the issue of “donor-driven” as­
sistance and the topic of local NGOs’ feelings of “helplessness”. As we shall see 
later, the complaints of local NGO workers are related to the topics of accountability 
and capacity discussed in the previous section.
The Significance of the English Language in the NGO Sector
One of the common complaints that local NGO workers express is that they feel bur­
dened by an agenda which is largely “driven by donors.” This criticism emerges in a 
number of different contexts. For instance, many local NGOs feel pressured to con­
form to international NGO accountability and capacity standards. But the problem of 
donor domination is also evident in even seemingly minor things, such as the use of 
jargon and language.
The dominant language used among international NGOs is English. Certainly in their 
internal communications or in their communication with head office, international
102 Approximately 70% of my interviewees stated this, yet they mostly do not want to be identified for 
this statement.
103 Interview with Martin (pseudonym), 3 January 2007.
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NGOs use English. They also, however, often use English when dealing with local 
partners. Moreover, English terms have been inserted in the Indonesian development 
vocabulary. These phenomena have created a type of post-colonial cultural superi­
ority.
The power of the international NGOs dialogue can especially be seen when looking 
at the language used in the Letters of Agreements (LoA) or Memorandums of 
Understanding (MoU) made between many international and local NGOs. As ex­
plained in chapter four, some international NGOs provide bilingual LoAs, in both 
Bahasa Indonesia and English, but most agreements are written in English. A local 
NGO worker recounted her experience of being asked by a staff member from an­
other local NGO several months after both NGOs signed an agreement with the same 
international organisation. This second person asked my informant about the mean­
ing of some aspects of the LoA. Apparently he did not understand what was written 
in the agreement and only signed it because he was attracted by the large amount of 
money offered by it. 104 This illustration suggests some local NGOs sometimes adopt 
agendas that they are not really familiar with -  even to the point where allegedly 
they did not know the terminology that formed the basis for its contract -  in order to 
get money.
One defence for the use of English as the language of the sector is that translation 
involves an interpretation and sometimes the interpretation can be misleading. 105 
Therefore it is better to use English as the medium of communication. Nevertheless, 
this defence does not deny the presence of cultural domination. This disadvantageous 
use of English extends beyond letters of agreement, to include NGO vernacular. 
Most of the terms in the Indonesian development sector derive from English words, 
such as the Indonesian word ‘akuntabilitas’ for ‘accountability’ and ‘pengarusu- 
tamaan jender’ for ‘gender-mainstreaming.’ Even so, the usage of English terms in­
stead of the Indonesian ones, such as ‘capacity building’ instead of ‘penguatan ka- 
pasitas’ or ‘monev’ (which derives from ‘monitoring and evaluation’) is rather 
common in the Indonesian NGO scene.
Although one could say that this might just reflect the nature of the Indonesian lan­
guage in general, which practically absorbs many foreign words and adopts them as
104 Interview with Endang, 26 October 2008. This informant however says that afterwards the interna­
tional program officer told them that they would be “more than happy” to help translate the letter of 
agreement and to answer any concerns raised by local NGOs.
105 Interview with Kamal, 19 October 2006.
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its own, or the growing significance of English language usage as a symbol of wealth 
and education among Indonesian society, the overwhelmingly widespread use of 
English in the development sector also signals that international NGOs have a large 
influence and cultural domination in it. An experienced local NGO director once 
commented: “Indonesian NGOs are latah dengan jargon [‘copy-cat’ or ‘imitate’ jar­
gon] like “good governance” and “gender mainstreaming” while they actually are 
clueless about what it is.”106 She notes that these two terms are two examples of 
popular terms found in local NGOs’ programs. The director said, “It is all because of 
funding requirements.” What she means here is that international donors are the ones 
who introduced these terms as agenda items to the development sector and thus 
added these terms to the vocabulary of local NGOs. On this topic she says: “Yet the
1 07base of a program should be the [needs of the] community instead of funding.” 
Other informants say that there are many local NGOs who, in order to survive, “are 
willing to do anything for money.”108 Linguistics may seem trivial but they are actu­
ally quite significant. In an environment in which soft-power dominates rather than 
force, controlling discourses through language is a powerful indicator of the balance 
of power within the sector.
Whose Agenda Counts? The Domination of Donor Priorities
As the discussion throughout preceding chapters and sections indicated, Indonesian 
NGOs’ dependency on international NGO funding makes local NGOs vulnerable to 
regurgitating the program interests of international NGOs. This section will now turn 
to discuss the topic of what is commonly known in the NGO sector as a “donor- 
driven” agenda. In other words, this section looks at how local NGOs perceive their 
relationship as being driven by their donors’ interests.
The influence of international donors on local NGOs’ has long been a common topic 
of discussion in the NGO sector. We can identify several examples which demon­
strate international NGOs’ domination in different matters, from programming pri­
orities, international campaigning issues, to issues in an internal debate of a local 
NGO. The first example is the issue of program priorities, on the issue of gender. In 
her study of labour NGOs in the 1990s Indonesia, Ford notes:
106
107
108
Interview with Ratih (pseudonym), 19 October 2005. 
Ibid.
Interview with Tony, 25 January 2007.
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NGO funding and the possibility of excessive donor influence were 
questions which concerned every respondent [NGO activists] to a 
greater or lesser degree. ... One strong indication of donor influence was 
the number of labour NGOs that had gender programs, even though 
gender was clearly not an issue of high concern for many of the activists 
involved.109
She states that one of her respondents “observed that their NGO had no plans to es­
tablish a gender program until donors encouraged them to do so.”110 Indeed, this 
confirms my own observations during fieldwork in which I see gender participation 
as one of the keywords in the Indonesian NGO sector. A country representative of an 
international NGO admits that although for his organisation gender justice is “an un­
compromised core value” when establishing partnerships with local NGOs, many of 
his local partners do not share a similar view. According to him, these local NGOs 
thus feel that the international NGO is “forcing their interests” on the local NGOs by 
putting gender justice as one of the requirements for their partnership.* 111 These ob­
servations indicate the important attachment international donors have towards gen­
der. Hadiwinata notes that gender started to become an issue in the international de­
velopment sector in the mid-1970s, with the shift from welfare to equality in the de- 
112velopment process.
During my research, I met local NGO advocacy workers in Jakarta who shared many 
stories which reflected their concerns that the perspectives of local NGOs were being 
eclipsed by the dominant concerns of their international partners. This does not only 
concern the adoption of programs (such as gender programs) at donors’ behest, but 
also the role of local groups in what are supposed to be highly collaborative and 
equal campaigns. One of their concerns was the involvement of local NGOs in glo­
bal environment advocacy campaigns.
This observation thus brings us to my second example, which concerns envi­
ronmental campaigning issues. Local NGO workers are often frustrated that most 
international environmental campaigns are conducted in what they perceive as the 
context of developed nations. Two local NGO workers provided an example: “how 
can we talk about [the issues of] carbon taxes [pajak karbon], the Kyoto Protocol 
and forests in Indonesia like the global campaign trend wants us to while we are still
109
110
111
Ford, 2003: 258. 
Ibid.
Smeru, 2000: 41.
112 Hadiwinata, 2003: 168. He argues that the United Nations’ declaration of the “decade for women’ 
(1975-1985) has played a role in it (ibid).
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dealing with issues of (properly zoning) national parks?”113 It is therefore unsurpris­
ing to learn that one Indonesian member of a large international environmental net­
work suspected that her organisation’s role in the network was simply to “be used” 
to strengthen the legitimacy claims of the international network to represent her area 
of the world.114
The third example, which is in the field of democratic advocacy, demonstrates that 
the struggle over whether the priorities of international or local NGOs’ interests 
should be served not only occurs at the inter-institutional level, i.e. in relations be­
tween local and international NGOs, but it also happens internally within local 
NGOs. As an illustration, a local NGO worker shared with me the case of his organi­
sation, which is a member of a major network involved in democratic advocacy in 
Indonesia. The local NGO worker admitted that the network’s decision to focus 
more on election monitoring activities than voter education programs sparked a 
heated debate inside his organisation. The decision, according to him, was heavily 
influenced by the preference of an international NGO which funded the network. His 
organisation actually believed that voter education was more important than election 
monitoring because it had a philosophical concern with the empowerment of the 
community. The argument waged in this organisation’s internal meetings thus re­
volved around the line of “we know our country best, why can’t we decide what’s 
best for our country?” He admitted that the arguments stayed inside his organisation 
as “this was just part of dinamika organisasi [the organisational dynamics] and an 
on-going process of negotiation.” Yet, he confessed that ultimately his local NGO 
had to choose to back the international NGO’s proposition because the local NGO 
felt “helpless.” 115 It felt that it risked loosing its funding support if it remained focus 
on voter education. As this example implies, there is a common view among local 
NGOs that they are often powerless and unable to control their own direction be­
cause they do not have money of their own. Many local NGO workers related to me 
that dependence on international NGOs comes at the price of accepting their agen­
das, as well as their money.
This feeling of helplessness among local NGOs also arises over the perception that 
their international counterparts do not want to listen to their input. For example, a 
local NGO director shared a story about an exchange that occurred when the Iraq
113 Interview with Gita and Nabila (pseudonyms), 1 February 2007.
114 Interview with Seth, 6 January 2007.
115 Interview with Lesmana, 11 September 2006.
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war happened. His organisation together with other local NGOs which received 
funding from a U.S government-supported international NGO expressed a firm pro­
test over the U.S government’s actions. Yet he said the international NGO did not do 
anything to even pass their concerns on to U.S government representatives (like the 
Department of State) . 116 It should be noted that of course it is rather naive to expect 
that the international NGO would express their local NGOs’ views to the Bush ad­
ministration without the risk of losing funding. However, this example also suggests 
that international NGOs are quite capable of dismissing the concerns of their coun­
terparts.
The obvious way to interpret the emerging theme of local NGOs’ “helplessness” is 
by seeing this phenomenon as a reflection of the lack of leverage that Indonesian 
NGOs have when dealing with international donors. A minority of local NGOs 
themselves critically admit they lack bargaining power, partly as a result of their lack 
of knowledge and related skills. In my analysis perhaps the informants understate 
the situation. The main problem is simply that local NGOs lack the money which 
would give them autonomy.
After complaining about “donor dominance”, about being treated unfairly, and about 
lacking the ability or resources to sustain their organisations; some local NGO work­
ers admitted that things would be much better for them had they “equipped” them­
selves with appropriate skill sets. As an example, several Indonesian advocacy NGO 
workers pointed out it is common to see local NGO representatives turning up un­
prepared in international forums abroad, in large delegations like “rombongan 
sirkus” [‘circus group’] with “most of them not even able to speak English.” Yet ac­
cording to my informants these participants often complain about the results of such 
forums though they implied these participants are incapable of contributing anything
116 Interview with Ali, 25 October 2005. The point to make here is that the international NGO did not 
make any effort to deal with the situation other than gather its local partners for a meeting. It is impor­
tant though, to note, on the topic of protesting over Iraq war, in 2004 Walhi, a national environmental 
network cut its ties with USAID, DFID and Aus AID as a protest over the involvement of these aid 
agencies’ parent governments in the Iraq war (interviews with Walhi staff, September 2005). This 
points to the fact that a prominent organization that has relative autonomy (in this case because Walhi 
has its own mass membership base and affiliations with other international NGOs) has considerably 
higher leverage and is in a better position than other local NGOs to bargain with international agen­
cies and even reject their cooperation.
117 Interviews with Rashid, 23 January 2007; Adam, 19 October 2005; Kamal, 12 October 2006; 
Omar, 27 January 2007; Charles, 16 August 2007; Sri, 16 August 2007; Kuntala, 1 August 2007; 
Chandra, 19 December 2006; Martin, 3 January 2007; Richard, 14 October 2005; Ali, 26 October 
2005; Yusuf, 30 January 2007; Wulandari, 1 November 2005. (All pseudonyms).
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to them. A local advocacy director expressed her frustration of the fact that Indo­
nesian NGOs “do not have a face [she means presence] they are not present in the 
international arena.” She mentioned an experience of attending a “high-level panel” 
at an international meeting in 2000 where a “Filipino NGO director, instead of an 
Indonesian” talked about the financial crisis in Indonesia. This made her feel deeply 
embarrassed.119
Other informants revealed that when it comes to decision making processes or other 
high level meetings of international NGO networks, the fact that many representa­
tives of Indonesian NGOs who are supposed to represent the interest of Indonesian 
NGOs, as has been pointed out in chapter four, are prominent figures, distracted with 
many personal pursuits which makes it difficult for them to fully contribute to man- 
aging their organisations’ interests. A long time Indonesian NGO worker who was 
present in some of these meetings said: “it is not surprising if in the end the interest 
of the international board member prevailed. They (the international board member) 
came well prepared, they were well argued, they followed the entire meeting ses­
sions, from the first day right to the end, unlike the local board members, who some- 
times “disappeared” [“lari-lari”] during the meeting.” These examples thus reveal 
that Indonesian NGOs themselves can be in some measure culpable for some of their 
own dependency.
However, it should be recalled that while local NGOs partly contribute to the domi­
nation, the main cause of this problem is the money issue I discussed in chapter four. 
The reason why local NGOs are unable to attract high quality of staff and send their 
staff for English training, as they lamented here is because they do not have the 
money to do so.
Naturally internal weaknesses are a sensitive issue among local NGOs. Talking 
about one’s own weakness is not a favourite subject in general but in NGO circles, 
doing so can mean revealing the contradiction between NGOs’ claims of coherence 
and effectiveness and the reality of their weakness. As explained in chapter one, the 
mainstream view of global civil society, with NGOs as its main pillar, tends to depict 
it as an idealised domain where values such as democracy and civility are fostered, 
not as an arena inhabited by groups that jealously compete, are frustrated by their
1IX Interviews with Kuntala, 1 August 2007; Wulandari, 1 November 2005; Omar, 27 January 2007.
114 Interview with Kuntala, 1 August 2007.
120 Interview with Wulandari, 1 November 2005.
121 Interview with Sri, 16 August 2007.
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weaknesses and dependence, and exaggerate their own influence to gain access to 
funds.
Thus far the discussion in this section has shed light on the resentment local NGO 
workers feel towards the power imbalance they have with their international coun­
terparts. Yet this problem is not exclusively experienced by local NGO workers. 
International NGO workers also admit this weakness is a problem for them when 
dealing with their own donors. Some international NGO workers, as mentioned in 
the previous section, acknowledge their organisations have a tendency to be donor- 
driven in much the same way that local NGO workers see the situation. Furthermore, 
as has been touched on in the previous section, many long-time international NGO 
workers express pragmatic views on the relationship between international and local 
NGOs, which they perceive as part of the aid industry. In the end, as expressed by a 
veteran international NGO country director:
The NGO can say they want to do something that way, in a particular 
place, or with this group, but it depends on the donor. The donor is al­
ways behind us [the international NGO]. We don’t have our [own] 
funds to give to the NGOs. The fund comes from the donor, so we have 
to direct them [the local NGOs]. If they [the local NGOs] came to us 
with their own proposal and there are no funds, we can’t fund them. 122
When it comes to dealing with their own donors, which are bilateral or multilateral 
funding organisations, some international NGO workers even admit that their posi­
tions are even worse than the local NGOs as no “partnership” exists. The interna­
tional NGO is merely the “subcontractor” of the funding agency. As one interna­
tional NGO worker says: “it’s basically the case of funding organisations giving 
money and dictating the terms.” In international NGOs’ relationships with their do­
nors, “there is no such thing as discussions, technical assistance and capacity build- 
ing the way we do it with our local partners” This is an important point to empha­
sise, as it again indicates that the ultimate power behind the relationship between in­
ternational and local NGO is in the hands of international NGOs’ funding sources. 
The governments of developed countries, through their bilateral and multilateral or­
ganisations which fund most international NGOs, are the ultimate source of the he­
gemony, while international NGOs are the agents of it. International NGOs are also 
vulnerable, particularly if they do not have their own funding base but instead they 
themselves depend on donors to survive.
122 Interview with Thomas, 14 September 2005.
123 Interview with Laksmi (pseudonym), 14 September 2005.
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Everyday Politics of NGOs and the Arts of NGO Resistance124
This chapter has scrutinised several issues which derive from Indonesian and inter­
national NGOs’ complaints about each other and about problems they have in work­
ing together. The discussion has revealed that international and local NGOs working 
in Indonesia have different perceptions of their shared problems, achievements and 
aims. The inter-related issues of accountability and capacity were the most common 
problems identified by international NGO workers. On the other hand, Indonesian 
NGOs stated that, from their vantage point, the problem of donor-driven agendas 
was their main concern.
The discussion about the complaints of international NGOs, concerning Indonesian 
NGOs’ alleged lack of accountability and capacity as well as Indonesian NGOs’ cor­
rupt practices, reveals that there are highly unequal power relations between the two 
sides. The discussion has also shed light on the rather critical view local NGOs have 
towards their international counterparts. Although the two sides work closely to­
gether, and might even be said to be locked in an inter-dependant relationship, what 
was striking through much of my research was the vehemence of local activists’ 
views about the international organisations that fund them and with which they co­
operate.
The discussion about international and local NGOs’ views on their relationship in 
this chapter, as I mentioned in the introduction, draws a striking parallel with 
Kerkvliet’s eloquent discussion about how people in different status groups in a vil­
lage in the Philippines see their relationship with each other. 125 In explaining poverty 
and wealth, Kerkvliet suggested:
The better-off frequently have an understanding that conflicts with the 
poor’s. Broadly speaking, rich people explain poverty in terms of the 
failings of the poor and explain their own wealth in terms of their abili­
ties. Meanwhile, poor people do not blame themselves for their situa­
tion; rather they tend to put at least some of the blame on the better-off 
and say that the wealthy have used the poor to attain their status. People 
in the adequate-status group tend to share the view of the rich regarding 
the poor; but agree with the poor that the rich abuse lower-status people 
to get or maintain their standard of living. These alternative explan­
ations are manifested in how people talk and behave and in obligations 
and responsibilities that poor think the better-off have toward them, and 
hence claims the poor make on wealthy people’s resources. 126
124 As the title has suggests, the discussion in this section draws heavily on the work of Kerkvliet and 
Scott. See Kerkvliet, 2002, 2005; Scott, 1985, 1990.
125 See Kerkvliet, 2002: 164-201.
126 Ibid.: 165.
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The parallel between the discussion in this chapter and the above paragraph starts 
right from the beginning.
The rich-poor dichotomy presented in Kerkvliet’s work strongly resembles the inter­
national-local NGO divide in Indonesia. And just as in Kerkvliet’s village, interna­
tional and Indonesian NGOs have different understandings about the problems they 
experience in their relationship and the sources of those problems. On the issues of 
accountability and capacity, international NGOs see these problems as failings of the 
Indonesian NGOs, similar to the attitude of the rich people of Kerkvliet’s case study. 
They view local NGOs’ weakness as arising from their lack of skills, knowledge, 
and, sometimes, integrity.
On the other hand, just as poor Philippines villagers did not blame themselves for 
their own situation, local NGOs in Indonesia also do not blame themselves for their 
problems. Rather, like the attitude of the poor towards the “exploitation” of the rich 
described in Kerkvliet’s research, Indonesian NGO workers put most of the blame 
on the International NGOs, by saying among other things that international NGOs 
themselves do not have a proper accountability standards, employ the wrong kind of 
standards (derived from corporate auditing standards, with heavy emphasis on re­
ceipts and proper procedures) and sharply criticise international NGOs’ reporting 
and training systems.
More fundamentally, similar to the view of the poor people of San Ricardo that the 
better off in their village have used them to maintain their status, Indonesian NGOs 
also believe that they have been used by international donors, for example as seen in 
the discussion of reporting in this chapter, in order to maintain international NGOs’ 
status before the international NGOs’ own donors. The discussion thus suggests a 
wider implication which leads to the donor factor, namely that they follow the capi­
talist agenda.
The attitude of the adequate-status group of people in San Ricardo is also parallel to 
the attitude of well-established Indonesian NGOs and their prominent leaders, who 
together constitute the Indonesian NGO elite. As we have seen, these NGO elites 
have an initiative to develop an NGOs’ certification program and a ‘Code of Con­
duct for Non-Governmental Organisations’ [Kode Etik LSM\. This evidence tends to 
indicate that the well-established among the local NGOs are adopting the intema-
127 For a more thorough discussion of this subject, see chapter five.
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tional NGOs’ view of local NGOs’ problem of accountability, capacity and corrup­
tion, similar to the attitude of the adequate-status group’s position in Kerkvliet’s 
study.
However, my study finds that the similarity between Kerkvliet’s adequate-status 
group and the Indonesian NGO elite is not complete. This research does not find that 
the well-established Indonesian NGOs share the view of other local NGOs that inter­
national NGOs “abuse” and “use” local NGOs to get and maintain their position of 
dominance. This point is clearer in my discussion in chapter five. The characteristics 
of local NGOs and the relationship between international and local NGOs in chapter 
five, particularly the heavy emphasis on the role of prominent leaders and the exist­
ence of a strong hierarchy and rivalry among the local NGOs indicate this point. 
There exists a strong hierarchy in the NGO sector. Access to funding and closeness 
to donors, with confidence of donors support make them align with donors’ interest. 
One way to interpret this condition is to see the well-established Indonesian NGOs 
as not standing in the middle between international and local NGOS, but being co­
opted and thus have become a part of the international development regime.
The discussion in this chapter also relates to Kerkvliet’s study on class and status 
relations insofar as, in Kerkvliet’s case, “although analyses and expectations in eve­
ryday discourse regarding rich-poor relations are frequently contentious, they rarely 
erupt into full public view.” He suggests two reasons why conflict rarely erupts. 
First, unbalanced distribution of power makes the poor very vulnerable. A second 
reason was that the poor were divided. Had they been coherent, Kerkvliet claims that 
these subordinate people could have become more powerful. He provides several
1 ?Qcases where this unity and increased authority occurred.
In trying to understand why open conflict rarely erupts between international and 
local NGOs in Indonesia, I find Kerkvliet’s argument helpful. The clearly unequal 
power relationship between international and local NGOs is noticeable, as has been 
shown throughout the discussion in this chapter. It was revealed, for instance, when 
discussing the “upward” accountability pattern, as well as the issue of the agenda of 
the relationship which is largely “donor-driven.” Deep factionalism also exists 
among local NGOs. For example, there are those who agree with donors’ bureau­
cratic accountability measures while others disagree. Moreover, some of the infor-
128 Kerkvliet, 2002: 176.
124 Ibid.: 176-198. For more discussion around how ordinary people can make a significant impact, 
see also Kerkvliet, 2005.
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mants point out that some local NGOs fail to even organise themselves in interna­
tional meetings, let alone an organised resistance to international NGOs dominance.
The discussion of the interactions between local and international NGOs in this 
chapter can also be understood by using Scott’s framework of the public transcript 
and the hidden transcript of resistance. As introduced earlier, Scott suggests that the 
public transcript is “a shorthand way of describing the open interaction between 
subordinates and those who dominate” but that it is often misleading because “it is
1 TOfrequently in the interest of both parties to tacitly conspire in misrepresentation.”
The public transcript of the relationship between international and Indonesian NGOs 
mostly contains positive stories about “partnership” and cooperation between the two 
types of organisations. It is also a discourse largely dominated by international de­
velopment agencies. For example, the vocabularies of the NGO sector are filled with 
donors’ phrases such as “strengthening civil society,” “good governance,” “ac­
countability” and “gender empowerment”.
However, in reiterating the discussion in chapter one, Scott mentions three character­
istics behind why the public transcript is not the whole story. First, “the public tran­
script is an indifferent guide to the opinion of subordinates.” Second, “to the degree 
that the dominant suspect that the public transcript may be “only” a performance, 
they will discount its authenticity.” And thirdly, “the questionable meaning of the 
public transcript suggests the key roles played by disguise and surveillance in power 
relations” . 131 These points are helpful in explaining international and Indonesian 
NGOs’ contrasting views of their relationship.
As the discussion throughout this chapter has indicated, the public transcript of 
NGOs in Indonesia largely does not take into account the opinion of local NGOs. 
For example, the discussions of accountability mechanisms and capacity, shows that 
it was the discourse of the donors that prevails. It was donors who largely established 
the terms of individual relationships, such as the system of reporting and training and 
even the dominant language.
The discussion of interactions between international and local NGOs also revealed 
the way Indonesian NGOs go along with the international NGOs and even disguise 
their own interests in the relationship. Thus we saw the discussion about local 
NGOs’ notions of “helplessness” which revealed that although local NGOs disagree
130 Scott, 1990: 2.
131 Ibid.: 3.
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with their international counterparts, they are reluctant to confront the issues where 
they see themselves as differing.
In discussing the public transcript further, Scott enumerated several ways for domi­
nant groups to “realise” and “maintain” the public transcript, namely acts of a con- 
cealment, euphemisms, stigma, and unanimity. " The discussion in this chapter il­
luminates the above points well. For example, the international NGOs ‘conceal' the 
exact amount of funding they have available for local NGOs. On euphemism, the 
example given previously of how international NGOs refer to local NGOs as “part­
ners” in public but “grantees” internally fits perfectly. By calling local NGOs their 
partners, international NGOs play down the inequality that exists between interna­
tional and local NGOs. “Stigma” occurs, for example, when international NGOs 
label local NGOs as lacking in capacity, and they maintain their own superiority in 
this process by defining what counts as “capacity”, namely organisational and man­
agement skills. By demanding accountability compliance and capacity building, in­
ternational NGOs are able to coerce (but not force) local NGOs into a system that is 
of the international NGOs’ making, and where they set the rules.
However, Scott also calls for people to ‘test’ the authenticity of the public transcript. 
He thus suggests that analysts “peek backstage” by looking at what he calls the hid­
den transcript. Scott defines the hidden transcript as the “discourse that takes place 
“offstage,” beyond direct observation by powerholders.” 733 He argues that “the hid­
den transcript is thus derivative in the sense that it consists of those offstage 
speeches, gestures, and practices that confirm, contradict, or inflect what appears in 
the public transcript. 134
Similar to my arguments in previous chapters, in this chapter, the hidden transcript 
thus can be found in the perspectives of local NGOs that are expressed privately as 
shown repeatedly, and I hope, vividly in this chapter. Their highly critical attitudes 
towards their international counterparts and their everyday practices of non compli­
ance contradict the public transcript. On almost every point, ranging from basic mat­
ters of principle and direction, to detailed matters of organisation and administration, 
local NGO members question, criticise and mock the requirements placed on them 
by their international partners. But they do these things almost exclusively in private
132 Ibid.: 45-69.
133 Ibid.: 4.
134 Ibid.: 4-5.
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settings only, so as not to jeopardise the relationships with donors they depend upon 
to fund their activities.
In seeking to understand the perspectives of local and international NGOs on the 
challenges they encounter in working together, this chapter has identified how local 
and international NGOs view their problems differently. This revelation confirms 
the existence of asymmetrical power relationships between international and local 
NGOs, as well as deep seated resentment that local NGOs have towards interna­
tional NGOs. This resentment serves as evidence of local NGOs’ non-compliance 
towards international NGOs. Utilising the framework of everyday politics and 
everyday resistance, I thus conclude that the chapter has demonstrated that because 
local NGOs do not give their consent to the rule of international NGOs, the interna­
tional NGOs are unable to completely dominate local NGOs.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion
This thesis has analysed the relationship between international and local NGOs in 
Indonesia. While scholars of Indonesian NGOs tend to discuss NGOs in the context 
of their relationship with the state and democracy, this study has looked at Indo­
nesian NGOs and their relationships with international NGOs within the context of 
theories on global civil society and hegemony.
The thesis questions the nature of the relationship between local and international 
NGOs in Indonesia through finding answers to two inter-related sets of questions. 
The first set of questions looks at the everyday politics of the relationship between 
international and Indonesian NGOs in their own terms, particularly their perspectives 
on the challenges each side faces. The second set of questions involves a higher level 
of conceptualisation by scrutinising the answers to the first set of questions within 
the context of theories of global civil society and hegemony. It asks: are local NGOs 
dominated by international NGOs as some literature suggests, or is global civil soci­
ety an arena of cooperation as suggested by its proponents? In the attempt to find 
answers to these research questions, the approach I adopted in this study was to 
examine the everyday interactions of these two types of NGOs. This methodology 
included scrutinising the perspectives of local and international NGOs to reveal how 
they perceive their relationships. This approach has led me to adopt a framework that 
draws heavily on the work of James Scott and Benedict Kerkvliet on the politics of 
domination and resistance in everyday life.
This research has found that the dominant pattern in the relationships between local 
and international NGOs is a hegemonic one: through controlling the supply of funds, 
through enforcing conditions of compliance on grant recipients, and through domi­
nating the discourse on development, international NGOs are able to exercise a pro­
found influence on local NGOs in a way that contradicts the egalitarian rhetoric of 
the development sector. As discussed in chapter one, Gramsci’s concept of he­
gemony refers to the process of ideological domination by one class over the other,
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not by coercive actions but through consent. However, this study finds that in con­
trast to the classical theories of hegemony which conclude that hegemonic subjects 
consent to their domination (or are co-opted), local NGOs in Indonesia passively re­
sist the agenda of international NGOs and criticise it vehemently when they are in 
private settings, even if they comply in their public performance.
The discussion in this thesis started with a literature survey of civil society, global 
civil society and hegemony. It first looked at two opposing perspectives of the rela­
tionship between international and local NGOs. On the one hand, there is what we 
can describe as a mainstream liberal view. This school of thinking takes an over­
whelmingly positive perspective on global civil society and tends to neglect the 
power relations between elements within global civil society. In this view, the rela­
tionship between local and international NGOs is essentially mutually beneficial and 
promotes ideal values such as democracy. On the other hand, there is a body of lit­
erature which associates global civil society with hegemonic power relations and the 
dominant influence of powerful political and economic forces rooted in the advanced 
capitalist countries. This strand of thinking perceives the relationship between inter­
national and local NGOs as asymmetrical and as being dominated by the interna­
tional NGOs. These two approaches are mutually exclusive and it has been the inten­
tion of my study to hold these contending propositions up to analysis.
In conducting the research, I found that both two approaches are biased towards sets 
of assumptions which, as I have shown, do not fully describe the full spectrum of 
relationships within global civil society. Although the relationships between ele­
ments of global civil society are much more equal and negotiated than, for example, 
relations between government and society which are premised upon legal compul­
sion and the coercive power of the state, hegemonic patterns and inequality still exist 
in the NGO sector. At the same time, neither are local NGOs merely compliant vic­
tims of the domination of international NGOs. As my research demonstrates, the nu­
ances in the relationships between international and local NGOs are greater than the 
dominant bodies of thinking suggest.
In order to allow me to better approach these nuances, I therefore borrowed from 
writings about the politics of domination and resistance in everyday life, which of­
fered a useful approach to understanding power relations and hegemony in “ordi­
nary” conditions where there is no political crisis or revolutionary upheaval to lay 
bare the underlying structures of inequality. The proponents of this strand of think-
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ing, led by Scott and Kerkvliet, suggest that Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is inad­
equate for explaining ideological domination in relationships between subordinate 
and superordinate people. As I have discussed in chapter one, Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony is premised on consent, which at first impression is an adequate explan­
ation of how international NGOs can create a system in which local NGOs are co­
opted. However, my research has revealed that local NGOs deny consent -  a critical 
component of hegemony. This framework proved useful as it allowed me to explain 
contradictions between everyday practices of local and international NGOs, both 
separately and when interacting with each other.
As this study has demonstrated, although the domination of international NGOs is 
evident and beyond dispute, the resentment of Indonesian NGOs towards that domi­
nation and their capacity to take advantage of opportunities that arise within it for 
their own benefit, displays a remarkable amount of non-compliance and independent 
behaviour on the part of local NGOs. This non-compliance therefore demonstrates 
the absence of local NGOs’ consent (at least full consent) towards the dominance of 
international NGOs, which is essential to hegemony.
In studying the relationships between international and local NGOs in Indonesia, I 
began in chapter two by providing a historical overview. I have identified that the 
relationships between international and local NGOs in Indonesia fall into three dis­
tinct periods: the “Old Order” era, the New Order era and the Reformasi era. Political 
trends in Indonesia have played an important role in defining the main themes in the 
relationships between international and local NGOs. As chapter two has shown, this 
study observes that international NGOs can by and large only implement activities 
and establish relationships with local NGOs within the parameters set by the gov­
ernment and these parameters were generally narrow during authoritarian rule. On 
the other hand, this study also argues that the limiting effect of the government only 
goes so far, and that NGOs demonstrate resilience. As a result, international funding 
enabled Indonesian NGOs to make a contribution to what Aspinall refers to as “a 
new hegemony of democratic ideas -  especially among the primarily middle class 
audience of NGO campaigns -  and thus lay the ground work for democratic trans­
formation” in Indonesia. 1
While links with local NGOs mainly provide international NGOs with access to the 
domestic sphere in Indonesia, the relationship with international NGOs enables
1 Aspinall, 2000: 159.
214
Indonesian NGOs to access a range of benefits like networks, material resources, ex­
changes of ideas, leverage and most importantly, funding. The fact that most Indo­
nesian NGOs rely heavily on external funding to be able to survive has made funding 
one, if not, the most important aspect of the relationship between international and 
local NGOs in Indonesia. At the same time, funding provides the basis for the hege­
monic influence of the international NGOs on the domestic sector.
This study also has examined the influence of funding on the relationship between 
international and local NGOs by scrutinising NGO funding mechanisms in some de­
tail and their implications for hegemony and resistance. As the discussion in chapter 
four suggests, a major pillar of the hegemony of international NGOs occurs through 
the establishment of funding patterns on terms dictated mostly by the international 
NGOs and through the establishment of rigorous and bureaucratic funding proced­
ures to audit spending by local NGOs. By deciding what sorts of programs and 
themes they are willing to fund, international NGOs also, at least in broad terms, set 
the agenda for the local NGO scene. Although this aspect of the relationship is im­
portant, it also falls within the confines of Scott’s concept of the public transcript -  
financial mechanisms are very much the formal and open transcript about the rela­
tionship. On the other hand, the discussion about funding mechanisms demonstrates 
a hidden transcript of the relationship, wherein local NGOs have built acts of non- 
compliance (such as compiling savings from grants) by which they attempt to gain 
some autonomy from the international NGOs.
In addition, this research has identified several patterns of relationship between in­
ternational and Indonesian NGOs that range along a continuum, from a near equal 
relationship, where both international and local NGOs have a say in the decision 
making process, to a relationship where the local NGO acts as a “subcontractor” for 
the international NGO. Even though there are some Indonesian NGOs that consider 
their relationships with international NGOs as equal, a close examination reveals that 
power relations are asymmetrical in most cases. This outcome is the predictable re­
sult of a situation where resources come from one party and are channelled to the 
other. However, this trend patently contradicts NGO rhetoric. Rhetorically, the de­
velopment sector emphasises the promotion of democratic values such as transpar­
ency and equality and most notably, maintaining egalitarian ‘partnerships’ between 
international and local NGOs -  a notion which has been repeated endlessly by actors 
in the development sector over the past several decades. My research reveals this
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rhetoric misrepresents the reality on the ground. International NGOs in most cases 
dominate and dictate their agenda to local NGOs.
As the discussion in chapter six has shown, in the attempt to study the nature of the 
relationship between international and local NGOs in Indonesia, this research has 
adopted the approach of analysing the perceptions of these NGOs’ members on how 
they perceive the relationships in the sector. In other words, my research scrutinises 
the way Indonesian NGO actors actually talk about and perceive their relationships 
with international donors and partners, and how those international actors view their 
Indonesian counterparts. This study reveals that local and international actors have 
very different perceptions of their cooperation, achievements and aims.
For most international NGOs, the main challenges of working with local NGOs are 
their organisational capacity (or in some cases lack of capacity) -  concerning their 
human resources, accountability, inefficiency and problems pertaining to corruption. 
While common complaints from Indonesian NGOs about international NGOs con­
cern the latter’s high expectations and rigidity in forcing local NGOs to abide by 
alien organisational frameworks, their excessive bureaucracy in matters like proposal 
formats and their use of English as the dominant medium of communication. But 
underlying these complaints on technical matters were a range of deeper-seated ob­
jections that concerned how local NGOs feel that donors and international NGOs set 
the agenda for the sector, determine what issues are important and, even, in the view 
of some local NGOs, act like new “colonialists.”
In scrutinising the views of local and international NGOs about their relationships, I 
thus find local NGOs are typically very critical of and resentful of international 
NGOs. A comparison of local NGOs’ critical attitudes with the subordinate people in 
Kerkvliet’s study of domination and resistance in everyday life suggests, like the 
poor who are highly critical towards the rich in rural settings, Indonesian NGOs tend 
to criticise international NGOs’ practices and procedures in their relationships. Local 
NGO members blame their international counterparts for their failure in meeting 
international NGOs’ standards, such as reporting standards.
This study also reveals that local NGOs demonstrated the act of non-compliance 
with international NGO demands, as shown in chapter four, by conducting the delib­
erate and conscious act of lying to international NGOs with regard to financial re­
porting in order to save funds for their own survival. In this regard I use Scott and 
Kerkvliet’s studies and propose that the absence of consent by Indonesian NGOs to-
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wards the domination of the superordinate, which in this study are international 
NGOs, constitutes resistance. Although international NGOs may have created a sys­
tem of hegemonic relations with local NGOs, the existence of resistance by local 
NGOs means that international NGOs’ hegemony is incomplete.
Placing my findings of the relationships between international and local NGOs in the 
context of the debates over theories of global civil society and hegemony, we can 
thus conclude that global civil society is indeed a domain of hegemony but one that 
is more or less understood as such by local NGOs. In their relationships, interna­
tional NGOs dominate Indonesian NGOs through providing the funding which is the 
life blood of local groups, and by setting conditions with which local groups must 
comply if they wish to receive such funds. Dominance is also facilitated by local 
NGOs’ dependence on international funding and by their internal weakness. How­
ever, local NGOs’ non-compliance and their critical views towards international 
NGOs demonstrate that international NGOs do not wholly dominate local NGOs.
Therefore, although a hegemonic system clearly has established itself in the relations 
between international NGOs and local NGOs, the important thing to note is that this 
is not the only reality. Hegemony is not complete. Local NGOs resist through acts of 
non-compliance. There is a hidden transcript that shadows and undermines the public 
one. Local NGOs resist discursively by complaining about the established state of 
relations between themselves and their sponsors: there is an incessant sub-text in 
which local actors criticise international NGOs’ behaviours, demands, priorities and 
outlooks. They also resist by taking actions: for example by engaging in creative fi­
nancial and other practices which seek to claim back some of their autonomy from 
international NGOs. Although these forms of resistance seem underwhelming, they 
are important demonstrations of the fact that the subordinate are clearly able to arti­
culate their own interests and that they deny their consent to the system to which 
they are subjected. Global civil society therefore may be an arena dominated by the 
powerful, but it is also one where the weak are constantly seeking new weapons with 
which to subvert and resist.
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Nicodemus Tuturoong (Binyo), Give2Asia, Formerly with the Asia Foundation. 
Nong Mahmada, JIL.
P. Raja Siregar, Walhi National Office.
Patrick Anderson, Walhi National Office.
Paul McCarthy, the World Bank, Formerly with CARE.
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Ruth Murtiasih S., Qaryah Thayyibah.
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Sandra Hamid, Ph.D, The Asia Foundation.
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Yoyok, Percik.
Informal Interviews/Email communication:
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Karin Johnson, Save The Children UK.
Riri, Lakpesdam NU.
Sabirin, Lakpesdam NU.
Yayuk Sri R., Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
Janne Sivonnen, KEPA.
Anu Lounela, KEPA.
John Lindsay, ILO.
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